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This research examines the relationship between democracy, authoritarianism, and political corruption through a comparative case study of Elite Cartel corruption in Hungary and Italy. While perceptions of corruption have significantly worsened in Hungary over the last 10 years, they have significantly improved in Italy. We utilize the theory of deep democratization as a way of explaining these trends. Deep democratization is a long-term process resulting in social and political changes leading to rules and mechanisms of accountability that provide wider inclusion in the governance process and autonomy from corrupt networks of elites. The five key characteristics of a country that has achieved deep democratization include competitive multi-party elections, professionalism in the civil service, a strong and independent judiciary, a free and independent press, and a strong and vibrant civil society. In the case of Hungary, each of these five characteristics have been significantly weakened as a result of its backsliding towards authoritarianism. In the case of Italy, however, the relative strengthening of these characteristics has led to substantive progress in its fight against corruption. Our findings support previous research that indicates authoritarianism breeds corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can governments make courts politically compliant without undermining public confidence in the judicial system? Many studies show a positive relationship between judicial independence and citizens' trust in courts. However, most of them have shown static cross-sectional correlations rather than actual effects of court curbing on trust. Factors such as citizens' level of education and political preferences may also play a role in moderating reactions to court curbing. We analyse how assaults on judicial independence by populist governments in Turkey, Hungary, and Poland affected judicial trust, using a difference-in-differences approach to Eurobarometer data. While we find evidence that court curbing has an adverse effect on judicial trust, this effect is much clearer among citizens who are ideologically distant from their governments. These findings coincide with experimental evidence indicating how citizens tolerate democratic backsliding, suggesting that, for many, trust in the judicial system can subsist even when courts are made politically subservient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The executive arm of the government in Nigeria has been underfunding the judiciary due to its lack of fiscal (financial) autonomy. However, despite the Nigerian judiciary being granted fiscal self-autonomy by the court in 2014, it continues to fall short of one of the main criteria for judicial independence due to inadequate budgetary support. Thus, the article examines the judiciary’s independence and its challenges from poor funding. It employs a qualitative methodology and desk research sources to examine several provisions of the Nigerian constitution, analyze the practicalities of fiscal autonomy from a comparative perspective between Nigeria and other countries, and determine the inadequate funding of the Nigerian judiciary by placing its percentage of budgetary allocation against the nation’s total annual budget over the years. The article suggests the need for implementation structures of fiscal autonomy involving a time frame of budgetary allocation directly to the judiciary to assure its independence and efficient funding for the provision of court services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conflicts over the independence of judiciary as one of the European Union's core democratic values is one indicator of democratic backsliding among its member states. Based on the Europeanization framework, we compare this conflict in German, Polish and Spanish print media and Twitter from 2019 to 2021. In the countries that are strongly affected by the value conflict, Poland and Spain, Europeanization is less evident. In contrast, the German discourse shows a high degree of Europeanization. We demonstrate that the print media is strongly elite-centric, while Twitter shows a higher actor visibility and inclusivity. However, we also identify important country differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) held Spain responsible for violations of Articles 14(1), 14(5) and 15 (1) of the ICCPR in the Garzón v Spain case. The purposes of this article are three-fold. Firstly, it provides an analysis of the 'Francoism' case and the 'Gürtel' case, the two trials held by the Spanish Supreme Court (SSC) against Judge Garzón, which the HRC declared were 'arbitrary and did not comply with the principles of judicial independence and impartiality', and an assessment of their political and legal aftermaths. Secondly, it assesses the dim prospects for Spain complying with the HRC's views on the Garzón case by providing an updated and comprehensive statistical account of Spain's extremely low record of compliance with previous HRC's decisions. Thirdly, it provides an analysis of the new opportunities for judicial enforceability in cases of non-compliance by Spain with the views of the HRC in the wake of the SSC's landmark judgement on the González Carreño v. Spain case and subsequent case law. The conclusion considers the enhanced potential role of domestic courts in fostering the enforceability of decisions by quasi-adjudicatory human rights bodies both in Spain and in the light of the Spanish experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of legality in an authoritarian zone requires a nuanced understanding of its dynamics and how they differ from those conventionally envisioned in a democratic society. This article critically examines the varieties of authoritarian legality in three differentiated paradigms, namely, 'law and politics', 'law with politics', and 'law in politics', each engaging in a distinctive entanglement of law with politics depending on the varying degrees of the law's autonomy. Furthermore, it points out that the engagement of authoritarian legality is favourably facilitated through politically controllable legal institutions and state-shaped public sphere. Moreover, it argues that the standalone statist reason cannot stand out alone as a legitimate ground for legality unless some other alternative reasons can be dialogically engaged in the public discourse. Otherwise, the force and violence may be clothed in the form of a law that serves as a political instrument for the ruling of the authoritarian government, which can be fuelled by nationalistic ideologies or demagogues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A rise in anti-immigrant pressure