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Hamas’s invasion of Israel on 7 October 2023, with the attendant massacre of some 1,200 Israelis and the occupation of population centres and military bases – something that no Arab army has done since the 1948 war – posed unprecedented challenges to Israel’s socio-political and security establishments. Based on Chief-of-Staff Eisenkot’s 2018 doctrinal manifesto ‘The IDF’s Strategy’, this article assesses Israel’s national security principles and the doctrines for the use of force in an attempt to evaluate whether its political and military actions were aligned with these doctrines during the 2023–24 war with Hamas, and to determine the strategy’s value and possible gaps. It concludes that while the political and military responses appear consistent with the outlined principles, unexpected problems like hostage dilemmas and urban warfare complexities present unforeseen challenges not directly addressed by the manifesto. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The editorial in the Journal of Strategic Studies discusses the challenges to traditional warfare assumptions posed by conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. It focuses on the need for doctrinal review and change in military organizations, with articles examining issues such as vertical implementation of military doctrine, disagreements within and across militaries, and the concept of 'total defense' during the Cold War. The editorial also highlights the critical role of the center of gravity concept in military doctrine and the limitations of counterinsurgency doctrine in complex conflicts like Afghanistan. [Extracted from the article]

Why do armed forces sometimes write doctrines that are inconsistent across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war? Using interviews to uncover how the Swedish Armed Forces implemented their 2016 military strategic doctrine, this study develops a theoretical concept of vertical implementation and explores why and under what conditions it varies. The findings suggest a tendency of lower levels to ignore superordinate doctrine; however, formal processes, actor attitudes, and doctrinal content seem to affect vertical implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military doctrine is a form of organisational knowledge. Scholars argue that beneath written doctrine lies a set of deeply held beliefs about war and warfare that do not change even if the written doctrine does. This article explores the relationship between written military doctrine, the underlying beliefs about doctrine that govern its interpretation and application, and ultimately how militaries operate. The analysis is based on fieldwork at a NATO division and 33 interviews with commanders and senior staff officers. It suggests a typology that can be used to understand variances in doctrine and operational differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The center of gravity (COG) is a crucial concept in both strategic studies and military planning, yet its ambiguous and incoherent nature has repeatedly led to abundant confusion. In particular, its relation to both Clausewitz and the German Schwerpunkt tradition remains poorly understood. This article addresses these shortcomings by tracing both Schwerpunkt and COG in German and US military doctrine, respectively. Comparing the two concepts across several dimensions, the article not only finds that both have evolved considerably over time, but also that while having a common origin, they are ultimately based on different approaches, assumptions, and traditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the evolution of UK military doctrine on counterintelligence (CI), one of the more consistently troubled aspects of military doctrine in general and intelligence doctrine in particular. We argue that current UK and NATO CI doctrine are in thrall to a deeply problematic defining concept in TESSOC (Terrorism, Espionage, Sabotage, Subversion and Organised Crime) that conflates an intractably diverse assortment of security threats under CI. Furthermore, TESSOC is the latest embodiment of a slow, century-long oscillation between two different basic concepts of CI. The first focuses purely on human threat vectors (referred to here as Human Threat CI or HTCI) while the latter entails a more comprehensive, all-source range of adversary technical and open as well as human source intelligence activities (designated Multidisciplinary CI or MDCI in US doctrine). That oscillation is driven largely by the balance between conventional and asymmetrical operations in defence priorities and recent campaign experience. TESSOC is a legacy of the recent, pre-Russo-Ukraine War emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Consequently, UK and allied military counterintelligence doctrine are entering the second quarter of the 21st Century fundamentally ill-equipped to cope with strategic peers and their use of full-spectrum and hybrid strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Colombia's military doctrine is being questioned as the country's armed conflict has evolved. President Gustavo Petro has promised a new approach, including negotiations with armed groups and a shift away from aggressive military strategies. However, progress has been mixed, with negotiations having varying outcomes and violence in conflict regions persisting. Petro's strategy combines military deployment and peacebuilding, but concerns remain about the effectiveness of a militarized approach. The government is also addressing the increase in cocaine production and the control of criminal armed groups in rural areas. The new military doctrine prioritizes protecting civilians and targeting the financial activities of these groups. However, challenges persist, such as the lack of trust in the military and the need for long-term investment and state-building. The United States supports Petro's peace efforts, but there are critics both domestically and internationally. Despite the challenges, there is an opportunity for genuine peacebuilding by establishing trust with affected communities and respecting their human rights. [Extracted from the article]

