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Although Avicenna does not explicitly develop a 'theory of intentionality', one can reconstruct his account of intentionality through an analysis of his thoughts on the relation between mind, meaning, and thing. We take up this task in this paper through an analysis of Avicenna's theory of the considerations of quiddity. First, we clarify Avicenna's idea of 'quiddity', and show how it functions as a core of 'meaning' which remains identical in its different modes of realization. Second, through an examination of the very notion of 'consideration' (i'tibār), we distinguish between two aspects of the mind, i.e. mental act and mental existence. This helps us clarify what Avicenna means by the existence of a quiddity in mind and in what sense, if any, it is essential to intentionality. Third, addressing the problem of the relation between 'mental existence' and 'external existence', we show how the mode of existence of a quiddity, including its concrete existence, is posited in and through intentionality. This implies that both being and quiddity are moments of the intentional object, and thus, intentionality, for Avicenna, is a dyadic relation between the intentional act and the intentional object. We conclude by reconstructing the structure of intentionality in Avicenna. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this analysis, I employ Husserl's three-part description of intentionality to show how a player/play act/play object model for consciousness helps us see play more clearly. I review Suits' logic-based attempts to amend Huizinga's overly inclusive characterization of play. However, I do so on what I see as stronger phenomenological grounds by describing four kinds of experience embedded in Suits' work-play dichotomy. I analyze two species of play-fortified work – namely, work that requires intrinsic enhancement and work that does not. I also describe two species of play – namely, play that is compromised and play that is unfettered. I conclude by summarizing advantages of phenomenological analyses and underlining the important distinctions this philosophic method uncovers within traditional work and play categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Appealing to some analytic tools developed by contemporary analytic philosophers, I discuss Avicenna's views regarding the problem(s) of linguistic and mental reference to non-existents, also known as the problem(s) of 'empty intentionality'. I argue that, according to Avicenna, being in an intentional state directed towards an existing thing involves three elements: (1) an indirect relation to that thing, (2) a direct relation to a mental representation of that thing, and (3) a direct relation to the essence of that thing. Empty intentionality does not involve the first element. Moreover, depending on the nature of the non-existent we are thinking about, the third element may not be involved either. Thus, the necessary element of being in an intentional state towards something is to be related to a mental representation of that thing. The nature of this representation may vary depending on the nature of the non-existent towards which our thought is directed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are 'token-reflexives', in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common knowledge is ubiquitous in our lives and yet there remains considerable uncertainty about how to model or understand it. Standard analyses of common knowledge end up being challenged by either regress or circularity which then give rise to well-known paradoxes of practical reasoning, such as the Two Generals' Paradox. This paper argues that the nature and utility of common knowledge can be illuminated by appeal to Wittgenstein's Hinge Epistemology. It is argued that those things that we standardly think of as being common knowledge in our lives are the same as those that Wittgenstein identified as hinge certainties. This identification of common knowledge with hinge certainties allows us to resolve the regress problem for common knowledge and explain how the Two Generals' Paradox arises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an original interpretation of the fourteenth-century debate over whether every volitio is a cognitio. This debate, I argue, was at its heart a debate about what constitutes the mark of occurrent mental states. Three participants in this debate – Adam Wodeham, Richard FitzRalph, and John of Ripa – articulated three distinct accounts of the mark of the mental. In doing so, they also developed several philosophical accounts of the intentionality of occurrent affective states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent Law Commission of England and Wales review of corporate criminal liability has presented a range of options to the Government to address current deficiencies in the law of corporate attribution. This article explores the nature and operation of two holistic models closely considered by the Law Commission, but which were not included in the suite: the distinctive Australian 'Corporate Culture' model and a novel model of 'Systems Intentionality'. In so doing, the analysis sheds considerable light on the comparative nature, strengths and limitations of Failure to Prevent offences, which formed a key element in the Law Commission's reform recommendations. Using the Rolls Royce Deferred Prosecution Agreement proceedings as a case study, the article demonstrates how, far from being foreign and uncertain conceptual tools, Corporate Culture and Systems Intentionality are essential parts of the regulatory toolkit that