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Trade among neighboring nations holds significant economic importance, influencing the socio-economic development of countries. India and Pakistan represent one of the most persistent conflicts in contemporary international relations. The continuation of this conflict poses significant challenges to the establishment and nurturing of robust economic ties between the two nations. Deep-rooted historical animosity between neighboring nations often adversely affects regional economic relations, leading to noticeable disruption and disparities in trade patterns. This study focuses on examining the impact of geopolitical dynamics on trade relations between India and Pakistan. Bilateral trade relations between the two countries have been examined in three distinct time periods: 1965–2011, 2011–2016, and 2016 onwards. The findings revealed that whenever there were hostile relations between the two countries, their trade relations were also adversely affected. Furthermore, it is recommended that emphasizing the importance of peaceful relations is crucial for fostering bilateral trade between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the interstate reconciliation between India and Pakistan after the shock of Sino-Indian War of 1962. The post-1962 war political-security equations, particularly at the regional level, gave rise to a situation that necessitated India's reconciliatory negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir. Though the rival parties engaged in a six-round political dialogue, the process ended up in a deadlock followed by spirals of armed clashes that culminated in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The paper shows that this reconciliation process proved counterproductive because it was imposed from outside and the principal parties, in a window-driven haste and under the political-strategic constraints, could not mutually agree on to reconcile their political differences and settle the territorial dispute over Kashmir. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jammu and Kashmir has been experiencing border conflict since the partition of India (1947) into two sovereign states (India and Pakistan). Four wars have been fought between them and still the issue has not been resolved. Uncertain firing, the continuous threat to life, unsettled life, and restricted living conditions affects the quality of life of the common people living in villages near the International Border (IB) and Line of Control (LoC). The number of ceasefire violations in 2020 was the highest number of ceasefire violations in the past 16 years. People on both sides are the worst sufferers of the military aggression between the nations. Children living in such a volatile context lack the required developmental opportunities and their future is highly jeopardized. A serious commitment to the peacebuilding and reconciliation process is the way forward. Reconciliation processes like the Tashkent Declaration (1966), the Shimla Agreement (1972), and the Peace Bus service (1999) have been initiated but could not sustain peace for a longer period. This paper highlights the reconciliation process between the two countries and the need for a sustainable reconciliation initiative to secure the future of coming generations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

No other issue has influenced the India–Pakistan relationship more adversely than the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. To understand the discourse surrounding the dispute, and how it has evolved within the foreign policies of both countries, this research undertakes a critical discourse analysis of both countries' official statements at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between 1948 and 2020. The findings of this study are crucial to not only understanding how the two states have been internationalizing the Kashmir dispute but also what lessons can be learned from the past as both countries attempt to slowly reengage with one another. Our analysis points to the fact that both India and Pakistan's stances on the Kashmir dispute, despite their varying phases throughout the conflict, have essentially remained the same. We argue that, despite seeming to have converged toward some form of resolution during the first decade of the twenty-first century, the current context of India–Pakistan relations presents a worsening trajectory that has not been witnessed since their last major war in 1971. In highlighting the cyclical, almost scripted nature of this debate, this paper attempts to suggest ways to break free from age-old tropes and help pave the way toward more meaningful ways to redefine the issue in light of a radically altered geo-political context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the contested region of Kashmir and investigates how the nation-building project that accompanied the partition of the South Asian subcontinent, along with the creation of the ceasefire line that divided the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan, shaped the question of belonging for the majority of its Muslim inhabitants, especially from the 1940s to the 1960s. It reveals the bureaucratic procedures put in place by the new nation-states, both driven by the question of self-determination pending in the United Nations and devoid of human considerations, made Kashmiris apprehensive about the motivations of both states. The article argues that Kashmiri belonging after partition did not seamlessly merge into the national identities of India or Pakistan. Instead, the anxieties of partition and structural challenges created by the arbitrary ceasefire line shaped Kashmir Muslim perceptions. Drawing from intercepted letters, pamphlets, and biographies, this article reveals the irrelevance of such artificial 'borders' in the Kashmiri psyche. In the process, it asserts that the Kashmiri demand for self-determination became intertwined