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The aim of this article is to examine the use of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism in the war in Ukraine. Following this brief introduction, the first section is devoted to OSCE mechanisms in general, with special emphasis on the Moscow Mechanism. Against this background, section two presents and analyses the conclusions of the reports of the OSCE missions to Ukraine. Finally, in the conclusions, the authors point to the value of the Moscow Mechanism and its meaning for peaceful resolution of conflicts and international security. The research method consists of formal-legal analysis of legal acts such as the Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of armed conflicts (1949) and Additional Protocol I on the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (1977) as well as reports of the OSCE expert missions and NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developments in machine learning prompt questions about algorithmic decision-support systems (DSS) in warfare. This article explores how the use of these technologies impact practices of legal reasoning in military targeting. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) requires assessment of the proportionality of attacks, namely whether the expected incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects is excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage. Situating human agency in this practice of legal reasoning, this article considers whether the interaction between commanders (and the teams that support them) and algorithmic DSS for proportionality assessments alter this practice and displace the exercise of human agency. As DSS that purport to provide recommendations on proportionality generate output in a manner substantively different to proportionality assessments, these systems are not fit for purpose. Moreover, legal reasoning may be shaped by DSS that provide intelligence information due to the limits of reliability, biases and opacity characteristic of machine learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While ambiguity is a common feature of international obligations, there is a strong theoretical anticipation that ambiguities may be exploited, and obligations circumvented, under competing interests. This article largely backs this anticipation. The article scrutinises how ambiguous arms export control obligations are handled under strong incentives for arms export. The empirical case explored is the UK government's arms exports to Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen. Exports continued despite evidence that the Saudi-led coalition was violating international humanitarian law (IHL) in Yemen, and despite obligations not to export if there is a risk that the exported equipment can be used in IHL violations. A resulting legal challenge against the UK government provides valuable information about the role of ambiguity in the implementation of arms export controls. Drawing on primary sources from the legal process, this article argues that the UK government has taken advantage of linguistic ambiguity. The article also argues that the government has engaged in the continuous construction of ambiguity around events in Yemen and around the ideal parameters for arms trade risk assessment. Together, these strategies have facilitated continued arms exports to Saudi Arabia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the extent to which peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and specifically Operation Sukola II, effectively applied the UN human rights due diligence policy (HRDDP) in the period under review (2014–2021), based upon reports and interviews with individuals with knowledge of the peacekeeping operations. It analyses the complexity and challenges the peacekeepers and Congolese government confronted in the application of HRDDP in the DRC, noting the different challenges in applying this policy due to the highly volatile situations faced. The study argues that in applying the policy in situations such as the DRC, where the conflict is complex, the UN needs to be responsive to unexpected contingencies, with a high degree of flexibility and resilience. It recommends that the UN should review its HRDDP and update its procedures based on gained experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the idea of asking what I describe as 'jester's questions' that are comfortable with paradox, this Afterword to the Special Issue reflects upon the value of critical, multi-disciplinary approaches for international law, the parallel binaries and pluralities in international law, and the relevance and capabilities of international humanitarian law regarding legal identity under insurgencies and unrecognised states. I suggest that the critique offered by the multi-/inter-disciplinary approaches in this Special Issue highlights international law's limits given the realities of the issuance of identity documentation by non-state entities. At the same time, precisely by illuminating those practical realities, this collection alerts us to the accompanying nuances existing in the law. Through this entry point, we are encouraged back, better-equipped, to international law and to better understand where and how it can already cope with greater complexity and compromise than might often be assumed. It allows us to place real demands on the law to prove itself as relevant and capable of protecting people, somehow holding together that paradox of universal principle and grounded application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International humanitarian law requires that the bodies of those who die as a result of armed conflict, whether of international or non-international character, must be protected, treated with dignity, and all available information recorded prior to their disposal. In practice, non-international conflicts have become more prevalent over the last years, resulting into a proliferation of non-state armed groups who increasingly hold territory and provide governance-like services, such as the case of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Iraq. In providing services to populations under control through the establishment of a civilian administration, non-state armed groups have recorded deaths and issued death certificates. In response, States have introduced cumbersome procedures to recognize the fact of death for inheritance purposes, though not necessarily recognizing insurgent death certificates alone as proof for death. Failure to obtain a valid proof of death for the death of a family members' results in denial of myriad rights afforded to surviving relatives. In considering the gravity and scale of this problem, this study considers whether the obligation to record deaths under humanitarian law, the obligation of humane treatment and the right to know the fate of