can reduce asylum recognition rates, irrespective of individuals' protection needs. Independent courts, which often act as a safeguard of migrant rights vis-à-vis such pressures, have been subject to increasing political interference. Yet, we know very little about how variation in the level of judicial independence – especially among lower courts – affects policy outcomes. In this paper, we assess the impact of anti-immigrant pressure and judicial independence on first and final instance refugee status determination decisions across 28 European Union member states over a ten-year period (2008–2018). We find that the relative independence of courts makes the biggest difference in asylum recognition rates at first and final instance when levels of anti-immigrant pressure are particularly high. This effect can be demonstrated not just regarding asylum appeals, but also for first instance decisions, suggesting that independent courts can have a liberal 'foreshadowing effect' on national asylum agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rise of populism, we frequently witness how elected governments try to limit judicial power by using different means. Comparing the court-curbing policies used by the Fidesz government in Hungary and the PiS government in Poland, this study has two objectives. First, it aims to explain whether different court-curbing policies effect judicial independence differently. Using synthetic control method, I find that the predominant use of informal court-curbing policies erodes judicial independence much more extensively compared to the predominant use of formal court-curbing policies. The second objective is to provide and empirically test the causal explanation for this effect. I argue that when the incumbent tries to weaken the judiciary mostly through informal court-curbing, this might instigate public discontent and jeopardize the judiciary's legitimacy in the short run. However, when the government tries to restructure the judiciary via constitutional reforms, the legitimacy of the 'new' judicial system might not be questioned by the public. Supporting these hypotheses, the empirical results show that while the court-curbing attempts of the PiS government reduced public confidence in the judiciary by almost 15 percent, we do not see a significant decline in the Hungarian case where mostly formal court-curbing was used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, governing parties in Central and Eastern Europe have dismantled liberal democracy, violating the rule of law and limiting the power of judges. This article examines the opposition to these transformations, focusing on the role of judges in Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Drawing on an original survey, as well as a set of interviews with judges, the article shows that while in Poland judges have developed a unified opposition to the government in defending their independence, in Romania, in contrast, governmental measures have polarized judges into a divided opposition, while their mobilization has been rather non-existent in Hungary. Why do judges oppose governmental action limiting judicial independence in some contexts but not in others? The article shows that the nature and the sequencing of domestic transformations, coupled with ideational factors and interests-based calculations, explain judges' opposition at the collective and individual levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between ethical behavior of firms and foreign direct investments in African countries and tests whether the judicial independence moderates this association. The sample includes 108 country-year observations over a period of 2014–2017. Findings show that the ethical behavior of firms is positively associated with foreign direct investment. Similarly, judicial independence has a positive and significant effect on the same variable. When testing for the moderating effects of judicial independence, the association between ethical behavior of firms and foreign direct investment remains positive and significant for high judicial independence sub-sample, while it becomes insignificant for countries characterized by low judicial independence. The findings highlight the importance of business ethics in attracting foreign direct investment inflows in African countries. It also emphasizes the need to consider the role played by high judicial independence in strengthening this association. These results signal to policy makers in African countries the importance of adopting enforcing rules obliging firms to act ethically and strengthening judicial independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A free and independent press monitors government actions, broadcasts public grievances, and facilitates debate and dissent among citizens. Because of this, some executives run interference—censoring newspapers, harassing journalists, and shutting down media outlets—whereas other executives do not. What explains this variation? We argue that executives decide to repress or to respect the press based on the sanctions they anticipate from two important constituencies: courts and citizens. We expect that attacks are less likely when courts can make adverse rulings and when citizens can vote leaders out of office. In addition, we suggest that these constraints can function as substitutes; we anticipate the reductive effect of judicial independence wanes as the level of electoral democracy rises, making courts vital to protecting journalists in less democratic systems. We evaluate these expectations using panel data on executive branch attacks on the press in 175 countries, from 1949 to 2016, and find strong support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the behavior of the Constitutional Court in Turkey. As the highest court in the country, it is responsible for many decisions that have shaped the course of Turkish politics over the past six decades. It begins with a brief overview of the institutional features of the Turkish Constitutional Court. It then looks at major arguments on constitutional review, including judicial independence and court-curbing. Finally, it examines change and continuity in the attitudes of the Court based on the speeches of its presidents. One conclusion is that the Constitutional Court has transformed itself from that of the defender of the state principles to that of the defender of human rights while retaining its role with regard to the separation of powers. This transformation has been driven by both internal and external pressures: the domestic transition of tutelary democracy to competitive authoritarianism and the equivocation of domestic laws with international treaties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the