with the desire for the reunification of the old princely state that would promote human-to-human contact, reopen old trade routes, and promote economic self-sufficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the past decade, computer models have predicted that the physical impacts of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, or even a single strike on a large city, would be devastating. The social, economic, and political impacts – although less well known – would also be crippling and would reverberate throughout the world. Efforts to use “Armageddon estimates” to scare the people of India and Pakistan have thus far not significantly reduced the risk of nuclear weapons use in this turbulent region. However, the increasing penetration of television and social media may give members of the public a better grasp of the scale of potential devastation. Combined with educational efforts targeted at media elites, increased public awareness of the consequences of a nuclear attack may help to reduce the pressure on political leaders to exercise the nuclear option. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this Commentary, I propose a bold, four-step plan which would address the question of self-determination for Kashmiris and hopefully resolve permanently the 70-year-old Kashmir issue which has poisoned Indo-Pakistan relations since Partition. Two important elements of this plan would be: first, the involvement of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group to assist Kashmiris, Pakistan and India in the mediation of the plan; and, second, the holding of four UN-supervised referenda which would be held simultaneously but counted separately: Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir; Kashmir valley; Jammu; and Ladakh. All Kashmiris would have three options: Join Pakistan, Join India or independence. As an incentive to India and Pakistan, the international community would deliver substantial economic assistance for the development of all parts of Kashmir. But as a quid pro quo for the economic aid package, there would have to be guaranteed free movement of people, capital and goods between all parts of Kashmir after the referenda, regardless as to which option had been chosen by the Kashmiris. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign policies of landlocked states have been a topic of interest for scholarship on international relations but the landlocked states in South Asia have received negligible attention. Due to their geographical realities, South Asian landlocked states that include Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal, depend on their neighbours for trade with the outside world. A range of factors place landlocked states in an unequal relationship with their coastal neighbours. While these factors include the superiority of coastal neighbours in terms of economy, population size, and military strength, we argue that their landlockedness plays a crucial role. To further investigate the role of landlockedness, this study compares the foreign policy decisions that guide India-Nepal and Afghanistan–Pakistan relations. Based on the assessment of historical, economic and geopolitical factors, we argue that India and Pakistan exploit their landlocked neighbours to achieve their national interests. Frustrated by the treatment of their coastal neighbours and the presence of new trade opportunities have compelled Afghanistan to use its closeness with India to counter over-dependence on Pakistan and Nepal has enhanced cooperation with China to overcome its reliance on India, thereby creating a new geopolitical dynamic within South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India's revocation of Article 370, which had granted Jammu and Kashmir a special status, has changed the security and strategic dynamics in the relations between India and Pakistan. India claims it is an internal matter whereas Pakistan considers it an international issue and pushes to resolve it in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. While Pakistan has limited international support, it still vows to go to any extent to secure 'freedom' for the Kashmiris. The visit of US President Donald Trump to India and the signing of a peace agreement between the US and the Taliban have added new dynamics to this conflict. This article discusses the aftermath of the revocation of Article 370, outlines Pakistan's claims from an historical perspective, analyses immediate measures initiated by Islamabad, points out the available options Pakistan may see at its disposal, and provides critical assessment of each. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to provide an answer to the question which has hitherto not been significantly explored in the relevant academic scholarship: Why did China block India's (and other countries) attempts to designate Masood Azhar – head of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM/Jaish) as terrorist under UN Security Council 1267 committee rules? According to the extant literature, China's actions are explained broadly by India-China rivalry and India-Pakistan rivalry resulting in a strategic and 'all weather partnership between China and Pakistan against their common enemy India. This study argues that China's actions are also explained by its New (Asian) Security Concept and the ensuing China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), domestic (in)stability in Pakistan and China's geo-strategic interests. China is deeply perturbed by the socio-economic-political instability in Pakistan. China was concerned that if Masood Azhar was designated as a terrorist under UNSC 1267 Committee rules, Jaish and other terrorist organizations would take up arms against the Pakistani state (as in the past) which will create further instability in Pakistan and undermine CPEC and China's geo-strategic interests. Thus, the paper provides a more comprehensive and nuanced grasp of China's reluctance to designate