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Republic of Korea (ROK) lobbying in the United States during the 1970s, which blew up into the Koreagate scandal, is a widely known but understudied episode in US-ROK relations. Utilizing declassified documents from the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this article argues President Park Chung Hee was pressured by Congressional condemnation of his human rights abuses and he sought to tame criticism through lobbying. To this end, ROK diplomats actively lobbied Congress in an attempt to guide the narrative of human rights hearings, temper legislation to cut military aid and force withdrawal of US troops from Korea, and silence critics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Syrian War, the US and other Western countries trained, equipped and paid Syrian rebels to fight the government and, later, root out the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). When states use armed groups to attain foreign policy objectives, control is a key concern. The US sought to enforce such control over providers and recipients of lethal military assistance in the period from 2013–18. We investigate the parallel CIA and Department of Defence assistance programmes. We challenge theoretical assumptions related to the application of the principal-agent model to explain the dynamics of foreign assistance to rebels. We argue that, in the US strategy to control rebels, co-ordinating the providers and dividing the recipients of security assistance were essential conditions. Meanwhile, the delays in recruitment, the limitations on the number of soldiers trained, the short supply of weapons and the strict regulation of the actions carried out by the rebels all reduced the efficacy of the assistance. This way of instrumentalising security assistance helped the US and its Western allies to crush ISIL while avoiding a collapse in Damascus. However, this happened at the expense of rebel cohesion, autonomy, and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines patterns and factors influencing U.S. civil-military relations interventions in developing countries. Drawing on theories of new clientelism and geopolitics, it proposes developing states’ political traditions and U.S. geostrategic interests jointly shape U.S. intervention policies through an interactive effect. Quantitative analysis of U.S. military assistance and engagement data across 97 developing countries (1990–2020) supports key hypotheses: U.S. civil-military intervention is higher in military-dominated polities and states of major geostrategic interest, with military political traditions amplifying geostrategic factors. Case studies of Egypt and India further reveal differentiated pathways of U.S. military influence across varying political systems. The findings provide new explanations of U.S. foreign military behavior, analytical perspectives on Third World military diplomacy, and insights for developing countries in responding to great power military pressures while preserving sovereignty and security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis article critically examines the shifting dynamics of foreign aid politics within the Gulf states. Historically rooted in cultural factors and solidarity with Arab and Muslim nations, foreign aid from prominent donors such as the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has undergone a profound transformation. Their aid has evolved from solidarity aid into an effective instrument of foreign policy, used strategically to project power and expand regional influence. This shift has not only redefined the role of Gulf countries in international and regional politics but has also catalysed the transformation of states in the broader Middle East. This article, therefore, seeks to answer the following two questions: (1) How do we explain the evolution of the politicisation of Gulf foreign aid? and (2) To what extent has the provision of Gulf foreign aid been a crucial determinant of changing regional dynamics in the Middle East, particularly since the Arab uprisings in 2011? It argues that Gulf donors have become crucial power brokers, shaping the politics and trajectories of key states such as Egypt post 2011. Their substantial financial assistance has proven instrumental in steering political and socio-economic transformations, highlighting the pivotal role of Gulf aid in shaping regional affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Democrat Party’s (DP) decade-long period in office ended with a military intervention on 27 May 1960. In the coup declaration, the National Unity Committee (NUC) announced that Turkey would remain loyal to its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) alliances as well as Turkey’s other international commitments. Turkey’s economic and military dependence on the USA (United States of America) also remained unchanged, contrary to the expectations of the Kemalists, leftists, and anti-DP circles who had mythicized the NUC’s role in Turkey’s independence from the USA. This study examines primary sources such as US archival records and the records of the Turkey’s constituent assembly and provisional government. It analyses the diplomatic relations between Turkey and the USA during this period and shows how Turkey’s dependence on the USA continued through economic and military assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Small-state leaders can profit enormously by collaborating with great powers on clandestine intelligence activities. The United States historically has provided billions of dollars in military and economic aid to intelligence liaison partners that host intelligence collections facilities or support joint covert operations. While many of these relationships are characterized by trust and mutual benefit, others are subject to a constant struggle for control. Unlike the scrutiny paid to overt base negotiations, this clandestine bargaining largely has been overlooked in intelligence and International Relations literature. This review of the negotiations surrounding the U.S.