conditions under which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) expanded the European Union's reach into issues of national judicial independence. The ECJ's 2018 ruling in a case known as Portuguese Judges contained a far-reaching constitutional interpretation that had a transformative impact on the European Union's rule of law crisis. We conduct a theoretically guided investigation into both the domestic origins and the judicial outcome in the Portuguese Judges case. We show how the ECJ, with implicit support from the majority of the Member States, strategically exploited suitable characteristics of an inconspicuous case to produce a landmark ruling that enabled unprecedented enforcement action against democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Allegations of corruption and rape against President Jacob Zuma constituted among the most covered stories in South Africa and beyond. Widely dubbed "the Zuma saga" by the media, the twin stories began with allegations of corruption in the arms deal. While the corruption case still gripped the public, another damning allegation (rape) surfaced and fermented the story to levels surpassed by no other story at the time. Zuma was subsequently acquitted of the rape charge, but the charge of corruption continued relentlessly until the eve of the 2009 elections, in which he was elected as president. But just as the South African public thought the dust was settling, Zuma was hit by another damning allegation of inappropriately spending R250 million on upgrading Nkandla, his private residence. This article is three-pronged. First, it examines the key issues that accounted for the media frenzy sparked by both the Nkandla debacle and the Zuma saga. Second, it unravels critical ethical questions and legal issues implicit in the aforementioned cases. Third, because Zuma's acquittal raised questions regarding the independence of the judiciary, the article also assesses the condition of judicial independence in South Africa. Theoretically, the article is informed by the sociology of journalism ethics and the notions of ethical leadership and judicial independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the role of restraints on military for limiting victimisation of civilians? We find that a higher number of officers trained on counterinsurgency are associated with a lower number of civilians killed by government forces in civil wars. We also find that the number of civilians killed by government forces reduces as the degree of military involvement in politics reduces, and as the judiciary becomes independent. These results suggest that if the goal is to curb indiscriminate civilian killings, better training in counterinsurgency, the existence of judicial checks, and lowering military influence in politics are practical policy tools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Samoa's 2021 constitutional crisis saw unprecedented attacks on the nation's judiciary and the rule of law. The Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP) refused to concede defeat after a tightly contested general election on 9 April 2021. The transfer of power to the incoming Faʻatuatua i le Atua Samoa ua Tasi (FAST) government was stymied by determined efforts such as the attempted exploitation of the women's parliamentary quota, attempts to justify the calling of fresh elections and the locking of the parliamentary chamber to prevent parliament's first meeting. This article examines how the constitutionality and lawfulness of these actions was repeatedly challenged in Samoa's courts in a highly charged political atmosphere that persistently ignored court rulings. It outlines how Samoa's judiciary came under serious and repeated threat by constitutional actors, in particular the head of state, the outgoing government, and the attorney general. The article finds that despite these critical challenges, the rulings of the courts ultimately resolved the four-month impasse through decisions on an unprecedented number of complex and novel constitutional issues. The courts' role in the crisis demonstrates the importance of a sound and independent judiciary to uphold the rule of law, particularly in small island states when the foundations and functioning of a modern constitutional democracy are attacked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In India, judicial discipline is exclusively enforced by the judiciary through in-house mechanisms, except for the constitutional removal procedure. The founding justification for in-house mechanisms is that they are indispensable to uphold judicial independence. In this milieu, the paper attempts to answer the following question: do in-house mechanisms in India uphold judicial independence and effectively enforce judicial conduct? The study, by analysing quantitative and qualitative data from 110 subject experts (judges, lawyers, and academics), offers an initial assessment of the implications of in-house mechanisms on judicial independence and judicial conduct regulation in India. The study lays special emphasis on the efficacy of in-house mechanisms in upholding "individual" and "internal" judicial independence. It also assesses the effectiveness of in-house mechanisms in enforcing judicial conduct. It concludes that in-house mechanisms, for both higher and subordinate judiciary, undermine individual and internal judicial independence. They are also ineffective in enforcing judicial conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judges all around the world, including in post-communist Europe, have become increasingly involved in the administration of judiciaries. Judicial self-governance is believed to secure greater judicial independence and merit-based decision-making regarding judicial careers. This article analyzes 126 examples of selection procedures at Slovak district courts that were held between 2012 and 2015 and finds that judge-dominated selection committees prefer candidates who can be expected to replicate the existing system. Candidates' social and judicial cultural capital, either knowing someone in the selection committee or having a family member working as a judge, serve as vehicles for such preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Court curbing, proposed policy that attempts to "restrict, remove or otherwise limit" the power of the judiciary, occurs regularly and with considerable variation throughout the US states. I deviate from past studies, which consider court curbing as an ex post control mechanism, by focusing on ex ante controls of state courts – judicial selection rules and processes. I argue that levels of political party influence over judicial selection (before a judge is seated) alter the motivation