Masood Azhar as a terrorist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This qualitative study problematizes the interplay between Pakistan's national curriculum textbooks and students' militaristic national identity constructions in six state-schools. Drawing on field-data collected employing interviews with twelve teachers and focus-groups and participatory tools with four-hundred and twenty-four students, it also analyses study-participants' interaction with these discourses and students' reactions vis-à-vis their teacher-mediated textbook positioning. Taking insights from Synder's and Johnston's concept of 'strategic culture' and Foucault's 'technologies of power and self', the findings suggest Pakistani students' militaristic national identity constructions in schools, portraying India as an existentialist threat to Pakistan. The textbooks glorify the India/Pakistan wars, heighten the feeling of insecurity amongst schoolchildren, and through that, build a heroic image of the Pakistan Army. The teachers reinforce these images in classrooms. Constituted under the influence of these technologies of power, students exude strong hostility towards India and adoration for the Pakistan Army, hence functioning as vehicles to further the militaristic approach of Pakistan's 'regime of truth'. The study illustrates how Pakistan's increasingly strengthening strategic culture has subverted Pakistan's civil institutions and served the vested interests of the military's high command. Similarly, it highlights the dangers/implications involved in using national education for shaping vulnerable schoolchildren's militaristic national identities in schools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan has always been an important factor in India's domestic politics and foreign policy – a position that flows as much from historical disputes as from Pakistan's continued support for terror activities against India. This importance has increased further under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's leadership. This article argues that the September 2016 'surgical strikes' by Indian special forces inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and the February 2019 'airstrikes' by Indian Air Force against terrorist training camps at Balakot inside Pakistan's Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province were defining moments in India's Pakistan policy. India's actions stemmed from its desire to change the status-quo in India–Pakistan relations by punishing Pakistan for its continued use of terrorism. But this is 'work in progress' since there are certain limitations to India's ability to compel Pakistan to alter its revisionist behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Five aspects of the BJP's election campaign contributed to its success in 2019. The first is the personal appeal of the prime minister, which again played a major role, like it did in 2014, as Narendra Modi led a hyper-personalized campaign. Second, this campaign focused on security-related themes which were especially relevant in the context of the India-Pakistan tensions. Third, the BJP campaign strategy was backed by the most formidable election campaign machinery assembled by any party in India since Independence. Fourth, the BJP saturated the public space with the prime minister's image, adroitly using the traditional mainstream media as well as social media. The party used religious appeal to address its core base of supporters while projecting the prime minister's image as a protector and sentinel. Fifth, the latter three aspects of the BJP's campaign were fuelled by unprecedented levels of campaign expenditure and by the opacity of political funding in India, which the BJP had made more impenetrable through the introduction of electoral bonds. The combination of these factors show that the 2019 elections were not business as usual; their singularity largely due to the decline of institutions regulating the electoral process, including the Election Commission of India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aman ki Asha is a joint initiative of the two leading media groups of India and Pakistan, The Times of India and the Jang Group of publications, which uses media cooperation for promoting people-to-people contacts and building peace. This is a unique initiative because in the history of peacebuilding, never before the mainstream media houses of conflicting communities are involved in such a peace initiative. Generally local media is seen inflaming the fires of conflict by following the nationalistic lines and portraying one sided picture of the conflict. After its launch in 2010, within few years Aman ki Asha emerged as one of the most successful peace initiatives between India and Pakistan but then suddenly in 2014 it became dormant when Jang group came under attack from the Pakistani military establishment and bilateral India-Pakistan relations worsened under Modi government in India. In this paper an attempt is made to provide a holistic story of Aman ki Asha covering its rise and decline. Moreover, the role played by Aman ki Asha in building peace between India and Pakistan at the top level, the middle range level and the grassroots levels is studied, and its current status is determined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political shockwaves from the partition of India and Pakistan were felt far beyond the local tragedies that followed in its wake – not least in British imperial politics, where the two new Dominions and the subsequent reorganisation of the Commonwealth drastically altered the character of the imperial machinery. This article covers the first decade of Pakistan's and India's independence through the activity of the Commonwealth journal The Round Table. Through studying the interaction between the local correspondents and the English editorial staff, it argues that the inclusion of these new members, whose political class did not primarily stem