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Teaching Canadian human rights law demands more than simply instructing law students on caselaw precedents, jurisprudential principles, and legislative developments, as important as learning about this legal framework is. It also requires the imparting of a human rights imagination to students. This involves a focus on the social environment that ultimately generates and shapes anti-discrimination laws, such as disparate living and working conditions, demonstrations and civil disobedience, new arguments about the meanings of equality and discrimination, and understanding the role of social science research. Human rights legal decisions, when written with empathy and lucidity, can become effective teaching tools not only in law classes but also in social science courses on human rights. Learning to understand and interpret the place of human rights through the leading rulings of courts and tribunals can offer instructive insights into the strengths, weaknesses, and potential of our contemporary approach toward protecting and enlarging human rights in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

UN Security Council Resolution 242 endorsed the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and called for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied" in the June 1967 war Since then, a debate has raged over whether these provisions call for a complete Israeli withdrawal, a minor revision of borders, or license for Israel to retain sovereignty over some of the conquered lands. This article argues that the resolution must be read through the lens of international law. A principled legal interpretation clarifies 242's amibiguities on withdrawal and re-establishes the importance of universal rights to a just and durable peace in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June 2004, the High Court of Israel (HCI) ruled on the "Beit Sourik" case in which Palestinian villagers challenged the legality of Israel's separation wall, which had been routed through their villages causing great hardship. This article examines the HCI derision--which upheld the legality of the wall under international law but mandated changes in its route--and the argumentation used. In the process, the article shows how the HCI, despite some disagreements with the state on narrow issues of administrative application, broadly supports the government's policies of occupation, and it explains how the court interprets international law in order to do so. The article also contrasts the HCI's ruling with the nearly simultaneous ruling of the International Court of Justice, highlighting the two courts' very different approaches to international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]