United States space policy has largely reflected the outlook of a major power. The key distinguishing feature of such a state is their willingness to proactively reshape and engage with international regimes and organizations. They do this to protect their strategic goals and national interest. US space policy has historically been shaped by geopolitical tensions and rivalries. Its space policy is an extension of the military doctrines and strategies that it subsequently developed. The article examines different periods since the start of the space race. These periods reflect how US space policy has adapted to meet new challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps: Defining Iran's Military Doctrine" by Alma Keshavarz provides a detailed analysis of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its role in Iran's hybrid warfare strategy. The book explores the historical development of the IRGC, its relationship with the Iranian government, and its influence on domestic and foreign policies. Keshavarz argues that the IRGC has become the sole proprietor of Iran's foreign policy priorities and is deeply embedded in the Iranian economy. The book also discusses the Quds Force, the IRGC's special operations unit, and its relationship with the Supreme Leader. Keshavarz concludes by offering policy recommendations for dealing with the IRGC's hybrid warfare strategies, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive and long-term approach. Overall, the book provides valuable insights for policymakers and academics studying Middle Eastern security issues. [Extracted from the article]

Written military doctrines are generally seen as declaration of intent and strategic objectives by military forces. Pakistan has typically stayed averse to the trend of formal military doctrines owing to its strategic culture. However, in a first precedent Pakistan Navy released a formal military service doctrine in 2018. Yet it remained short of being a truly comprehensive formal naval doctrine. This article explores the naval doctrinal developments in Pakistan since the end of last century, its relationship with the ensuing major power competition in the Indian Ocean region, and its possible implications on doctrinal development in Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tells the extraordinary story of Fiorenzo Capriotti, the man behind the sinking of the Egyptian flagship the Emir Farouk in October 1948 and the birth of the Israeli navy commando unit. Using the same unconventional technique that the Italian navy special assault unit Decima Flottiglia MAS had pioneered against the British in World War II, the embryonic Israeli navy was able to defeat Egypt's superior numbers and weaponry. Not only did Capriotti play a key role in the founding of the Israeli navy commando unit, but he also made a significant contribution in shaping the doctrine that the Israeli navy should overcome the unfavourable balance of power through the superiority of its naval commando units. The sinking of Emir Farouk in fact consolidated the notion that the Israeli navy should compensate for its small size relative to most of its enemies through greater agility and firepower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The willingness of defence departments to select the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for their fifth-generation multirole fighter has frequently been analyzed as stemming from the close historical connections allies such as Japan or Canada have with the United States. However, such an approach glosses over or ignores the operation of military procurement processes which are more idiosyncratic and subject to many pushes and pulls from different actors and directions. This article compares the experiences of Australia and Canada in procuring the JSF. Both countries are British Commonwealth members, with a long history of supporting western, and in particular, US alliances. But while Australia has secured its F-35 procurement and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has already received its F-35s, Canada has only recently overcome a lengthy F-35 procurement battle that remains mired in controversy and will not deliver to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) an aircraft for several years yet. This comparative case study between Australian and Canadian defence priorities offers a new explanation for this disparity of procurement success based on the need to both create and maintain alignment between government strategic defence policy and military service doctrine if major platform purchasing decisions are to survive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Doctrines are considered a key component of military power, shaping the ways in which armed forces organize and operate. This study critically examines the assumption that armed forces can change their practices by writing formal doctrine. The study addresses the research problem of why some formal doctrines are implemented and others are rejected. It does so by developing and testing a novel theoretical framework on doctrinal implementation through a comparative case study on rejection of the US Army 1976 Active Defense doctrine and successful implementation of the 1982 AirLand Battle doctrine. The study shows that contrary to popular beliefs, the actual concepts within a formal doctrine do not seem crucial for whether it is implemented or rejected. Rather, cultural coherence and inclusive creation seem crucial in this regard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What started as