from settlers, pressed the journal to transform its character. Thus, the journal went from facilitating imperial discussion, in which a homogenous group of contributors sought agreement, to transnational debate, in which a heterogeneous set of national perspectives were contrasted without any substantial reconciliation. As such, this meant the breakdown of the journal's vision of a united, disinterested imperial truth and in its place spawned a multitude of parallel national views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a glimpse of the representation of India in The Pakistan Times in 1950–51, in the last months of the first phase of its editorship by Faiz Ahmed Faiz. It contextualizes this reflection in a period of relative lull, marked by pacts on minorities and trade, within the post-Partition upheaval. Focusing especially on editorials, commentaries, and cartoons, it highlights the formation of views of the neighbor from the news that was being generated. The stress is on firstly, a variety of themes included – not just the "unfinished business of Partition", secondly, a responsible review of these themes – not just a narrow-minded nationalist reading, and thirdly, an involved – if not intertwined – interpretation of both countries' socio-economic relations, while not underplaying the differences of their regimes. Further, the article goes beyond an inter-governmental framework, as The Pakistan Times went beyond it and presents a slice of the possibilities then existing, of a progressive politics on questions of class, community, and capital. In early independent Pakistan, this was personified by Faiz and this article, while not on him nor on an extensive Saidian reflection of the "other", tries to trace his imprint in the representation of India in the newspaper he edited and seeks to contribute to our understanding of India as constructed through Pakistani eyes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did India launch and later withdraw from the exercise in coercive diplomacy – Operation Parakram – against Pakistan in response to the attack on India's Parliament by terrorists based in that country? This paper marshals factors operating at the systemic, state and individual/small-group levels of analysis to show that, despite the paucity of evidence on decisionmaking of the kind required for an effective foreign policy analysis (FPA) approach, a reasonably clear picture can be developed. It combines deductive logic relating to state behavior in a nuclearized environment with the limited empirical evidence available to show that India never intended to go to war and that the operation was essentially a bluff that, having eventually reached a dead end, was called off. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major news media and think tanks have written and broadcast repeatedly about efforts to prevent nuclear war in South Asia, but relatively little attention has been paid to containment should a conflict between India and Pakistan break out. Even a limited nuclear exchange in South Asia would kill millions and have adverse environmental effects far beyond the region. Because India and Pakistan have ties to the world’s major nuclear powers, such an exchange also has the potential to expand into worldwide nuclear war. A US-led effort to engage the major nuclear powers in bilateral or multilateral no-first-use pledges would decrease the likelihood that a conflict between India and Pakistan could spin out of control. Beyond South Asia, a no-first-use policy would help the United States implement its nonproliferation agenda, promote stability between nuclear weapons states, and deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in defense policy, saving the United States money and increasing world security. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The India–Pakistan War of September 1965 has attracted little attention in the larger body of work on South Asia. Further, almost nothing has been written on the earlier skirmish, in April 1965, between Indian and Pakistani security forces in the Rann-of-Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh. This article argues that the limited conflict in the Rann, its immediate consequences, and its impact on Pakistani military and civilian leaders were central to Pakistan's consideration of a military solution to the ongoing dispute in Kashmir, which then led to Indian retaliation and the outbreak of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Special Issue looks at the importance of institutions and the role played by international actors in crucial episodes of India's strategic history. The contributions trace India's tryst with war and peace from immediately before the foundation of the contemporary Indian state to the last military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999. The focus of the articles is as much on India as it is on Pakistan and China, its opponents in war. The articles offer a fresh take on the creation of India as a regional military power, and her approach to War and Peace in the post-independence period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kargil conflict was a limited war between India and Pakistan fought along the Kashmir Line of Control during the spring/summer of 1999. Named for the principal town in the combat zone on the Indian side, it was the first open warfare between India and Pakistan as declared nuclear weapons states and included the first combat employment of the Indian Air Force since 1971. Despite its intensity, it was also characterised by considerable restraint on both sides. The potential for conventional escalation, however, was high and the possibility of nuclear confrontation could not be excluded. It had significant long-term ramifications for both countries and constitutes an important part of the backdrop to their relations today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger's own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon's policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since July 2016, Indian-administered Kashmir has again raged with mass protests favouring self-determination and freedom from India. In the protests more than ninety-eight people have been killed, over eleven thousand wounded, and more than eight hundred Kashmiris injured in the eyes or blinded by Indian troops using force against protestors and non-protestors alike. Since 1947, when the region was temporarily bifurcated between India and Pakistan, Indian-administered Kashmir has clamoured for a plebiscite, which the United Nations mandated so that the Kashmiri people could choose their own fate. The original options in the plebiscite were mergers with either of the two countries, but Kashmiris have increasingly demanded that a third option for an independent Kashmiri nation-state be added. While the majority of the Kashmiris seek independence, a small faction favours merger with Pakistan. Despite continuing demands for an independent nationhood – one that preceded the creation of India and Pakistan – Kashmir continues to be perceived simplistically as a bilateral dispute between the two nation-states. Using the analytic of "right to maim," this essay illustrates how the Indian state "blinds" Kashmiri subjects by perfecting a technology of punishment that produces bodies incapable of physical resistance and as a representational threat to the rest of society. By making maiming as a punishment central, this essay will examine India's control of the Kashmir valley as a de facto military occupation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign policy making in India is typically viewed as highly centralised and dominated by the Prime Minister's Office and bureaucracy. Yet in 2004, the Congress-Party-led United Progressive Alliance government launched a Composite Dialogue with Pakistan which included a place for Indian think tanks in the Kashmir dispute. We suggest that as India liberalised its economy amidst domestic political upheaval, think tanks were given greater access to domestic and foreign funding and adopted new roles in foreign policy making. In the case of the Kashmir conflict, peacebuilding think tanks were encouraged by the government to engage in cross-border activities that would build constituencies for peace with Pakistan and promote economic cooperation as an incentive for peace. While the government aimed to depoliticise the conflict, these think tanks used this opportunity to draw attention to marginalised perspectives and issues. Peacebuilding think tanks nonetheless faced significant challenges in shaping the peace process because of structural constraints regarding access to resources and lack of autonomy to further their agendas. This reflected resistance within the state to depoliticising a conflict that has long been India's central national security issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines India's historical efforts to spy inside Pakistan from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s. It draws from memoirs of notable Indian spies who were jailed for espionage in Pakistan and spy 'fiction' written by former Indian intelligence and military officers who allege their writing is based on actual cases. The article highlights commonalities among Indian spies using the words of Indian officers to better understand human intelligence efforts inside Pakistan. It finds that Indian spies in these books have initially been Hindus or from multi-religious families, from the Indian-Pakistan border and have been poorly treated by the Indian government and its intelligence services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The composition of participants in the combined training exercises (CTXs) conducted by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with foreign armed forces points to prospective, preferential, and priority partners of Russia in the field of defense and security cooperation. When staging CTXs, the Russian military, along with professional tasks, has to take note of the difficult relations between its foreign partners, of which India and Pakistan are a good example. Whereas India is a long-standing partner of Russia, Pakistan only recently aspired to develop comprehensive cooperation with Moscow. Moreover, Pakistan is a key regional partner of China, which Russia cannot ignore. Finally, the development of relations with Pakistan balances India's possible bias toward the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The composition of participants in the combined training exercises (CTXs) conducted by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with foreign armed forces points to prospective, preferential, and priority partners of Russia in the field of defense and security cooperation. When staging CTXs, the Russian military, along with professional tasks, has to take note of the difficult relations between its foreign partners, of which India and Pakistan are a good example. Whereas India is a long-standing partner of Russia, Pakistan only recently aspired to develop comprehensive cooperation with Moscow. Moreover, Pakistan is a key regional partner of China, which Russia cannot ignore. Finally, the development of relations with Pakistan balances India's possible bias toward the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on S(c)helling in Kashmir and India and Pakistan had declared themselves nuclear-weapons and Kashmir, India and Pakistan fought one of the two limited wars between nuclear powers. It mentions nuclear powers might tacitly recognize limits in a crisis or conflict and avert mutual disaster and attempting to interdict supply lines using air power. It also mentions Kargil conflict has its roots in the Ceasefire Line (CFL) drawn at the Karachi Agreement between India and Pakistan following a war over Kashmir in 1949. It reflects on Pakistani Army chief Parvez Musharraf presented his rationale for the Kargil operation.

