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China has evolved into an important provider of resources for developing countries, encompassing capital, know-how and expertise. China has also actively worked to strengthen diplomatic ties with developing regions since the early 2000s. Against this backdrop, the governments in many developing countries have moved to incorporate China as a significant factor in their geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations. Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), Turkey has also sought to foster relations with China, particularly since the early 2010s. This pursuit has been further triggered by Ankara's strained relations with the United States and the European Union. Turkish political leadership envisions China as a potentially crucial partner that could enhance the country's autonomy in relation to the West. While this expectation has not entirely materialized so far, there is an ongoing debate regarding the extent to which China can potentially be a transformative actor in Turkey's position within the international order. This paper contributes to this debate by locating Turkey-China engagement within a broader context of China's power and influence in the developing world. The paper suggests that the potential for Turkey's cooperation with China is likely to remain relatively limited for the foreseeable future. This is not only due to Turkey's deeply rooted ties with the West, but also because of the nature of China's global power, which is more partial and not as deep as commonly assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s economic resurgence augurs the possibility of a recalibration in the global balance of power. Many contend that this process is already underway in East Asia – specifically in relation to the South China Sea. In other parts of the world, China’s growing footprint is discernible through infrastructure projects, under Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative. Does China leverage its economic power to realise its interests by forcing smaller nations to accept conditions and agreements which are not in the latter’s interests? This paper examines whether evidence to this effect is visible through a case study of Sri Lanka. The island’s geographic location – astride the Indian Ocean Sea Lanes of Communication – continues to draw the attention of regional and extra-regional powers. Sri Lanka’s constraints in size and poor pace of economic development also grants leeway for India (the regional hegemon) and China to leverage bilateral ties in their interest. Is there evidence to suggest that China has utilised port infrastructure to realise its national interests at the expense of Sri Lanka? Or, has Sri Lanka managed to thread a fine line between the two Asian powers: the neighbouring regional hegemon – India; and the resurgent great power – China? Does the truth lie somewhere in between? This article delves into these questions by examining the approaches and stances which Sri Lanka has adopted towards both nations, particularly during President Gotabaya Rajapakse’s government, from 2019 leading up to the end of 2021. By doing so, it aims to shed light on how Sri Lanka handled bilateral ties with both Asian powers as well as the degree of Sino-Indian competition visible within the island’s port infrastructure landscape. It concludes that the decisions reached with regard to port infrastructure projects represent a mixed picture. A key finding is the ability of domestic interest groups to shape Sri Lanka’s foreign policy during this period, which has significantly dented the island’s ties with other regional allies such as Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the beginning of the 21st century, an unprecedented theoretical change in perspective took place, and non-Western theoretical approaches began to be developed as an alternative to traditional theories of International Relations. In this way, some specialists began to debate about the emergence and consolidation of a "Chinese School of International Relations", based mostly on the Asian culture. The aim of this paper is to present the main streams of international studies in China, among which the reverse, obverse and interactive approaches stand out. Likewise, it is particularly intended to understand the conception of international cooperation of each of these approaches. In addition, it is intended to highlight the evolution of international studies in China and departs from the assumption that the production and changes of the axis of international studies follow the rise and geographical position of the great powers. In the Chinese case, they have been growing in parallel with its international prominence and the attainment of great power status. The theoretical framework proposed for this research takes as a starting point the so-called non-western theories, that is, all those theories that are not part of the mainstream of the Western International Relations Theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]