opportunistic operations has gradually given rise to Israel's prevailing military doctrine of Inter-War Campaigns (IWC). This article provides a comprehensive analysis of a phenomenon that has shaped conflicts in the Middle East, one that has been overlooked in the literature. The IWC utilises advantageous conditions to formulate continuous military campaigns below the threshold of severe conflict. This article argues that the IWC creates and manages limited competitive conflicts intended to mitigate adversaries' force buildup in preparation for war. It provides the first account of the doctrine's development, analyses its enabling factors, and discusses its degree of success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Apartheid-era South African military (SADF) underwent dramatic peacetime changes, from a small and underfunded expeditionary element of Commonwealth forces in the 1950s to a regime bulwark with regional capabilities under 'Total Strategy' in the mid-1970s. By comparing internal assessments, changes in the SADF's official view of future wars are traced through security crises of the 1960s and 1970s. Shifting future war perceptions were shaped by the interplay of organizational-political needs during crises of legitimacy for the military. These shifts in future war perception motivated strategic and operational-tactical doctrinal change and shaped the military's view of security crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) different perceptions of military education from the 1940s to the 2000s and discusses their place in the Israeli military strategy. It first compares the founding principles of Israeli military education with other concepts from around the world, and then examines the changes in the Israeli concept between the 1940s-1970s. Finally, it addresses some of the trends and challenges of the Education Corps from the mid-1970s onwards, which are still relevant today. The historical discussion starts with the educational doctrine of the Palmach, a pre-state military force established in 1941, and culminates in 2004, with the articulation of the military education doctrine in a formal document. The main argument is that the Israeli case presents a unique understanding of military education, which is important not only in historical context, but also in the wider context of the relationship between armed forces and society, and the never-ending question of what motivates the soldier to put his life in danger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the gaps and ties betweenthe doctrine and theory, in contrast with the practice, of countering subversive movements in the British Empire during the Interbellum. Contradictions between security services led to the articulation and promotion of different models of counterinsurgency. The research contains an analysis of the guerrilla warfare concept' evolution within the military thought, through the second Boer war, Irish warof Independence and the second Arab rising in Palestine, reflecting different thoughts on interrelated problems of the 'revolutionary movements' and 'sub-war' after the Great War. Particular attentionis paid to military and political incentives and constrains of the counterinsurgency doctrine, reflecting the bureaucratic logic that stood behind the implementation of the guerrilla warfare concept at the levels of doctrine and theory in the context of the systemic crisis of empire and the growth of external pressure over the questions of the imperial defense and self-determination. Conflicting coexistence of internal security models tested within the British Empire during the Interbellum is observed in the conclusion,as well as perspectives of transfers of colonial (dis)order in front of the 'sub-war', as it was understood among the military circles through the prism of the guerrilla warfare concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 2017 U.S.-North Korea nuclear crisis, the Trump administration's 'maximum pressure' strategy failed to achieve its objectives of the complete, irreversible, verifiable denuclearization (CVID) of the DPRK, and induced escalation pressures that brought the two countries to the brink of war. A deficit in signalling capacity (i.e. biased intelligence portfolio, lack of diplomatic-military integration, and inflexible military doctrine and war plans) prevented Washington from managing the crisis, creating the conditions for its strategic failure. The signalling capacity framework offers a comprehensive approach to explaining the outcome of the 2017 crisis, outperforming audience cost and brinkmanship theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article applies grounded theory and epistemological, teleological, ontological, and methodological (ETOM) lenses to describe the prevalent contemporary theories of the centre of gravity concept, originated by Carl von Clausewitz. These include the theories of John Warden, Joe Strange & Richard Iron, Antulio Echevarria II, Milan Vego, Dale Eikmeier, and Jacob Barfoed. The article then compares the theories across 14 deduced theoretical aspects and produces a comparison matrix, that can be used as an analytical tool, and discusses implications as guidance for further research and doctrine development. The article argues that the term "centre of gravity" is polluted, and that the application of the term in military planning and doctrines requires careful attention to the specific theory being applied, so that logical consistency and clear, accurate communication is achieved. Alternatively, the concept may be removed from doctrine altogether, renovated with inclusion of a new unpolluted term, or reconstructed with removal of the centre of gravity, leaving a "critical factor analysis" concept behind. This article also provides a level of granularity to the debate about the concept, that renders critics like Paparone & Davis Jr and Zweibelson partly irrelevant and can provide a more nuanced and qualitative basis for future discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deterrence between states is a long-established theory in security studies, but it is rare, if not unique, that an insurgency would deter a state from attacking another country. Insurgencies in the Middle East are increasingly playing an international role, of which deterrence is only a part. This generates an interesting dynamic in which an insurgency uses non-traditional tools to dissuade an adversarial state from attacking the group or country in which it resides. Thus, the research topic is: How is Hezbollah able to deter Israel? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does Russia need so many nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), which are considered by some observers to be an irrelevant relic of the Cold War with little use in actual, present-day warfighting? The question is all the more acute given that Russia has conducted a sweeping military modernization program since 2008, significantly improving its general-purpose forces and thereby seemingly reducing the need to rely on nuclear weapons. Yet Russia's nonstrategic (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons continue to play a central role in its military doctrine -- and if anything, the weapons' role has increased in the post-Cold War security environment. Initially, they were viewed as a way of compensating for Russia's military-technological inferiority after the collapse of the Soviet Union, giving the country some breathing space until Russia would have the wherewithal to boost its conventional power -- especially in the research and development of high-precision conventional weapons that could be an alternative to nuclear munitions. Indeed, in recent years, Russia has increased its focus on developing nonnuclear deterrence capabilities. That said, NSNWs remain an integral element in the evolving Russian military strategy, combining a set of cross-domain deterrence options including strategic and nonstrategic nuclear, strategic conventional, and nonmilitary ways and means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reprises central aspects of John Boyd's thinking about competition and conflict, including his unwavering reliance on analogies and connections between disciplines as disparate as fighter tactics, decision theory, history, philosophy, and physics. We trace how elements of Boyd's ideas about winning and losing have been incorporated (or neglected) in the doctrines of the U.S. military services. Given the richness of Boyd's ideas there is much we can learn from the view of decision making underlying the Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop, for which he is best known, as well as the analogical reasoning embodied in slide presentations such as his massive "Patterns of Conflict." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critiques the prescription of joint security units called for by civil war peace agreements as a means to integrate armed forces previously in conflict. Drawing on cases from Sudan, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, this article offers a comparative assessment of the joint security units attempted in each country. As negotiators and mediators often employ templates from other contexts, the deficits exemplified by these cases call for rethinking the practice of establishing joint units in the doctrine of military integration, as well as in the wider practice of negotiating security arrangements in peace processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The importance of Military Geography in the curricula of military academies cannot be overemphasized, because geography plays a significant role during military operations of any nature. Military Geography encompasses various social science sub-fields, among others political science, military history, military strategy and military intelligence. It should therefore be recognized as a force multiplier in terms of educating military students and as a research avenue by both military academic and military training professionals. Military Geography as a subject should not focus exclusively on the theory of geography with potential military operational application. It should much rather train soldier-academics to conform to a country's military doctrine for using geospatial information. This study evaluated the geography curricula of two military academies, abroad and in Africa, and one extra-continental civilian tertiary institution to identify generic elements needed in a fit for purpose Military Geography curriculum. The undergraduate Military Geography curriculum at the South African Military Academy was then assessed against their addressing these generic elements. Three limitations in the Military Geography curriculum were identified, namely inadequate Urban Geography coverage, lack of practical GIS and remote sensing application, and lack of accreditation credits to professional GIS bodies. Solutions were proposed to address the limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Training on the Law of armed conflict (LOAC) employs different rationales to motivate soldiers and to induce their compliance with LOAC rules. Of these, none is as controversial, or as potentially contradictory, as the Golden Rule. This article analyzes the role of the Golden Rule in historical and contemporary LOAC training material, including manuals, pamphlets, circulars, and films. Research findings suggest that the Golden Rule message corresponds with changes in military training and doctrine that emerged as a result of Vietnam War violations. Furthermore, the Golden Rule is conceptually dynamic, having both positive and negative formulations that are tied to the larger concept of reciprocity. This article concludes with a discussion of possible