The article focuses on issues regarding Kargil War 1999 between India and Pakistan and conflict in the spring of 2019 in response to a deadly attack on Indian military forces by the Pakistan-backed terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed. Topics discussed include lessons and implications for future India-Pakistan relations and Kashmir's liberation a central foreign policy objective, Indian airpower had been used against Pakistani forces since the 1971 war and disparity in the size of nuclear forces between two crisis participants. It mentions inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.

The article focuses on Pulwama crisis, terrorist attack in Pulwama in Kashmir, India, in light of the Kargil conflict in 1999. It mentions individual identities and organizational affiliations of the attackers, and how these likely affected India's ability to justify forceful responses and Pakistani support has been central to the Kashmiri insurgency. It also mentions identity of the perpetrator or the claimed involvement of Pakistan-based militant organizations. It reflects on crisis focused on the immediate justification and tactical effects of the initial Indian airstrikes as Indian Air Force almost certainly intended to hit targets.

Pakistan's largest donor has been the United States of America, granting around $ 70 bn in aid. In 2015, China, as part of its One Belt One Road global ambitions, promised Pakistan $ 46 bn (since revised to $ 60 bn), for a road running from its border to the port of Gwadar. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is being seen as a 'fate-changer' for Pakistan. CPEC could change Pakistan's fate in more ways than one; this article explores the domestic and regional consequences of China's involvement in Pakistan, and what this will mean for South Asia and for India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the case study of India–Pakistan to explore how rivals build cooperation over time. India and Pakistan have shared an intense rivalry since their independence and subsequent partition in 1947, having fought three major wars and several militarised disputes over the last 70 years. The authors use network analysis to study the pattern of all treaties between the two countries between 1947 and 2017. This expects rivals to focus on non-security issues such as trade as they work to build trust and patterns of cooperation. The article finds that given the long and intense rivalry between the two neighbours, and the subsequent lack of trust, India and Pakistan have adopted a functionalist approach towards building cooperation; most of their bilateral treaties are related to non-security issues such as trade, telecommunications, transport and technology. Only a few of their treaties are nested within prior treaties, indicating ad hoc rather than institutionalised cooperation. The authors also find that efforts by the two states to build cooperation has not spilt over into areas related to security, pointing to a continued lack of trust between the two states. The article notes the implications of this approach for the future of Indo-Pakistani ties as well as peace on the subcontinent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In September 2016, militants who were allegedly backed by Pakistan attacked an Indian Army camp in Uri. The government in New Delhi was facing important regional elections. It faced intense public pressure to muster a military response. Such a response, however, ran the risk of triggering a nuclear exchange. Ten days after the Uri attack, India reported that it had carried out 'surgical strikes' on terrorist training camps in Pakistan-controlled territory. The paper examines this specific episode in India–Pakistan deterrence dynamics, focusing on the nomenclature 'surgical strikes'. The paper argues that the choice of the term itself is new and worthy of investigation. Using qualitative content analysis of the official announcement of the operation, it identifies specific rhetorical moves by the Indian government that framed the response as a surgical strike. The paper also considers other statements in the media by high-ranking political and military leaders regarding the strikes, and the reception of these statements by the Indian audience, by Pakistan, and by the international community. The concluding section sounds a note of caution about future iterations of so-called surgical strikes. While the term 'surgical strike' can be useful in some circumstances, it produces destabilising outcomes in others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India and Pakistan have tempered their rivalry over the years by negotiating many bilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs), but the current patchwork of agreements cannot prevent an act of cross-border terrorism from triggering a major militarised crisis. To help mitigate this shortfall, this article advocates a new conceptual approach towards confidence building that identifies two categories of agreements – negative and positive. Negative CBMs oblige inaction; they can be defined as promises to eschew provocative behaviour, so as to prevent miscalculation and accidental war. Most prominent Indo-Pakistani CBMs fall under this category – examples include agreements on non-attack of