relatives can shed light on how states may regard the validity of insurgent death certificates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews a body of recent literature that interrogates the development and deployment of the contemporary regime of political violence. This literature includes Samuel Moyn's account of the emergence and dominance of the humanitarian paradigm and Francine Hirsch, Giovanni Mantilla and Boyd van Dijk's diplomatic histories of the creation of the central provisions of this paradigm. It also encompasses Dirk Moses, Benjamin Meiches and Sinja Graf's examinations of genocide and universal crime, Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini's Human Shields, and Yagil Levy's Whose Life is Worth More? This is a diverse literature but, considered together, it traverses the creation of the legal categories, the cultural values and the ethical concerns that shape the current regime. It shows how these laws and values are created through political and cultural negotiations and how they become, themselves, political mechanisms that erase or legitimize certain forms of violence. By doing so, these works reveal the contingency and dangers of the current paradigm of ethical violence. They also, this review argues, show how difficult it is to escape from this paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his recent JME article Daniel Restrepo argues that both legal and ethical rules should protect the so-called Naked Soldiers, combatants engaged in activity unrelated to military operations and unaware of the imminent danger threatening them. I criticize this position from several angles. I deny the existence of any link between vulnerability and innocence, and claim ignorance of deadly threats does not give rise to a morally distinguished type of vulnerability. I argue that actions not contributing to the war effort are nevertheless an inherent part of fighting a war, and that combatants do not signal intention to abandon their commitment to the war effort by undertaking these. I show that by granting hors de combat status to Naked Soldiers, we would unjustly disadvantage their opponents and engender significant and manifold practical difficulties that the proponents of the view fail to solve or even anticipate. Finally, I demonstrate that Restrepo's general project of "making killing in war difficult to legitimately justify" regardless of why, how and by whom the killing is done is incompatible with just war theory's basic assumptions. That project is in fact pacifist in nature and as such redundant in light of pacifism's broader and stronger implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Training on the Law of armed conflict (LOAC) employs different rationales to motivate soldiers and to induce their compliance with LOAC rules. Of these, none is as controversial, or as potentially contradictory, as the Golden Rule. This article analyzes the role of the Golden Rule in historical and contemporary LOAC training material, including manuals, pamphlets, circulars, and films. Research findings suggest that the Golden Rule message corresponds with changes in military training and doctrine that emerged as a result of Vietnam War violations. Furthermore, the Golden Rule is conceptually dynamic, having both positive and negative formulations that are tied to the larger concept of reciprocity. This article concludes with a discussion of possible contradictory interpretations of the Golden Rule and prospects for future research. Since this is the first systematic examination of the Golden Rule in LOAC training material, the author hopes that it will provide a foundation for further dialogue and research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) against both male and female combatants, as well as civilians, remains a reality of war despite global efforts to address it. International humanitarian law (IHL) unequivocally condemns sexual violence in armed conflict, and there are specific measures addressing this issue in IHL. However, Buddhist teachings and practices to address sexual violence in armed conflict have not been extensively researched, despite the prevalence of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict involving Buddhist communities. This article examines Buddhist teachings and practices relevant to addressing this challenge, identifying where these align with IHL, as well as proposing how Buddhist teachings may reduce the likelihood of CRSV. It is proposed that insight into the Buddhist teaching on lack of a permanent, essential self, as expounded in the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta, coupled with meditation, is a practical means of dispelling the toxic conceptions of gender that exacerbate sexual violence in armed conflict and of fostering compassionate behaviour towards others. As brought to light by recent neurological research, Buddhist meditation practices lessen the 'self'-focused outlook common to humans and increase the capacity for compassion, active empathy and resilience to peer pressure. Training in Buddhist meditation, supported by explanation of relevant Buddhist teachings, may therefore significantly reduce the cultural and individual attitudes that currently exacerbate the risks of CRSV. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All of us agree that a civilian population is inevitably and profoundly affected by a war, regardless of where this population stands in the scheme of things. A civilian population is hostage to the forces at work, not only physically, economically and socially, but also intimately, emotionally, psychologically and spiritually. In fact, everyone involved in a conflict has to deal with the chaos in his or her own mind and in his or her own environment. The formulation of international humanitarian law (IHL) was influenced by a socially oriented intellectual culture that has often failed to address the inner workings of the individual consciousness. Buddhism's contribution here may be just that: its insistence on the process of cognition as the ground for both the creation of and the liberation from suffering. More specifically, this paper focuses on the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (DDV), an ancient North Indian Buddhist text. The premise is that many such ancient texts have something important to contribute to our contemporary world, by offering some insight into 'universal principles' in the workings of the mind and in human interactions. The question then is: how can these ideas contribute to the development of individual willingness to care and embody ethical conduct even during armed conflicts? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I present abhayadāna ('the gift of fearlessness') as a Buddhist framework for the protection of populations who are vulnerable to violence, terror or displacement during times of conflict. Abhayadāna is an ancient Indian ethic that inspired the political activism of Hindu leader Mohandas Gandhi. Although seldom invoked by Buddhists today (one notable exception is Aung San Suu Kyi's appeal to abhayadāna in her 1990 essay 'Freedom from Fear'), abhayadāna is also deeply rooted in the Buddhist tradition and holds vital potential for transforming the way that Buddhist-majority societies conceive of their Buddhist identity and their responsibility to protect the vulnerable during times of conflict. In this article, I argue that abhayadāna offers a Buddhist principle of protection that in substantial ways complements and strengthens the principle of protection enshrined in international humanitarian law (IHL). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Buddhist teachings relevant to the regulation of war and compares them with international humanitarian law (IHL) and the just war tradition by which it has been informed. It argues that Buddhist ethics broadly align with IHL rules to minimise harm inflicted during war, and that Buddhism's psychological resources can help support IHL to improve compliance with common humanitarian norms. Indeed, Buddhist mindfulness techniques can support even non-Buddhist combatants by enhancing their psychological resilience and capacity to fight with skill and restraint. While IHL is a legal regime that legitimises violence under certain conditions, and lays down clear universally ratified rules, Buddhism is primarily an ethical and psychological system that addresses the motivations and inner roots of behaviour and can be understood and interpreted in different ways. In this respect, Buddhism overlaps with the field of military ethics, and can contribute much to enhance military training. However, while the centrality of non-harming (ahiṃsā) to Buddhism dictates that extraordinary efforts should be made to prevent war or otherwise minimise the harm inflicted – thereby checking interpretations of IHL that are overly permissive – Buddhism's consequent reluctance to legitimise and thereby institutionalise war, and the ambiguity of its teachings in this regard, have generally precluded it from developing clear just war guidelines for belligerents to follow, and Buddhist resources to improve the conduct of hostilities have remained largely untapped. Mainstream traditions of Buddhist ethics must also be distinguished from more esoteric and localised beliefs and practices, and from the lived Buddhisms with which most lay Buddhists are more familiar, which do not necessarily embody the same degree of restraint. Belligerents might therefore have different conceptions or expectations of Buddhism depending on their culture and particular circumstances, or be unclear about what it says on the conduct of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The branch of international humanitarian law (IHL) pertaining to targeting is notoriously challenging for decision makers to apply in practice. The rules of distinction, precautions and proportionality in attack form the bedrock of targeting law, but compliance with these rules requires combatants to correctly understand what is happening in the battlespace. Those who decide upon, plan or execute an attack may not always have access to the right kind or amount of information needed to correctly set up an attack. Furthermore, they may not even know what information they need. Given the ambiguity posed by inadequate intelligence or information overload, how can combatants train themselves to successfully cut through the fog of war? In Japanese Zen (Chinese: Chan) Buddhism, adherents typically practice meditation methods featuring elements of open monitoring and focused attention. One style of focused attention, known as kōan practice, is often used by those in the Rinzai and (to a lesser extent) Sōtō schools of Zen. Kōans are short stories that Zen teachers use to communicate those Buddhist insights that cannot be expressed through direct communication, such as the experience of 'nonduality'. Although kōans are often described as riddles or puzzles, they are not intended to be solved logically. Rather, the practitioner focuses their attention upon the kōan and observes what happens when linguistic and logical means of 'solving' it fall away. By training the mind to recognise its attachments to particular concepts or habitual ways of problem-solving, those who take up this practice in its proper context may find themselves better prepared to make decisions based on ambiguous information, and to spot errors in their perception or thinking when considering such matters of grave importance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At first glance, a military life and practising Buddhism may seem like two pursuits at odds. Buddhism sets the moral bar very high and nowhere in its teachings can one find any evidence in support of violence, whether in word, thought or deed. One could therefore argue that Buddhism and the military are two strange bedfellows, and some may find it difficult to conceive of serving in the military whilst adhering to the ethos, values and standards of Buddhism. This article challenges this popular myth and resolves this apparent paradox between Buddhism and the military. By drawing on canonical Buddhist teachings as well as voices from the Sangha and Buddhist military practitioners, we demystify the 'Buddhist soldier' and clear common misconceptions regarding: the fundamental teachings of ahiṃsā, karma and skilful (kusala) action; Buddhist teachings being equated to pacifism; the duty of soldiers and the State to protect; soldiering as a 'right livelihood'; and the karmic implications of military professions. Using international humanitarian law, the body of law regulating the conduct of war, as a natural reference point, we explore what guidance Buddhist teachings provide to soldiers and how they potentially can contribute towards reducing suffering in war, including through application in military training. Buddhism endorses the concept of maintaining disciplined, virtuous and skilled military forces to protect what is good. At all times one needs to aim at not causing suffering to others, but never at the expense of preventing even worse suffering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chogye Order of Korean Buddhism (K. Chogye chong or Jogyejong 曹溪宗) compiled a booklet called Kukkun pŏbyo chip (Essential Buddhist Teachings for the Armed Forces, 國軍法要集, EBTAF hereafter), which is distributed in the military Buddhist temples (K. kun sachal; Ch. jun sisha 軍寺刹) of South Korea. This manual for Buddhist military personnel draws on Buddhist classical texts and teachings to provide them both with doctrinal and practical information, and guidance as well as litanies for chaplains to perform crucial rites such as funerals. At the same time the EBTAF contains some distinctively Korean Buddhist references and ideas, and combines them with elements of