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I analyse epistemic and non-epistemic factors involved in expert advisory practices and decision-making relating to the regulation of health claims in the US, EU, and Japan. I consider the changes that have taken place, historically, in regulatory policies in all three cases in order to confirm the hypothesis that not only epistemic, but also non-epistemic factors and values determine the methodological decisions on which expert assessments are based for the authorization of health claims. I found that the current European, US, and Japanese assessment systems are based on different kinds of what have been termed 'epistemic policies' and that these policies and other characteristics shape what might be identified as differing 'policy styles' in the regulation of health claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A standard of evidence is a rule or norm pertaining to the type or amount of evidence that is required to prove or support a conclusion. Standards of evidence play an important role in institutional review board (IRB) decision-making, but they are not mentioned in the federal research regulations. In this article, I examine IRB standards of evidence from a normative, epistemological perspective and argue that IRBs should rely on empirical evidence for making decisions, but that other sources of evidence, such as intuition, emotion, and rational reflection, can also play an important role in decision-making, because IRB decisions involve an ethical component which is not reducible to science. I also argue that an IRB should approve a study only if it has clear and convincing evidence that the study meets all the approval criteria and other relevant, ethical considerations; and that for studies which expose healthy volunteers to significant risks, an IRB should require that evidence be more than clear and convincing as a condition for approval. Additional empirical research is needed on how IRBs use evidence to make decisions and how standards of evidence influence IRB decision-making at the individual and group level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper focuses on evidence-based practice and policy with a specific focus on the cooperation between researchers, policy makers, and practitioners. The evidence-based practice movement has gained greatly in impact in recent years and standards for research leading to evidence-based practice have been defined. However, the slow and incomplete uptake of research findings especially in the field of education obviously has shown that the development, implementation, and dissemination of sustainable strategies requires intensive cooperation between researchers, politicians, administrators, and the media. This paper presents and discusses (1) standards of evidence; (2) the use and implementation of scientific evidence in policy and practice; (3) the development of the National Strategy for Violence Prevention in the Austrian Public School System as a successful example for establishing a sustainable cooperation between research, policy, and practice; and (4) lessons learned for the promotion of evidence-based policy and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Regulatory science, which generates knowledge relevant for regulatory decision-making, is different from standard academic science in that it is oriented mainly towards the attainment of non-epistemic (practical) aims. The role of uncertainty and the limits to the relevance of academic science are being recognized more and more explicitly in regulatory decision-making. This has led to the introduction of regulation-specific scientific methodologies in order to generate decision-relevant data. However, recent practical experience with such non-standard methodologies indicates that they, too, may be subject to important limitations. We argue that the attainment of non-epistemic values and aims (like the protection of human health and the environment) requires not only control of the quality of the data and the methodologies, but also the selection of the level of regulation deemed adequate in each specific case (including a decision about which of the two, under-regulation or over-regulation, would be more acceptable). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evidence-based practice (EBP) is a relatively recent incarnation in social work's long history of valuing evidence as a basis for practice. Few argue with the ethics and usefulness of grounding practice in empirically tested interventions. Critics of EBP instead focus on how it is defined and implemented. Critiques include what counts as evidence, who makes decisions regarding research agendas and processes, and the lack of attention to context. This essay reflects on such critiques and suggests that social work, as a profession that values human diversity, equality, and self-determination, is well situated to shed light on such debates about EBP. As a profession that supports a person-in-environment perspective, we must examine not only the theory but the practice of EPB in academic, institutional, and societal settings. It is also argued that, owing to our professional mission, it is not enough to acknowledge the risk of oppression and harm; we are obligated to take them seriously and include such potential for harm in our assessment of so-called best practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]