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Congressional delegation choices are widely studied, but scholars have overlooked the states as an inherent part of this process. How do members of Congress with state constituents delegate responsibility to the states? This article incorporates states and legislators with state-based interests in a theory of intergovernmental delegation and argues that members of Congress consider their relationship with their state government vis-à-vis their connection with the national executive branch as they make intergovernmental delegation choices. This theory is tested against current explanations of decentralization: Republican devolution, average partisan congruence between Congress and the states, and policy type using a novel data set spanning over 30 years, 30,000 provisions, and 197 significant laws. Not only is support for the theory of intergovernmental delegation found, but alternative explanations fail to explain the degree of responsibility delegated to the states in national law, demonstrating the importance of national and state political contexts on delegation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Republican thinkers normally have considered prerogative powers natural and necessary to a state's survival. Yet Americans are suspicious of these powers, despite their frequent use. This paper draws a consequential distinction between the legitimacy of prerogative as such and the dangers of its use. Employing the Roman dictatorship to illustrate the stakes, I demonstrate that, while the Romans were cautious with the Dictatorship, they embraced its legitimacy in a broader context of a self-consciously flexible government and a tradition of innovation. This serves as a vivid contrast with contemporary American perceptions of the sources of constitutional stability. I argue that unwarranted suspicion of flexible government plays an important role in misperceptions about the legitimacy of prerogative power in constitutional regimes. The inevitable dangers of prerogative in action do not suffice to demonstrate its illegitimacy as an institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]