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Traditional separation of powers models assert that the Supreme Court takes into consideration the policy preferences of other institutions and behaves strategically so as to place legal policy at its preferred policy point. The vagueness doctrine, however, asserts that the Court determines statute constitutionality not from strategically calculating institutional ideological preferences but from the degree of specificity of the statute's language itself. This study finds that the vagueness doctrine better predicts Court declarations of unconstitutionality than preference-based models, suggesting that the language of the law itself is crucial to statutory decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Congress passes statutes defining particular areas of the law, but the Supreme Court can interpret those statutes. This tension over the meaning of the rule of law has profound implications for democratic theory and the separation of powers. Though scholars have examined whether the Supreme Court issues decisions against the preferences of Congress, there has been little focus on whether legislators can constrain the Court. Our study examines how much discretion Congress provides in statutes it enacts into law. Our basic argument is that ideological decision making by Supreme Court justices depends upon the level of discretion Congress incorporates into the law. The greater the discretion, the less constraint federal judges and justices will encounter, making them more likely to vote according to their individual ideologies. Conversely, more detailed statutes will reduce the judges' discretion. Using data on 1953-96 Supreme Court decisions, our analysis supports this model of contingent discretion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article briefly examines the history of federal court adjudication of national security issues to determine how judges have employed specific legal rationales for deciding not to decide in order to avoid confrontation with the executive branch. By focusing on the historical development of these legal strategies, we demonstrate that while judges have been generally deferential to the executive on national security issues, this deference increases in times of crisis. Through a series of qualitative case studies, we examine the use of threshold issues as a legally justifiable means to avoid ruling on the merits. Specifically, we focus on the use of the political question and act of state doctrines both historically and in the post-September 11th environment. We conclude that the federal courts continue to employ these techniques to avoid resolving challenges to national security, thereby promoting a continued deference to the executive branch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though previous research on party capability demonstrates that the "haves" win more often in litigation than the "have-nots," this conclusion contradicts the conventional wisdom among the general populace that views the judiciary as the institution most likely to protect individual rights. This raises the question whether an area of the law exists where the courts tend to favor the have-nots over the haves. Using data from the Courts of Appeals Database, our results demonstrate that health-care policy cases present an opportunity for the have-nots to offset advantages typically possessed by the haves, thereby increasing their chances to prevail in litigation. Whether one examines average success rates for appellants, the "net advantage" for litigants, or a more sophisticated statistical model, the data indicate that individuals (i.e., the have-nots) typically enjoy larger success rates than either state and local government or the federal government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes foreign affairs litigation in the United States Courts of Appeals. Understanding of how the judiciary operates in the foreign relations scheme; Influence of competing preferences on decision making; Paradoxical dilemma facing judges in foreign policy cases; Theoretical expectations for judicial behavior.