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This article presents a systematic critique of phylogenetic linguistic methodology as applied to social or cultural data. The example that occasions this criticism is a 2006 article by Fortunato, Holden, and Mace on marriage transfers (dowry) in the Indo-European areas. The present article advances certain general proposals for methods of reconstructing the evolution of a custom or an institution. The concepts needed to properly consider the question of marriage transfers include the notion of combination and of differentiated social practice. After having reviewed the data from comparative anthropology and historical sources, the author concludes that the most plausible evolutionary scheme for the Indo-European area is the replacement of an ancient bridewealth, or a combination of bridewealth and dowry, by dowry.

On a busy day in October 1202, Walframo of Gemona, a resident of Venice living in the parish of San Stae, made his will. Although still a young man, he was anxious to put his affairs in order because, as he put it, “preparing to go in the service of the Lord and his Holy Sepulcher, I am mindful of the day of my death.” Walframo was apparently a man of some wealth. In his will he left his wife, Palmera, her dowry of seventy Venetian lire as well as three houses and four household slaves that Walframo had given to her as a morning gift after their nuptials. He also directed her to spend three hundred Venetian lire for the benefit of his soul. Days later, Walframo boarded one of the hundreds of vessels that made up the great fleet of the Fourth Crusade and sailed out of the Venetian lagoon. Whether he ever returned home is unknown.

The birth of a new form of business organization, the partnership system, in Renaissance Florence is examined closely in order to discover the social processes of invention in that extraordinarily inventive place. Stated generally, the processes of invention the authors discover there are transposition, refunctionality, and catalysis across multiple social networks. Specifically, political co‐optation of cambio bankers in the aftermath of the Ciompi revolt induced the transposition of domestic guild methods to the international plane, thereby changing their purpose and their reach. Subsequent social absorption through marriage of these elevated bankers into the victorious political alliance infused partnership with the multiplex logic (and often money) of dowry, thereby reproducing partnership systems as an integral component in post‐Ciompi republicanism. Medieval organizational logics of patrilineage and guild were transformed into Renaissance organizational logics of marriage and clientage. The origins ...

In contrast to most dowry-oriented societies in which payments have declined with modernization, those in India have undergone significant inflation over the last five decades. This paper explains the difference between these two experiences by focusing on the role played by caste. The theoretical model contrasts caste- and non-caste-based societies: in the former, there exists an inherited component to status (caste) that is independent of wealth, and in the latter, wealth is the primary determinant of status. Modernization is assumed to involve two components: increasing average wealth and increasing wealth dispersion within status (or caste) groups. The paper shows that, in caste-based societies, the increases in wealth dispersion that accompany modernization necessarily lead to increases in dowry payments, whereas in non-caste-based societies, increased dispersion has no real effect on dowry payments and increasing average wealth causes the payments to decline.

Becker attributes the existence of marital transfers to inflexibility in the division of joint product within the marriage. If that were the only reason, we would not have observed the coexistence of dowries and bride‐prices. This paper offers an alternative analysis. While Becker's interpretation is retained for bride‐prices, a dowry is now represented as a premortem bequest by altruistic parents for a daughter. It not only increases the wealth of the new conjugal household but also enhances the bargaining power of the bride in the allocation of the output within the household, thereby safeguarding here welfare. Using micro data from Taiwan, we found that a dowry improves the bride's welfare whereas a bride‐price has no effect. These empirical results support the theoretical predictions of the model.

