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This article discusses why EU economic (competition and internal market) law is hospitable to and can be enriched by socio-legal and critical insights about the instability of the economic/non-economic distinction, the unavoidable plurality of market arrangements as shaped by legal regulation, as well as the distributive effects of the said arrangements. The proneness of EU economic law to critical insights can be ascribed to: its subject matter, as law in this area maps upon everyday market experiences; the casuistic development of EU law; the wide scope of EU economic law, which interferes with arrangements understood as non-economic; the non-outcome-determinative character of EU law. Through discussion of two CJEU decisions - a competition decision dealing with selective distribution (Coty) and an internal market decision on the regulation of AirBnb (Cali Apartments) - I illustrate how more explicit deployments of socio-legal and critical approaches can enrich EU economic law and specifically its teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional, price-focused antitrust tools for assessing dominance under Article 102 TFEU and merger control are challenged by the business models and features of multisided digital platforms. This article demonstrates the importance of data in digital markets and how data enable the utilization of network effects and economies of scale in a manner that challenges the traditional dominance evaluation. Based on this, the article systematizes the solutions to the challenges caused by decreased accuracy of price-based tools through an analysis of various approaches to the issue. It is argued that potential competition should be emphasized more strongly throughout the dominance assessment and that different approaches can be chosen based on the case at hand. Thus the article contributes to the development of the dominance analysis for digital markets with a thorough overview of possible solutions and ties it to the proposed renewal of the Market Definition Notice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Super League case has been widely discussed by EU regulators, football associations, clubs, players, supporters and legal practitioners. This article intends to explore the legal reasoning of the Court of Justice regarding the intervention of EU competition law in football governance in this case. This article accordingly analyses the interpretation of the rules and exemptions stipulated in Articles 101 (1) and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and gives comments on the antitrust assessment by the Court of Justice regarding the common rules of prior approval and sanctions. It follows that the Court of Justice stressed the importance of transparent, objective and non-discriminatory procedures in the rule-making of football associations and saw this as a significant condition for the enforcement of EU competition law and antitrust exemption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The CK Telecoms judgement shed the light on the difficulties to apprehend unilateral effects, aka insufficient individual rivalry, in the context of a merger. This paper examines the overall European competition law framework applicable to these effects. After underlining the difficulties related to their apprehension by the competition authorities, the adequacy of the solely ex ante-based European competition regime will be assessed as well as the use of the New Competition Tool as an option to solve the identified drawbacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the way in which the large football clubs are increasing their dominance, and whether this is compatible with EU competition law. Various insights from the economic and legal literature have been combined to give a new interpretation of EU competition law. The number of clubs with a realistic chance of winning important prizes has declined in many national markets. As a result, the economic competition has diminished and prices have increased to the detriment of welfare. This development has been reinforced by the joint actions of the top European clubs, such as threatening to start a Super League. Consequently, UEFA has implemented policies that have been particularly helpful for the top clubs. But, the clubs' actions are incompatible with EU competition law, as is the actual creation of a European Super League. If the EU were to enforce the law, the power of the big clubs would be reduced, and UEFA's policies could be based more on the old democratic principles, again. This would lead to more sporting successes for small clubs and to lower prices for the fans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of smart electronic devices are enabling online businesses to collect any data related to the consumer's online activity. Such an extensive trove of consumer personal data can be used for "personalized pricing". We have evaluated the challenges this form of price discrimination creates for competition and found that in jurisdictions such as the EU which prosecute exploitative abuses, the probability that personalized pricing might be assessed as an abuse of dominant position is high. Another issue raised by the collection and the processing of data for personalized pricing purposes is the growing invasion of privacy. In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation foresees that personal data cannot be used without the consent of the consumer. As for online businesses processing personal data, they'd better stick to the provisions of the GDPR aiming to ensure greater transparency, if they are to avoid any risk of infringement of privacy law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates what role fundamental rights can play in the interpretation of EU antitrust law, in particular Art. 102 TFEU. It spells out the difficulties that derive from the fact that antitrust law and fundamental rights are of equal ranking in the EU legal order. It concludes that nevertheless as a matter of systemic and teleological interpretation, EU antitrust law is open for fundamental rights considerations. However, recourse to fundamental rights should be taken only when companies possess regulatory power. This approach sheds light on social media platforms' recent increased engagement in content moderation. It suggests that for dominant platforms with regulatory power, any discrimination based on political beliefs is prima facie abusive behaviour under Art. 102 TFEU. However, such conduct may be justified by the pursuit of legitimate goals and companies should be granted a wide margin of appreciation in that regard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present paper, we consider the question of the effectiveness of the remedies imposed by the EC. Our fundamental analysis stems from the reciprocal influence between Competition Law and the Digital Economy. Nowadays, Competition Law has a profound role, affecting not only direct undertakings worldwide but also indirectly by having an impact on our daily life and protecting customers. In recent years, however, the idea of creating a culture of innovation among companies has prevailed. For more than 20 years, the Digital Economy is also part of our life characterizing markets by rapid innovation and technological sophistication. The digital era has introduced the global network of economic activities and commercial transactions enabled by information and communication technologies. Through innovative products/ideas, not only the companies themselves benefit by increasing their productivity and consequently constantly creating new jobs (Alibaba, Amazon), but also consumers having the opportunity to choose a plethora of products at the best possible price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to highlight the need for a new understanding of what constitutes "procedural justice" in EU competition law enforcement. This is done via an exploration of the concept of procedural justice, followed by a synthetization of this