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This paper provides a detailed explanation how the law of the World Trade Organization regulates environmental subsidies with a focus on renewable energy subsidies. The paper begins by discussing the economic justifications for such subsidies and the criticisms of them and then gives examples of categories of subsidies. The paper provides an overview of the relevant World Trade Organization rules and case law, including the recent Canada-Renewable Energy case. The paper also makes specific recommendations for how World Trade Organization law can be improved and discusses the literature on reform proposals. The study finds that because of a lack of clarity in World Trade Organizaion rules, for some clean energy subsidies, a government will not know in advance whether the subsidy is World Trade Organization-legal.

Critical appraisals of the current and potential benefits from developing country engagement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) focus mainly on the Doha Round of negotiations. This paper examines developing country participation in the WTO dispute settlement system to enforce foreign market access rights already negotiated in earlier multilateral rounds. The dispute data from 1995 through 2008 reveal three notable trends: developing countries’ sustained rate of self-enforcement actions despite declining use of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) by developed countries, developing countries’ increased use of the DSU to self-enforce their access to the markets of developing as well as developed country markets, and the prevalence of disputes targeting highly observable causes of lost foreign market access, such as antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. The paper also examines potential impacts of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) into the WTO system in 2001. A close look at the data reveals evidence on at least three channels through which the ACWL may be enhancing developing countries' ability to self-enforce foreign market access: increased initiation of sole-complainant cases, more extensive pursuit of the DSU legal process for any given case, and initiation of disputes over smaller values of lost trade.

An important recent World Trade Organization dispute settlement case for many developing countries concerned European Union exports of sugar. Brazil, Thailand, and Australia alleged that the exports have substantially exceeded permitted levels as established by European Union commitments in the WTO. This case had major implications for both European Union sugar producers and developing countries that benefited from preferential access to the European Union market. It was also noteworthy in the use of economic arguments by the WTO dispute settlement panel, which held that the excess sugar exports were in part a reflection of illegal de facto cross-subsidization-rents from production that benefited from high support prices being used to cover losses associated with exports of sugar to the world market. Although in principle the economic arguments of the panel could apply to many other policy areas, in practice WTO provisions greatly limit the scope to bring similar arguments for trade in products that are not subject to explicit export subsidy reduction commitments of the type that were made for sugar and other agricultural commodities.

Statutory marketing boards that have exclusive authority to purchase domestic production, sell for export, and set purchase and sales prices of commodities are a type of state trading enterprise that is subject to World Trade Organization disciplines. This paper assesses a recent dispute brought by the United States against Canada, alleging that WTO rules require state trading enterprises to operate solely in accordance with commercial considerations and that the Canadian government did not require the Canadian Wheat Board to do so. The panel and Appellate Body found that the primary discipline of the WTO regarding state trading enterprises was nondiscrimination, and that operating on the basis of commercial considerations was not an independent obligation. Instead, WTO disciplines regarding the pricing behavior of state trading enterprises use a commercial considerations test as a possible indicator of discrimination. Although a significant degree of price discrimination is observed in the case of Canadian wheat exports, there are economic arguments why this might also be pursued by a private, profit maximizing firm.

To address these broad questions: How to analyze the impact of globalization? What is the effect of rich countries' policies on developing ones? How to redefine the development agenda and scale-up the aid effort? The European Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE-Europe) focused on some of the problematic features of globalization and discussed the global impact of developed countries' policies in a number of crucial areas for developing countries, such as farm trade, migrations, the protection of intellectual property, and capital flows. It also highlighted the role and responsibilities of the private sector. This volume, organized in twelve chapters, opens with the five plenary session papers that were at the core of the discussion and focuses on five crucial issues and policy challenges: agricultural trade, migration flows, intellectual property rights, the costs and benefits of international capital flows, and options for sovereign debt restructuring. The seven remaining chapters offer a collection of selected papers discussed in the parallel workshops held during the conference. They cover a wider range of issues, from the role and responsibilities of private actors and the components of the business environment, to the sources of development finance and the relationship between commodity resources and development, to the issue of scaling up, and the possibility of intensifying the volume and impact of development aid.