The purpose of this article is to present an economic analysis of a specific prenuptial agreement (or marital financial pledge) called mahrieh. Mahrieh is an important part of the marriage institution in contemporary Iranian society. It is a form of marriage payment that has been practiced in Iran since pre-Islamic times. In Iran's civil law, mahrieh is defined as a financial or equity asset that a man will either offer to his wife at the beginning of their marriage or assume as a debt to her.' If it remains in the form of a debt, the woman has the right to demand it anytime after consummation of marriage. The couple's agreement on mahrieh is formally stated in the marriage contract (aghd nameh) and is legally binding. In case of the husband's death, it is treated as a dower and must be settled before the inheritance is divided among the heirs. On the basis of the above definition, the closest parallels to mahrieh in Western culture are donatio propter nuptias and dower. The former is defined as "a marriage gift or settlement required by law of the husband or his family early during the later Roman empire and that was required by Justinian to be equal to the wife's dowry but permitted to be made after and used for expenses of the marriage."2 Dower, which could be viewed as a more recent interpretation of donatio, is defined as "the life state to which every married woman is entitled on death of her husband."3 While donatio and dower are similar to mahrieh in some aspects, neither one of them is similar enough to justify its use as an English equivalent for mahrieh. Hence in this article I use the word mahrieh rather than an English translation.4 Mahrieh as a social custom is observed in most Islamic societies. Even though its origins are pre-Islamic, mahrieh is addressed in the Quran, the Islamic holy book, which advocates a moderate value for mahrieh and emphasizes that it belongs to the woman herself in order

Foreword Michael H. Jameson 1. Introduction: past and present in rural Greece Susan Buck Sutton 2. The Southern Argolid from Byzantine to Ottoman times Peter W. Topping 3. The Agrarian economy of the Ermionidha around 1700: an ethnohistorical reconstruction Hamish A. Forbes 4. Social and economic formations in Kranidhi (1821-1981): a preliminary investigation Marina Petronoti 5. Liquid landscapes: demographic transitions in the Ermionidha Susan Buck Sutton 6. Changing house and population size on Methana, 1880-1996: anomaly or pattern? Mari H. Clarke 7. The material culture and settlement history of agro-pastoralism in the Koinotis of Dhidhima: an ethnoarchaeological perspective Claudia Chang 8. The present as past: an ethnoarchaeological study of modern sties in the Pikrodhafni valley Priscilla M. Murray and P. Nick Kardulias 9. The changing household economy on Methana, 1880-1996 Mari H. Clarke 10. Dowry and inheritance: their relationship to land fragmentation and risk reduction on Methana Hamish A. Forbes 11. Mutable boundaries: subdivision and consolidation in a Greek village, 1936-1978 Keith W. Adams 12. Neighbors and pastures: reciprocity and access to pasture Harold A. Koster 13. The 'commons' and the market: ecological effects of communal land tenure and market integration on local resources in the Meditteranean Harold A. Koster and Hamish A. Forbes 14. The 'traditional' craftsman as entrepreneur: a potter in Ermioni P. Nick Kardulias 15. 'Nobody weaves here anymore': hand textile production in the Southern Argolid Joan Bouza Koster Appendixes Notes Index.

The Marriage Law of May 1950 has been described as a radical departure from Chinese tradition and a means of effecting the transformation of society. In its own time, it was attacked by some as the 'Woman's Law' and the 'Divorce Law' and seen as an instrument for the destruction of the family. Certainly, the term 'Marriage Law' does not adequately convey the extent -of family and inheritance matters covered in its articles. Provisions of the Law which have attracted most attention and which are relevant to the subject of this paper may be summarised as follows: first, a daughter had the right to inherit a share of the family patrimony equal to that of a son; secondly, husband and wife both had the right to inherit each other's property; thirdly, a woman had the right to take her property into marriage. This encompassed not only first marriages of daughters and sisters but second marriages of widows and divorcees; fourthly, household labour was to be considered as productive labour during determination of property disputes; fifthly, exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage was prohibited, i.e. dowry, bride-price and other 'betrothal gifts' which turned marriage into a commercial transaction were illegal; and finally, interference in marriage, including marriage of widows, was prohibited.' Scholars analysing this period of Chinese history frequently contrast the above provisions of the Marriage Law with conditions in the traditional or imperial era in the following way. Property, in particular land, passed from father to son to grandson. A daughter had few or no inheritance rights. Her property consisted of no more than her dowry - furniture, clothing and jewellery given to her at the time of marriage. The kinship system, with its emphasis on male descent lines and family solidarity was the rationale for this state of affairs: a girl was but a temporary member of her natal family; she left it upon marriage taking with her her labour and reproductive potential.