deserve further consideration given the complex reality of modern corporate defendants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano's repeated attempts to analyze intentionality in terms of 'notional constituents' – aspects of intentionality which cannot come apart in reality but which can be conceptually distinguished. After bringing out this tension, I explore some options for resolving it, ultimately offering my own favored interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of Mark Textor's main aims in Brentano's Mind is to refute Brentano's claim that intentionality – the capacity our mental acts have for being of, about, or directed on something – is the mark of the mental. I defend the view that Brentano analysed intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence (and so wasn't an intentionality primitivist as Textor suggests). And I argue that we can regard intentionality as being the mark of the mental, but only if we give a non-relational analysis of the idea of intentional inexistence. Textor objects to an analysis of intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence for failing to account for the relationship between the object our mental act is directed on, and the 'immanent' or 'inexistent' object which all mental acts contain. I claim that this problem doesn't arise if the object our mental act is directed on just is the immanent/ inexistent object. I argue that Brentano (at least sometimes) seems to identify the two. I then offer my own view of intentionality according to which our mental acts are directed on immanent/ inexistent objects, and that 'directedness' should be understood non-relationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The extant critical literature on international interventions has not only discussed liberal peace interventions from Western subject positions but has also explained its drivers principally from the intention of Western actors to perpetuate neo-imperialism. This analysis, while not illogical, ignores the non-Western involvement in the liberal peace project and, therefore, cannot offer insights into how and why some non-Western actors equally commit to this enterprise. This article moves beyond Western subject positions of this discourse to focus on how and why African interveners engage in liberal interventions despite its Western neo-imperialist instrumentality. Drawing on official documents, interview data and the framework of hegemony, it uncovers African regional actors as practitioners of liberal peace interventions. It argues that they became involved in this practice mainly because they consented to the hegemony of the liberal world order as the only social vision suitable for maintaining domestic stability. Overall, the study offers a broad lens for understanding why the undertaking of liberal projects in many non-Western societies, especially in Africa, cannot be solely explained from the standpoint of Western neo-imperial intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I take up two questions raised by Luz Christopher Seiberth's meticulous reconstruction of Wilfrid Sellars's theory of intentionality. The first is whether we should regard Sellars as a transcendental phenomenalist in the most interesting sense of the term: as denying that even an ideally adequate conceptual structure would enable us to represent worldly objects as they are in themselves. I agree with Seiberth that the answer is probably yes, but I suggest that this is due not to Sellars's rejection of the Myth of the Given or appeal to image-models (as Seiberth maintains), but to his view of modality as categorial but as absent from the world an sich. The second is whether, as Richard Rorty complained, Sellars's appeal to picturing lands his theory of intentionality in intractable skepticism. Pace Seiberth, I argue that the transcendental role of picturing does not mitigate this problem, and I suggest that Sellars's most fruitful resource for doing so is not his semantic externalism, but his purely pragmatic response to skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Luz Seiberth's interpretation of Sellars as a transcendental philosopher promises to change the way we read Sellars. Nonetheless, I dispute two of his central claims: that by depicting "picturing" as as a transcendental imposition we can see it as addressing a "vertical" constraint that Kant does not detect; and that Sellars's transcendental philosophy commits him to a Kantian "necessitarianism" about categorical strucure. Ultimately, I conclude, Seiberth's focus on Sellars's relationship to Kant in particular distorts his understanding of Sellars's peculiar version of a transcendental methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Actions in sport are intentional in character. They are directed at and are about something. This understanding of intentional action is common in continental as well as analytic philosophy. In sport philosophy, intentionality has received relatively little attention, but has more recently come on the agenda. In addition to what we can call ‘action intentionality,’ studied by philosophers like Searle, the phenomenological approach forwarded by Merleau-Ponty has opened up for a concept of ‘motor intentionality,’ which means a basic bodily attention and relatedness to the surrounding world. This conception is very relevant for the study of bodily actions as we find them in sports. However, there may be even deeper layers. The identification of mirror neurons in the brain has opened up for a type of almost ‘muscular intentionality’ whereby a simple bodily movement like grasping a cup to drink seems