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IN THE CLOSING DECADE Of the nineteenth century Great Britain and Japan, diplomatically isolated, faced two powerful combinations, the Dual and the Triple Alliances. Within a period of less than a year, however, two unrelated incidents vividly exposed the danger of such a situation: the intervention of Russia, Germany, and France against Japan at the close of the Sino-Japanese War in April, 1895, and the wave of European hostility which rose against England as a result of the Jameson Raid in January, 1896. At the same time, the disturbed condition of the Far East in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War soon revealed a positive identity of interests in the policies of Great Britain and Japan, since both Powers sought to resist Russia's glacial pressure on the northern frontiers of Manchuria and to preserve their interests, actual or potential, in China and Korea. But it required more than such an obvious community of interests to bring about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In the first place, the two countries were separated by a wide geographic and cultural gulf. In the second place, Japan was still a minor Power and had to be able to offer Great Britain something more than her friendship and good intentions. But more important still, was the fact that the political leaders in both countries at that time not only adhered to the traditional policy of isolation, but also failed to discover where the two countries had enough in common to warrant a political union. Therefore, the opponents of isolation who began to advocate an Anglo-Japanese Alliance after the SinoJapanese War were compelled to engineer a vigorous propaganda campaign on behalf of their cause. In reviewing the history of these years, it would seem that the work of these propagandists contributed more toward the eventual alliance than the actual

this conflict had a direct bearing on Japan because of her military alliance with Great Britain. The principal objects of this treaty (as expressed in the preamble) were the maintenance of peace and the territorial rights of the two parties in Eastern Asia and India, and the defense of their special interests in those regions. According to the first article it was agreed that "whenever in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan" any of the rights or interests referred to were jeopardized, the two Governments would communicate with one another fully and frankly and consider in common what measures should be taken to safeguard their rights and interests. By the second article each ally agreed to render the other armed support "if by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising," either Power should become involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests as mentioned in the preamble. If these rights, or interests, were threatened by a war having its origin in Europe, or elsewhere, it may be assumed, by the wording of this article, that either Great Britain or Japan could invoke the casus foederis of the alliance.

The treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Japan was officially brought to an end at the Washington Conference in 1921 by the conclusion of the Four Power Pacific Treaty. Since that date there have been periodic expressions of regret from British Conservatives over the passing of the agreement. Speaking in the House of Lords on July 20, 1936, Lord Newton condemned the abrogation of the treaty, which, in his opinion, would have enabled Great Britain to have exercised "a moderating influence" upon Japan in recent years.1 Another British Conservative, Lord Rothermere, during a recent visit to Japan, publicly stated that he deplored the death of the alliance, since its continuation would have produced "modifications in Japanese policy which would have been entirely beneficial to British interests in China." 2 Such statements