contradictory interpretations of the Golden Rule and prospects for future research. Since this is the first systematic examination of the Golden Rule in LOAC training material, the author hopes that it will provide a foundation for further dialogue and research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies obscure the traditional boundaries associated with the military realm. As the first examination of the conditions underlying the assimilation of 4IR technologies in Israel's armed forces, this paper makes several contributions. It expands the knowledge on the military assimilation of 4IR technologies and describes the interaction between military doctrine and technology using current evidence. It also enriches the evolving discussion on the strategic effect of emerging technologies. Finally, it demonstrates how emerging technologies involve neither straightforward spinoff or spin-on processes but a reciprocal transfer of know-how between the military and civilian sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1991, the Kazakhstani military and security apparatus has been seeking to define the primary threats it faces in the post-Soviet world and develop the capabilities needed to counter them. This article discusses the latest iteration of this process by analyzing Kazakhstan's security challenges, their reflection in its 2017 Military Doctrine, and, using Ministry of Defense training and exercise descriptions, its Ground Forces' success in developing the prescribed capabilities. By linking together the logic of threats, doctrine, and Ground Forces training, this article assesses that Nur-Sultan is preparing to counter a variety of amorphous threats, largely from within the bounds of its traditional security concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideally, military doctrines are not just written; they are implemented. However, there exists a theory gap on why new doctrines are sometimes successfully implemented and other times not. Based on ideas presented in previous research, this study develops a theoretical model for under what conditions new formal doctrines are most likely to be implemented. The model suggests that cultural coherence, authority and credibility are decisive for the implementation of new doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper models 'no war, no peace' situations in a game theoretical framework where two countries are engaged in a standoff over a military sector. The first main objective is to identify rational grounds for such situations and, more precisely, for the explicit equilibria that lead to such situations. It is demonstrated that both countries gain the same payoff from being in this continuous state of perpetual hostility and, moreover, that 'no war, no peace' situations can be explained only if the countries perceive an equal measure of military advantage from controlling the area. Given this insight, the second objective of the paper is to provide insights about how 'no war, no peace' situations can be resolved. Two different pathways are suggested. The first is idealistic and based on mutual trust, whereas the second is based on deterrence, involving both countries imposing a threat of using armed force against the other country in their respective military doctrines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The area of special operations doctrine offers a number of research avenues for exploration in order to provide broader context and understanding of special operations and special operations forces (SOF) to both scholars and practitioners. In this spirit and to add to the body of existing special operations literature, this article delivers an overview to published UN, NATO, and EU SOF doctrine and compares and analyzes these documents for similarities and differences. The exploration of the SOF doctrine of international organizations is germane to states committing SOF units to missions abroad under UN, NATO, or EU mandates. While the SOF contingents will deploy guided by national military doctrine, they will need to align their operational approach with the SOF doctrine published by the multilateral organization leading the operation. SOF deployments to Afghanistan under the auspices of NATO, to Mali under the EU, and to Sudan under the UN demonstrate the real-world necessity of doctrinal understanding for multinational SOF interoperability. The conclusion offers some thoughts to follow-on areas of SOF doctrinal research that would contribute to an increased understanding of SOF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding states' perception of biological-weapons (BW) utility is key to understanding the motivations behind states' development, possession, and use of these weapons. The calculations underlying a determination of utility are complex, having to balance threat perceptions, national scientific and industrial capacities, diplomatic relations, and the importance of prohibitory norms. Case studies of the former US and British offensive BW programs, beginning in World War II, illustrate how perceptions of BW utility evolve under wartime circumstances. The US case also illustrates how perceptions of BW utility heightened during periods of international tension, namely the Korean War and early in the John F. Kennedy administration. Both the US and UK examples also demonstrate how possession of nuclear weapons affected perceptions of BW utility and the role of BW in military doctrine. Given the prohibitions on BW development and possession, BW utility today is limited to small-scale, covert operations, including assassinations, much like the recent assassinations and attempted assassinations conducted by North Korea and Russia. Unlike chemical weapons, BW have the additional characteristics of delaying the onset of effects, mimicking natural diseases, and foiling attribution efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military