to be intentionally controlled and orchestrated. My goal in this paper is to discuss the relation between different levels of intentionality, such as a) ‘action intentionality’ operating at a conscious cognitive level, as for instance, when a player shoots a goal in football, b) the ‘motor intentionality’ directing the bodily movements when kicking the ball, and c) the muscular ‘mirror neuron intentionality’ of the goal keeper which is in operation when the keeper is seeing how the kicker’s foot hits the ball. How are these different layers of intentionality related and how can they give a more nuanced and integrated picture of the body–mind in action in sports? [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article analyzes how the legal sources of nonproliferation regimes define "dual-use items," a concept that lacks a universal and fixed definition despite its importance to international security and trade. The analysis shows how these legally binding and soft-law sources approach dual-use goods and technologies differently and classifies them based on the criteria they employ to define the potential uses of these strategic items: the dichotomies of peaceful versus non-peaceful and civil versus military, and the intentionality criterion. The article also traces the expansion of the concept beyond a concern with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It analyzes how the existence of multiple criteria to define such items affects their international control. It also considers the evolution that this notion may undergo, which may call into question the standards of legal certainty that the international regime of dual-use items aims to provide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay aims to show how the development of close reading, and more specifically its relationship to authorial intention, is itself historically contingent on technological development. In historicising New Criticism through the lens of its context within an economy of technological development, the essay asks how newly available technologies might impact and perhaps alter some of New Criticism's essential tenets about the nature of close reading, particularly its relationship to the author. The argument focuses specifically on Roland Barthes's landmark essay, 'The Death of the Author', as we confront new technologies and a new technological context in which authorial intention may be newly accessible. Introducing one such technology, proteomic literary forensics, which allows scholars to identify intimate information about the life of the author at the time of composition, I argue that underlying methodological assumptions of close reading, particularly the constellation of interpretive practices foregrounded by the idea of the 'Death of the Author', may limit the possibilities of literary inquiry, particularly for cultures of literature that seeks to reckon with the marginalisation of voices and groups of people. Finally, this essay seeks to demonstrate the way that authorial intention might productively be brought into practices of close reading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proponents of the causal theory of perception have applied the theory to questions about which particular objects or events are perceived, which parts are perceived, and which properties are perceived. In each case, they insist that successful perception is causally dependent on what is perceived. The causal theory rests on an important insight regarding the information-carrying role of perception. In order to succeed in this role, perception cannot be grounded in spurious correlations. But we can respect this insight without embracing the idea that a successful percept must be causally dependent on what is perceived. A correlation in nature can also be genuine or lawful when it arises from a common cause. I show how successful perception is frequently achieved through correlation via a common cause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity, Sacha Golob criticizes and offers an alternative to the standard interpretation of intentionality in Being and Time. According to Golob, the dominant reading's derivation of propositional intentionality from practical intentionality fails on textual and philosophical grounds, so he develops a different approach that involves deriving propositional intentionality from prototype intentionality. In this essay, I offer an overview of dominant reading of intentionality in Being and Time and Golob's alternative account, and then I criticize them both for attempting to derive propositional intentionality for some form of non-propositional intentionality. Finally, I offer my own ontological interpretation of intentionality by arguing that Heidegger's aim in Being and Time is not to derive one form of intentionality from another but to describe the basic aspects of human existence that make any and all forms of intentionality possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A total of 97 monolingual and multilingual users of English participated in an adaptation of a matched-guise design to investigate the effect of visual cues (co-speech gestural intensity and facial expression) on perception of emotional intensity of the same speaker in two video stimuli in which verbal and vocal emotional information was kept constant. Participants included 41 adults British first language (L1) users of English and 56 highly proficient adult foreign language (LX) users of English. Statistical analysis revealed that gestural intensity was significantly linked to perceptions of emotional intensity by all participants. However, LX users perceived