Korean nationalism. In this context, this article analyses (1) the ideal traits of Buddhist combatants suggested in the EBTAF and their compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL); (2) the conflicting values illustrated in the booklet between Buddhist soldiers' religious aspirations to uphold common humanity and the partiality inherent in their governmental affiliation; and (3) a passage to resolve the disparity. While the EBTAF aligns with IHL principles, some parts of it reflect a tension between Buddhist aspirations for peace and the military necessities of the state. Though IHL is not explicitly mentioned in the EBTAF, there is potential for embedding education on mutually complementary Buddhist and IHL values into Korean military chaplaincy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article places international humanitarian law (IHL) side by side with Buddhist narratives as seen through the Jātakas, to investigate how they view the expectation placed on soldiers to risk their lives in battle. To this end, I delve into the notion of reciprocity of risk in battle from an IHL perspective, which I argue is crucial to infusing warfare with restraint. Similarly, Buddhism acknowledges the importance of reciprocity as an ethical principle that leads to non-violence. I demonstrate how IHL tries to ensure that the risk combatants undertake in combat is limited through its rule of surrender. I compare this argument with the Seyyaṃsa or Seyya Jātaka (no. 282), which illustrates the need to cease violence in cases of surrender. The way militaries treat their own combatants is crucial to the meaningful practice of surrender and thereby the limits and restraints of warfare. Buddhism too encourages rulers to value the lives of their soldiers and not to put their lives at unnecessary risk. I conclude that to maximise the combatant's choice to limit the risk he takes in battle, IHL should pay more attention to the orders that militaries and armed groups issue to their combatants. Buddhism, for its part, can facilitate the constructive use of military orders because it projects positive images of rulers who are reluctant to order their soldiers to take unnecessary risks in war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In international humanitarian law (IHL), collateral damage to civilians caught in warfare is restrained through the rule of proportionality. The first part of this chapter explains how this increasingly controversial area is dependent on the perceptions, values and good faith of the military commander in the specific instance. In determining which Buddhist teachings can guide the mind in this grey area, the quality of appamāda, 'heedfulness', is significant. The Buddha refers to it several times in his sermons (suttas) and, most importantly, included it in his final words before his demise. The second part explores what the Buddha meant by appamāda and argues that the concept has a moral dimension useful in decision-making for Buddhists engaged in warfare. The third part discusses Emperor Ashoka to whom the monk Nigrodha preached the Appamāda Vagga. The change in Emperor Ashoka's manner of ruling and conquering as manifested in his many edict inscriptions proves that Buddhist values can be practically applied by the laity, not just monastics. The fourth analyses how appamāda could guide the minds of Buddhists engaged in warfare, and proposes that this could be done through sermons (to transform intention) and meditation (to aid such transformation). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, drawing on Pali materials, highlights the Buddhist emphasis on minimising suffering, even in the conduct of war, in line with principles of international humanitarian law (IHL). It reflects on the inner roots of conflict and explores ideals of governance and the conduct of war, especially as explored in the Jātaka stories and stories about the god Sakka, and then as reflected in the Edicts of emperor Asoka and the Mahāvaṃsa chronicle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on how Buddhist ethics contains ideas and principles that would urge those in a combat situation to minimise the harm they do to others, within the requirements of their military goal. This international humanitarian law principle is in line with both compassion for others and a concern to limit the bad karmic results to the combatant of their intentional killing and maiming. The motive for an act of killing can worsen or lessen its karmic results, and non-combat actions such as helping the wounded can generate good karmic results which can dilute, though not cancel, the bad karma of killing. Harm to both humans and non-humans is to be avoided wherever possible, but killing a human is worse than killing an animal. The Mahāvaṃsa passage on combatants killed by King Duṭṭhagāmaṇi's army as mostly being less than human, such that killing them produced little or no bad karma, is a totally implausible statement to put in the mouths of monks whom the text says were Arahats, spiritually enlightened ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Yemen has shown inconsistencies in European Union (EU) member states' arms export control practices: specifically, how they have applied international humanitarian law standards in their arms transfer decisions towards members of the Saudi-led coalition involved in the conflict. While such discrepancies are not new, the ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty by all EU member states, including the United Kingdom (UK) at the time, has provided another framework for bringing these controversies into the spotlight. It has also provided non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the UK and France with further legal grounds to challenge the legality of these governments' arms exports to Saudi Arabia and to seek their compliance with their obligations in the field of arms trade. These actions are noteworthy in terms of the information they provide on states' arms export risk assessment procedures, on how to interpret and implement applicable legislation, and their possible impact on other countries' decision-making in the same domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'weaponisation' of artificial intelligence and robotics, especially their convergence in autonomous weapons systems (AWS), is a matter of international concern. Debates on AWS have revolved around (i) the identification of hallmarks of AWS with respect to other weapons; (ii) what it is that makes AWS destructive force especially troublesome from a normative standpoint; and (iii) steps the international community can take to allay these concerns. Of particular concern is the need to preserve the 'human element' in the use of force. A differentiated approach to this latter issue, which is also principled and prudential, may pave the way to a legally binding instrument to regulate AWS by