to engage in court curbing after a judge is seated. I test this novel ex ante explanation with an original data set of court curbing and judicial selection from 2015 to 2018. Mixed results offer some support for my theory while opening new opportunities for study, particularly among partisan election systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the EU is a rule of law community it struggles to make all Member States engage fully in upholding its laws and values. Some issues have to do with concrete violations against basic rights others are more institutional having to do with the independence of the judicial system as such. In this article, we look at the institutional side demonstrating that there is a link between the degree to which the judicial branch of a Member State enjoys full independence and its national high court engagement with the CJEU through the preliminary reference procedure. While drawing on judicial dialogue instruments, it is demonstrated how higher courts that are less constrained by political power make more preliminary references. This finding supports the hypothesis that governments that keep courts in a short leach often discourage judges from engaging with Luxembourg, impacting in the longer run the uniform development of EU law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between populism and judicial activism in Kenya's Security Laws (Amendment) Act, No 19 of 2014 High Court Case determined in 2015. The article defines populism as a political strategy rather than as a thin-ideology, and adopts majoritaianism and deference to elected branches, and judicial aggrandisement as indicators of judicial activism. The Act, which aims at, among others, augmenting counterterrorism, amended the provisions of 22 other security and security-related Acts of Parliament. The omnibus Act is an expression of penal populism. It is these amendments that precipitated the petition. The populism of both coalitions manifested itself in the issues raised for determination. Kenya's parliamentary opposition Coalition for Reform and Democracy, the key petitioner, challenged the constitutionality of the Act on issues of legislation and human rights. The governing coalition Jubilee defended the Act on issues of justiciability and national security. Though judicial activism was apparent in relation to judicial aggrandisement, and majoritarianism and deference, both coalition's populism, however, did not critically impact upon judicial decision making in the case. The implications for the integrity, independence and role of the judiciary in Kenya are offered in the conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent backsliding in judicial independence and erosion of rule of law in Turkey follow the findings of the existing literature which already informed us about the pathological effects and unintended consequences of the external promotion of the EU conditions. Yet, we know little about the domestic strategies of the governments that enable them to capture the judiciary under the guise of EU-led reforms. This article argues that the frequent and ad hoc institutional changes demanded and funded by the EU and readily adopted by the political elites open a window of opportunity for the consolidation of patronage networks within the judiciary system. This is achieved by the adoption of formal and informal domestic strategies of resistance – formal readoption, staff politicization and intimidation & bribery – remaking, distorting, and when necessary, reversing EU-led reforms in a way that enables governments to take control of the high judicial bodies and capture them from within. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutionalist scholars argue that international rights norms, judicial autonomy and discourses of immigrant nationhood constrain shifts to harsher immigration policies in liberal democracies, particularly settler societies. The Trump presidency and the Liberal–National Coalition government in Australia during the same period are occasions to test whether those norms functioned as expected in two paradigmatic country cases. Both governments attempted to undermine judicial autonomy, the illegitimacy of ethnic and religious selection of immigrants, the rights of detained children and families, and the principle of non-refoulement. A new institutionalist analysis of attempted norm-busting in each country specifies which norms were effective constraints. International legal and political constraints were weak. Domestically, norms obliging the protection of children were more effective than norms related to adults. Discourses favouring immigrant nationhood and opposing discrimination resonated, but were confronted by equally powerful discourses of insular nationalism and security that promoted restriction. While the judiciary moderately constrained new policies, particularly in the US, in neither country did the judiciary fully act in line with dominant theoretical expectations, because of both structural and normative weaknesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State court systems are being reshaped by the widespread adoption of drug courts. However, there has been limited attention to what drives the decision to create drug courts in the states. I link the establishment of drug courts to local issue environments found in each state that support proactive judicial and legal elites. I propose hypotheses that link the density of drug courts to judicial professionalization, state funding of courts, drug arrest rates, and levels of court consolidation. I test these hypotheses with panel data from 2009 to 2014. I find that states with more professional judiciaries and higher rates of drug arrests are more likely to adopt drug courts, that higher levels of court consolidation show a small negative effect and, finally, that higher levels of state funding for court systems do not have consistent effects. I conclude that there is support for (a) using the issue environments approach to analyze the establishment of drug courts and (b) considering issue environments when analyzing other community oriented changes in state court systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes recent trends of democratic backsliding within the European Union (EU). While some scholars highlight threats to the rule of law and judicial independence as the key development and problem, others focus on elite discourse and partisan competition. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the essence of democratic backsliding by analyzing changes between 1990 and 2019 on key indicators of democracy – polyarchy, liberalism, participation, deliberation and egalitarianism – documented in the V-Dem dataset, within the European Union. We find that democratic backsliding at its core is structured by a deterioration of the quality of deliberation. Deliberation is also the component where EU member states differ amongst each other the most and which has featured the greatest deterioration in recent years. We conclude by spelling out the implications this has for EU policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Overrides are acts by politicians which undo or modify the impact of court decisions. In the field of judicial politics in general, and in studies of the Court of Justice of the European Union's role in European integration in particular, the existence and effects of overrides have been intensely debated. This article argues that much of this disagreement is driven by a lack of a common definition of the term at issue. It distinguishes between 'political' and 'constitutional' overrides, and defines the conditions under which either matters for judicial independence in the European Union and the Court's impact on European integration. This is followed by an investigation into the occurrence of overrides in the European Union. It is concluded that while political overrides, where the policy impact of court decisions are affected by subsequent EU legislation, have occurred, constitutional overrides, which challenge or revise the Court's mandate, have not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than a decade, Nepal has been undergoing a process of re-democratisation, its third transition to democracy since the 1950s. Among the key pillars of the new democratic regime has been the establishment of constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence. Focusing on the role of the Supreme Court in defining, overseeing, and adjudicating Nepal's transitional justice process, this article considers the extent to which judicial independence and empowerment have been achieved in Nepal's ongoing democratic transition. It argues that despite institutional measures designed to protect judicial independence and efforts by members of the Supreme Court to exercise independence in their judgments, Nepal's re-democratisation process has seen the erosion of judicial independence. In doing so, the article provides new insights into the relationship between institutional judicial independence and judicial empowerment during transitions to democracy, and highlights a significant area of concern for the achievement of democratic consolidation in Nepal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judicial independence for the lower courts, especially at the magisterial level, is often disregarded, be it administratively or in academic studies. Shortcomings in the independence of the Malaysian magistracy, though apparent, were never systematically evaluated against the judicial independence benchmarks. By using the Brisbane Declaration 2018, a Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association (CMJA) established instrument that prescribed standards of independence for the magistracies, this article briefly assesses the state of magisterial independence in Malaysia. The analysis confirms that institutional independence, adjudicatory independence and administrative independence of the Malaysian magistracy have been compromised. Certain essential formal safeguards of judicial independence are also absent. This lack of magisterial independence is mainly attributable to the complexity of the courts' administrative structure that exists as a hybrid framework between the Executive and the Judicature. Hence, further in-depth study of this matter is required to preserve the dignity, integrity, impartiality and independence of the Malaysian magistracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using panel data for 16 Central and Eastern European countries from 2006 to 2015, we report there are six statistically explanatory variables for the variation of ethical behavior of firms in the CEE countries such as judicial independence, protection of minority shareholders interest, wastefulness of government spending, favoritism in decisions of government officials, rule of law and public trust in politicians. By using panel data related to 16 Central and Eastern European countries for a period of 10 years (2006–2015), we investigate the influence of specific legal, political, and country-level governance determinant factors on firms' ethical behavior in the CEE region. Thus, we report there are certain statistically explanatory variables for the variation of ethical conduct of firms in the CEE countries such as judicial independence; strength of investor protection; protection of minority shareholders interest; wastefulness of government spending; government effectiveness; diversion of public funds; the rule of law and public trust in politicians. This study indicates the necessity for policymakers and political leaders to look for practical solutions to ensure the necessary enforcement mechanisms for improving firms' ethical behavior in CEE countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two findings stand out in the literature on public attitudes vis-à-vis courts. The first is that judicial independence increases public trust. The second is that 'to know courts is to love them'. In this study, these stylised facts are used as a starting point to ask three questions. First, is there also a role for judicial accountability in fostering public trust, above and beyond that played by independence? Second, could it be that only the most aware citizens are sensitive to such properties of the judicial system? Third, is the notion that 'to know courts is to love them' limited to systems with high levels of judicial independence and accountability? Using recently available macro-level indicators of judicial independence and accountability and the high-quality survey data collected by the European Social Survey in 32 countries throughout more than a decade, this study provides evidence that the answers to these questions are positive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Whitlam Government's efforts to revoke the London-based Privy Council's ability to hear appeals on the decisions of Australian courts constituted a significant chapter in paving the way for Australia's final judicial independence. The significance of this issue was also reinforced by its serving as the point where Australia's internal politics became inseparably intertwined with its British connection. To untie this historical knot left over from Australia's colonial past and, as such, support from both the British government and the Australian States were essential for Whitlam Government's success. The troubled course of the Australian government's reform offers an opportunity to assess the