Reforming agricultural trade for developing countries is a two-volume set. The first volume is subtitled Key issues for a pro- development outcome of the Doha Round, and it is focused on specific concerns that are being encountered in the agricultural negotiations, and on strategies for dealing with them to arrive at a final agreement that will significantly spur growth and reduce poverty in developing countries. The companion volume is subtitled Quantifying the impact of multilateral trade reform. It comprises chapters that take different approaches to modeling trade reform and quantifying the resulting benefits and costs to various players in the negotiations. The study explains the differences in results that come out of these different approaches, and compares them to some other recent estimates of the gains from global trade reform.

Reforming agricultural trade for developing countries is a two-volume set. The first volume is subtitled Key issues for a pro- development outcome of the Doha Round, and it is focused on specific concerns that are being encountered in the agricultural negotiations, and on strategies for dealing with them to arrive at a final agreement that will significantly spur growth and reduce poverty in developing countries. The companion volume is subtitled Quantifying the impact of multilateral trade reform. It comprises chapters that take different approaches to modeling trade reform and quantifying the resulting benefits and costs to various players in the negotiations. The study explains the differences in results that come out of these different approaches, and compares them to some other recent estimates of the gains from global trade reform.

How can international trade agreements promote development and how can rules be designed to benefit poor countries? Can multilateral trade cooperation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) help developing countries create and strengthen institutions and regulatory regimes that will enhance the gains from trade and integration into the global economy? And should this even be done? These are questions that confront policy makers and citizens in both rich and poor countries, and they are the subject of this publication. It analyzes how the trading system could be made more supportive of economic development, without eroding the core WTO functions.

This paper is the introduction and summary chapter of the 43 chapter volume entitled Handbook of Trade Policy and WTO Accession for Development in Russia and the CIS. The key policy conclusions of each of the chapters are highlighted in this paper. The Handbook will be published only in Russian in 2005, but an English language version of the majority of the papers described here is available on the website www.worldbank.org/trade/russia-wto. This paper first explains the potential importance of World Trade Organization (WTO) accession as a development tool, and discusses the recent successful development models and the role of trade policy in their development. The paper then summarizes the three parts of the Handbook. The first part treats trade policy (with applications to Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]). The second part treats World Trade Organization institutions and disciplines, again with Russia and CIS applications. And the third part focuses on various aspects of the impact of WTO accession on Russia. The numerous papers that relate trade policy and WTO accession to experience in Russia and the CIS are likely to be of special interest to native English speakers, since these papers are new to the literature. The papers in the Handbook are intended to be non-technical materials accessible to a wide policy audience. The Handbook forms the basis of a World Bank Institute course on trade policy and WTO accession, which has been delivered and will be delivered again on multiple occasions.

Agricultural protection and subsidies, particularly in high-income countries, have induced overproduction, thereby depressing world commodity prices and reducing export shares of countries which do not support agriculture. One - and perhaps the only - effective way to bring a socially acceptable and politically feasible reform is to replace payments linked to current production levels, input use, and prices by payments which are decoupled from these measures. This paper describes the objectives and consequences of agricultural support, surveys the theory and practice of decoupling agricultural support, and gives a number of policy recommendations on how to improve decoupled support mechanisms. Overall, the experience with decoupling has been mixed while the switch to less distorting support has been uneven across commodities and countries. Ideally, compensation programs would be universal (open to all sectors in the economy, not just agriculture) or at least non-sector specific within agriculture. The paper describes a simple and minimally distorting scheme that would maintain government credibility and reduce uncertainty.

An important issue in multilateral trade negotiations is the approach taken to reduce tariffs. The authors believe that there are important advantages in formula approaches and survey a range of options between the sharply top-down Swiss formula and proportional cuts in tariffs. Over the range the authors consider, they find that the economic efficiency impacts for the importer are not greatly influenced by the extent to which higher tariffs face bigger cuts. However, top-down approaches appear to be more effective in reducing tariff escalation, and provide greater market access gains to poor countries.