establishing meaningful human control over all weapons systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autonomous weapons are robotic systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. Advances in computer technology, artificial intelligence, and robotics may lead to a vast expansion in the development and use of such weapons in the near future. Public opinion runs strongly against killer robots. But many of the same claims that propelled the Cold War are being recycled to justify the pursuit of a nascent robotic arms race. Autonomous weapons could be militarily potent and therefore pose a great threat. For this reason, substantial pressure from civil society will be needed before major powers will seriously consider their prohibition. However, demands for human control and responsibility and the protection of human dignity and sovereignty fit naturally into the traditional law of war and imply strict limits on autonomy in weapon systems. Opponents of autonomous weapons should point out the terrible threat they pose to global peace and security, as well as their offensiveness to principles of humanity and to public conscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout history, new military technologies have had profound ramifications: The rise of gunpowder and cannon created economies of scale that encouraged the emergence of nation-states, and Prussia used railroads to surprise the Austrians at Königgrätz, beginning the end of the Austrian Empire. Today, emerging military technologies—including unmanned aerial vehicles, directed-energy weapons, lethal autonomous robots, and cyber weapons—raise the prospect of upheavals in military practice so fundamental that they challenge assumptions underlying long-established international laws of war, particularly those relating to the primacy of the state and the geographic bounds of warfare. But the laws of war have been developed over a long period, with commentary and input from many cultures. What would seem appropriate in this age of extraordinary technological change, the author concludes, is a reconsideration of the laws of war in a deliberate and focused international dialogue that includes a range of cultural and institutional perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an opinion that the use of nuclear weapons is “scarcely reconcilable” with international humanitarian law and concluded that nations have an obligation to pursue good-faith negotiations leading to disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference reaffirmed the need for all states to comply with international humanitarian law, which governs the use of nuclear as well as conventional weapons. When the rules of war are applied to nuclear weapons, it becomes clear that these weapons cannot comply with international law. The effects of nuclear weapons are inherently uncontrollable and do not meet international criteria for discrimination between military and civilian targets, for proportionality, and for necessity. Arguments made by the United States as to why some uses of nuclear weapons could be lawful do not stand up to scrutiny. Nuclear weapon states should make immediate changes to any missions, deployments, and targeting policies and practices that facilitate the use of nuclear weapons. Not only does international law preclude the use of nuclear weapons, but it also precludes threats to use nuclear weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article offers information on issues when it comes to banning or regulating autonomous offensive weapons, which are capable of selecting and attacking targets without human intervention. Several key topics being discussed include the use of artificial intelligence to warfare and intelligent robotic system. Issues such as dehumanized killing as well as human rights are mentioned.

The article offers information on issues related to banning or regulating autonomous offensive weapons, particularly about countering potential threats on civilian safety. Several key issues being raised include international human rights law,armed conflict, and international humanitarian law. It also discusses the use of artificial intelligence and dual-use technologies.

The article examines the application of the UN Declaration on Indigenous Rights (UNDRIP) beyond the confines of a State entity. Specifically, it explores the potential integration of indigenous housing, land and property protections into an occupation setting – where sovereignty is suspended and the responsibility to protect the population's rights is vested in an external governing power. Can and should indigenous protections be integrated into the law of occupation? What implications would that entail vis-à-vis the limits that the law of occupation imposes on the occupant to introduce new legal obligations into occupied territory? The need to address this theoretical inquiry arises from the dire conditions of indigenous Bedouin in the West Bank, a Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 1967. Historically and culturally, the West Bank Bedouin have close ties to Bedouin within Israel, the latter acknowledged internationally as indigenous people. Therefore, arguably, the West Bank Bedouin are also entitled to indigenous protections – the relevant difference being that the latter live in occupied territory. The case study of the West Bank Bedouin offers thus a unique opportunity to examine the potential relationship between the law of occupation and the indigenous rights regime as embodied in UNDRIP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical research shows that armed groups may provide governance services to civilians where they have established some form of control over a territory or population. At the same time, armed groups often pursue policies designed to enhance legitimacy in order to strengthen their claim to power. This gives rise to the question: Does the virtuous governance circle, to which this special volume is dedicated, also apply to governance efforts on the part of armed groups and which conditions must be fulfilled in order for the virtuous circle to operate? The article highlights that the contradictory demands of the multiple audiences of legitimacy with which armed groups need to communicate, create a dilemma that may interrupt the virtuous circle. Bringing together international legal and political science discourses on armed group governance, the article argues that the state-centric fabric of the international legal framework contributes significantly to this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In so far as the nuclear-weapons possessors do not accept the Ban Treaty, practically it will not reduce nuclear weapons nor abolish them as a matter of law. However, if the treaty is accepted by an overwhelming majority of states, it will significantly strengthen the norm against the nuclear weapons. A norm binds everybody irrespective of legal acceptance of a treaty. Thus, it exposes any violator to the risk of international punishment. The Ban Treaty will help bring the movement towards nuclear abolition forward and reduce incentives to own nuclear weapons. The international humanitarian law that was the main basis for the Ban Treaty needs to be upheld firmly. The set of norms under international humanitarian law will serve to limit the justifiable cases where nuclear weapons can ever be used. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation must be sustained even after the Ban Treaty comes into force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is about the armed conflict in Colombia and the situation for people with disabilities. Decades of internal conflict have created a complex situation which both gives rise to disability but also fails to take account of the many urgent needs of people with disabilities. Despite the ratification by Colombia of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, persons with disabilities are still not accorded a voice in the peace agreements. Although there is little known about the extent of disability in Colombia, it is important to understand the history of the Colombian armed conflict to see how it impacts on disability issues. We conclude by highlighting the legal instruments in Colombia which provide opportunities now to redress some of those wrongs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women and girls are increasingly the direct and targeted victims of armed conflict and studies show that they are disproportionately and differentially affected. However, humanitarian laws, policies, and protocols have yet to be meaningfully interpreted and adapted to respond to their specific needs, including to sexual and reproductive health services and rights. In particular, safe abortion services are routinely omitted from sexual and reproductive health services in humanitarian settings for a variety of reasons, including improper deference to national law, the disproportionate influence of restrictive funding policies, and the failure to treat abortion as medical care. However, properly construed, abortion services fall within the purview of the universal and non-derogable protections granted under international humanitarian and human rights law. This commentary considers the protections of international humanitarian law and explains how abortion services fall within a category of protected medical care. It then outlines contemporary challenges affecting the realisation of these rights. Finally, it proposes a unification of current approaches through the use of international humanitarian law to ensure comprehensive care for those affected by armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The graphic and widespread atrocities committed during conflicts around the world and broadcast across 24/7 news and social media have made war never feel so close and the powerlessness of law seem so real. This raises difficulties in engaging students in real-life decision-making quandaries where military necessity meets legalism, as well as fundamental ethical questions about the use of realistic, yet explicit, imagery in the classroom. The School of Law at Queen’s University Belfast has developed a series of innovative computer scenarios based on theArma 3open world tactical war simulator. A variety of formative scenarios (addressing issues such as cluster munitions and landmines) were developed to familiarise the students with the factual scenario and the computer technology. Subsequently, students engaged in a summative assessment to test their legal understanding in the face of increasingly challenging conflict situations, in particular grey zones where legal argument can justify seemingly morally wrongful acts during war. This paper examines both the learning objectives of this project, and the project development cycle – from the initial proposal to its implementation in class, as well as positing the benefits and drawbacks in integrating technology and games into the legal teaching environment, reflecting on the emerging and traditional pedagogy in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examinesThe New York Times’ andWashington Post’s coverage of US drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan to determine whether they have accurately reported on the number of civilians killed in drone strikes and the overall civilian impact, as well as whether they have placed drone strikes within their proper legal context. The author concludes that both newspapers have failed to report the number of civilian casualties accurately and have underemphasized the civilian impact of drone strikes, while also excluding international legal issues from their coverage. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper calls for comparative analysis of international humanitarian law and Islamic laws regulating armed conflict by focusing on the underlying assumptions and interests informing both systems (rather than on rule-based comparison). It argues that examination of the biases inherent to each legal system can potentially inform scholars to understand better the paradigms shaping each of them. In doing so, the paper builds on contextual and critical interpretations of both fields of law to assert the need for ‘critical comparativism’ rather than functionalist comparativism. Unlike functionalist comparativism, which treats international law as the ‘objective’ benchmark against which other legal traditions are measured, ‘critical comparativism’ treats the two legal systems examined as alternative manifestations of power structures which, when contrasted against each other, help shed more light on the inherent bias in each legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that humanitarian aid in intra-state conflict plays a crucial but largely unrecognised role in shaping the preconditions for negotiations for peace and post-conflict reconstruction. Drawing on a spatial theory approach, it identifies the role of humanitarian aid as not being temporary and independent, but as forming an integral part of the daily lives of local communities and of continuously evolving structures of governance during conflict. As a result, significant imbalances in the distribution of aid between different geographical areas, as highlighted in the current Syrian war, threaten not only the immediate survival of civilians, but also their future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines a number of key legal issues related to recent Palestinian moves at the International Criminal Court (ICC). It begins by describing the technicalities of these moves in light of article 12(3) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC and the ICC's accession regime. It then turns to some of the considerations that ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda will have to bear in mind when she decides whether to escalate her preliminary examination to an investigation. These are the questions of jurisdiction, admissibility, and the "interests of justice." While it is difficult to predict whether Bensouda will initiate an investigation, it is likely that Palestinian engagement with the ICC will continue to pose a significant obstacle to rapprochement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Palestinian moves have fundamentally challenged the bilateral negotiation imperative that emerged between Israel and the PLO in September 1993. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the international legal analysis of dealings in natural resources in Western Sahara has focused on its status as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, as well as the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi people. Surprisingly overlooked in the legal debates is a close examination of the application of the international law of occupation under international humanitarian law (IHL). This article considers whether and why Western Sahara is ‘occupied territory' under IHL, discussing some of the unique peculiarities that complicate the legal answer. It then considers issues of state responsibility and individual criminal liability under international law for unlawful dealings with natural resources in Western Sahara by Moroccan and foreign companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) publicationInterpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, all civilians (including child soldiers) lose their immunity from direct targeting ‘for so long as’ their actions amount to direct participation in hostilities. All civilians can, however, access the revolving door of protection and return to their civilian activities – complete with full immunity from direct targeting – provided the nature of their direct participation was spontaneous and disorganised. Once it can be ascertained that their participation in hostilities amounts to continuous combative functions, they relinquish their access to the revolving door of protection, and can be targeted at all times until they abandon their formal or functional membership of the belligerent group. This piece analyses how the revolving door phenomenon and the notion of continuous combative functions apply in instances where civilian child soldiers are directly participating in hostilities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over the last several years there has been an explosion of scholarly interest in drones, their impact on armed conflict, and the ethics of using such unmanned weaponry. While this attention and inquiry is to be welcomed, an examination of this scholarship reveals that much of it frequently gets drones wrong – focusing too much on the questionable ‘newness’ of the technology, misunderstanding or misapplying the legal principles which govern such conventional weaponry (especially proportionality) and searching for definitive answers from problematic data. This article highlights the trouble with the contemporary debate over drones and sets out a research agenda in a world of murky campaigns and imperfect information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the legality of drone strikes. It limits the analysis to conduct within a traditionally defined armed conflict, in order to focus more clearly on the question of whether features inherent to the drone as a weapons system might make it conducive to violations of international law. The article reviews the applicable legal principles from international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and examines the record of civilian deaths caused by drone strikes in Afghanistan. While transparency and accountability are a problem, the study suggests that the drone strike operations may be characterised by more direct systemic violations of international law. In examining such potential violations the article considers the features inherent to the drone as a ‘means' of warfare, and the features of the policy and practices that underlie the ‘methods' of warfare related to drone strikes, with the aim of determining which is more responsible for any violations. The features of the armed drone as a weapons systems appear to make it more conducive to compliance with international humanitarian law than competing aerial weapons systems. Conversely, aspects of the policy governing drone operations, such as the criteria used for ‘signature strikes', are more likely to contribute to violations of international law. However, examining the issue from the perspective of a particular strike, and viewed through the lens of cognitive consistency theory on misperception, the article suggests that the picture may be more complex. Paradoxically, the very features that are most likely to make the drone compliant with international humanitarian law – its ability to linger undetected for protracted periods over potential targets, feeding intelligence back to an operations team that can make targeting decisions in a relatively stress-free environment – may facilitate targeting errors caused by misperception and misinterpretation of the target data. In short, both the ‘means' and ‘methods' of drone strikes may combine to facilitate violations of international humanitarian law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional arms control approach is slow in dismantling nuclear arsenals. It is also a state-centered approach, and does not enthuse public opinion as it is rather technical and complex. The recent interest in the so-called humanitarian approach of nuclear disarmament can be explained by a growing frustration with traditional arms control. The humanitarian approach points to the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons for individual human beings, and recommends forbidding nuclear weapons. The step-by-step approach is replaced by a principled approach, which holds that nuclear weapons are too destructive to be used, just like chemical and biological weapons. A ban on nuclear weapons will turn the tables. The burden of proof will shift from the non-nuclear weapon states to the nuclear weapon states. Those nuclear weapon states that are not eager to eliminate their nuclear weapons will come under growing pressure from worldwide public opinion as well as their own public opinion. It is this stigmatizing effect of nuclear weapons as inhumane and therefore unusable that may bring all states to pursue Global Zero. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International human rights law and international humanitarian law, of which Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are applicable in non-international armed conflicts, at first glance seem two separate bodies of law with contradicting foundations and provisions. However, this article explores the similarities between the two, demonstrating their shared philosophical underpinnings and purpose of protecting people's rights despite the varying contexts within which they apply. Through studying the application of the two bodies of law in varying jurisdictions, this article concludes that far from an either/or choice, the best way to ensure the protection of those who find themselves the victims of non-international armed conflicts is to use the two bodies of law together so that they complement and strengthen each other. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The rapidly growing presence of private military and security contractors (PMSCs) in armed conflict and post-conflict situations in the last decade brought corresponding incidents of serious misconduct by PMSC personnel. The two most infamous events--one involving the firm formerly known as Blackwater and the other involving Titan and CACl -engendered scrutiny of available mechanisms for criminal and civil accountability of the individuals ivhose misconduct caused the harm. Along a parallel track, scholars and policymakers began examining the responsibility of states and international organizations for the harm that occurred. Both approaches have primarily focused on post-conduct accountability--of the individuals who caused the harm, of the state in which the harm occurred, or of the state or organization that hired the PMSC whose personnel caused the harm. Less attention, however, has been paid to the idea of pre-conduct accountability for PMSCs and their personnel. A broad understanding of " accountability for" PMSCs and their personnel encompasses not only responsibility for harm caused by conduct, but responsibility for hiring, hosting, and monitoring these entities, as well as responsibility to the victims of the harm. This article provides a comprehensive approach for analyzing the existing international legal regime, and whether and to what extent the legal regime provides "accountability for" PMSCs and their personnel. It does so by proposing a practical construct of three phases based on PMSC operations--Contracting, In-the-Field, and Post-Conduct--with which to assess the various bodies of international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the common claim that there are gaps in international law that undermine accountability of private military and security companies. A multi-actor analysis examines this question in relation to the commission of international crimes, violations of fundamental human rights, and ordinary crimes. Without this critical first step of identifying specific deficiencies in international law, the debate about how to enhance accountability within this sector is likely to be misguided at best. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the ways in which the two normative concerns of casualty-aversion and civilian protection influenced US military strategy in the particular context of the asymmetric conflict in Somalia in the early 1990s. The article critically evaluates US military operations through the prism of international humanitarian law and examines whether American forces started prioritizing casualty-aversion over the safeguarding of Somali civilians. Finally, by drawing on emerging moral guidelines (such as Michael Walzer's idea of ‘due care’), the article examines whether lower numbers of Somali civilian deaths could have been achieved if marginal increases to the risks faced by US soldiers had been accepted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions, in Article 57, mandates the rule of proportionality governing military attacks. The literature on international humanitarian law, however, reflects a widely-held view that this mandate is often ignored. Motivated by that view, this paper discusses three strategies, which, by appealing to ubiquitous social values, can encourage respect for and, in turn, compliance with the proportionality rule. These strategies are: first, interpreting a proportional attack as one which requires a rational and equitable balance, in cost-benefit terms, of the conflicting military and humanitarian interests, respectively, of the attacking and the attacked Parties (without sacrificing the desired military advantage of the former); second, requiring a planned attack to be 'objectively proportional', as measured by the preferences, quantified in statistical terms, of the 'reasonable military commander'; and, third, requiring the attacking Party to compensate victims for incidental civilian damage resulting from an attack that is not objectively proportional. Observance of the principle of proportionality depends upon voluntary compliance, induced by respect for this principle, since compliance is not compelled under current international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) declined its jurisdiction in its 2010 ruling in Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr by not ordering the repatriation of Canadian Guantanamo detainee Omar Ahmed Khadr. Despite finding that Khadr's deprivation of liberty at Guantanamo was not in accord with the principles of fundamental justice, and that Canada was complicit in his ongoing detention, the Court left the remedy to the Canadian federal government's discretion. This based on a theory of 'royal prerogative' inapplicable on the facts of the case, and an erroneous claim of an inconclusive record relating to alleged relevant foreign relations matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines whether the use of Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions can be considered illegal under current public international law. The analysis covers the law of arms control and focuses in particular on international humanitarian law. The article argues that DU ammunition cannot be addressed adequately under existing treaty based weapon bans, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, due to the fact that DU does not meet the criteria required to trigger the applicability of those treaties. Furthermore, it is argued that continuing uncertainties regarding the effects of DU munitions impedes a reliable review of the legality of their use under various principles of international law, including the prohibition on employing indiscriminate weapons; the prohibition on weapons that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment; and the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. All of these principles require complete knowledge of the effects of the weapon in question. Nevertheless, the author argues that the same uncertainty places restrictions on the use of DU under the precautionary principle. The paper concludes with an examination of whether or not there is a need for - and if so whether there is a possibility of achieving - a Convention that comprehensively outlaws the use, transfer and stockpiling of DU weapons, as proposed by some non-governmental organisations (NGOs). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]