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Rather than interpreting President Nursultan Nazarbayev's nation-building model of Kazakhstani-ness as a balance between civic and ethnic forms of nation-building, we show that Kazakhstani-ness was styled on Leonid Brezhnev's supranational modern identity of the Soviet People. We explore three similarities by comparing rulers' discursive aspirational statements (rather than historical policy trajectories) in a single case study of Kazakhstan. Both discursive models were based on teleological supranational state ideology, both were depicted as modern and advanced, and both modelled the new identity on the language and culture of ethnic majority. We used thematic discourse analysis in over 50 government documents and speeches of leaders to illustrate our argument. This case presents bigger lessons for regime's power of defining the national membership in post-Soviet Kazakhstan and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What impact has the 'Arab Spring' had upon Kazakhstan's approach to regime security? Short of the possibility of a 'Central Asian Spring', if and how the Arab Spring reshaped this authoritarian regime has not been addressed. A longitudinal narrative analysis of Kazakhstan's presidential rhetoric from 2005 to 2015 and fieldwork interviews indicated that the Arab Spring uprisings brought about an elite-level demonstration effect. That is, the regime perceived a heightened threat to its security as a result of instability and regime responses elsewhere, and it sought to shore-up its position and forestall the emergence of local challenges as a consequence of this, whether through discourse, behaviour or policy. This suggests that uprisings elsewhere, including those outside of a state's immediate region, can affect perceptions of regime security in the medium term, despite the absence of domestic unrest at home and a lack of close social and cultural ties between regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Norm contestation by local actors has emerged in recent years as an explanation for the failure of norm diffusion. This article contributes to the literature on norm contestation by analysing how norms diffused by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) pertaining to election observation and free and fair voting are re-constituted and contested by domestic actors in Kazakhstan. The study contributes to the idea of 'constitutive localisation' by emphasising a more fundamental level of disagreement beyond just congruence between the diffused norm and local beliefs; by demonstrating contestation can occur in the later stages in the norm diffusion cycle; by focusing on the micro-politics of contestation by local actors involved in the implementation of diffused norms; and by revealing how norm contestation is not necessarily a process of emancipatory politics, but a strategic act to serve authoritarian consolidation. Utilising a four-fold framework, the analysis illustrates how norms, while initially accepted by Kazakhstani authorities, are reconstituted through political discourse and/or practice, creating the moment of contestation. While this contestation is instrumentalised by political elites for their own advantage, it also remains an important element of agency within a normative order which they had little previous control over. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on recent scholarship, this essay contributes to further developing a conceptual understanding of multivector foreign policy, a term that, despite its frequent use, is still in need of additional refinement. I use the two-pronged concept of diversification as hinging, first, on simultaneous co-alignment with multiple major power providers and, second, as resulting from the interaction of variables at both system and unit levels. The essay then models a causal mechanism to explain Kazakhstan's approach to international infrastructure connectivity, an oft neglected issue-area of interstate collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores issues of citizenship and belonging associated with post-Soviet Kazakhstan’s repatriation programme. Beginning in 1991, Kazakhstan financed the resettlement of over 944,000 diasporic Kazakhs from nearly a dozen countries, including Mongolia, and encouraged repatriates to become naturalised citizens. Using the concept of ‘privileged exclusion’, this article argues that repatriated Kazakhs from Mongolia belong due to their knowledge of Kazakh language and traditions yet, at the same time, do not belong due to their lack of linguistic fluency in Russian, the absence of a shared Soviet experience, and limited comfort with the ‘cosmopolitan’ lifestyle that characterises the new elite in this post-Soviet context. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As the seat of the Kazakh government and a booming city since 1998, Astana has attracted hundreds of thousands of migrants. As a cultural and financial capital, Almaty has also continued to boom, drawing comparable numbers of migrants from different regions of Kazakhstan. However, varying historical trajectories and historically constructed notions of the urban and rural, as articulated by the cultural elites and policy-makers, as well as different preparedness of the government for migration flows in the 1990s and the 2000s in Almaty and Astana respectively, have resulted in quite diverse attitudes toward mobility and different perceptions about how urban order should be achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Kazakhstan’s and Tajikistan’s governments were able to successfully strengthen their reach and their capacity to control the population in the wake of deadly violence against regime opponents. Yet the process of deepening authoritarianism was not a straightforward affair. Both countries expanded their coercive capabilities – they upgraded policing in rural areas to improve intelligence gathering on the local population and predict the rise of any anti-government activities. While doing so, however, leaders of both countries sought to frame their actions as an inclusive process that was sensitive to the grievances of the affected populations and the general public. This article adds to the growing body of literature on authoritarian state responses to insurgency by showing how authoritarian regimes create narratives, engage civil society and look for political advantage to expand the coercive apparatus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the concept of political postcolonialism and how political groups appropriate and contest this discourse. Elites and contesting political groups utilise postcolonial rhetoric to legitimate their political goals by projecting that their country, in this case Kazakhstan, was colonised by the Tsarist Russia and then by the Soviet Union. For President Nursultan A. Nazarbayev's nationalising regime the status of Kazakhstan as a colony represented a vital item in post-1991 nation-building projects. Political opposition and Kazakh national- patriots contested this official discourse, blaming the regime for scarce efforts towards 'full decolonisation'. The absence of major intellectual discussion allowed these elites and political players to reappropriate these discourses in the political rather than critical intellectual domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an order from K. Kasymov Minister Lieutenant General in the Police and Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the approval of rules governing the implementation of the state protection of persons involved in crimincal proceedings. The order is in accordance with the Chapter 12 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the country, with information on the general provisions, security measures, and obligations of the protected person.