doctrine assures a nation's survival. Yet even when faced with a security threat that requires change, militaries rarely innovate but instead adhere to old doctrines that enhance autonomy, reduce uncertainty and claim resources. Existing theories cannot explain an important case of peacetime military innovation when the U.S. Air Force adopted Battlefield Air Interdiction to support the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. A revised theory of peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation resulting from external and internal threats explains not only why innovation occurred with Battlefield Air Interdiction but also why such successful cases are so rare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In India, issues related to environmental governance have not been aligned to the military's objectives except in a few cases. Since environmental change has not been recognised as a critical 'security' issue yet in India, there is a reluctance on the part of the security establishment, including the military, to deal with it on an urgent basis. The question of why the armed forces should be trained to undertake environmental activities when their primary duty is to defend the country against external aggression assumes significance as it is largely believed that if they are trained for the former, their primary functions could suffer and territorial integrity of the nation could be threatened. Other impediments to institutionalisation include the complex relations between the civil and military establishments; constitutional and legal status of the Indian armed forces that is not uniformly enshrined or recognised; and their societal status that still comes under constant scrutiny, leading to a wedge between the military and civilian domains. In this context, the article attempts to identify the doctrinal and policy dimensions of the Indian military's role in environmental affairs as well as the factors that influence formal institutionalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The International Military Education and Training (IMET), has given Indonesian military personnel access to U.S. doctrine and tactics. However, due to the dynamics and changes in priorities of interest between the U.S. and Indonesia, the IMET program has experienced a critical period, when for over a decade, from 1992 to 2005, the U.S. Congress imposed a ban on the program for the Indonesian military. The country also adopted an embargo towards Indonesia in responding to the 'Santa Cruz' incident in East Timor in 1991. Not only had the embargo limited defence cooperation with the United States, but also with its alliance countries. During the 'IMET Ban' period, access to U.S. professional military education was significantly reduced. The ban fully restricted Indonesian military's development since the country relied on the American military's doctrines and tactics. The ban further disrupted the U.S.–Indonesia defence relations. Therefore, through desk research, this article uses process tracing approach to qualitatively examine the dynamic of the US–Indonesia defence relations during the 'IMET Ban' period. The lessons learned during this period in the article are important to help the current Trump and Widodo administrations navigate their bilateral defence relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on an analysis of state documents, this article analyzes the features of the evacuation policy of the Soviet government during the Second World War, using the example of the Kazakh SSR. It is shown that material resources were of primary importance, and human resources — even those people who would have been of use to the war economy and the nomenklatura — were of secondary importance in the wartime evacuation policy of the Soviet state. On the basis of declassified archive sources, the article shows that the evacuation policy of the Soviet government on the whole reflected the social hierarchy that had developed and the system of privileges of the Soviet state. The families of the nomenklatura and the higher leadership personnel were in a more favored position, regardless of their personal labor contribution. The article examines the specific features of the material and everyday services, medical and sanitation services, and social support of the people evacuated to Kazakhstan. The difficulties and problems the evacuees faced with respect to resettlement, conditioned by the catastrophic shortage of material resources, food, and industrial goods, are also examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By employing well-known methods of warfare, but in innovative ways and with the help of new technologies, Russia's concept of operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine took many in the West by surprise. Almost immediately, Western analysts embarked on a search for definitions for this 'new' approach, most of them within the West's own theoretical framework. These have included the Gerasimov Doctrine, hybrid warfare and hybrid threat, non-linear warfare, fourth-generation warfare, and most recently 'gray zone' conflict. Nevertheless, a vast volume of Russian theoretical debates about new ways of warfare has remained under-studied. This has resulted in misconceptions in the characterization of Russian strategy, through molding it to fit Western theoretical constructs as opposed to those within which it was developed. Rather than helping assess the real options open to Russia, each of the aforementioned terms has tended to be unhelpful, as none reflects Russia's doctrine or assumptions about the nature of war in the 21st century. This article's main aim is to describe the Russian way of 'sub-threshold warfare' as defined by Russia itself. This was done by researching more than 30 years of Russian military literature, case studies