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How many and which firms issue equity and bonds in domestic and international markets, how do these firms grow relative to non-issuing firms, and how does firm performance vary along the firm size distribution? To evaluate these questions, a new data set is constructed by matching data on firm-level capital raising activity with balance sheet data for 45,527 listed firms in 51 countries. Three main patterns emerge from the analysis. (1) Only a few large firms issue equity or bonds, and among them a small subset has raised a large proportion of the funds raised during the 1990s and 2000s. (2) Issuers grow faster than non-issuers in assets, sales, and employment, that is, firms do not simply use securities markets to adjust their financial accounts. (3) The firm size distribution of issuers evolves differently from that of non-issuers, tightening among issuers and widening among non-issuers.

This paper reassesses what works in banking regulation based on the new World Bank survey (Survey IV) of bank regulation and supervision around world. The paper briefly presents new and official survey information on bank regulations in more than 125 countries, makes comparisons with earlier surveys since 1999, and assesses the relationship between changes in bank regulations and banking system performance. The data suggest that many countries made capital regulations more stringent and granted greater discretionary power to official supervisory agencies over the past 12 years, but most countries have not enhanced the ability and incentives of private investors to monitor banks rigorously -- and several have weakened such private monitoring incentives. Although it is difficult to draw causal inferences from these data, and while there are material cross-country differences in the evolution of regulatory reforms, existing evidence suggests that many countries are making counterproductive changes to their bank regulations by not enhancing the ability and incentives of private investors to scrutinize banks.

This paper provides the first comprehensive documentation of how firms use domestic and international corporate bond markets. Debt issues in domestic and international markets have different characteristics, not explained by differences across firms or countries. International issues tend to be larger, of shorter maturity, denominated in foreign currency, include more fixed rate contracts, and entail lower yields. These patterns remain when analyzing issues by firms from countries with more developed domestic markets and higher financial integration, and even when comparing issues conducted by the same firm in different markets. These findings are consistent with the views that (1) frictions limit the ability of investors and firms to enter into certain contracts in certain markets, (2) domestic and international markets provide distinct financial services and firms use them as complements, and (3) firms with access to domestic and international markets enjoy advantages relative to those that rely solely on domestic markets.

This paper introduces the updated and expanded version of the Financial Development and Structure Database and presents recent trends in structure and development of financial institutions and markets across countries. The authors add indicators on banking structure and financial globalization. They find a deepening of both financial markets and institutions, a trend concentrated in high-income countries and more pronounced for markets than for banks. Similarly, the recent increase in cross-border lending and debt issues has been concentrated in high-income countries, while low and lower-middle income countries have experienced an increase in remittance flows. Low net interest margins, rising profitability and declining stability in high-income countries’ banking sectors characterize the recent financial sector boom in high income countries leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007.

This paper documents several new patterns associated with firms issuing securities in foreign markets that motivate the need for and help guide future research. Besides noting that these international capital raisings grew almost four-fold from 1991 to 2005, accounting for 35 percent of all capital raised through security issuances, the paper has three main findings. First, a large and growing fraction of capital raisings, especially debt issuances, occurs in international markets, but a very small number of firms accounts for the bulk of international capital raisings, highlighting the distributional implications of financial globalization. Second, changes in firm performance following equity and debt issuances in international markets are qualitatively similar to those following domestic issuances, suggesting that capital raisings abroad are not intrinsically different from domestic ones. Third, after firms start accessing international markets, they significantly increase the amount raised in domestic markets, suggesting that international and domestic markets are complements.

An influential body of theoretical research and an emerging line of empirical work suggest that the operation of the formal financial system affects the degree to which economic opportunities are defined by talent and initiative rather than by parental wealth and social connections. This paper discusses the theory of how financial markets influence economic opportunity and reviews recent empirical work on the relation between formal financial systems and poverty, income inequality, and economic opportunity. The authors consider recent efforts to measure the ability of households and small enterprises to access financial services, the impact of this access, and the mechanisms through which finance affects poverty and inequality. The authors argue that considerably more research is needed to identify which formal financial sector policies enhance the operation of the financial system in ways that expand the economic horizons of the economically disenfranchised.

