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Rice with a high resistant starch (RS) content is one the most commonly used, effective, and safe functional foods, which can be used to prevent diabetes and its related complications in humans. Based on the health benefits (highest to lowest), the types of RS can be categorized as follows: RS1> RS3> RS5> RS4> RS2. Here, we discuss the biosynthesis and mechanism of action [processing changes, biochemistry, and glycemic index (GI)] of the five RS types present in rice as well as their potential of preventing diabetes-related diseases, based on reports published from 2004 to 2021 in PubMed, CNKI, and ISI Web of Science databases. High-RS rice has gained considerable interest owing to the advantages it offers as a staple food product and its potential for controlling appetite with satiety, lowering glucose levels in the stomach and small intestine, and increasing the short-chain fatty acid content in the large intestine, which helps combat metabolic syndrome by controlling gluconeogenesis, promoting glycogenesis, maintaining glucose and lipid homeostasis, and improving pancreatic function. Rice is an important source of RS (>3%, GI<55) and can help prevent diabetes. However, certain types of rice have a high GI (>85), which may induce metabolic syndrome. The RS content of rice ranges from 0.1% to 25.4% and the GI ranges from 44 to 132, which has many factors relating in the white rice. In this review, we discuss the diversity in RS content based on the biosynthetic mechanism and the mechanism of action of high-RS rice in diabetes. We also discuss potential limitations of rice breeding programs and the methods that can be used to ensure the availability of effective, yet palatable, high-RS rice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article gives a holistic re-examination of the semantic content and syntactic structure of the concept of relative identity: it suggests and explains an expanded and enhanced dual-track characterization of relative identity. It is expanded in this sense: its due coverage is not narrowly restricted to the equal-status case of identity statements (the symmetric case for identity simplex) but also includes the category-assimilating case (the asymmetric case for identity complex), both of which are unified by the shared semantic core content of relative identity. It is enhanced in this sense: it is intended to give a more refined characterization of relative identity for the sake of enhancing our understanding of the structure and content of real-life relative-identity statements in people’s basic employment of language in view of the relation between thought, language, and the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explore the issue of how the validity of the parallel inference (as a type of deductive reasoning) is possible in view of its deep semantic-syntactic structure. I first present a philosophical interpretation of the ancient Mohist treatment of the parallel inference concerning its semantic-syntactic structure. Then, to formally and accurately capture the later Mohist point in this connection for the sake of giving a general condition for the validity of the parallel inference, I suggest a modern logical treatment via an expanded predicate logic account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, through a comparative analysis of Dewey's and Laozi's relevant accounts, I examine a pragmatic insight concerning moral rules and moral experience to the effect that (i) fixed and formulated moral rules should not be taken as the final absolute moral authority, and (ii) attention needs to be paid to the moral agent's own moral experience that responds to the felt demands in concrete situations. The purpose of this paper is to enhance understanding the crucial points of the pragmatic insight and to look at how, in certain complementary ways, Dewey's and Laozi's distinct approaches could contribute to the pragmatic insight and learn from each other. I endeavour to show several points: (1) The pragmatic insight has its distinct metaphysical foundations in Dewey's and Laozi's accounts, whose combination could enhance each other's visions and overcome each other's limitations; (2) Both Dewey and Laozi reject some sharp dualism to look at the nature of moral experience that responds to the felt demands in concrete situations; in so doing, their distinct focuses on different aspects, or developing stages, of such moral experience could be complementarily coordinated into a whole; (3) Their characterisations of the pragmatic insight are also based upon their distinct but related naturalistic perspectives to human moral foundation; Laozi's approach could provide some constructive insight for and due natural limitations on Dewey's account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]