nuclear facilities and non-violation of airspace. Positive CBMs, by contrast, oblige action; they entail tangible engagement and cooperation in the military, diplomatic, or economic domains. Examples might include counter-piracy cooperation and the expansion of people-to-people contacts. This article argues that positive CBMs invite reciprocity and are a plausible tool for promoting bilateral goodwill, reducing mistrust, and insulating Indo-Pakistani relations from shocks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on prevention of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba Attack and compared to its main rival Jaish-e-Mohamed (JeM), which conducted a suicide attack in February in Pulwama, India and spurred a military confrontation between India and Pakistan. Topics discussed include Lashkar has focused on the insurgencies in Kashmir and Afghanistan, activities consistent with the Pakistani military's policies, Pakistani government's support for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and campaign against al-Qaida and need to find resolution to the Kashmir dispute is among the solutions frequently raised as a potential avenue to persuade Pakistan to relinquish Lashkar as well as Jaish.

The article focuses on nuclear ethics and the repeated threats of nuclear first use by the Pakistani Army, nuclear restraint has reigned and power of mutual nuclear deterrence for the nonuse of nuclear weapons in the past India-Pakistan military crises and the 1999 Kargil War. It mentions Pakistan Army's reluctance to use nuclear weapons in the past was neither caused by deterrence nor by a nuclear taboo. It also mentions Pakistani Air Force could launch a preemptive strike with precision guided and nuclear cruise missile attack on Indian Air Force bases in Jaiselmir, India.

India's relations with the Gulf countries started to flourish in the 1990s after India succeeded in de-hyphenating Pakistan from its policy toward the Gulf. Though Pakistan remained a factor as it continued to raise Kashmir and internal situation in India at multilateral forums such as OIC to evoke anti-India sentiments, it did not remain an underlying factor in as was the case during the Cold War era. In the contemporary dynamics, when India-Gulf relations are progressing toward strategic partnerships, Pakistan has re-emerged as a factor but its nature has changed. As highlighted in the joint statements issued during the Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visits to the Gulf countries since May 2014, India can now put pressure on Pakistan by highlighting its policy of sponsoring terrorism. This was evident when the Arab Gulf countries condemned the Pathankot (January 2016) and Uri (September 2016) terrorist attacks. India's relations with the Arab Gulf and other Middle Eastern countries are independent of their engagements with Pakistan and India-Pakistan tension, but New Delhi has stepped up efforts to raise the issue of cross-border terrorism and use of religion to incite terror activities against India during its engagements with these countries. It underlines the growing convergence between India and Arab Gulf countries over regional issues and the ability of India to isolate Pakistan over issues related to terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, India's policy on Iran has been a balancing act between securing its interests as a counterweight to Pakistan, and ensuring its continued partnership with the US and other regional players. Yet confusion in India's Iran policy became evident when Iran's nuclear program began to draw international attention in the 1990s. More recently, India has attempted to reach out to Iran, reigniting trade relations and initiating new plans. Growing Indo- Iran relations are however a worrying sign for Islamabad, which is attempting a simultaneous expansion of ties with Tehran while continuing to resolve outstanding disputes. The central argument of this paper is that India's relations with Iran are best understood through the prism of the intertwining of geo-economic and geopolitical considerations. Analysis has often separated these two factors, but there is evidence that a synergy exists -- and that it is particularly visible when the Pakistani element is introduced. Often emphasising historical and cultural affinity, India and Pakistan have each sought politically and economically viable relations with Iran. Yet their bilateral political calculations and the current economic challenges have prompted a nuanced policy based on a careful balancing of geo-economics and geopolitics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seventy years after the partitioning of India into two countries, India and Pakistan, the bitter legacies of that violent founding moment have not gone away. While explorations based on oral histories had begun to open up Partition histories, there is still a great deal to be done and the need to record the stories of survivors is urgent as more and more of them are dying out. But even as direct histories become more diffuse and elusive, other explorations have begun to open up as research moves into the hands of non academics, writers, theatre activists and others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is easy to gain the impression from the copious