both the low and medium gesture video as significantly more emotional than L1 users. We suggest that LX users may have relied more on the visual channel over the vocal and verbal channels compared to L1 users. The difference between both groups might also be the consequence of overcompensation for the detachment effect of LX emotion speech. The number of languages known, gender, LX users' English proficiency and length of stay in the UK turned out to be unrelated to perceptions of emotional intensity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, transfer is described as interference and consequently as an unintentional mechanism. More recently, however, the perception of control in transfer has changed and it is now commonly accepted that transfer can occur both automatically and strategically. Studies have previously employed think-aloud protocols during writing tasks to establish the degree of intentionality in transfer. However, this method does not let us distinguish between instances of transfer that are truly unintentional and instances that were simply not commented on due to the constraints imposed by the think-aloud protocol. The present study, therefore, conducted a stimulated recall interview in direct succession of the think-aloud protocol in order to categorise also those instances of transfer that were not commented on initially. With data from highly multilingual adult learners of Catalan, the study examines the proportion of unintentional and intentional transfer in relation to (1) different types of transfer, (2) different source languages of transfer and (3) different word classes in transfer. The data indicates that some of these aspects of transfer tend to occur unintentionally, whereas others are more prone to be used intentionally. The theoretical implications of the results, as well as their limitations, are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Therefore, I conclude that Dancy's argument here does not warrant the conclusion that reasoning leads to bodily action in the same way in which reasoning leads to belief or intention. Most theorists have remained doubtful about the possibility of genuine practical reasoning to action, Dancy argues, because they let their view of practical reasoning be embarrassed by mistaken conceptions of theoretical reasoning. Many believe that the mental activity of reasoning, through which we form, revise and discard attitudes like beliefs and intentions, is the weighing of and responding to normative reasons. Dancy argues that Broome's account primarily targets reasoning to prior intentions, and that Broome denies - "or at least is very close to denying" - reasoning to intention-in-action, because he denies reasoning that concludes in action and we cannot distinguish between an action and the relevant intention-in-action, for the act intended "is not a mere bodily motion" (167-168). [Extracted from the article]

Trust and the concept of the brand are increasingly of interest in the study of business relationships on the Internet. Synthesizing studies of trust from other disciplines such as accounting, sociology, psychology and biology can provide useful insights into the application of trust, both specifically and generally, to Internet business relationships. While there is a plethora of models, those with potential application for Internet business relationship theory are described and analysed. The argument is extended to discuss the concept of the brand as a surrogate for trust, and hence as a reliable identifier of a certain cluster of values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by Benjamin's exuberance for weaving haunting sonic textures into his renowned style of snappy passages and his own sense of writerly intentionality, this paper describes an ongoing research project concerned with the collection of sound bytes using a sound archive and interface (sonification). The archive records my recollections of an earlier life reimagined as 'Scenes' from a Childhood, Village Life and Songs of Resistance. The recollections, rendered in Scene I, materialise as a textual street-sketch using a manually-generated word cloud with childlike doodles to disrupt the oneiric rhetoric of national boundaries and régimes of memory. The work blends creative writing (Scene II) with digital art (Scene III) and reflects my fascination with the built and the natural, home and host, the ear as 'prompt' for and 'prop' in practices of the imagination. The larger cartography of linked digital designs acts as a literary device (ekphrasis), an organising tool that accents the possibilities and impossibilities of listening techniques, while connecting me to the collective voices of what Deleuze and Guattari call a minor literature. The sound archive contains noise that is simultaneously recognisable and alien. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the theory endorsed by some philosophers that it is logically impossible to win or even to compete in a game when the player breaks the rules. This theory asserts that the purpose of every game is to play according to the rules, that its rules are inherent to the objective of the game, and that if they are broken, then the end becomes unattainable. The author argues that this is false. Although following some rules is essential to playing any particular game, and violation of some rules may lead us to say that no game worthy of the name has been played, the unqualified incompatibility rule is easily rebuked by countless real life examples. The author then considers unintentional violations of the rules in both individual and team sports.

