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Despite a rapid proliferation of conflict-sensitivity approaches and tools over more than two decades, a key question is largely unanswered: Why does conflict sensitivity remain a resisted concept in post-conflict peacebuilding? Regardless of socio-political contexts of armed-conflict termination, authorities in post-conflict countries, such as Nepal and Sri Lanka, often deny the existence of conflict, despite situations in which social division and polarisation continue to threaten peace and stability. This conflict denialism at the political level often engenders a type of conflict-sensitivity dilemma. This article highlights two types of conflict-sensitivity dilemma: operational dilemma and thematic dilemma. It argues that implementing conflict sensitivity requires peacebuilding and development actors to overcome these dilemmas and enhance their engagement with political elites, with consideration of the political settlement framework that shapes peacebuilding and the dynamics of conflict denialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the revived interest in new – populist and/or authoritarian – styles of leadership has been a response to developments, initially in Europe, from the late1980s on, one aspect of which has been a renewed interest in charisma and in plebiscitary leadership. How applicable are approaches to leadership developed primarily in European political science and sociology to contemporary South and Southeast Asia? Building both on Weber's classical account of charismatic authority, and on more recent work, we propose a relational conception of charisma as an interaction between leader and followers. This leader-follower dialectic is a key characteristic of contemporary populist politics. In order to investigate the ways in which populist leaders appeal to followers, we apply this relational conception of charisma to two Asian national cases: India under Narendra Modi and Myanmar under Aung San Suu Kyi during the – now arrested – period of transition from military rule. We shall be primarily concerned with one specific form of charisma: plebiscitary leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the politics of human rights in Pacific Island Countries (PICs). It expands the focus from "culture" to "institutions" to analyze how PICs have engaged with the international human rights regime. We reveal that although the Pacific Island Countries have ratified more international human rights treaties and engaged proactively with the international human rights regime in recent years, this shift has not substantially led to accountability necessary to protect, respect, and promote human rights. To unpack this contradiction, we propose an analytical approach, what we call, an "institutional logic." Using the institutional logic, we argue that the current situation of human rights in PICs is primarily determined by the presence or absence of necessary institutional arrangements pertaining to rights. Thus, we conclude by suggesting that significant institutional reforms are indispensable for protecting and promoting human rights in PICs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines issues facing peace and conflict scholars, peace practitioners and policy-makers in developing countries, wherein the rise of populism and right-wing extremism intersect with armed violence and social conflicts. Topics discussed include the inverse relationship between democracy and populism in these countries, a three-dimensional framework to understand the interplay between populism and peacebuilding in these countries, and the value of populism for peacebuilding.

Myanmar's path to democracy, freedom and development has been marred by emerging Buddhist religious extremism targeted against the Rohingya Muslims. This article examines the rise of Buddhist religious extremism in Myanmar. Its core focus is on the political economy of state-building and development, and the structural and social conditions that have produced violence. We argue that contested state-society relations, negotiated by the discourse of state-building and development rather than religion and religious ideologies alone, can better explain the current dynamics of extremist violence in Myanmar. We show that hegemonic state-building processes (that have been ongoing since Myanmar became independent in 1948) and exploitative development serve as a site for inequalities and discriminatory policies. These policies and their manipulation for political and developmental gains have had multiple social effects: they have radicalised a section of Buddhists, resulting in the rise of violent religious extremism, and marginalisation and double victimisation of the Rohingya Muslims, targeted by the State security forces as well as Buddhist extremist groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]