contested nature of official Anglo-Australian relations during the Whitlam years and the ways in which his reforms fostered renewed attempts to protect State rights through the preservation of traditional ties to Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of the Russian legal system underscored the discrepancy between formal legal order and the informal practices used to maintain control over the judiciary. This essay argues that, despite laws introducing meritocratic principles of judicial selection at the beginning of the 1990s, the patronage of court presidents continues to significantly outweigh all other candidate characteristics, such as education and professional experience. By analysing 957 protocols issued by the judicial qualification boards (JQBs), I show that the influence of court presidents on the JQBs' decision-making in the selection process undermines judicial independence and accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The academic contribution to the question of reforms to the China International Commercial Court (CICC) has essentially been based on classic comparative legal approaches. More precisely, two main schools of thought have emerged which compare the CICC with the international commercial courts established by Singapore (the Singapore International Commercial Court [SICC]) and Dubai (the Dubai International Financial Centre [DIFC]) because Chinese officials have presented these institutions as models for the CICC. This article breaks new ground by adopting a legal and geopolitical analysis. The article makes an interdisciplinary enquiry, which combines political-economy and sociological analysis. The political-economy approach emphasizes an institutional reform in line with China's self-interested response to the commercial needs of Chinese investors along the Belt and Road Initiative. The sociological approach refers to China's history and culture, appreciates China's contemporary policies, and suggests that reform on mediation and arbitration under the CICC are likely to play the most prominent role at the new court. This article highlights the fundamental contradiction between geopolitics and judicial independence within the realm of the CICC, and argues that if the designers of the CICC treat SICC and DIFC courts' procedural rules as templates for replication, any reform attempts are likely to fail, given that the CICC forms part of China's geopolitical tactics rather than being a product of market orientation. Instead, this article argues that the CICC should be understood as a mechanism for domestic reform purpose and function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a 'judge-rapporteur' who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court's legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges' political accountability can polarize already politicized debates. The President circumvents such dynamics by appointing a rapporteur whose government holds moderate political preferences. However, politics are relevant mainly when case law is not yet developed. The need for consistency also contributes to explain judges individual-level specialization, which arguably favors the construction of a coherent case law. The results speak to the lingering effect of judges' renewable terms – despite secret voting – as well as the importance of courts' internal organization for judicial independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) in South Africa was established in response to a pre-democratic era appointment system rich in patronage, opaqueness, and invariably, inequality. The use of judicial appointment bodies has been recommended by the Commonwealth Latimer House Principles, as a method of preserving judicial independence. However, not much research has been conducted into whether there is an absence of patronage and power dynamics when judicial appointment bodies replace executive type of appointments. This paper suggests that the introduction of appointment bodies does not eradicate privilege and power dynamics as some might believe. Rather, it creates a different type of dynamic that can be harmful for women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines regulatory mechanisms for combating judicial corruption and misconduct in India. It aims at a critical analysis of the regulatory mechanisms for both subordinate and higher courts. The study, inter alia, concludes that the regulatory mechanisms for subordinate courts lack conceptual clarity, suffer role ambiguity, and are bereft of functional autonomy; the powers and functions of these mechanisms are not clearly prescribed, and the procedures concerning complaints, inquiries and disciplinary actions are ad hoc. The mechanisms for subordinate courts are opaque, inaccessible, slow and ineffective. The paper also argues that the "in-house procedure" in the higher judiciary is inadequate, opaque, informal and judge-centric; it terms the "removal procedure" as rigid and ineffective. This paper recommends structural, organizational and functional reforms to strengthen regulatory mechanisms for the subordinate judiciary. For the higher judiciary, it proposes a constitutional body having adequate representation from a broad spectrum of the population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China was the world's largest importer of e-waste in the 2000s, with e-waste entering the country via different pathways. It was treated informally by using primitive techniques. Since the 2010s, the quantities of illegal importation have been gradually decreasing as China started to amend and enforce the importation ban policy. The amount of imported e-waste is predicted to disappear in the coming decades if China keeps to her stringent enforcements. Being a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, Hong Kong (HK) pursues an independent judiciary, rule of law and retains a free trading policy. As such, a substantial amount of e-waste has entered HK, and is stored in the northern part of the New Territories (NT). Some of the e-waste has been dismantled and recycled, jeopardizing the local environmental and the human health of this increasingly affluent city. This article reviews the effects of the new movement of global e-waste, to find out whether the same mistakes made in China are being repeated in HK, in particular, the environmental and health impacts of recycling e-waste. In addition, the management strategies to deal with the problems in this densely populated city are also summarized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is one of the most controversial fora for intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. The current IPRs enforcement in China is the result of a combination of external pressure