According to the New Angle, any explanation of the Knobe effect must be gradable and asymmetric. It has been argued that only Hindriks' approach meets both criteria. First, we argue that Holton's hypothesis also meets the criteria. Second, we show that the authors are not justified in taking the criteria to be empirically justified. We have failed to replicate the asymmetry result in two experiments. Moreover, gradability can be objective or epistemic. We show that the New Angle presupposes objective gradability. In our experiments, the patterns of responses to questions about epistemic and objective gradability are the same, irrespective of whether the feature is objectively gradable (e.g., blameworthiness) or not (e.g., intentionality). Our results thus question the extent to which the New Angle is empirically grounded. Moreover, they raise doubt whether the answers to questions about epistemic and objective gradability can be taken at face value at all. Abbreviations: NRH - normative reasons hypothesis; NVH - norm violation hypothesis; DQ - degree question; DAQ - degree of agreement question [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article in this journal, Joshua Shepherd presents and rejects a new argument for the sceptical conclusion that everyday decisions aren't intentional actions. After relating his focal argument to a different argument for the same conclusion that is presented and rejected by Alfred Mele, I defend these arguments from extant criticisms, and develop new objections that shed light on the intentionality of typical decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This note addresses two of Gibbard's central contentions in Meaning and Normativity: first, that the concept of meaning is normative, and second, that an expressivist account of semantic concepts and statements can shed light on the hard problem of intentionality, the problem of explaining intentionality in naturalistic terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a contradiction in how Stevie Smith saw the relationship between her poems and drawings. On the one hand, she looked at her doodles as vital to her poetry and backed with a great deal of intentionality. She painstakingly cut and pasted them into her drafts and left detailed notes to her publishers when those placements were not to her exact specifications. On the other hand, though, she talked about her doodles as if they were ephemeral and backed only by caprice. This essay argues that Smith's doodles play at the intersection of intentionality and caprice; in doing so, they become deliberately detachable objects that signify both placed with and when displaced from her poetry. Decisions, whether by Smith or by her editors, to move or remove an image have both subtle and dramatic changes for readers' experiencing of her poems. This paper relies on archival and published sources to provide readings of several of Smith's poems including 'Do Take Muriel Out,' 'The Rehearsal,' 'The After-Thought,' and 'Not Waving but Drowning.' In their continual ability to be removed and reattached to her poetry, Smith's doodles destabilize the texts that they supposedly compliment, while at the same time also revitalizing them by allowing them to remain open to new interpretations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Important work on alignment systems has been applied to philosophical work on joint action by Tollefsen and Dale. This paper builds from and expands on their work. The first aim of the paper is to spell out how the empirical research on alignment may be integrated into philosophical theories of joint action. The second aim is then to develop a successful characterization of joint action, which spells out the difference between genuine joint action and simpler forms of coordination based on alignment. I begin by introducing the empirical research and two definitions of joint action. I then argue that instead of using this research in conjunction with Searle's account of collective intentionality, as Tollefsen and Dale suggest, we would be better served by applying this research to Gilbert's account of plural subjects. In the final sections I distinguish between alignment, coordination, and joint action, clarify the roles of joint commitment and sub-personal alignment in joint action, and argue that these concepts are both consistent and mutually supportive. Combining these two research programs gives us an account of joint action that does justice to both the empirical and philosophical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In our current historical moment, marked by increasing technological mediation of human communication, this essay investigates the relationship between, and effects of, technological mediation on intersubjective intentionality and moral consciousness. Beginning with an explication of the phenomenological concept of intersubjective intentionality as a key component in the structure of moral consciousness, this essay then investigates how media ecology can provide insight to the effects of technological mediation and digital communication technologies on our intersubjective relationships and our moral experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Heidegger’s ‘serious idealism’ aims at capturing the realist impulses of our natural consciousness whilst avoiding a collapse into metaphysical realism. This idealism is best conceived as a form of transcendental empiricism. But we need to distinguish two varieties of transcendental empiricism, corresponding to Heidegger’s early and later work. The latter, transcendental empiricism2, is superior. Here, Heidegger’s ontology of gift gives full, conceptual shape to the two-way dependency between man and world characteristic of transcendental empiricism as a whole. In exemplary forms of inspired experience, marked by the 'animation' of our conceptually-structured natural powers, things call on us in a speech that is their very own. This moves us decisively beyond not only early Heidegger’s transcendental empiricism1but also the picture of experience presented in McDowell’sMind and World. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Cappelen and Dever have recently defended the view that indexicals are not essential: They do not signify anything philosophically deep and we do not need indexicals for any important philosophical work. This paper contests their view from the point of view of an account of intentional agency. It argues that we need indexicals essentially when accounting for whatit is do something intentionallyand, as a consequence,intentional action, and defends a view of intentional action as a possible conclusion of practical reasoning where the indexical is essential for the content of such a conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgements about intentional action, Knobe [(2003). “Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language.”Analysis63: 190–194] has claimed that these judgements are shaped by our moral judgements and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action – the “frame-of-mind condition”, according to which judgements about intentional action are about the agent’s frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition Hindriks [(2008). “Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry.”The Philosophical Quarterly58: 630–641; (2014). “Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives.”Mind & Language29: 51–72] has proposed an alternate account of the Knobe Effect. According to his “Normative Reason account of Intentional Action”, a side-effect counts as intentional only when the agent thought it constituted a normative reason not to act but did not care. In this paper, I put Hindriks’ account to test through two new studies, the results of which suggest that Hindriks’ account should be rejected. However, I argue that the key conceptual insight behind Hindriks’ account can still be saved and integrated in future accounts of Knobe’s results. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper explores some key commitments of the idea that it can be rational to do what you believe you ought not to do. I suggest that there is a prima facie tension between this idea and certain plausible coherence constraints on rational agency. I propose a way to resolve this tension. While akratic agents are always irrational, they are not alwayspracticallyirrational, as many authors assume. Rather, “inverse” akratics like Huck Finn fail in a distinctivelytheoreticalway. What explains why akratic agents are always either theoretically or practically irrational? I suggest that this is true because an agent’s total evidence determinesboththe beliefsandthe intentions it is rational for her to have. Moreover, an agent’s evidence does so in a way such that it is never rational for the agent to at once believe that she ought to Φ and lack the intention to Φ. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Future-directed intentions, it is widely held, involve behavioral dispositions. But of what kind? Suppose you now intend to Φ at future timet. Are you thereby now disposed to Φ att no matter what?If so, your intention disposes you to Φ even if aroundtyou will come to believe that Φ-ing would be crazy. And would not that be a crazy intention to have? – Like considerations have led Luca Ferrero and others to believe that only intentions with strong internal conditions are capable of rationality. This paper explores in how far a broadly dispositional view of intention supports their claims. Its first point will come as a surprise: Intentions indeed involve dispositions toward follies in plenty. Natural objections against this bizarre-sounding claim are shown to fail, and standard counterfactual analyses of disposition locutions are shown to underpin it further. However, since the dispositions at issue arepro tantodispositions, the consequences are not as odd as might be expected: When hedged by reasonable habits to reconsider one’s intentions, dispositions toward follies do not entail any actual crazy behavior. On balance, unconditional intention is therefore found rational after all. Dispositions toward crazy actions need not be crazy dispositions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Learning Communities Association (LCA) is a national organization designed for individuals to get involved in advancing learning community work in an effort to bring unity to and expand participation opportunities for learning community (LC) practitioners. The LCA offers a series of webinars each academic year to advance learning community theory and practice. This review describes the origins and mission of the LCA, as well as critical takeaways from several webinars offered in the 2017–2018 academic year to inform readers of the various structures of LCs, the importance of intentionality as it pertains to LC design, and the benefits of these communities on both student success and faculty teaching and scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My focus in this paper is the use of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) in the context of Just War Theory. Different versions of DDE have different degrees of plausibility. Two distinctions are crucial. First, I distinguish between epistemically idealized and non-idealized