The article presents the instruction on organizing the oversight of the legality of the pretrial stage of criminal proceedings, which was approved by Order of the Procurator General of the Republic of Kazakhstan on March 30, 2015. Information is provided on the provisions of the oversight, the division of powers during the practice of oversight, and the oversight of statutory procedure compliance in making decision on statements and reports on crimes.

This paper evaluates Kazakhstan's natural resource policies and their impact on the standard of living of the Kazakhstan population within the framework of three determinative factors: globalization and international markets; Soviet legacy and ‘resource nationalism’; and Nursultan Nazarbayev and his authoritarian leadership. It argues that natural resource policies of Kazakhstan failed to improve the living standards of the majority of people in Kazakhstan, especially the poor and those living in oil-producing and rural areas, despite increasing oil prices and revenues. The argument will be supported with an analysis of Kazakhstan's oil wealth distribution in light of global initiatives as well as with evidence derived from official reports and statistical data to find out whether Nazarbayev's widely discussed ‘resource nationalism’ is ‘nationalistic’ enough to favour the whole nation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents the study of the criteria that Kazakhstan’s government used for granting a public–private partnership (PPP) contract to a private investor for construction and operation of eleven kindergartens in the city of Karaganda during 14 years. From the perspective of value creation for critical stakeholders, there was often misalignment between bidders’ views of these criteria and the perceived value for citizens and the government. The latter may significantly enhance the creation of shared values in a PPP by actively engaging stakeholders in the design of the bids’ assessment criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the foreign policy of Kazakhstan as defined by geopolitics. It examines 18 presidential addresses by Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev. Topics discussed include emphasis placed by Nazarbayev on specific countries and regions, Kazakhstan's geopolitical position and foreign policy, its role in the international system and the need for Kazakhstan to be integrated into the global economy.

