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3 results on '"Serra-Garcia M"'

1. Hiding an Inconvenient Truth: Lies and Vagueness

Author

Serra Garcia, M., van Damme, E.E.C., Potters, J.J.M., Research Group: Economics, and Department of Economics

Subjects
Communication, Public Goods, Lying, Efficiency
Abstract

When truth conflicts with e¢ ciency, can verbal communication destroy efficiency? Or are lies or vagueness used to hide inconvenient truths? We consider a sequential 2-player public good game in which the leader has private information about the value of the public good. This value can be low, high, or intermediate, with the latter case giving rise to a prisoners' dilemma. Without verbal communication, efficiency is achieved, with contributions for high or intermediate values. When verbal com- munication is added, the leader has an incentive to hide the precise truth when the value is intermediate. We show experimentally that, when communication about the value must be precise, the leader frequently lies, preserving efficiency by exaggerating. When communication can be vague, the leader turns to vague messages when the value is intermediate, but not when it is high. Thus, she implicitly reveals all values. Inter- estingly, efficiency is still preserved, since the follower ignores messages altogether and does not seem to realize that vague messages hide inconvenient truths.

Published
2010

2. Lying About What you Know or About What you do? (replaces TILEC DP 2010-016)

Author

Serra Garcia, M., van Damme, E.E.C., Potters, J.J.M., Serra Garcia, M., van Damme, E.E.C., and Potters, J.J.M.

Abstract

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one- shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-riding depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less, and thereby lies less frequently, when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-riding and less lying.

Published
2011

3. Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by TILEC DP 2011-055)

Author

Serra Garcia, M., van Damme, E.E.C., Potters, J.J.M., Serra Garcia, M., van Damme, E.E.C., and Potters, J.J.M.

Abstract

We compare signaling by words and actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing, can signal by contributing first (actions) or by sending a costless message (words). Words can be about the return or about her contribution decision. Theoretically, actions lead to fully efficient contributions. Words can be as influential as actions, and thus elicit the uninformed player's contribution, but allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, we fnd that words can be as influential as actions. Free-riding, however, does depend on the language: the informed player free-rides less when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the returns.

Published
2010

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