In this paper, authors first review the literature on the relation between finance and growth. Theory provides ambiguous predictions concerning the question of whether financial development exerts a positive, causative impact on long-run economic growth. The second part of this paper reviews the literature on the historical and policy determinants of financial development. Governments play a central role in shaping the operation of financial systems and the degree to which large segments of the financial system have access to financial services. The authors discuss the relationship between financial sector policies and economic development. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Sections one and two review theory and evidence on the relation between finance and growth. Section three turns to an examination of financial sector policies, and section four concludes.

Policymakers and economists disagree about the impact of bank regulations on the distribution of income. Exploiting cross-state and cross-time variation, the authors test whether liberalizing restrictions on intra-state branching in the United States intensified, ameliorated, or had no effect on income distribution. The analysis finds that branch deregulation lowered income inequality by affecting labor market conditions, not by boosting the business income of the poor, nor by enhancing educational attainment. Reductions in the earnings gap between men and women and between skilled and unskilled workers account for the bulk of the explained drop in income inequality.

The author examines the corporate governance of banks. When banks efficiently mobilize and allocate funds, this lowers the cost of capital to firms, boosts capital formation, and stimulates productivity growth. So, weak governance of banks reverberates throughout the economy with negative ramifications for economic development. After reviewing the major governance concepts for corporations in general, the author discusses two special attributes of banks that make them special in practice: greater opaqueness than other industries and greater government regulation. These attributes weaken many traditional governance mechanisms. Next, he reviews emerging evidence on which government policies enhance the governance of banks and draws tentative policy lessons. In sum, existing work suggests that it is important to strengthen the ability and incentives of private investors to exert governance over banks rather than to rely excessively on government regulators. These conclusions, however, are particularly tentative because more research is needed on how legal, regulatory, and supervisory policies influence the governance of banks.

While substantial research finds that financial development boosts overall economic growth, the authors study whether financial development is pro-poor: Does financial development disproportionately raise the income of the poor? Using a broad cross-country sample, the authors find that the answer is yes: Financial intermediary development reduces income inequality by disproportionately boosting the income of the poor and therefore reduces poverty. This result is robust to controlling for simultaneity bias and reverse causation.

The authors explore the relationship between the relative size of the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector, economic growth, and poverty using a new database on the share of SME labor in the total manufacturing labor force. Using a sample of 76 countries, they find a strong association between the importance of SMEs and GDP per capita growth. This relationship, however, is not robust to controlling for simultaneity bias. So, while a large SME sector is characteristic of successful economies, the data fail to support the hypothesis that SMEs exert a causal impact on growth. Furthermore, the authors find no evidence that SMEs reduce poverty. Finally, they find qualified evidence that the overall business environment facing both large and small firms-as measured by the ease of firm entry and exit, sound property rights, and contract enforcement-influences economic growth.

What is the impact of firms that cross-list, issue depositary receipts, or raise capital in international stock markets on the liquidity of remaining firms in domestic markets? Using a panel of over 3,200 firms from 55 countries during 1989-2000, Levine and Schmukler find that internationalization reduces the liquidity of domestic firms through two channels. First, the trading of international firms migrates from domestic to international markets and the reduction in domestic liquidity of international firms has negative spillover effects on domestic firm liquidity. Second, there is trade diversion within domestic markets as liquidity shifts out of domestic firms and into international firms.

The authors study the impact of bank concentration, regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 79 countries over the period 1980-97, they find that crises are less likely (1) in more concentrated banking systems, (2) in countries with fewer regulatory restrictions on bank competition and activities, and (3) in economies with better institutions, that is, institutions that encourage competition and support private property rights.

The authors examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. They find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption in raising external finance, which is consistent with political and regulatory capture theories. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent of the government and banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Finally, the authors find that bank supervisory agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing obstacles faced by firms.