–Pakistani joint covert operations in Afghanistan during the 1980s addresses this void. Declassified documents and memoirs reveal that Pakistani leaders deliberately deceived Washington as to their motives and commitment to the joint Afghan program in order to maximize their negotiating leverage. This case study demonstrates that acquiring accurate information regarding a partner's intentions is a critical factor in determining power dynamics within an intelligence liaison relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2004, competition between the European Union (EU) and Russia over the European political, economic and security order intensified sporadically, with a focal point in Ukraine. The EU's main mitigation tactic in response to this competition used to be denial, but in 2022, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this approach became untenable. As a result, the EU entered the competition as an emerging geopolitical actor in three important respects: engaging in a conflict over the European order; utilising its (still limited) hard power; and extending its geographical borders. Most importantly, the EU is actively trying to shape the future of the European order that was challenged by Russia's war against Ukraine. While pursuing its goals predominantly through civilian means, the EU has also taken major steps to strengthen its hard power capabilities and contributed military assistance. Furthermore, by granting candidate country status to Ukraine, it took a clear stance on its future borders, while these were violently contested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the Anglo-Nigerian negotiations for a Royal Navy training team during the Nigerian Civil War against the background of Africa's 'phoney' Cold War and Britain's global strategic withdrawal. This allows it to show Britain's diplomatic manoeuvres to simultaneously prevent provoking debilitating opposition against its tightrope policy of supporting Federal Nigeria against Biafra and safeguard its significant, predominantly economic – particularly oil – interests in Nigeria. Initially inconvenienced by the Nigerian request for a naval training team, British policymakers gradually agreed to send one after the war, then promised to do so already before, and, after the foreign policy establishment had overcome the Ministry of Defence's resistance, finally sent out Royal Navy officers to Nigeria before the end of hostilities. In this process, the Nigerians had allies in the British High Commission in Lagos and the Foreign (and Commonwealth) Office, as well as substantial leverage as a result of Indian and Soviet competition in the Nigerian market for military assistance. Yet this leverage was mitigated by the Federals' preference for British over Indian military assistance, and fear of becoming too reliant on Moscow. Not only in the British, but also in the Nigerian case, diplomatic concerns thus outweighed the military rationale for the naval training team, and this 'diplomacy of military assistance' contrasts with the basic tenor of the theoretical literature on military assistance in civil wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits the formulation of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between South Korea (ROK) and the United States. It situates the treaty's development in a more international and greater historical context by tracing how certain preceding developments, especially the existing security arrangements, could have impacted the shaping of the ROK-US MDT. The aim is to better understand the origins of this momentous agreement and what it stands for. A thorough examination of how the alliance was first forged suggests that the "bilateral" ROK-US alliance is more international in character than hitherto thought in a sense that developments in the Americas, Europe and the wider Pacific impacted the shaping of the ROK-US MDT. It seems fair to say this was an early indication that the ROK-US alliance could not be isolated from major unfolding of events elsewhere around the world. This has important implications for Seoul, as the future of ROK-US alliance recently came to the fore as the US continues to wrestle with the developments in the Indo-Pacific. In addition to this contemporary significance, this study also has academic significance as it seeks to fill certain gaps in the existing historiography, such as Washington's experience negotiating the North Atlantic alliance and its bearing on the ROK-US MDT, and thereby offer a more balanced understanding of the ROK-US alliance. This article represents the author's own opinion and in no way reflects the views of the Institute for Military History. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the provision of military aid to Ukraine during the first year after the 2022 Russian invasion and explains why it was more effective compared to other examples. It discusses the impact of material and intangible military assistance. The article examines tensions arising from principal-agent relationships between Ukraine and the states that provided support that may have affected what was provided and when it was delivered. It is notable that providers of assistance emphasised equipment rather than training, a choice that could be made because Ukraine had already built up a high level of combat skills and military organisation. The article argues that the distinctive aspects of military assistance to Ukraine that led to its impact were the quality and quantity of equipment provided, good communication and co-ordination between Ukraine and those states providing assistance, and that Ukrainian defence and government institutions could manage the aid provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents on trends in military spending, building on the most recent military expenditure data by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). World military spending grew for the eighth consecutive year in 2022, up 3.7 per cent to an all-time high of $2240 billion. The increase in world spending in 2022 was largely due to