Hoekman, Michalopoulos, and Winters discuss options that could be considered in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide more favorable treatment - so-called special and differential treatment (SDT) - to small and low-income countries. They argue that there is a need both for differentiation across WTO members and for steps that would benefit all developing countries. The authors suggest the following to make the Doha Round more supportive of development: - A binding commitment by industrial countries to abolish export subsidies and nontariff barriers (tariff quotas) and to reduce most-favored-nation tariffs on labor-intensive products of export interest to developing countries to no more than 5 percent in 2010, and to no more than 10 percent for agricultural products. All tariffs on manufactures should go to zero by 2015, the target date for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Liberalization should also be undertaken by developing countries on the basis of a formula approach. - A binding commitment by industrial countries on services to expand temporary access for service providers by a specific amount - for example, equal to an additional 1 percent of the workforce - and not to restrict cross-border trade (for example, by telecom channels). - Unilateral action by all industrial countries to extend preferential market access for less developed countries, and to simplify eligibility criteria, especially rules of origin. - Affirmation by the WTO that core disciplines relating to the use of trade policy apply equally to all WTO members. - Acceptance of the principle that for small and low-income countries "one size does not fit all" when it comes to domestic regulation and to WTO agreements requiring substantial investment of resources. - Recognition that some WTO agreements need to be adapted to make them more supportive of development, and a consequent willingness by industrial countries to modify them. - Expansion of development assistance to bolster trade capacity in poor countries and strengthening of the links between trade-related technical assistance and the mechanisms through which aid priorities are determined in developing countries. In practice, calls for specific types of SDT often appear to be motivated by a perception that a certain WTO rule is "anti-development" and that, therefore, developing countries should be exempted from the rule in question. The authors suggest that the appropriate solution to such problems is to change the rules rather than seek an opt-out. What should be up front changes in rules and what should be part of the negotiating agenda is a major issue which needs to be addressed at the Cancun Ministerial meeting. The suggestion that SDT should focus primarily on WTO rules and be limited to those countries that need it most - very small and poor economies - implies that criteria should be adopted to differentiate between countries. Leaving this to self-declaration - the current approach - is not feasible, while reliance on case-by-case, agreement-specific negotiation can generate excessive costs, discretion, and associated uncertainty. While the authors' preference is for a simple rule-of-thumb approach to determine eligibility, this is an issue that requires much more thought and discussion. They suggest that WTO members establish a high-level group to consider criteria that could be used for differentiation purposes and to determine the set of agreements to which differentiation will apply. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze the issues being negotiation in the WTO from a development perspective.

Historically, industrialized countries dominated trade negotiations from the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) through the lengthy Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s. These negotiations established the World Trade Organization (WTO)-the GATT's successor organization-and formulated the UR Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Even though developing countries possibly have the most to gain from a substantial reduction of existing export subsidies and removal of other trade impediments (Gorter, Ingco, and Ruiz 2000; Ingco 1995), these countries have been the most powerless, and the most ineffective. This is why it is imperative that developing countries, particularly those in South Asia, seize the moment to actively participate in this process of shaping a more globally integrated economic environment and to convey, for instance, their experience from implementing the reduction commitments and the effect of those commitments under the URAoA, the consequence of Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment, and their concerns regarding food security and the environment and the possible negative effects of the execution of the reform program. The new round, it is hoped, will cover broader issues, with established deadlines and room for tradeoffs.

Many fear China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) will impoverish its rural people by way of greater import competition in its agricultural markets. Anderson, Huang, and Ianchovichina explore that possibility bearing in mind that, even if producer prices of some (land-intensive) farm products fall, prices of other (labor-intensive) farm products could rise. Also, the removal of restrictions on exports of textiles and clothing could boost town and village enterprises, so demand for unskilled labor for nonfarm work in rural areas may grow even if demand for farm labor in aggregate falls. New estimates, from the global economywide numerical simulation model known as GTAP, of the likely changes in agricultural and other product prices as a result of WTO accession are drawn on to examine empirically the factor reward implications of China's WTO accession. The results suggest farm-nonfarm and Western-Eastern income inequality may well rise in China but rural-urban income inequality need not. The authors conclude with some policy suggestions for alleviating any pockets of farm household poverty that may emerge as a result of WTO accession.