from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine built from interviews with Ukrainian military and security personnel, and information on the Syrian case based on Russian sources. An analysis of the Russian military literature when compared to the empirical evidence of Russian tactics in Ukraine and Syria shows that its strategy is multi-layered and comprehensive. It is counterproductive to frame the Russian strategy within artificial frameworks established outside of the threat context, such as Hybrid Warfare. The Russians have their own framework that, although influenced by Western military doctrine, is the result of their own theoretical developments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a five-year journey for the Polish Armed Forces and U.S. Special Operations Command's Joint Special Operations University in establishing military design education, theory, and practice within the Polish military. Military design is presented as a significant development in defense theory that draws from complexity theory, systems theory, scenario planning, postmodern theory as well as social paradigm theory as applied to security contexts and war. Military design is a recent development and in part a reaction to traditional, mechanistic, and linear planning and strategy methodologies becoming insufficient in contemporary security environments. The increasing complexity of modern security challenges coupled with institutional barriers to challenging well-established military doctrine, decision-making methodologies, and belief systems concerning war and warfare have ushered "military design" to the forefront of numerous militaries; designing for war is not without controversy and debate over methodological application and relation to existing warfare methods. JSOU and a small team of Polish Army educators would work in tandem to implement military design theory as currently provided within the SOCOM enterprise to international partner nations such as the Polish Armed Forces and Polish Special Forces. The JSOU andragogic approach to design education emphasizes building design facilitation capacity within the partnered organization, and this article explains the five-year process to stand up Polish-centric design concepts and customized education oriented toward Polish security challenges and attuned to cultural as well as geopolitical considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2019, Russia's Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, presented a 'strategy of active defence', a possible prelude to the forthcoming Russian military doctrine. This article examines this strategy with particular emphasis on the role of precision-guided missiles, tactical nuclear weapons and the role of the navy. It provides insights on the shape of new Russian military doctrine and the military threat Russia might represent to the West. Maren Garberg Bredesen and Karsten Friis conclude that the active defence concept may imply a lowering of the use-of-force threshold. Russia's continued build-up of tactical nuclear weapons integrated into the conventional forces reinforces this concern. ◼ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines a hypothetical six-dimension doctrine for military intelligence-gathering in the Akashic domain. The Akashic records are described by esotericists and mystics as a permanent record of all thoughts, feelings, and actions, stored in a kind of cosmic memory bank outside of space and time. Psychics, clairvoyants, and other intuitives purport to read the records, suggesting that development of an operational strategy for accessing such information may be possible. Command oversight, however, would present significant moral challenges, as "hacking" into this information would be a personally intrusive invasion of privacy with serious repercussions for the operators and state sponsors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2014, the Obama administration announced that the United States would almost entirely adopt the global ban on antipersonnel (AP) mines, despite longstanding military and political opposition. To explain this puzzling outcome, I expand upon recent accounts of rhetorical entrapment in which norm-promoting actors seek to compel change in a target actor by exploiting tensions between the target's words and actions. Tracing US policy change over the past 25 years, I show how transnational civil society and domestic political elites strategically deployed factual and normative claims to draw US officials into an iterative debate concerning the humanitarian harm of AP mines. Successive US administrations have sought to mitigate external critique by gradually conceding to the discursive framing of pro-ban advocates without endorsing the international treaty prohibiting the weapons. These rhetorical shifts stimulated a search for alternative technologies and incremental changes to military doctrine, tactics, and procurement that constrained US policy choices, culminating in the effective abandonment of AP mines despite ongoing military operations around the globe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on how the international community can prevent the accumulation of large weapon stockpiles by unstable and irresponsible regimes. It reports on several examples of massive political upheavals that led to the widespread dispersal of government weapons stocks, including several disasters in Iraq, Somalia, and Albania. It suggests steps to prevent similar disasters, which includes securing and destroying surplus weapons caches and constructing an effective foreign aid programs to help dispose weapons. It mentions that the U. S. Government Accountability Office recommends the Defense Department to incorporate consideration of conventional munitions storage security into all levels of planning of policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, and instructions.