This article argues that, unlike other Central Asian states, the official response in Kazakhstan to its Islamic revival is distinctively ambivalent and even contradictory. The Nazarbayev government has rhetorically embraced the Kazakhqoja-centred Sufi heritage and the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam as the ‘traditional’ forms of Islam among Kazakh nomads and perceived them as constituent elements of the nation-building process. However, the representatives of the political elite have in reality unknowingly absorbed much of ‘untraditional’ Salafi Islam and ignored, marginalised or even suppressed the revival of Kazakh Sufism. This is in part because of their limited knowledge of the indigenous Kazakh Islamic tradition and in part due to the younger generation’s greater exposure to a range of Salafi-dominated influences emanating from abroad. The article begins with a brief historical perspective on the relationship betweenqoja-centred Sufism and ‘Kazakh-ness’ which is essential for establishing an analysis of the fissures in the current religious and political ideology pertaining to Kazakh nation-building. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Using the perspective of political opportunity structure, this qualitative survey of primary sources attempts to determine whether environmental NGOs (ENGOs) in Kazakhstan are achieving institutionalisation from the standpoint of representative democracy, or are being co-opted by a corporatist national government. Are ENGOs the harbingers of the democratisation of the country that many observers hope to see? Given increases in the nation’s budgets for the environment and easing of NGO/ENGO legislation, the institutionalising project would seem to have some prospects for success. Concomitantly, the participation of civic groups in the policy arena has contributed to better governance through experiments in new forms of state-society partnership. However, these partnerships have under-performed. Local governments face conflicting demands, while the insufficient administrative and technical capacity of state agencies highlights the need for capacity building. On the political level, authentic ENGOs must compete for policy inclusion with co-opted “front” organisations selectively favoured by the national government, at the same time that the government’s ambiguity towards ENGOs retards the latter’s institutionalisation. The immediate future of environmental civic society is uncertain. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The pragmatic interests of Kazakhstan and the European Union have profoundly influenced the relationship between them, preventing the establishment of successful cooperation in the human dimension. This article investigates these dynamics in detail, placing its spotlight on the role assigned to the relationship with the European Union in the most recent technologies of power devised by the Kazakhstani regime. Particular attention here will be devoted to the tension between the regime's search for international legitimacy and its efforts to insulate itself from EU pressures for political liberalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As opposed to the current literature which argues that informal politics pervades formal institutions in Kazakhstan and Central Asia more widely, this article argues that Nur Otan, the political party of the President of Kazakhstan, acts as a formal institution to counter the instability generated by informal networks competing for access to political and economic resources. This is achieved by consolidating the political parties associated with these networks into Nur Otan and the synchronisation of the party and the state apparatus. However, the extent to which Nur Otan can provide this stabilising function in the long term is dependent upon regime dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There were several high-profile violent incidents in 2011 in Kazakhstan, including several bombings, shootings that targeted police, and a protest turned clash that resulted in a number of deaths. Some of the perpetrators reportedly had links with radical religious groups. An overlooked aspect of the violence is how it is reported in Kazakhstan. There are active, competent media in Kazakhstan, which are largely unknown in the West. An examination of these incidents using the media in Kazakhstan can provide a unique insight into what took place. While Western sources quickly blamed radical religious groups with international connections, media in Kazakhstan have found that there are other reasons for the violence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In a world still dominated by a geopolitical system of territorial states, one tool in the state- and nation-building repertoire is the strategy of moving a capital from one city to another, and to an ostensibly more 'central' location of a geometrically conceived territory. From Ankara to Brasília, the technique has been used in a variety of places around the world, and Kazakhstan's new capital since 1997, Astana, is one more recent iteration. Taking a Foucauldian approach to analysing political technologies of government, the author examines the strategy of the centrally located city and considers how it has been instrumental to simultaneously producing a 'state effect' and a 'territory effect' in newly independent Kazakhstan. Part of a larger mixed-methods study, this article draws on a diverse range of methods, including data from interviews, participant observation, textual analysis, focus groups and a country-wide survey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new political development that emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the adoption of ‘homeland stances’ by the newly independent states. Through the construction of the homeland image, the states of the region claimed responsibility not only for their own citizens, but also for a diaspora community of co-ethnics. Kazakhstan became one of these states and its leadership portrayed Kazakhstan as the homeland of the Kazakh diaspora. Furthermore, Kazakhstan's leadership developed far more active homeland rhetoric and initiated an ethnic return-migration policy as early as 1992. This paper will explore the discourse of Kazakhstan's leadership on the repatriation of its co-ethnics as well as the legal and political context that it created to achieve their smooth absorption into domestic society. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the way the cultural revival in post-Soviet Kazakhstan is perceived by both the state and militants from non-titular nationalities. Based on ethnographic material, the author analyses state engineering of cultural diversity and the strategies elaborated by militants of Tatar cultural associations to manage the status quo, as well as the preservation of ‘cultural intimacy’. The study points to convergences between the state discourse about inter-ethnic concord and the practices of cultural national militants. It also shows that behind this apparent status quo, the cultural sphere has become the arena where the issue of the recognition of full-fledged citizenship and the legitimacy to reside in Kazakhstan is raised and disputed by non-Kazakh groups, albeit implicitly. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article offers information on the political instability in Kazakhstan. It states that the major factor for the political stability of Kazakhstan is the personal authority of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev. It says that Kazakhstan never had a leader who can capitalize on the discontent of Kazakhs and transforms discontent into political actions and expectations.

