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Professor Federico Fabbrini, Full Professor of European Law in the School of Law and Government, DCU and founding Director of the D.C.U Brexit Institute discusses the legal origins of the European Union and the challenges and opportunities for the EU institutional structures in the 21st century with JCER editor, Dr Kenneth McDonagh. Thank you to Mark Glynn at Dublin City University (DCU) for the video production. The video reflects the views only of the speaker(s). JCER, UACES and DCU cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

The role of national parliaments in EU decision-making has generally been considered marginal since national parliaments participate indirectly through national executives. The Lisbon Treaty, however, triggered important developments in this regard. Direct involvement of national parliaments through the Early Warning System and Political Dialogue has prompted internal reforms. This article argues that, because of the new procedures provided for by the Lisbon Treaty and the direct relationship between the Commission and national parliaments, certain legislatures such as the French and Italian have become stronger in their involvement in EU affairs. However, seven years of practice post-Lisbon show that the innovations brought about by the new Treaty have fallen short of fully satisfying national parliaments’ thirst for active engagement. We also observe that changes at the national level have only been implemented progressively and have not yet been exploited to their full potential.

This article examines, from a legal perspective, the Lisbon Treaty changes over the European Union’s (EU) common agricultural policy (CAP) and their impact on developing countries. The study focuses particularly on the Caribbean region of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP group), which signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU in 2008, and will use bananas as the exemplar commodity. The Lisbon Treaty which entered into force in December 2009 has brought important institutional changes within the EU and altered the distribution of responsibility over European policies. The European Parliament (EP) now exercises legislative functions ‘jointly’ with the Council over fields falling outside EU trade policy but which often have trade-related impacts. This is the case of the CAP which is now a shared rather than an exclusive competence policy area. The EU is an important market for developing countries’ export of agricultural food products. However, there is a risk that the EP positions, pressured by consumer opinion, could influence the negotiating process leading to the reinforcement of the EU’s protectionist agriculture policy. This subject is of high importance given the end of the so-called ‘banana war’ in 2009 against the EU banana import regime, allowing better access for Latin American countries’ bananas to the EU market. This article argues that ACP countries will not be affected by the EU internal changes post-Lisbon. They have managed to legally maintain special trade arrangements with the EU under the Economic Partnership Agreements, which provide them with favourable trading conditions, particularly for agricultural food products.

This article analyses the post-Lisbon legal framework for the adoption of restrictive measures against individuals or non-State entities – so-called ‘targeted sanctions’ or ‘smart sanctions’. It is argued that the procedural differences to adopt targeted sanctions in the framework of the EU’s counter-terrorism activities (Art. 75 TFEU) and with regard to the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Art. 215 TFEU) increase the potential for inter-institutional litigation. This is particularly the case because the boundaries between the EU’s competences in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are blurred. This is illustrated with the discussions surrounding the adoption of amendments to Regulation 881/2002 imposing restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The European Parliament contests the adoption of those amendments on the basis of Art. 215 (2) TFEU and argues that only Art. 75 TFEU is the appropriate legal basis given the counter-terrorism objective of the measure at stake. This article discusses the different options to find an appropriate solution for this inter-institutional competence battle and argues that the Court’s new possibilities to rule on the duty of consistency may help find a way out.

This paper investigates the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the harmonization of the actions concerning the foreign relations of the European Union (EU), with a focus on trade and human rights policies. It argues that an alliance of NGOs and economic interest groups promoting a human rights approach to external trade has found in the strengthened European Parliament an institutional channel for their demands. However, the creation of the European external action service as the EU’s diplomatic body and the separation of the negotiation tables concerning trade and human right have ultimately reduced the influence on European trade policy of both the European Parliament and stakeholders interested in human rights promotion. On the basis of the case study of the negotiations with Vietnam, this paper contributes to the literature on the EU as promoter of human rights through bilateral trade by discussing the internal constraints on its normative power.

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A commentary on the 2009 Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty

This article explores the problems with the Lisbon Treaty (LT) ratification process in the Czech Republic and its repercussions for the EU. We will proceed in four steps: First, we will describe the recent developments in the Czech domestic scene regarding the elites´ attitudes towards the European Union. Second, we will present a more detailed analysis of the Czech debates about the LT. In the third step, we will sketch some probable scenarios of future development. Finally, we will briefly point to some limitations of the existing theories of European integration which are related to their inability to reflect the profound changes in the integration process caused by the Eastern enlargement.

On 10 October 2009 the President Lech Kaczynski signed the Ratification Act of the Lisbon Treaty, thereby concluding a long and painful ratification process in Poland. The President waited for the result of the second Irish referendum, despite the fact that the Polish Parliament ratified the Treaty already in April 2008. This comment discusses ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in Poland and it has the following structure. Firstly, it briefly discusses the literature on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which multiplied after the Irish veto in June 2009. Secondly, the constitutional procedure concerning ratification of international agreements by Poland is briefly introduced. Then, the article outlines the conflict among the main (parliamentary and non-parliamentary) political forces up until the beginning of April 2008 and the ratification of the Treaty by the Polish Parliament. This period marks the first phase of the ratification procedure. The Irish veto in June 2008 initiated a second phase, because then the President decided to put the Polish ratification process on hold. Finally, the comment identifies some of the major aspects of the dispute over the ratification, such as the role of the controversial Radio Maryja.

In late June the German Constitutional Court ruled on the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty as well as the German accompanying laws (that ratified the Treaty) with the German Basic Law. Although the Court ruled that the Treaty was compatible with the Basic Law, it requested changes to the accompanying laws. The Court specifically refers to shortcomings in the areas of parliamentary accountability and democracy. This Commentary critically analysis the judgement and argues that the Court's ruling could start a new phase of national judicial activism that might threaten the legal and political integration process.

The Lisbon Treaty, as it was first negotiated, is dead and the institutional stalemate has the potential to kill the entire integration process. European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) needs effective institutions, shared rules and clear priorities: to this end both Professor Romano Prodi and Professor Jolyon Howorth think that some reforms are necessary, among others: the introduction of an ‘exit clause’ and the rationalization of the decision making process, with the abolition of the unanimity rule. As regards ESDP and the future of Europe as a reliable and effective player in world politics, Prodi and Howorth believe that the EU is heading in the right direction: more capabilities, more resources, clearer objectives and stronger alliances; this is the recipe that they suggest to increase the quality of the action of the European Union at the international level. Notwithstanding, Prodi and Howorth are well aware that institutions matter but political will matters more. In the field of security and defence the EU lacks political consensus, and this is going to limit the ambitions and aspirations of some important European states.