The authors assess three established theories about the historical determinants of financial development. They also propose an augmented version of one of these theories. The law and finance view, stresses that different legal traditions emphasize, to differing degrees, the rights of individual investors relative to the state, which has important ramifications for financial development. The dynamic law and finance vie, augments the law and finance view, stressing that legal traditions also differ in their ability to adapt to changing conditions. The politics and finance view, rejects the central role of legal tradition, stressing instead that political factors shape financial development. The endowment view, argues that the mortality rates of European settlers, as they colonized various parts of the globe, influenced the institutions they initially created, which has had enduring effects on institutions today. When initial conditions produced an unfavorable environment for European settlers, colonialists tended to create institutions designed to extract resources expeditiously, not to foster long-run prosperity. The authors' empirical results are most consistent with theories that stress the role of legal tradition. The results provide qualified support for the endowment view. The data are least consistent with theories that focus on specific characteristics of the political structure, although politics can obviously affect the financial sector. In other words, legal origin - whether a country has a British, French, German, or Scandinavian legal heritage - helps explain the development of the country's financial institutions today, even after other factors are controlled for. Countries with a French legal tradition, tend to have weaker financial institutions, while those with common law, and German civil laws, tend to have stronger financial institutions.

The authors explore the relationship between financial structure - the degree to which a financial system is market- or bank-based - and economic development. They use three methodologies: 1) The cross-country approach uses cross-country data to assess whether economies grow faster with market- or bank-based systems. 2) The industry approach uses a country-industry panel to assess whether industries that depend heavily on external financing grow faster in market- or ban-based financial systems, and whether financial structure influences the rate at which new firms are created. 3) The firm-level approach uses firm-level data across a broad selection of countries to test whether firms are more likely to grow beyond the rate predicted by internal resources, and short-term borrowings in market- or bank-based financial systems. The cross-country regressions, the industry panel estimations, and the firm-level analyses, provide remarkably consistent conclusions: a) Financial structure is not an analytically useful way to distinguish financial systems. b) Financial structure does not help us understand economic growth, industrial performance, or firm expansion. c) The results are inconsistent with both market-based and bank-based views. In other words, economies do not grow faster, industries dependent on external financing do not expand faster, new firms are not created more easily, firms' access to external finance is not greater, and, firms do not grow faster in either market- or bank-based financial systems. The authors find overwhelming evidence that the overall level of financial development, and the legal environment in which financial intermediaries, and markets operate, critically influence economic development.

Costly bank failures in the past two decades have focused attention on the need to find ways to improve the performance of different countries' financial systems. Belief is overwhelming that financial systems can be improved but there is little empirical evidence to support any specific advice about regulatory and supervisory reform. With scant cross-country comparisons of financial regulatory and supervisory systems, economists cannot decide how to correct incentives and moral hazard problems in developing economies--whether, for example, to require higher (and more narrowly defined) capital-to-asset ratios, to mandate stricter definition and disclosure of non-performing loans, to require that subordinated debt be issued, or to install world-class supervision. Proposed reforms usually involve changes in financial regulations and supervisory standards, but many pressing questions about reform remain unanswered. Making use of a new database, the authors come up with brief answers to three key questions: Do countries with relatively weak governments and bureaucratic systems impose harsher regulatory restrictions on bank activities? Yes. Do countries with more restrictive regulatory regimes have poorly functioning banking systems. No--or at least the evidence is mixed. Do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have less probability of suffering a banking crisis? No. In fact, the reverse is true. In countries where banks' securities activities are restricted, the likelihood of a banking crisis is greater, other things being equal.

The authors investigate the impact of stock markets and banks on economic growth using a panel data set for 1976-98 and applying recent generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques developed for dynamic panels. The authors illustrate econometrically the differences that emerge from different panel procedures. On balance, stock markets and banks positively influence economic growth--and these findings are not a result of biases induced by simulaneity, omitted variables, or inobserved country-specific effects.