The article examines public opinion polls conducted in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 1993 and 2007, focusing on the implications of those polls for U.S. foreign relations. Changes in results of the two polls are discussed, including the relatively low support for a democratic system of government in both polls compared to a desire for an orderly society. It is noted that Kazakhstan saw a large increase in the number of respondents stating that economic conditions in their country were good from 1993-2007 while Uzbekistan did not. An increase in those expressing belief in Islam in both countries is considered. Implications for U.S. economic assistance to the two countries, much of which has gone to support democratic and economic reforms, are discussed.

Departing from some prominent scholarship on Kazakhstani politics, the author argues that competition between financial-industrial groups over scarce economic and political resources—rather than inter-clan or centre-periphery rivalries—largely determines who gets what, when and how. While clan politics and regional grievances may still influence struggles over the distribution of power and wealth, their importance has diminished in recent years. Instead, observable political conflict has centred around competing financial-industrial groups, which represent the diverse, and at times clashing, interests of Kazakhstan's business and political elites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the genesis and influence of informal politics on non-democratic outcomes in Central Asia. As opposed to current scholarship which explains the emergence of informal politics as a result of kinship-based cultural legacies, this work uses the broader analytical framework of neopatrimonialism to understand informal political phenomena while emphasizing the role of uncertainty and contingent actor choice in explaining its appearance. The article also assesses how informal political behaviour (patronage and patron-client relations) was used to consolidate authoritarianism. Using Kazakhstan's (1990-95) early transition period as a case study this article notes how three processes central to transition (institutional conflict, emerging pluralism, and electoral competition) elicited a degree of uncertainty which destabilized prior institutional equilibrium. The president of Kazakhstan applied informal forms of politics to manage this uncertainty to re-assert his power and consolidate his personal authoritarian rule at the expense of emerging democratic institutions. The article illustrates how the uncertain and contingent process of transition is instrumental to the emergence of informal politics and the durability of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan, and that informal political relations and behaviour are important to understanding non-democratic and democratic paths in former Soviet states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the outlook for democracy and social modernization in Kazakhstan. Kazakh identity that is distinct from the former collective Soviet identity, ethnic relations between Kazakh tribes, and the development of a national identity are discussed. Opposition from traditionalists against the concepts of modernization, democratic liberalism, and a market economy is mentioned. The distinction between traditionalism and tradition is noted. Urbanization and paternalism in Kazakhstan during the Soviet era of colonization and agricultural de-collectivization in the country after the Soviet Union's collapse are discussed.

The article explores foreign policy and relations of Kazakhstan and its geo-strategic role in Central Asia. The author reflects on petroleum reserves and the location of the country as factors in Kazakhstan's geopolitical importance. A policy of multi-vector politics is related to the security relationships of the Kazakhstani government. The multi-ethnic character of Kazakhstani society and tensions with the Russian Federation are also noted. Other topics include oil pipeline routes, foreign investment in Kazakhstan, and authoritarian regimes.

The essay discusses public relations campaigns undertaken by the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that aim to establish these countries' national identities among the international community. The political aspects of nation branding in these countries are discussed. Various slogans developed by these campaigns are analyzed.

The article focuses on the bazaars or marketplaces in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Three arguments concerning their fate relate to the modernization theory and the city's plans for commercial and cultural development, path-dependent logic suggesting that bazaars are an entrenched trading institution, and government intervention at bazaars in the interest of economic elites. Topics include the: growth of bazaars as a post-Soviet economic system; social dynamics among the bazaars' traders, owners, and political elite; sanitary conditions and lack of rent regulations at the markets; city's attempts to modernize, regulate, and reconstruct bazaars via "passportization" into modern trading complexes; and official and unofficial stories about the closing of the Baian Aul bazaar.