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The premiership of Shinzo Abe has had a significant impact on the debate surrounding Japanese foreign policy. In the autumn of 2020, Shinzo Abe resigned, ending what would become the country’s longest consecutive tenure in history, lasting from 2012 to 2020. Following the Second World War, Japan has per its 1947 constitution constrained its foreign policy unlike that of any other country of comparable size. During Shinzo Abe’s tenure, from 2012 to 2020, the academic debate surrounding the potential dismantling of said constraints has moved significantly towards finding a so-called remilitarization a likely outcome. International relations schools of realism and to some extent liberalism find that predictions of remilitarization might strike true while constructivist scholars find that this might be the case despite prior reservations. This is a significant shift in the debate consensus, especially on the part of constructivist analysis which often held that Japan’s unique character, be it norms or institutions, was inherently antimilitaristic. Through previous literature we learn that there was long a divide between authors arguing for a remilitarization being imminent while others take the opposite stance. A shift in Japanese foreign policy has a number of implications for international relations theory, previously a hallmark of constructivist argumentation surrounding identity and a thorn in the side of realist assumptions of power politics. A methodical approach of theory comparison sheds light on the empirical case of Japanese foreign policy by the means of assessing each relevant perspective’s arguments against each respective set of expectations in the event of a remilitarization. Through this study we find that contributions to the debate overwhelmingly argue for an increased possibility of a remilitarization taking place. Likewise, we find that this may come to play into the hands of both realism and liberalism as well as potentially doing so for constructiv