Rappelant les problemes de traduction et d'interpretation de la position ou du statut des femmes a partir des concepts anthropologiques classiques, l'A. propose une approche emic comparative du role et statut des femmes a travers les pratiques matrimoniales en Afrique subsaharienne et en Inde du nord, et reevalue la these developpee dans son ouvrage en collaboration avec J. Goody " Bridewealth and Dowry " (Cambridge University Press, 1973)| commentaires, critiques et reponse de l'A.

Historians of Renaissance Florence have insisted that the dowry was a keystone of the institution of marriage in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Matrimonial strategy-when, where, how, and with whom a marriage was arranged-it has been argued, was a reflex of social and economic position, yet a reflex conditioned by the amount and nature of the dowry.1 To stress that the dowry was a critical variable of matrimonial strategy is not to imply that Florence in this regard was unique. The dowry was equally important throughout Mediterranean Europe and continues to be so in southern Italy and in Greece.2 There was no such phenomenon as the "Renaissance dowry." In the light of current knowledge, what distinguished Florence from other localities was the entrance of the commune into the matrimonial plans of its citizens, by the creation in the winter of 1425 of a dowry fund commonly known as the

A revised consideration of bride-price and dowry is presented. Marriage payments are viewed as status symbols and mechanisms of fluidity relating to stratification systems. An inability to carry out exchange "in kind" (i.e., bride for bride) appears in cases of marriage between groups of different status and is shaped by cultural principles of stratification. The phenomena of hypergamy, hypogamy, and isogamy, along with different exchange currencies such as money, prestige, services, and patronage, stress the importance of the cultural component. All are solutions to the same structural problem. The solution characteristic of Arab Muslim society stems from the symbolic linking of the ruling hierarchy with the roles of the sexes; the male roles are the preserve of the elite, while the symbol of subjection to authority means effemination. Hypergamy implies that daughters, as representatives of lower strata, move upward. Elite groups are distinguished by the ability to do away with any payments, viz., to pro...

Recently, considerable attention has been given to the question of the extent of Egyptian influence upon the court of David and Solomon. Central questions in this discussion have been (1) Solomon's marriage to Pharaoh's daughter and her territorial dowry (1 Kgs 3:1, 9:16; cf. Malamat 1958; 1963); (2) the use of the Egyptian custom of coregency to solve the problem of a successor for David (1 Kgs 1; cf. Ball 1977); and (3) the possibility that the titles borne by the court officials in Jerusalem were modelled after Egyptian prototypes (1 Kgs 4:1-6; cf. de Vaux 1939; Begrich 1940; Cody 1965; Mettinger 1971; Heaton 1974). We are not concerned here with examining previously discussed proposals. Our attention is directed rather to a possible relationship pointed out by Redford (1972: 141-56) in rejecting the notion of correspondence between the court titles referred to above.

Differences in colonial policy are not reflected in the ecology of Leopoldville and Brazzaville, which are alike and reminiscent of American patterns. A class of Westernized Africans is growing up, with marginal characteristics, some apparently universal and others local, but the urban masses remain tribally conscious and mix little. This does not prevent the growth of intertribal customs, which today include significant extended family relationships, dowry or bride price, and some recognition of the father, even in families with a matrilineal tradition. The African heritage appears to be strong enough to keep these traits alive indefinitely.

The concepts of class, caste, and estate, derived as they are from Eurasian models, are not wholly satisfactory when applied to Africa. Homogamy and in-marriage are not characteristic of the social strata in African states, which tend to encourage marriage between groups of different status, hence these groups tend not to develop in isolation with distinctive modes of life. Out-marriage and bridewealth in Africa stand in contrast to in-marriage and dowry in Eurasia. It is suggested that the more intesive form of agriculture in the latter area encouraged the preservation of familial status by the transmission, inter alia, of property ot females (e.g., the dowry) as well as males, a procedure which strongly encourages the marriage of like with like. In africa, out-marriage strengthens the social ties and cultural similarities within a society. As a consequence, "class conflict" was less significant in the political system, although the situation is now changing in the "modern" sector.