Africa's economic history since 1960 fits the classical definition of tragedy: potential unfulfilled with disastrous consequences. The authors use one mehthodology - cross-country regressions - to account for sub-Saharan Africa's growth performance over the past 30 years and to suggest policies to promote growth over the next 30 years. They statistically quantify the relationship between long-run growth and a wider array of factors than any previous study. They consider such standard variables as initial income to capture convergence effects, schooling, political stability and indicators of monetary, fiscal, trade, exchange rate, and financial sector policies. They also consider such new measures as infrastructure development, cultural diversity, and economic spillovers from neighbors' growth. Their analysis: 1) improves substantially on past attempts to account for the growth experience of sub-Saharan African countries; 2) shows that low school attainment, political instability, poorly developed financial systems, large black-market exchange-rate premia, large government deficits, and inadequate infrastructure are associated with slow growth; 3) finds that Africa's ethnic diversity tends to slow growth and reduce the likelihood of adopting good policies; 4) identifies spillovers of growth performance between neighboring countries. The spillover effects of growth have implications for policy strategy. Improving policies alone boosts growth substantially, but if neighboring countries act together, the effects on growth are much greater. Specifically, the results suggest that the effects of neighbor's adopting a policy change is 2.2 times greater than if a single country acted alone.

The authors report cross-country data on commercial bank regulation and ownership in more than 60 countries. They evaluate the links between different regulatory/ownership practices in those countries and both financial sector performance and banking system stability. They document substantial variation in response to these questions: Should it be public policy to limit the powers of commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities? Should the mixing of banking and commerce be restricted by regulating commercial bank's ownership of non-financial firms and non-financial firms' ownership of commercial banks? Should states own commercial banks, or should those banks be privatized? They find: 1) There is no reliable statistical relationship between restrictions on commercial banks' ability to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate transactions and how well-developed the banking sector, how well-developed securities markets and non-bank financial intermediaries are, or the degree of industrial competition. Based on the evidence, it is difficult to argue confidently that restricting commercial banking activities benefits-or harms-the development of financial and securities markets or industrial competition. 2) There are no positive effects from mixing banking and commerce. 3) Countries that more tightly restrict and regulate the securities activities of commercial banks are substantially more likely to suffer a major banking crisis. Countries whose national regulations inhibit banks' ability to engage in securities underwriting, brokering, and dealing--and all aspects of the mutual fund business--tend to have more fragile financial systems. 4) The mixing of banking and commerce is associated with less financial stability. The evidence does not support admonitions to restrict the mixing of banking and commerce because mixing them will increase financial fragility. 5) On average, greater state ownership of banks tends to be associated with more poorly developed banks, nonbanks, and stock markets and more poorly functioning financial systems.

The author argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth. There is evidence that the financial development level is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and technological change. Moreover, cross-country, case-style, industry level and firm-level analysis document extensive periods when financial development crucially affects the speed and pattern of economic development. The author explains what the financial system does and how it affects, and is affected by, economic growth. Theory suggests that financial instruments, markets and institutions arise to mitigate the effects of information and transaction costs. A growing literature shows that differences in how well financial systems reduce information and transaction costs influence savings rates, investment decisions, technological innovation, and long-run growth rates. A less developed theoretical literature shows how changes in economic activity can influence financial systems. The author advocates a functional approach to understanding the role of financial systems in economic growth. This approach focuses on the ties between growth and the quality of the functions provided by the financial systems. The author discourages a narrow focus on one financial instrument, or a particular institution. Instead, the author addresses the more comprehensive question: What is the relationship between financial structure and the functioning of the financial system?

The authors find no evidence for the superiority of either market-based or bank-based financial systems for industries dependent on external financing. But they find overwhelming evidence that industries heavily dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with higher levels of financial development, and with better legal protection for outside investors - including strong creditor and shareholder rights and strong contract enforcement mechanisms. Financial development also stimulates the establishment of new firms, which is consistent with the Schumpeterian view of creative destruction. Financial development matters. That the financial system is bank-based on market-based offers little additional information.

The authors introduce a new database of indicators of financial development and structure across countries and over time. This database is unique in that it unites a variety of indicators that measure the size, activity, and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets. It improves on previous efforts by presenting data on the public share of commercial banks, by introducing indicators of the size and activity of non bank financial institutions, and by presenting measures of the size of bond and primary equity markets. The compiled data permit the construction of financial structure indicators to measure whether, for example, a country's banks are larger, more active, and more efficient than its stock markets. These indicators can then be used to investigate the empirical link between the legal, regulatory, and policy environment and indicators of financial structure. They can also be used to analyze the implications of financial structure for economic growth. The authors describe the sources and construction of, and the intuition behind, different indicators and present descriptive statistics.