scenarios. Second, I distinguish between versions of DDE that make aceteris paribuscomparison between intentional and non-intentional outcomes, from versions that either make a comparison that is notceteris paribusor are non-comparative. After undertaking these classificatory tasks, I defend the following claims: First, in an idealized world,ceteris paribusversions of DDE are plausible. Second, we cannot transfer such plausibility to stronger (non-ceteris paribus) versions of DDE. Finally, in a non-idealized world, DDE is plausible. The argument for this last claim combines the reasons for defendingceteris paribusversions of DDE in idealized circumstances with an argument about how to proceed when we face hard choices under uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents a response on the reviews of the book "Intentionality and the Myths of the Given: Between Pragmatism and Phenomenology." Topics discussed include the entanglement between discursive intentionality and somatic intentionality, the understanding of language, and the fundamental idea of sapience as a two-dimensional intentionality.

The article discusses nostalgia as a purposeful narrative strategy adopted in order to authenticate Lawrence Vambe’s narrative in a colonial context. I argue that nostalgia for Vambe is not just a narrative technique, but a practice in self-authentication and marketing. Focusing on Vambe’s use of ‘selective nostalgia’, I offer a reading of his memoir as an anti-colonial personal discourse opposed to the dominance of imperial narratives and colonialism in Africa’s socio-political, economic and cultural realms. This approach reveals the utilitarian nature of the memoir, and speaks to the intentionality and functionality of text. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay explore the role of the accidental and contingent in photography, contrasting the very different approaches of Roland Barthes and Roger Scruton to the questions of photographic intentionality and aesthetic value, tracing their positions back to the early discourse on the medium. In doing so it examines the adoption of the medium as a fine art in the art museum and gallery space since the 1980s, exploring what is revealed and obscured by this position. It concludes with a discussion of a single photograph by Lee Friedlander in terms of contingency, intention and aesthetic value. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Faced with the growing number of case studies in contemporary art, philosophy provides conservators with a series of conceptual tools that allow to theorize their practice. The notion of intentionality and attentionality borrowed from Genette enables a better understanding of the problems thatDirty Cornerby Anish Kapoor (a work vandalized on many occasions) poses. I will show that the conservator deals with the issue of the identity of a contemporary work in a different way from the art historian, and that philosophy is a practical tool to understand the specificity of the former's approach and intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines Levinas’s evolving relationship with Husserl. It shows how the critical dialogue with Husserl and, specifically, the transfiguration of Husserl’s key notion of “intentionality,” grounds the maturation of Levinas’s ethical thinking. It does so by unpacking the manner in which the Levinasian critique of Husserl is tied to a concept of “debt” through which Levinas understands his long-lasting relationship with the founder of phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Illusionism is a prominent hypothesis about action control, according to which acts that we consider voluntary are nevertheless caused by unconscious brain events, and thus our subjective experience of consciously willing them is ultimately illusory. Illusionism can be understood as either an ontological thesis or a phenomenological claim, but both versions are vulnerable to a line of attack based on the role of long-term planning (distal intentions) in action control. According to this objection, the evidence upon which illusionism rests is confined to short-term (proximal) intentions, so it is not sufficient to justify broader conclusions on the causal inefficacy of conscious will. In this essay we reconstruct the logic of this objection against illusionism, clarify why surveying folk intuitions on conscious distal intentions is essential to the debate, and present a study in which the role of conscious planning in intentionality judgment is clearly revealed. We also present other relevant findings, such as a gender effect on intentionality attributions, a moral influence on responsibility judgments, and confirmation of mechanistic incompatibilism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Erotic capital refers to the use of sexuality for personal gain and has been theorized as a particular source of power (some) women can leverage to advance their interests (Hakim, 2011). With its overt sexuality, women's roller derby provides an ideal opportunity to investigate erotic capital. Locating erotic capital within a specific time, space, and context, I draw upon third-wave feminism and use in-depth conversational interviews and participant observation to reveal ways “derby girls” perform their sexuality and use it to advance their collective and individual interests. This analysis introduces erotic capital to the leisure literature and demonstrates the intentionality of women's resistance to, and reproduction of, gendered stereotypes, particularly with respect to sexuality. In so doing, the findings highlight a need for rethinking traditional conceptualizations of empowerment whereby resistance equals empowering and reproduction equals disempowering, and initiates a new direction for feminist scholarship in this regard. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the first part, the paper introduces and unfolds the concept of the ‘agent’ as contrasting the concept of the ‘actor’. The figure of the secret agent, for example, in TV series and feature films, serves as a starting point for the analysis of the concept. Agents, efficient only if they work independently and under command at the same time, having agency only within networks of both persons and artefacts, cross the border between the active and the passive. Even objects can be addressed as agents, an example of which is the clock. As an agent of timemaking, the clock has an intricate relation to intentionality; it hence deals with the problem of how and under which conditions it is possible to qualify certain operations, such as the functioning of a clock, as actions without actor. In the second part, the concept of the clock as agent of time and the time it produces is re-examined against the backdrop of Christian Marclay’s video installationThe Clock. It shows that, according to Marclay’s work, the intersection of two operations of timing, namely the punctuating rhythmic measurement on the one hand, and the opening of undefined duration, creates moments of continuous presence in which an operation can change its course, take another direction or be affected by another. The overlapping of time measurement and duration thus opens up the necessary possibility for intentionality to inscribe itself into the chain of operations which then can be ascribed the quality of action, however, infiltrated with passivity at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kriegel has recently developed (but not fully endorsed) an adverbial account of intentionality, in part to solve the problem of how we can think of non-existents. The view has real virtues: it endorses a non-relational (internalist) conception of intentionality and is ontologically conservative. Alas, the view ultimately cannot replace the act-object model of intentionality that it seeks to, because it depends on the act-object model for its intelligibility at key points. It thus fails as a revisionistic theory. I argue that the virtues of adverbialism can be had from within the act-object framework, provided we understand intentional objects correctly. I use Crane as a guide here, and build on his work on intentional objects. In the end, we can provide a suitable solution to the problem of thinking of non-existents within the act-object framework without adopting implausible ontological or metaphysical views. So, adverbialism is neither a possible stand-alone revisionary option nor a needed modification of the common-sense act-object framework of intentionality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the place of creativity within UK Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) as a way of developing understandings of resistance within these spaces. It draws upon empirical research undertaken within an IRC, to explore the role of improvised music-making between staff and detainees. This work arises out of a concern that framings of resistance within IRCs have been characterised by acts that intentionally challenge the particular manifestation of sovereign power within these sites, where non-citizens are incarcerated. This study interferes with the prevailing view that for an act to be considered resistance, it must be characterised by intent, and follows Foucault to argue that to resist something is to create something, as ‘inventive, as mobile’ as power itself. Consequently, this paper explores creativity as ‘poiesis’, drawing upon work by Agamben and Deleuze to explore the potentiality of improvised music within an IRC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It is thus something of a mystery why the condition is so widely accepted. By rejecting three arguments that could potentially support it, I argue that reductionists should get rid of the condition. I show that two of the arguments fail. While the third argument is intuitively compelling, it builds on key premises that are unavailable to the reductionist. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his 2012 article Philosophy of Education for the Public Good: Five Challenges and an Agenda, Gert Biesta identifies five substantial issues about the future of education and the work required to address these issues. This article employs a Heideggerian reading of education to evaluate ‘Biesta’s truth’. I argue that Biesta’s point of view (a) underestimates knowledge’s predominance and relativism; (b) frames intentionality in pre-Heideggerian terms, which—although not a problem in itself because an individual is free to choose a particular perspective on the concept—raises the issue of consistency in Biesta’s theoretical framework; and (c) a final criticism concerns Biesta’s choice of tools for engaging with the identified challenges: The primary tools Biesta uses are intrinsic to the perspective he challenges. The use of a ‘first person perspective’ to frame pedagogy that focuses on the subject and ‘subjectification’ reaffirms the fundamental Western gesture that makes human beings subjects who ‘stand-over-and-against’ the world. I argue that it is possible to penetrate Plato’s ‘theoretical gaze’ and find a ‘weak’ alternative to an all-encompassing point of view of education through a Heideggerian approach that regards intentionality and thinking as ‘hearing’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]