The article discusses the nuclear policy for 2007. The author mentioned that India's nuclear capabilities and ambitions continue to progress and their nuclear policy struggled to keep up. He also included a statement from the Indian Defense Minister Shri A.K. Antony that said that the country will take all steps to give a minimum negative motivational influence to the armed forces in equal to the size and strategic position of India in the world. A discussion of the different military branches in India is also provided.

This study examines the role elite factional politics played in China's decision to attack Vietnam in February 1979. Whereas existing studies have clarified the geopolitical context and the influence of China's international relations with other states, this one unlocks the connections between the war, China's post-Mao political succession struggle, and a long-standing dispute between the supporters of two distinct military doctrines—Mao's People's War strategy and, its rival, military modernization. To establish whether causation exists, this study first identifies the causal mechanism, then conducts a careful investigation of the relationship between the decision to go to war and the power struggle that raged in Beijing at the time. Process tracing is used to conceptualize and sequence six distinct stages in the causal chain between 1959 and 1981; that is, in the lead up to, during, and in the aftermath of the war. The primary conclusion is that, in addition to international considerations, Deng Xiaoping advocated the attack on Vietnam because it allowed him to accelerate military modernization and de-Maoification and thus defeat his political rival Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng and take control of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores a theory of intelligence developed by 19th century military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz. His treatise "Vom Kriege" has had an impact on both military theory and current military doctrine which share many issues with intelligence. The resemblance between dimensions of war and the area of intelligence is discussed, as well as the impact of the human factor on intelligence.

This paper explores the construction of combat motivation in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), arguing that although Israeli society at large is in a 'Post Heroic' era, the 'Heroic Spirit' is revealed during emergencies. A total of 1535 questionnaires were administered among combat soldiers during large-scale operations fought during national emergency and during small-scale routine operations. The results reveal differences in the construction of combat motivation typical for emergency vs. routine, as well as for reserves vs. regular units. These results indicate that the Post Heroic era is a condition that could be shifted according to cultural, organisational and individual determinants. This paper discusses the roots of these constructions and their implications on the theory of combat motivation and combat experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The complicated problematic of Imperial Policing in many respects still comes down to the principle of minimum force, and much of what we consider an integral part of the modern doctrine of counterinsurgency, is perceived as by-product of post-1945 colonial experience. Charles Gwynn wrote about it in his still underestimated text-book on internal security, 'Imperial Policing'. As a result, there is a lack of clear understanding how colonial (based on local experience) knowledge was transformed into the expert (universal, transferable) knowledge in confronting rebellions at the doctrinal level. This article examines the work of Gwynn as part of a transitional stage from the age of global empires to the age of nuclear superpowers within the context of internal security doctrine. Adaptation to the new realities during the interwar period and after the World War II – reconfiguration of the British army epistemological system in confronting insurgencies – was a hard process. In this sense, the question about transformation of colonial knowledge into expert knowledge onto the field of internal security is a part of a more general and sensitive question about transition from colonialism to the post-colonial age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hybrid warfare is the latest of the terms/concepts that have been used within the defence community in the last three decades to label contemporary warfare. It has been officially adopted in the core strategic documents of NATO, EU and national governments and has already inspired many articles, policy papers and books; however, this paper is unique in the sense that it analysis the hybrid warfare concept through the lens of strategic theory. It is argued that hybrid warfare does not merit the adoption as a doctrinal concept. Strategic theory instead, which lies at the nexus of all dimensions of warfare, provides a better viewpoint to approach contemporary warfare. It concludes that efforts should be directed towards exploring warfare under the light of eternal principles instead of proving the emergence of new types of warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the evolution of the current British military joint intelligence doctrine. We argue that military intelligence doctrine is dogged by an intrinsic tension between the ethos and expectations of military doctrine and those of the professional practice of intelligence. We further argue not only that prior iterations of UK joint intelligence doctrine failed to effectively deal with this intelligence doctrine dilemma, but also that measures in the current doctrine to address this problem directly created their own problems. Moreover, as a result, otherwise sound innovations in the current UK intelligence doctrine have proven unsuitable to wider diffusion in more recent intelligence doctrine such as the new NATO intelligence doctrine which, otherwise, draws extensively on its British precursor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]