three factors: Russia's invasion of Ukraine; the increase in military spending by Central and Western Europe countries as a reaction to the invasion and expenditure rises in major powers in Asia, namely China, India and Japan. There were two major military expenditure related developments in 2022 linked to the war in Ukraine. Firstly, Central and Western European responded to the deteriorating security situation by announcing plans to substantially increases their military spending. Some of the acutest increases in military spending took place in countries with close geographical proximity to Russia and Ukraine. Secondly were the immediate and record levels of military aid sent to Ukraine. Based on official figures for the largest donors and other assistance funds, at least $30 billion worth of military aid was given to Ukraine in 2022, with the US as the largest provider accounting for around two-thirds of all military aid [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers sometimes argue that material assistance to rebels involved in a civil war can create a 'ripe moment' that is favorable for negotiations. Ripeness theory provides support for this idea. However, this notion has never been systematically assessed. This article evaluates this claim by using global data on negotiations in all intrastate armed conflicts from 1975 to 2009. Contrary to popular belief, the article demonstrates that external state support to rebel groups does not increase the prospect of negotiations. Instead, the results suggest that external support is likely to reduce the likelihood of negotiations between the warring parties, especially if the state sponsor is a great power. The study contributes to our understanding of civil war processes by demonstrating that military assistance hinders rather than promotes the onset of negotiations and by questioning the utility of ripeness theory as the most suitable framework for understanding this phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What sort of military assistance has Ukraine received to date from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members since 2014? What has driven NATO allies' decisions to provide military assistance to Ukraine? This essay addresses both questions. It offers a preliminary examination of how strategic, economic, and risk considerations might have shaped NATO members' decisions regarding arms transfers to Ukraine, a country that remains outside of the Alliance but nevertheless is an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. Using both a qualitative analysis of post-2014 assistance and a purpose-built dataset combining military aid to Ukraine since late January 2022, we find that prior strategic preparation in the form of investments in military readiness and infrastructure is strongly associated with military aid to Ukraine. Economic considerations and prominent risk factors such as fossil fuel dependency thus far have not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study seeks to answer why Turkey could not reach its defense industry targets despite the efforts between 1919-1950. Defense industry was significant for the government's foreign policies and efficiency. The problems in defense industrial infrastructure and absence of a private industrial sector were significant reasons for falling of the empire. During Turkish Independence War and in early Republican Era, lack of national defense industry remained as a crucial problem. Thus the government considered the establishment of indigenous defense industry as a strategic target and invested limited resources. Despite, by the end of the World War II, Turkish Republic still failed to fulfil military requirements. This failure led Turkey to join NATO due to security requirements against USSR. It led to dependency on Western military assistance. Turkey's failure was due to lack of corporate planning, inadequate investment financing, and the difference between current human resources and strategic target requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What should matter, for Shesterinina's text, was whether Abkhaz might have I believed i that someone in Moscow I would i pick up the phone. Shesterinina revisits a contested social history in order to place readers in a sympathetic lineage running back through decades of Abkhaz social memory. In I Mobilizing in Uncertainty i ([1]), Anastasia Shesterinina curates a set of memories shared by Abkhaz community members. [Extracted from the article]

Using Foreign Ministry Archives and memoirs from China, this article explains the nature and the development of Chinese policy in the Congo Crisis, in particular, Beijing's support of two Lumumbist movements in Kwilu and eastern Congo in 1963–5. While initially loyal to the Soviet Union, China sought to position itself as the leader of the newly independent 'Third World', sympathetic to – and able to provide experience, training and weaponry for – rural guerrilla struggles. However, China's military assistance to opposition movements in Congo had to make sure not to provoke direct conflict with the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the current conflict in northern Mozambique as a case study, we argue that the South African government and its current legislation on private military and security companies (PMSCs) has prevented it from being a more effective agent for peace in the region. South Africa's current legislation – the Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998 (FMA) and the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities Act of 2006 (PMA) – creates a situation, a deliberate and intentional one, where PMSCs are unable to operate effectively effectively. Therefore PMSCs do not operate from South Africa, despite South African PMSCs being well regarded and experienced internationally. The FMA and PMA also oppose a general international trend which is seeing increased use and acceptance of PMSCs. We argue that the conflict in northern Mozambique is an example where legislation which is more accepting of the PMSC industry would have