literature that each Olympic Games has been carefully assessed by academics. Certainly, a wealth of detail and statistics have been generated about particular Olympic sports, the careers of prominent athletes and the performance of their respective nations on the unofficial medal table. However, some sports and some nations remain under-represented in the literature of the Games. This is especially the case with several post-colonial, non-Western countries and some sports that have had a relatively low-profile on the Olympic stage. In the case of Pakistan, formed after the partition of India in 1947, only a modest amount of medals have been won, and the majority of its Olympic success has been achieved in field hockey. The aim of this paper is to examine the historical background associated with Pakistan's early involvement in the Olympic Games (with a special focus on the example of field hockey), thereby expanding knowledge about a range of issues facing this Islamic country in the context of the development of elite sport. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, written by Prateek Joshi in close collaboration with Colonel Narender “Bull” Kumar, discusses the development of the conflict over the Siachen Glacier between India and Pakistan. It sets out the Siachen Conflict in the broad framework of the Great Game and explains the crucial role of Colonel Narender “Bull” Kumar's Siachen expeditions in rekindling this old flashpoint in High Asia. Based on Colonel Kumar's two expeditions to the Siachen Glacier region, namely the Teram Kangri expedition in 1978 and the Siachen expedition in 1981, it discusses the perspectives regarding the dispute and its relation to reviving a consciousness of the Great Game. The first perspective discusses Colonel Kumar's expeditions in light of the Indo-Pak conflict as these two visits became the precursor to Operation Meghdoot, following which the Indian Army occupied the Siachen Glacier in 1984. The second perspective discusses a crucial cartographic blank which was filled only after Colonel Kumar's Siachen expedition. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On 29 September 2016, the Indian army conducted a surgical strike along the India-Pakistan border. The mainstream news media in India followed the event with assertive nationalistic rhetoric. What was supposed to be a covert military operation against terrorism became morphed into political rhetoric aggravated by the unwarranted jingoism of television news channels and social media. The coverage of the strike on television news is typically characterized by a confluence of militant nationalist discourses, and the ideologically imbued labelling of specific communities. Within this context, drawing from the close reading of the coverage, this article analyses how Indian television news sustains the construction of a fictive "we", conflated with the government policies and military strategies, and speaks for a supposedly homogeneous national consensus that also consciously obscures the dissent through minority voices. The article emphasizes the relationship between communities, formal politics, and the supposedly non-political spaces and practices of news media in India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is worth asking whether short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons really serve Pakistan's interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses India's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system dealing with implications for Asian deterrence stability following the 2005 India-U.S. nuclear deal, India's geopolitical and geostrategic goals, and role of the Indian Ministry of Defense. The article discusses the triangular dilemma between nuclear weapon states China, India, and Pakistan. Topics include India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) in shaping the nation's BMD system, and U.S.-India strategic partnership. Also noted is the strategic and economic partnerships between China and Pakistan and impacts of the Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) on India and Pakistan's arms control regime.

The article discusses Pakistan's Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) dealing with Pakistan's sea based deterrent and nuclear weapon as the nation carried a nuclear-capable, submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). Topics include Pakistani nuclear crisis, role of the Pakistani government, and organizational and technological developments of Pakistani Naval nuclear strategies. The article also discusses the deployment of nuclear weapons, India-Pakistan conflict, and Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Also discussed are threats in the Pakistan Navy and dangers of sea-based nuclear weapons.

The article discusses Pakistan's nuclear-weapons policy and its impact of Pakistan's evolving nuclear weapons policy on India's nuclear doctrine dealing with the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) by Pakistan, relevance of Pakistani TNW's on Indian national security, and India's no-first-use (NFU) policy. Topics include role of Pakistan's Inter-Services Public Relations, full-spectrum deterrence (FSD) for nuclear weapons, and India's approaches to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.