and internal drive, of the paradox of technology reliance and indigenous innovation, and of a mixture of incompatible history and culture with gradually changing social norms. This article aims to provide a critical assessment of the latest development in judicial enforcement of IPRs in China, including improving the professionalism and efficiency of the judicial process, increasing the adequacy of remedies and reducing judicial local protectionism. It concludes that the technical development of the IPRs judicial system is obvious and the remaining problems are relatively easy to correct. However, although China has also adopted measures to increase the power and independence of courts, the structural weakness of courts continues to remain. The Chinese judicial system, institutionally, is not independent, and judgments are influenced by the policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Although the contemporary policy in China is to improve judicial protection of IPRs, the possible influence of the CCP policy in courts remains a concern for the long-term transformation of the IP system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extrajudicial killings are cases where a government kills citizens with no judicial oversight. We offer first-of-its-kind analyses of this phenomenon that by now is widely discussed in the context of international politics. The theoretical framework proposed here underscores the importance of two pillars: an independent judiciary and violent conflicts. Ordered logistic regression models and GEE time-series cross-sectional analyses with data for 146 countries from 1981–2004 lend support to our theory. Furthermore, the analyses compare extrajudicial killings as a political phenomenon with other phenomena they are often associated with or even lumped together with in empirical analyses. Those include political imprisonment and political disappearance. We find that in various ways extrajudicial killings are indeed unique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislative proposals that attack or curb state supreme courts are often introduced in state legislatures. However, the causes of state court curbing legislation have not been systematically analyzed. This article seeks to expand on existing knowledge of court curbing by examining what causes some U.S. state legislators to introduce court curbing bills. I develop a theoretical argument that court curbing is driven by court–legislator ideological distance and legislator electoral security. I demonstrate that legislators who are ideologically distant from their state supreme court and electorally secure introduce the most court curbing legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the standard of review to be applied, on appeal from a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel regarding professional misconduct of lawyers. It is argued that the approaches taken by the majority, dissenting judges and dissenting Côté J can be conceptually classified as according some, full and no deference to the Panel's decision, respectively. This note explores the three approaches by comparing them with the English and Hong Kong approaches. It is submitted that there should not be full deference. The note also explores Côté J's view on the distinction between 'in-court' and 'out-of-court' misconduct. Côté J has raised concerns regarding judicial independence and the fundamental right to a fair trial when 'in-court' misconduct is involved. These insightful concerns would justify less deference and these concerns can be equally applicable to England and Wales, and Hong Kong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Distinctions between the common and civil law are crucial when considering the rule of law and judicial independence in a political system. The 1993 Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia provides for a democratic government with separation of powers, judicial independence and human rights guarantees consistent with international legal instruments. However, Cambodia ranks poorly in international indices of political interference and corruption in the judiciary and for the rule of law. Drawing on interviews with Cambodian state officials and legal practitioners, the article situates the domestic judiciary within the socio-political environment and constitutional arrangements in which it must operate and examines the limits to judicial independence in the country. The article argues that the lack of judicial independence in contemporary Cambodia is not only attributable to its neopatrimonial political culture but also to the legal-institutional framework established during the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) period. The legal-philosophical underpinnings of civil law, the nature of the civil law system operating in Cambodia, and how it is interpreted locally, are crucial to understanding the limits to judicial independence in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judicial reform has been part and parcel of democratization process among countries preparing for European Union accession. The literature on EU enlargement, political conditionality conceptualizes the EU's role in promoting rule of law and judicial reforms in its external neighbourhood, especially in the candidate states as largely positive. However, in the Turkish case, the EU's political conditionality in judicial reform presents a mixed picture. This paper provides a qualitative case study with the aim to assess the conditions under which backsliding occurs. The paper's main proposition is that this backsliding in judicial reforms and rule of law is due to the interplay of the relative weakness of the EU's political anchor and the relative strength of the domestic struggles facing political elites. Judicial reforms emerge as a visible aspect of backsliding as it has become a key priority area for the EU. This paper assesses to what extent the changing pace and direction of judicial reforms have been driven by a mix of factors; the EU's political conditionality as well as the domestic costs of adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) marks a striking shift towards a more restrictive interpretation of EU citizens’ rights. The Court's turnaround is not only highly relevant for practical debates about ‘Social Europe’ or ‘welfare migration’, but also enlightening from a more general, theoretical viewpoint. Several recent studies on the ECJ have argued that the Court is largely constrained by member state governments’ threats of legislative override and non-compliance. We show that an additional mechanism is necessary to explain the Court's turnaround on citizenship. While the ECJ extended EU citizens’ rights even