allowed South Africa to provide more (and earlier) assistance to Mozambique. This would have helped Mozambique and the region, but, importantly, it would also have been a valuable tool in South Africa's foreign diplomacy and projected the potential for the use of smart power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shortfalls in personnel are common across UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). An ongoing concern is that many PKOs lack sufficient resources to effectively fulfil their mandates. This may in turn be a major contributing factor to shortages of peacekeepers. How do provisions of non-personnel resources to UN PKOs shape other states' voluntary commitments of peacekeeping personnel? This study focuses on the role of the U.S.'s voluntary peacekeeping assistance as a mechanism for reducing personnel shortfall. By providing additional assistance for specific peacekeeping operations, the U.S. enhances the ability of states that are willing but lack the resources to deploy peacekeepers and increases the willingness of states that are otherwise reluctant to make personnel commitments to these operations. In turn, these provisions of support lead to greater personnel commitments to the missions where the U.S. allocates this aid. Results from an analysis of U.S. peacekeeping assistance and personnel commitments within UN operations from 2000 to 2015 indicate that these aid provisions lead to reductions in shortfalls of peacekeepers. These findings suggest that the U.S. not only increases collective personnel commitments by providing this additional assistance but, in doing so, may also enhance the effectiveness of the missions it supports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their ambitious article, Joshua Alley and Matthew Fuhrmann ask how "alliance commitments affect US military spending." This does not mean alliances are ineffective instruments of deterrence; it shows that the substantive relationship between alliance commitments and spending remains strong even after accounting for any cost savings that alliances generate by deterring military disputes - at least in this sample.[79] We must be circumspect in interpreting this evidence. Reviewing the (Budgetary) Costs of US Alliances Applying a host of statistical analyses to data on US alliance commitments and US military expenditures from 1947 to 2019, Alley and Fuhrmann find that one new alliance commitment adds between $11 billion and $21 billion annually to the defense budget. [Extracted from the article]

This article explores the prospect of transforming the Philippine-U.S. alliance into a security partnership. In the past, the Philippines doubted the U.S.'s often-repeated commitment to assist its ally because the 1951 Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) merely stipulated consultation rather than an automatic armed response in case of an armed conflict. In mid-2011, the Aquino Administration asked for an unequivocal U.S. guarantee to defend the Philippines and its naval/air units deployed in the Spratlys. The Duterte Administration, however, has expressed its uncertainty over America's willingness to back the Philippines militarily in any confrontation with China over the disputed maritime territory. Early this year, President Rodrigo Duterte commented that an armed clash in the South China Sea would crush the Philippines because the involvement of American forces would make the conflict spiral out of control. This development, along with his decision to abrogate the 1997 Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), has generated a crisis in the alliance. To avert any break-down in their overall security relations, the two allies can explore the possibility of downgrading their alliance to a security partnership. In conclusion, the article argues that should the Philippines consider this option, it must take into account the following: the consequence of losing the deterrence effect of a defence treaty with the world's most powerful nation; the impact on Philippine defence spending; on the ongoing Armed Forces of the Philippines' (AFP's) modernisation program; and whether or not the Filipino nation will support this move. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Respect for human rights is one of the main conditions for European Union (EU) cooperation with third countries. When human rights are gravely violated, the EU can apply a variety of restrictive measures ranging from issuing sanctions threats to imposing economic sanctions. However, can such measures impact the subsequent human rights situation in the target country, and under what conditions? Using time-series cross-sectional data accounting for eleven post-Soviet states over a period of twenty-six years (1991–2016), this article demonstrates that the impact of sanctions on the target's human rights situation depends on two factors – the type of sanction applied and the extent of the target's linkage with alternative regional powers. In the absence of regional alternative support, sanctions in the form of arms embargoes and aid suspension demonstrate a positive effect on the human rights situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After a quarter-century during which it was a relatively rare phenomenon, external military intervention is now a common occurrence during contemporary civil war. Research has highlighted the additional challenges that this poses for peacemaking, but to date has not identified evidence to inform mediators assisting negotiations to resolve internationalized civil conflict. This paper addresses this inadequacy by undertaking a structured, focused comparison of a series of mediation processes in six internationalized civil wars during in the 1980s. I find that effective mediation in this era involved now unfamiliar negotiation process designs related to the types of mandates issued to mediators, participation arrangements for talks and strategic choices on how to best sequence and symbiotically link the external and internal dimensions of civil war negotiations. Likewise, internationalized