The Uruguay Round involved a grand North-South bargain: The North reduced import barriers, particularly in textiles and agriculture. The South adopted new domestic regulations in such areas as services and intellectual property-changes that would lead to increased purchases from the North. In mercantilist economics, apples for apples-imports for imports. In real economics, apples for oranges. The authors argue that while the North's reduction of import barriers benefits both the North and the South, the new domestic regulations adopted by countries of the South could prove costly to those countries. To begin with, the regulations will be expensive to implement. And while the cost side of their impact is secured by a legal obligation (in the case of intellectual property rights, for example, the cost is higher prices for patented goods), the benefits side is not so secured.

This discussion paper contains seven studies, designed to a) review, and assess the impact of the implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture, and, b) to analyze the key issues, interests, and options for developing countries in the new World Trade Organization's (WTO) round of multilateral trade negotiations in agriculture. Six regional case studies are presented: Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America, Eastern Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and industrial countries. A quantitative analysis of the dynamics of multilateral liberalization in food, and agricultural trade is also presented. Among some of the key conclusions, it is suggested that much preparatory work was achieved in bringing agriculture fully into the multilateral trading system during the UR, and, a significant achievement was the development of a broad framework for reductions in trade-distorting policies. The UR was also successful in negotiating reduced volumes of subsidized exports, and in providing at least, minimum levels of access to markets. There were, however, a number of limitations in both what was agreed to, and in how the Agreement in Agriculture has actually been implemented, as the analyses show that the work achieved during the UR, will be of limited value, unless market distortions in agriculture can be reduced substantially. If liberal agricultural trade is to succeed, its limitations should be addressed, and policy induced distortions to agricultural production

The author analyzes how changes in thinking about the role trade plays in economic development have been reflected in provisions affecting developing countries in the GATT and the WTO. He focuses on the provisions calling for the special and differential treatment of developing countries. The WTO's special, and differential treatment has been extended to include measures of technical assistance, and extended transition periods to enable countries to meet their commitments in new areas agreed on in the Uruguay round of negotiations. At the same time, many WTO provisions encourage industrial countries to give developing countries preferential treatment, through a variety of measures, none of them legally enforceable. The author concludes that weaknesses in the institutional capacity of many developing countries, provide a conceptual basis for continuing special, and differential treatment in the WTO, but that the benefits should be targeted only to low-income developing countries, and those that need help becoming integrated with the international trading system. In addition, an effective system of graduation, should be put in place for higher-income developing countries. Developing countries find it politically easier to argue, that all should be treated the same, except for least developed countries, although their capacities, and need for assistance differ vastly. Industrial countries are expected to provide special, and differential treatment, but in practice, their commitments on market access, preferential treatment, and technical assistance, are not enforceable. Leaving it up to the industrial countries to decide which developing countries get preferential treatment, invites extraneous considerations in determining who gets how much special treatment. Unless higher-income developing countries accept some type of graduated differentiation in their treatment (beyond that granted the least developed countries), there is little prospect of implementing meaningful, legally enforceable special, and differential treatment favoring all developing countries under the WTO.

Perhaps the major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round is agreements reached on nontariff barriers (NTBs). All NTBs imposed under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) will be phased out over 10 years, and all "voluntary" export restraints will be abolished. OECD countries' NTBs on agricultural goods will be converted to tariffs and then reduced by an average of 36 percent. Agreement was also reached on limiting subsidies and other agricultural export incentives. As a result, the profile of OECD nontariff protection Africa faces will change dramatically. Formerly, about 11 percent of all Sub-Saharan Africa exports encountered NTBs; now this ratio will fall to about 2 percent. Formerly, 83 percent of Reunion's pre-Uruguay Round exports were affected by NTBs; now none will. Some African countries, however, will be largely unaffected by the Uruguay Round's accomplishments. No NTBs on energy products were liberalized so coverage ratios for Angola, Congo, ad Nigeria are still high - but the measures applied (largely quantitative restrictions and special import charges) apparently do not raise the cost of imports significantly. The exclusion of fish from the agreement on agriculture also limited the potential benefits to countries like the Seychelles. Others simply faced no (or few) nontariff restrictions before the negotiations. The new developments are regarded as positive for developing countries as a group, although some countries may incur losses. Trade in textiles and clothing has been closely regulated for three decades through MFA quotas. Phasing these restrictions out will subject African countries to aggressive international competition. Whether they can maintain a viable textile and clothing export sector depends on whether they can achieve reforms aimed at cost-cutting. The MFA liberalization is heavily backloaded, with roughly half the restrictions being removed at the end of 10 years, so there is ample time for adjustment. Africa should also face more vigorous competition on footwear and ferrous metals when "voluntary" restraints on some other developing countries are lifted. Any losses in market share that may occur, however, may not reflect welfare changes, especially if African exports were heavily subsidized. Agriculture could also be harmed unless appropriate domestic policies are adopted. The tariffication (and reduction) of NTBs, along with limits on export subsidies, could raise international prices on some staples, which would hurt net food importers. Reforms to ensure that prices paid to domestic producers increase in line with international prices (thus stimulating a local supply response) could limit increases in the food import bill. In the post-Uruguay Round world, it is increasingly important to remove domestic constraints that prevent local producers from taking full advantage of new export opportunities. "Unfinished business" includes further initiatives needed to address NTBs on fish, chemicals and energy products which the Round bypassed. Stricter regulations on safeguards and the use of antidumping duties are also needed to ensure that these measures are not substituted for those eliminated. But much of the unfinished business involves domestic reform needed to ensure that African countries can react to new export opportunities and competitive challenges.