against strong opposition by member state governments, its recent shift reflects changes in the broader political context, i.e., the politicization of free movement in the European Union (EU). The article theorises Court responsiveness to politicization and demonstrates empirically, how the Court's jurisprudence corresponds with changing public debates about EU citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent cases concerning mobile citizens and access to social assistance the Court has sided with Member States against the litigating citizens. Given that in early cases it sided with the litigants, this has created the impression of a change in judicial perspective. This article looks at the most discussed sub-set of cases, and argues that a more plausible explanation lies in the changing characteristics of the litigants themselves - recent claims for social assistance are based on less meritorious facts. This raises a broader issue about research into judicial decisions: Trends in outcomes cannot be analysed without taking account of possible trends in inputs. These may vary due to changes in skills or strategies at national courts or authorities, or social changes leading to different litigant characteristics. Unless accounted for, claims that a court is changing its approach will be unreliable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between international criminal justice and democratisation processes in post-conflict settings, illustrating that international tribunals did not contribute to democratisation in the cases of Serbia, Kosovo and Rwanda. The argument that tribunals have willingly or inadvertently empowered local non-reformist factions is rooted in the agency of local elites. The findings suggest prioritisation of international over localised knowledge, political over victim interests and stability over judicial independence. This article makes a contribution to the emerging, critical literature on the dynamics between institutions of international criminal law and their socio-political environments, drawing attention to volatile effects of internationalised justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In China, "judicial management" mainly includes case management, case management, judiciary personnel management and judicial property management. As a basic concept, "judicial independence" means the courts exercising judicial power independently as a whole, instead of independence of a single judge or collegiate bench as to manage the cases. Such a system has been criticized as "bureaucratization of adjudication" in that the leaders or managers of the courts actually share the judges' judicial power so as to damage both transparency and efficiency of judicial processes. A series of reforms aim to establish a new mechanism as so called "panel responsibility" or "trial accountability" system, which will adjust the relationship among the judges or penal as a case manager and their leaders as a judge manager under the principle "Let the trier/inquisitor to decide, and let the decider to be responsible". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The state supreme court literature often overlooks the twelve states that use traditional appointment systems or fails to explore differences in their judicial designs. Eight states require justices to be reappointed at the end of a fixed term, while a different set of eight states currently use judicial commissions to limit the discretion of partisan elites to appoint judges. I develop a principal-agent theory of judicial independence to test how unelected judges under different institutional arrangements respond to elite preferences. An analysis of business cases from 1995-2010 indicates justices selected by judicial commissions are significantly less sensitive to elite ideology than justices nominated by partisan elites. The most responsive behavior occurs among justices subject to periodic reappointment who are chosen by partisan elites, while tenured judges chosen by judicial commissions behave independently of elite ideology. The data also provide evidence that state tort reforms significantly increase the probability of pro-business votes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of how ordinary courts in new and emerging democracies may gain judicial independence remains an understudied subject compared to its constitutional court counterpart. Through a case study of Taiwan, this article adopts and expands upon the concept of power diffusion from the extant literature, arguing that the growing power of Taiwan’s private corporate sector led the dominant political party Kuomintang (KMT) to grant independence to the ordinary courts as a means to check against this threat, because the excessive rent-seeking and corruption brought about by these empowered corporations were threatening the nation’s successful economic model and its rule of law. Also, due to the corporate sector’s growing influence on the ruling party itself, the KMT leadership had to devise strategies that can credibly commit to ordinary court independence, which would otherwise be reversed thereafter. This unique implication guides a qualitative empirical analysis that reinterprets the historical events surrounding the judicial reforms that took place in the mid-1990s. The results yield strong evidence in support of the theory. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article, we test the extent to which decisions by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court (ECC) are predicted by non-legal variables. Our theoretical argument proposes that not only the presence of public actors as plaintiffs—especially those working for the executive branch—but also political salience, i.e., the degree of importance attributed to a case by the government and public opinion, plays a crucial role in explaining the outcome of judicial decisions. Original data on all abstract review decisions issued by the ECC (2008–2016) is used to test our argument. We control for possible selection effects, incorporating a novel measure of the overall quality of argumentation and strength of cases brought before the ECC by both public and private parties, in the form of an expert survey. Consistent with our argument, the results show that even when controlling for a wide range of potential confounders, norms are more likely to be struck down by the ECC when (1) public officials claim unconstitutionality than when non-public parties do, and (2) cases are reported by media. In the light of the Ecuadorian case, we conclude that the formally powerful ECC is quite sensitive to governmental influence, even under an improved situation ofde jurejudicial protections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]