civil wars introduce a distinct class of issues for negotiation, including troop withdrawals and curtailing outside military assistance, non-intervention pledges, possible foreign policy reform of the civil war state and bespoke international roles in implementation. The paper closes by considering the issue of ripeness in relation to internationalized civil wars and the possible applications of these findings to contemporary mediation processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Bolsheviks consolidated their newly won power, they looked toward the Western democracies to achieve additional victories. Under cover of diplomatic recognition, trade agreements, and local communist parties, Soviets sent numerous clandestine agents abroad to pursue national security objectives, including theft of military and industrial secrets on a large scale. France, Britain, and the United States were the main targets in which, organizationally, Soviet intelligence used a consistent pattern. As an existential threat, France was the first priority until displaced by the fear of German rearmament. France represented a rich resource for advanced military and industrial technology that the Soviets needed to transform Russia's infrastructure. In 1935, France and Russia signed a mutual defense pact that effectively ended Soviet espionage in France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a speech given by Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy in which he expresses his gratitude to the global community for their support against Russia's aggression towards Ukraine. He emphasizes the need to continue the fight against the Kremlin's attempts to control the minds of people. He highlights the importance of the U.S. support in Ukraine's fight for freedom, as well as the need for more military aid to help defend their cities against Russian attacks.

US–Turkish relations were marked by the primacy of military actors during the Cold War. This is considered to be the consequence of the so-called special relationship between the US and Turkish militaries based on mutual trust. However, historical record suggests that the two militaries clashed over a number of institutional, strategic and cultural matters from the onset. The US military assistance did not result in Turkish military's transformation along the US military system. Nevertheless, it precipitated a long overdue generational change within a decade. The US-trained young officers purged the Prussian/German–trained old guard from the ranks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a world of global interdependent security, the West is increasingly involved in the stability of all regions that could directly or indirectly influence national interests. To this end, security sector assistance (SSA), with its' perceived favourable effect-to-resource-ratio, has become somewhat of a panacea. For small states, coalition SSA has become the way to pursue own ambitions with military means internationally. But SSA is a difficult task, especially for miniscule contributors with scarce resources. We therefore ask: How can small states achieve the highest yield from their SSA-efforts? From a Norwegian perspective, and focusing on the SOF component, this article provides a practitioner's view on how to increase the military contribution to strategic utility. Through understanding the wicked problem SSA represents, and adhering to the principles of long-term commitment, vertical implementation, and specialised skillsets, we argue small states might gain a disproportionate advantage allowing them to punch above own weight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded exclusively to focus on economic integration. However, in 1976, the Nigerian government proposed the adoption of a non-aggression protocol to regulate issues of regional collective security. The proposal was accepted in principle and the secretariat was tasked to formulate policy prescriptions for adoption of the decision organs. Using historical techniques, this article peruses existing literature, official reports and minutes of meetings of the ECOWAS authority and Council of Ministers to highlight the successes of the executive secretariat and reflect on the political, structural and security challenges that it encountered in facilitating the implementation of inter-organisational cooperation in the Liberian crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Southern Somalia has attracted substantial military aid and assistance for decades. As the state disintegrated in the late 1980s, clan dynamics became more critical, warlords emerged, and power bases shifted. Since 2008, the number of foreign military forces and advisors (including private military contractors) has substantially increased, as has the creation of numerous Somali security units. Such actions are symptomatic of broader trends concerning multilateral attempts to rebuild security forces in fractious states, where security assistance activities lack unity or common national interests. This has resulted in various Somali military forces with different loyalties (domestic and international), capabilities, and priorities in each Federal Member State (FMS). Uneven foreign military training programs in the context of survival politics fuels the fragmentation of various security forces. Locally appropriate military forces in each FMS potentially appear to be more effective at resisting Al-Shabaab. However, locally appropriate military forces contribute to further fragmentation, as security donors bypass the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to directly assist these localized forces. This accelerates devolution of military forces outside of FGS control. These assessments are based on fieldwork and interviews with security officials in East Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What motivates states to provide others with military assistance? Traditional explanations naturally focus on the security interests of the sender state. But could domestic considerations – intra-party politics, for example – also be a factor in some cases? This analysis, which examines the British decision to send a Military Advisory Team [MAT] to the newly federated United Arab Emirates [UAE] in 1971, answers in the affirmative. It demonstrates that the MAT was primarily, albeit not exclusively, a means by which the British government of Prime Minister Edward Heath could stave off sharp criticism from fellow Conservative politicians that under his leadership that Britain was cutting and running from its overseas responsibilities. Furthermore, because the MAT was in inception a political tool, its military utility in assisting the UAE, or the influence Britain derived from its presence, was minimal at best and counterproductive at worst. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the initial implementation of US military assistance to Spain under the lopsided Mutual Defence Agreement of 1953. The process was characterised by the disparity in the objectives of both sides, the centrality of the military training programmes, and the logistical and organisational limitations of the Spanish Armed Forces to assimilate American aid. The Ifni-Sahara decolonisation conflict of 1957–58 in Northwest Africa, in which Spain was forced to seek French military cooperation, made apparent the conditioned and limited nature of US military assistance and Madrid's need to diversify its security partners during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits moral hazard associated with military aid given to host countries to eliminate their resident terrorist groups. This conflict aid presents recipient countries with perverse incentives because the aid ends once resident groups are removed. In the case of US aid recipients, the longevity of resident terrorist groups rose dramatically. The current article improves on the empirics of the pioneering article by showing that the moral-hazard concerns extend to other major donors – the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Additionally, military assistance given by a collective of countries to host countries greatly reduces the moral hazard but does not eliminate it. Moreover, policy alignment or affinity between a major donor and the host aid-recipient country does not generally augment resident terrorist groups' survival, except marginally for the United States, when other sources of military aid are allowed. We introduce other empirical and conceptual innovations for analyzing military-aid-induced moral hazard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We distinguish between U.S. aid and non-U.S. aid and study the effects on growth in recipient countries. Our analysis exploits time variation in aid due to changes in the supply of U.S. aid and cross-sectional variation in a country's tendency to receive any U.S. aid. We find that U.S. aid has a positive effect on growth. In particular, U.S. economic aid has a positive effect on growth while U.S. military and food aid have no effect on growth. There is also no evidence of U.S. aid crowding out aid from other countries. The effect of U.S. aid on growth is smaller for countries that are well endowed with natural resources, less ethnically polarized, and more aligned with the U.S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing literature has looked at different aspects of the socialist bloc's assistance to liberation movements in southern Africa. However, there is little scholarly work that analyses the experiences and narratives of Soviets who assisted liberation movements on the ground. This article looks at the narratives of Soviet military advisers, specialists and interpreters who fulfilled their 'international duty' in Angola during the Cold War. Using the approach to storytelling developed by Hannah Arendt and Michael Jackson, it argues that telling stories about the war in Angola plays important roles for the narrators. It allows them to revive and give value to the concept of internationalism; demonstrate their ability to act independently, despite political, ideological and military strictures; address the injustices they faced during and after their international duty. The article also shows that it has been difficult for Soviet veterans of the Angolan War to transform their personal experiences into an inter-subjective discourse able to enter the public sphere, owing to official restrictions, the lack of an audience and the difficulty of explaining their story in contemporary Russia, where Soviet values no longer matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on innovative conceptual definitions to capture the various terms and ideas that abound concerning the delivery of military assistance, aid, and training in fragile states, often subsumed under the term security force assistance (SFA). It highlights different Kurdish militias and units within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to demonstrate inherent problems with any SFA program. We conduct a conceptual, theoretical, and empirical analysis to evaluate variations, concluding that in these contexts the definition of success and military effectiveness is contextual, often deviating from what the providers, such as the U.S. and other nations, may desire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, military assistance in southern Somalia focused on building up a central state army. This reflects standard patterns of Western assistance worldwide. Yet the nature of Somali society and clan, greatly affected by the winnowing process of more than 30 years of conflict, means that most sub-clan groupings are more militarily effective than centralised forces deployed to unfamiliar areas. The centralised Somali National Army remains riven by clan itself, thoroughly politicised, and ineffective (with the exception of the Danab special forces). Based on fieldwork and interviews with military personnel who work in Somalia, Colin D Robinson and Jahara Matisek argue that these locally appropriate forces deserve assistance, albeit with some caveats, in the continuing struggle against Al-Shabaab.