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We investigate the determinants of application for Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) benefits in approximately 45 jurisdictions between 1981 and 1999. We reproduce findings of previous studies of the determinants of DI application then test the additional influence of changes to workers' compensation program benefits and rules on DI application rates. Our findings indicate that the programs are interrelated: When workers' compensation benefits declined and eligibility rules tightened in the 1990s, the DI application rate increased.

We use data from Social Security administrative records to examine the lifetime patterns of initial entitlement to retired-worker and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits across cohorts born in different years. Breaking out age-at-entitlement patterns for different birth-year cohorts reveals close adherence in entitlement ages to changes in program rules, such as increasing the full retirement age. The proportion of a cohort that becomes newly entitled to DI benefits rises noticeably during recessions and at ages 50 and 55, and cumulative entitlement rate patterns show that more recent cohorts rely increasingly on DI benefits in their late 30s and 40s.

In the United States, poverty is generally assessed on the basis of income, as reported in the Current Population Survey's (CPS's) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), using an official poverty standard established in the 1960s. The prevalence of receipt of means-tested transfers is underreported in the CPS, with uncertain consequences for the measurement of poverty rates by both the official standard and by using alternative "relative" measures linked to the contemporaneous income distribution. The article reports results estimating the prevalence of poverty in 2002. We complete this effort by using a version of the 2003 CPS/ASEC for which a substantial majority (76 percent) of respondents have individual records matching administrative data from the Social Security Administration on earnings and receipt of income from the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. Adjustment of the CPS income data with administrative data substantially improves coverage of SSI receipt. The consequence for general poverty is sensitive to the merge procedures employed, but under both sets of merge procedures considered, the estimated poverty rate among all elderly persons and among elderly SSI recipients is substantially less than rates estimated using the unadjusted CPS. The effect of the administrative adjustment is less significant for perception of relative poverty than for absolute poverty. We emphasize the effect of these adjustments on perception of poverty among the elderly in general and elderly SSI recipients in particular.

This article offers a brief summary of the workers' compensation and Social Security Disability Insurance programs. Information highlighted includes the differences between the two programs' types and terms of coverage. It compares the differing patterns in workers' compensation and Social Security disability benefits as a percentage of wages over the past few decades and considers the potential causes for such trends. The article also explains the offset provision included in the 1965 Social Security Amendments, the intention behind the offset, and how and when offsets are applied.

The normal age of retirement is scheduled to increase to 67 by 2022, and several proposals to increase it to age 70 are being considered. The Medicare eligibility age is not scheduled to increase under current law, but proposals to raise it in step with the retirement age were recently considered by the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare (1999). This article examines how raising both the normal retirement age and the Medicare eligibility age would affect Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) eligibility, Medicare eligibility, and Medicare expenditures under two hypothetical policy scenarios. The first (the 2022 age-67 scenario) assumes that the eligibility age is raised to 67 by 2022, in step with the scheduled increase in the normal retirement age. The second (the 2040 age-70 scenario) assumes that the eligibility ages are increased to 70 by 2040. The findings are based on a summary of two reports. The earlier one (Wittenburg and others 1999) describes a series of microsimulation models developed from data in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). The base simulations in that report assume that the normal retirement and Medicare eligibility ages had already been increased in 1993, when the SIPP and MCBS respondents were observed. In the later report (Wittenburg, Stapleton, and Scrivner 2000), adjustment factors were developed to reflect future increases in Medicare expenditures, population growth, and increased participation in DI. The base simulations were then adjusted by those factors, yielding a final set of annual projections under the two policy scenarios. The hypothetical policy scenarios illustrate that the major cost reductions from jointly raising the Medicare eligibility age and the normal age of retirement would not be realized until after 2020, when the increases are fully phased in and a large portion of baby boomers have reached age 65. Although the projections provide important cost estimates, the equity and efficiency of those policies must be studied before the desirability of any specific proposal can be evaluated fully.

People with medical conditions that limit their ability to work tend to receive short-term disability benefits initially and may then move to long-term and eventually to permanent disability benefits. The progression of older workers (those aged 55 to 64) along that continuum of benefits is documented here with data from a large disability insurance company. The data show that older workers who receive short-term medical disability benefits are three times as likely as younger workers to progress to receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, although a slight reversal of that trend occurs as workers pass age 62. Musculoskeletal conditions are the most frequent basis of short-term disability claims among older workers, with circulatory conditions running a close second. Furthermore, although all medical conditions are more likely to lead to SSDI benefits among older workers, circulatory conditions do so most frequently. This article discusses industry standards for the management of disability claims at each level of severity. It also addresses common and emerging disability management practices that may reduce the likelihood of impaired workers developing long-term or permanent financial dependence on disability benefits programs.

Beginning in January 1974, the three previously existing State adult assistance programs were amalgamated into the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, to be administered by the Social Security Administration. This change was made to provide a nationwide floor of income for needs-based assistance, and to make such payments more efficiently by working through SSA's existing network of field offices. This article traces the 25-year patterns of growth and changes in the number of persons applying for assistance, the number and proportion of those applicants who were awarded payments, and the overall number of persons who received SSI. Three major age groups are considered separately: those aged 65 or older, disabled adults aged 18-64, and children age 18 and younger. The last group was newly eligible under SSI for payments based on their own blindness or disability and not, as was the case previously, because they were a member of a needy family.

This note has reviewed the extent of protection of workers against income loss during the first 6 months of illness or injury. National income loss in 1994 was $81.1 billion, of which $49.4 billion (60.9 percent) was replaced by income-protection programs, including sick leave, group insurance, temporary disability insurance under statutory State provisions, individual insurance, workers' compensation, and (during the 6th month) the Social Security Disability Insurance program. In 1994, wage and salary workers in the private sector lost $55.2 billion because of nonoccupational illnesses or injuries, of which $19.0 billion (34.5 percent) was replaced. Wage replacement rates are higher for full-time professional and technical employees with longevity in large or medium firms, and especially public employees. The lowest level of coverage is given to part-time employees with limited seniority who work in production and related areas in small, private firms. Approximately 70 percent of wage and salary workers in the private sector have some protection through their employment against earnings losses caused by short-term illness. Forty-four percent of these workers have short-term disability insurance,and only half have sick-leave coverage.