Many developing countries have been reluctant to participate in multilateral trade negotiations except for those on agriculture and services, topics mandated under previous World Trade Organization (WTO decisions. The author argues that developing countries can gain significant benefits from a broader WTO Millennium Round of negotiations but must develop strategies for participating in it. Different groups will have different interests, but developing countries as a group may want to include additional issues in the new Round, especially, industrial tariffs and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. It may also be to their advantage to include discussions on trade-related environmental issues and government procurement, if they obtain the institutional support they need to meet their commitments under any new agreements. Other topics should be resisted because they are premature or counterproductive or do not promise net benefits for most developing countries. The new Round should be a single undertaking, to maximize tradeoffs across issues and for political economy reasons: to permit liberalizing forces everywhere to exert pressure on governments to liberalize world trade. But there should not be too many issues, as that would strain the capacities of the poorer and least developed economies. In a new WTO Round, developing countries should be prepared to exchange liberalizing trade concessions on a most-favored-nation basis. Liberalization of their own trade in exchange for improved access to the markets of their trading partners, most of which are other developing countries, is the only way to maximize benefits from multilateral trade negotiations. Efforts to obtain special and differential treatment should focus on establishing realistic transition periods and technical assistance to address constraints on their institutional capacity.

The author evaluates the progress in agricultural liberalization -and the welfare effects for least-developed and net food-importing countries- as a result of agricultural price shocks resulting from the Uruguay Round. She finds that: (1) The changes in welfare are significantly affected by the structure of trade and distortions in the domestic economy. (2) Although many economies are hurt by increases in world prices, losses in terms of trade are small relative to total GDP. Only in a few countries does the estimated welfare change constitute more than 1 percent of GDP. (3) In several countries, the distortion effects are significantly larger than the terms-of-trade effects. In some cases, the distortion effects work in opposition to the terms-of-trade effects and are large enough to reverse the sign of the net welfare change. In short, removing policy distortions could convert the small loss in terms of trade to potential gains. But many least-developed, net food-importing countries did not use the Round to support domestic efforts at trade reform. As most studies show, most gains from multilateral liberalization come from the countries' own liberalization efforts, so countries that failed to liberalize their trade policy lost the opportunity for gains.

This discussion paper contains thirteen studies designed to assess the economic impact of the Uruguay Round on the developing economies. Some of the key conclusions to emerge from the study include the following: the agriculture agreement achieved a great deal in terms of defining rules for agricultural trade, but little in terms of immediate market opening. The substantial cuts in tariffs on manufactures in both developing and industrial countries, and the agreement to abolish the Multifiber Arrangement, will provide important benefits for developing countries. Cuts in protection on total merchandise trade will increase real incomes in developing countries by between 1.2 and 2.0 percent of their GDP in 1992. The establishment of the World Trade Organization will strengthen the world trading system. Earlier versions of the papers were presented at a conference held at the World Bank in January 1995. The analyses contained in this volume are the first in which estimates of the effects of the Round were based entirely on the actual cuts in protection from previously prevailing rates achieved by the Round.