◼ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the effects of foreign security assistance on the quality of the peace in post-conflict countries? Despite the stakes, and the tremendous amount of weaponry and other forms of foreign military aid flowing to governments of post-conflict countries, the academic literature provides little guidance as to what effects policymakers and practitioners should expect from this type of aid. Military assistance provided to the government of a country emerging from the turmoil of civil war could enable the state to establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, leading to a more durable peace and greater human security. However, we contend that significant flows of military aid and weapons from foreign governments may encourage regimes to adopt more repressive approaches to governance. We investigate the impact of security assistance on human rights conditions after 171 internal armed conflicts that ended between 1956 and 2012 using a novel measure of military aid and an instrumented measure of weapons transfers. We find strong evidence that both military aid and arms transfers to post-conflict governments increase state repression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the 9/11 attacks in particular, there has been a controversial discussion in the academic and public arena on whether the United States' close relationship with Israel has made it a likelier target of transnational terrorism. Indeed, foreign terrorist organizations with various ideological profiles have repeatedly justified attacks against U.S. interests as punishment for the (purported) special relationship between the United States and Israel. We analyze the effect of various measures of U.S. support for Israel (e.g. U.S. military assistance to Israel) on anti-American terrorism for the period 1970–2014. Using both time-series and panel approaches, we do not find that more U.S. support for Israel systematically translates into more anti-American terrorism. Rather, other systemic (e.g. U.S. dominance in the international system) and local conditions (e.g. local state failure) are found to predict the patterns of anti-American terrorism. However, as a qualification to these general findings, we also provide some (preliminary) evidence that for terrorism originating from the Middle East and Northern Africa a favorable U.S. policy stance towards Israel may indeed contribute to more anti-American terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growth in the role of the military sector of certain Soviet states in the overall structure of the national economy, to the detriment of other sectors, along with providing military assistance to other countries, with government subsidies to unprofitable enterprises and long-term unproductive production that never reached a buyer—these were the factors that provided the prime conditions for the collapse of the Soviet Union. The authors survey the stark economic status of the country, and show that in conditions of complete deficit citizens would value highly any chance to get hold of products that reflected the viability and status of their owners, even though the quality of these products declined steadily for a number of reasons. This article seeks to describe in detail the reasons and components of these prerequisites, as a way to review life in Russian society under conditions of shortage and poverty that presaged the collapse of the USSR, and the consequences this all had for post-Soviet Russian culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the inauguration of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) in 1950, until its termination in the early 1960s, Norway was among the main European beneficiaries of military assistance from the United States. Previous research on this subject has mainly seen the MDAP from the perspective of the recipient, analysing what effect the influx of large amounts of equipment had for the shape and development of the Norwegian Armed Forces. This article discusses the motives for US military assistance to Norway, and analyses this activity as an expression of US Cold War objectives concerning Norway and NATO's northern flank. The article also explores how these objectives influenced policy making relevant to military assistance, and gives particular attention to the role of US representatives in Oslo. These actors played an important role in highlighting the political and strategic benefits of extensive aid to Norway. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sri Lanka is a small country with limited resources. Historically, its politics have been dominated by a Sinhalese/Buddhist majority. Non-alignment has been viewed as a matter of principle in foreign policy and as a means to provide for Sri Lanka's political and economic security. Sri Lanka has had to balance its relations with the major powers and its immediate neighbours as well as Israel and its Arab and Muslim neighbours. The last relationship has been the most difficult to navigate and, at times, has had the appearance of expediency rather than consistency. Somehow, Sri Lanka has been able to navigate its way quite effectively in foreign relations, while domestic affairs have been another matter. While there are numerous studies on India's and Pakistan's relations with countries in the Middle East, Sri Lanka's ties to the region have received little or no attention by scholars. This article intends to remedy the situation with a comprehensive historical examination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although China's assistance to North Vietnam was substantial, playing a vital role in Hanoi's war against the United States, this policy was made based on Beijing's strategic calculation and ideological conviction rather than on Hanoi's needs. The Chinese leadership attempted to use aid to influence Hanoi's approach to the war, but achieved almost no effect. Instead, Beijing's manipulation made Hanoi suspicious about the Chinese leadership's real intentions in Indochina, and Beijing's effort to help Hanoi against the United States was