concept with the conceptual underpinnings of EU competition law. The modern realities of EU competition law are then examined, with a particular focus on the Commission's approach to Google. The general thrust of the argument presented is that considering the nature of the problems facing the Commission, it is not necessary, as a matter of justice, to consider large tech firms as being endowed with a huge panoply of procedural justice rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by Case C-435/18 Otis and Others, this article examines central issues raised in Otis and Others, such as who can claim compensation, what harm is genuinely relevant, and the issue of causation. The Court of Justice of the European Union relies on the principle of full effectiveness of EU competition law to ensure that all causally relevant harm is actionable, and thus achieves a very broad protection of the right to full compensation. As a result, in cases involving both competition law and other legal areas, such as contract law and tort law, EU law and CJEU caselaw apply instead of national law and national caselaw. The increasing and problematic dependence on the principle of full effectiveness may develop damages actions for competition law infringements as an independent category of tort governed by a highly specialized set of rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital economy is deeply and irreversibly changing markets' structures and global competitiveness. This paper deals with the suggested adoption of an additional legal framework as a supplement of EU competition law in digital markets. A co-regulatory and legally binding code of competitive conduct will be signed by undertakings that have a Strategic Market Status. A new-born Digital Markets Unit at the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission will be in charge of the elaboration and enforcement of the code, together with undertakings having a Strategic Market Status and relevant stakeholders of the industry. The code will target behaviours considered to be especially harmful for the consumers in digital markets such as self-preferencing practices by vertically integrated companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The crisis of the long 1970s marked a structural transformation of the European automobile industry. It shifted from national oligopolies to supranational oligopoly coordinated by European institutions. This article presents this historical transition by looking at competition law as the key regulation for politically governing a European market of automobiles. In particular, it reconstructs the central role played by the European Commission in creating a legal exemption from the general rules of competition through a specific regulation (123/1985), which for a decade limited competition in automobile distribution between multinationals at the expense of distributors and consumers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In August 2016, drivers delivering meals in London after being booked via the platforms 'deliveroo' and 'UberEATS' made headlines by challenging working practices in the gig-economy through collective industrial action. Dissatisfaction resulted from extremely low levels of pay as well as a new payment calculation system being introduced without consultation. This indicates that the 'gig-economy', though arguably contributing to 'smart cities', may not always constitute the smartest solution for those serving within it. However, it also highlights that collective industrial action is far from structurally impossible for workers in the 'gigeconomy', even though management of labour relies on anonymous and automated micro-management through internet platforms and apps. Indeed, collective organisation may seem the smartest solution for upgrading the gig-economy for its workers. This article develops an original contribution to the interface of smart technology in the gig-economy, collective labour rights, and EU competition law. We identify that EU competition law as interpreted by the Court of Justice would hinder collective organisation of those serving the gig-economy and develop a comprehensive re interpretation which allows adaptation of EU competition law to smart employment markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of the current work is to delineate national judicial responses to Commission-issued competition soft law within two EU jurisdictions – the UK and the Netherlands. A comparative methodology is adopted and – in terms of theory – several hypotheses of possible judicial attitudes to soft law are established. In broad terms, it is ventured that courts can either recognize (agreement, disagreement, persuasion) or refuse to recognize (neglect, rejection) supranational soft law in their judicial discourse. While acknowledging that judicial refusal for recognition is a natural judicial response to legally non-binding instruments, the paper argues that competition soft law could and should become recognized by national courts of law because that would contribute positively to the enforcement system’s goals of consistency and the concomitant legal certainty and uniform application. The empirical picture that transpires, however, reveals a varied recognition landscape that could well pose challenges for consistent enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The EU Damages Directive came into force in December 2014. One of its objectives is to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by infringements of competition law can effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation in the courts of the EU Member States. This paper looks closely at the Directive’s compensation goal and the key arrangements that are to encourage victims to seek redress in the national courts. The paper uses a simple framework to demonstrate that the legal measures in the Damages Directive are unlikely to foster compensation because they fail to create incentives for harmed individuals to seek redress. If Member States seek to encourage full compensation, they should devise a framework for private antitrust actions that goes beyond the Directive’s remit by, for example, allowing class actions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Chicago Revolution has transformed antitrust into a highly complex, impenetrable if not impracticable area of law, all but extinguishing its traction with the public at large. Under the pretense of scientificity, furthermore, its efficiency-based mantra appears to be, under scrutiny, more a product of ideology than anything else. Not to mention a rather striking volte-face with respect to the political origin and the judicial history of US antitrust as it had developed till then: a path where the emphasis on rivalry was motivated also by the desire to protect the democratic process from the reach of big business. In the European framework, where antitrust derived more from US pressure than any internal political debate, while the European Commission has at times tried to embrace the new US-style approach, the Court of justice has maintained its emphasis on competition and rivalry per se, sometimes indirectly referring to ordoliberal ideas and concerns. In the meantime, however, antitrust has become a training field for another roughly 120 jurisdictions all over the globe. Briefly reviewing enforcement in such countries, with particular focus on BRICS, reveals that an emphasis on rivalry as such and a close attention to the non-efficiency-based goals actually seem to be key in such up-and-coming legal systems. Having completed a review of the legal approach in such three different areas, the article first suggests new enforcement priorities as, e.g., in the areas of mergers and monopolisation, divestiture remedies, and oligopolies. Finally, it reviews the massive collateral benefits that a rivalry-based, politically non-oblivious antitrust enforcement may carry on innovation, economic and social growth, and inclusive institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]