arguably its biggest, unexpected foreign policy failure in the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Norway, Sweden and Finland have proclaimed a willingness to cooperate militarily in a future crisis or conflict despite their diverging alliance affiliation. This article assesses their ability to do so through various elements affecting their interoperability, with Arctic Challenge, a multinational military exercise, as an empirical basis. The analysis finds that the NATO/non-NATO-divide has a negative impact on the trilateral defence cooperation, especially on exchange of information and aspects related to command and control. At the same time, Finland and Sweden have become largely NATO-standardized through their active partnership with the Alliance. This has affected interoperability aspects, such as communication, culture, and the compatibility of technical solutions, in a positive manner. Through agreements with the Alliance, as well as domestic legal changes, the two NATO-partners have facilitated receiving military assistance from Norway and other NATO-members during a crisis. Other agreements between the Nordic countries, however, have been limited to peacetime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do international actors influence dissidents' decisions whether to challenge their states using violent means, nonviolence, both or neither? We argue that the presence of important actors affects dissident decisions to engage in violent or nonviolent contention by affecting whether dissidents expect that governments will repress or concede to dissident demands in response to this contention. We examine the effect of two prominent types of actors – powerful states with close ties to the government and Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations (HSIGOs) on dissident behavior in all national-level elections in Africa from 2000–2012. Using integrated data drawn from four leading conflict events datasets, we find that dissidents are less likely to engage in violent contention when their government receives higher levels of military aid from the United States and in former French colonies, and more likely to engage in both violent and nonviolent contention when their state is a member of a greater number of HSIGOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on military assistance shows that its effects depend on overcoming the information advantage of the receiving state. This paper examines when donor states are willing to overcome the information asymmetry, given the risk involved for special operations forces. The paper builds on a study of Danish military assistance in Cameroon. The findings show that preventive military assistance by special operations forces is not driven by vital national interests, which reduces the risk-taking of the donor state and its efficiency. However, being part of international networks of special operations forces and participating in multinational efforts is important for small states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is unclear how public authorities shaped responses to Ebola in Sierra Leone. Focusing on one village, we analyze what happened when "staff, stuff, space, and systems" were absent. Mutuality between neighbors, linked to secret societies, necessitated collective care for infected loved ones, irrespective of the risks. Practical learning was quick. Numbers recovering were reported to be higher among people treated in hidden locations, compared to those taken to Ebola Treatment Centres. Our findings challenge positive post-Ebola narratives about international aid and military deployment. A morally appropriate people's science emerged under the radar of external scrutiny, including that of a paramount chief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does a state directly police certain kinds of transnational perpetrators by itself while indirectly policing other kinds through their host government? To address this question, we develop a formal model, where Defender chooses either to police Perpetrators or to make Proxy do so. According to our theory, the delegation of policing can enhance its effectiveness in light of Proxy's three advantages: (a) Proxy can convince Perpetrators of punishments more credibly than Defender (communicative advantage); (b) Proxy is more likely to identify Perpetrators and detect what they hold dear (informational advantage); (c) Proxy can cripple and punish Perpetrators more effectively (offensive advantage). On the other hand, the delegation may cause inefficiency if Defender has limited information about Proxy's choice or cost of policing. Depending on the relative size between these advantages and disadvantages, one of the following four forms of policing may emerge: (i) Defender polices Perpetrators on her own (e.g. Somali counter-piracy operations); (ii) Defender induces Proxy to police Perpetrators (U.S. War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico); (iii) Defender and Proxy together police Perpetrators (Operation Inherent Resolve); (iv) two or more Defender-Proxy states police Perpetrators in each's own domain (Interpol, Budapest Convention). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the impact of military technology diffusion on military assistance operations (MAO), in the United States known as Security Force Assistance or SFA. The discussion looks conceptually at the role of technological change and how it interacts with martial cultures in military assistant operations. I argue that growing trends in science and technology suggest potential conflicts between culture and technology. Relying on a culture-technology model drawn from anthropology, the paper contends that new technologies will present increasing challenges for the emerging MAO landscape. The paper will illustrate that the techno-science gap will continue to grow as innovations such as robotics, sensors, and networks continue to develop. Finally, the paper will look at ways to overcome this conflict between culture and technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]