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Myanmar's unofficial minorities encompass diverse religious and ethnic groups excluded from Myanmar's list of 135 officially recognised "national races." They face exclusion due to their citizenship status as well as societal prejudices and entrenched discrimination against minority communities. Yet, debates over politics, federalism, and power-sharing in Myanmar primarily concern the relationship between the officially recognised ethnic minorities and the majority Bamar population. The Spring Revolution has opened the door to "rethink federalism," suggesting that moving beyond historically entrenched binaries of unity or ethnonational federalism may be on the table. Understanding how unofficial minorities face discrimination and disenfranchisement as well as inclusion, is imperative in not only imagining a new political system following a successful Spring Revolution, but in expanding the revolutionary process. Yet, discussions related to minorities and diversity have centred on the pre-coup model of ethno-nationalist federalism as a post-revolution power-sharing arrangement. With minority rights tied to increased autonomy for minority-dominated territories, how do minorities without territory meaningfully participate in or benefit from the revolution? How can the recognition of Myanmar's unofficial minorities – an estimated 10% of the population – be ensured? "Rethinking federalism" highlights relationships between territory, citizenship, and belonging in the Spring Revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno died on 20 April 2021 on the front lines against rebels from the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT). Following Déby's death, a military committee headed by his son, Mahamat Déby, seized power and initiated a transition that led to Mahamat's election to presidency in May 2024. Domestic conditions have worsened in the interim, and the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel are now among the most unstable regions in the world. Idriss Déby was a key figure in regional security operations and employed gatekeeping and neopatrimonialism to direct resources towards strengthening Chad's forces, but the prolonged transition has called into question the extent to which this strategy of rentier peacekeeping can be maintained. This article assesses why Chad is facing this crisis and how the transition has impacted domestic and regional conditions. This rests on theorisation of the Chadian state, analysis of Chad's history and transition to date, and application of theories of gatekeeper states, neopatrimonialism and omnibalancing to assess where the state is headed in the immediate term, concluding that a transition lacking real democratic transformation will exacerbate rather than alleviate tensions in Chad and the surrounding region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One decade after Myanmar's military regime organized non-competitive elections that unexpectedly commenced a period of political reforms, the military leadership upended this transitional period with a coup based on a narrative of electoral fraud. Cancelling the November 2020 election results which had confirmed the voters' preferences for civilian rule, the military has begun organizing fresh elections while concurrently leading a war against the population. Building on Schedler (2002) and the debate on authoritarian elections, this article analyses the military's contemporary menu of electoral manipulation as a comprehensive set of intertwined strategies. It integrates the analysis of various technical elements of the authoritarian electoral process that are often only looked at in isolation. The article deconstructs the military's election-related narratives as self-legitimation in a region where authoritarian elections are the norm. Despite considerable efforts to forge conditions in their favor and create an aura of legitimacy, however, Myanmar's military does not appear very imaginative in this undertaking, but employs a retrograde toolbox in a brutal manner. Whether this strategy is successful will not depend on the authoritarian leaders' skills alone, but also on recognition from domestic, regional and international audiences which the junta's performance seeks to achieve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the formative years of Iran's so-called 'jihadi field diplomacy' toward Azerbaijan during and after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. To accomplish this, I adopt a novel version of neoclassical realism, which considers the socially constructed nature of variables. The application of constructivist neoclassical realism facilitates a deeper comprehension of the reasons and mechanisms behind Iran's embrace of unconventional interventionist policies in Azerbaijan. I argue that Iran's jihadi field diplomacy is characterized by two main features: the use of military tools to achieve foreign policy goals and a distinct leadership structure that operates independently of the government. Then I analyze three turning points that shaped Iran's jihadi field diplomacy toward Azerbaijan. Firstly, after a failed diplomatic mediation between Yerevan and Baku in May 1992, Iran intensified its military and ideological efforts in Azerbaijan. Secondly, during the June 1993 coup, Iran supported pro-Russian coup leader Colonel Huseynov and sought to persuade him to collaborate with ex-Communist Aliyev against nationalist President Elchibey. Aliyev later perceived this initial cooperation as a serious ideological and military challenge. Lastly, the perceived threat and Iran's Quds Force connections to the leaders of the subsequent military uprisings adversely affected bilateral relations between Iran and Azerbaijan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic vulnerability has been linked to pro-democracy protests in autocracies. This study suggests that the economically vulnerable are also more likely to participate in protests in support of autocracy in democracies. When democratically-elected governments are perceived as incapable of resolving economic problems, but are not democratically removable, the economically vulnerable should gather and call for an authoritarian takeover. The theory is tested through a representative survey of 1,000 Tunisian respondents. Results show underemployed Tunisians are generally more likely to say they would attend protests demanding military intervention and significantly more than protests demanding local reform. The findings suggest that just as economically vulnerable individuals can destabilize autocracies through protest, they can also destabilize unconsolidated democracies through public agitation for authoritarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hans Kelsen's theory of the nature of legal systems—and how legal systems are changed—has been endorsed in a series of cases in which courts have adjudicated the legality of a revolution. In all of these cases except one, courts have validated the revolutionary regime. This article focuses on the sole case that stands against this jurisprudential tide: Republic of Fiji v Prasad. In Prasad, the Court explicitly criticised Kelsen's influence on the jurisprudence of revolution and, remarkably, declared the coup in question unlawful. Commentators have received the case positively, arguing that the court's eschewal of Kelsen was instrumental to the result in the case. I seek to rebut this received view. I show that the Kelsenian view is alive and well in the Court's method and result. I conclude with broader reflections on the very coherence of a jurisprudence of revolution itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the state of democracy around the world in 2021. The level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2021 was down to 1989 levels. In 2021, autocracies were on the rise, harbouring 70% of the world population, or 5.4 billion people. There was also a record number of countries autocratizing in 2021: 33 countries, home to 36% of the global population. In recent years, the EU seems to be facing its own wave of autocratization, with 20% of its members autocratizing over the last decade. In addition to the continued downturn in global democracy, this article documents several signs that autocratization is changing in nature. Polarization increased substantially and significantly in 40 countries between 2011 and 2021, and our analysis indicates that polarization increasingly damages democracy especially recently and under anti-pluralist governments. Over the past decade, the data also shows that autocratic governments more frequently used misinformation to shape domestic and international opinion. Finally, with five military coups and one self-coup, 2021 featured an unprecedented increase in coups for this century. These coups contributed to the uptick in the number of closed autocracies in 2021 and seem to signal a shift toward emboldened autocratic actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the 1958 cotton crisis in Sudan, an event that has hitherto been absent in histories of the country and the region. I present the cotton crisis as a crisis of capital during which political, religious, and corporate elites each struggled to regain liquidity and to determine the resulting distribution of money, debts, and power in Sudanese society. The ways in which each of these actors sought to recover investments and refinance their positions had a lasting impact on the politics of the postcolonial state in Sudan, as different sections of capital sought different policy responses to the crisis from government. This article highlights how religious elites in Sudan had renewed and expanded their influence within the corporate business structures created by the colonial economy. Profits from these structures then flowed into the political system, shaping conflict and crisis after decolonisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are show trials always one-sided affairs? In looking at Turkey, this article argues that they can be venues where competing versions of the past are offered to the public and outcomes need not be pre-ordained. In 1960, Turkey's government was overthrown in a military coup. Within months of the coup, the military began trials to show the nation both how corrupt the former ruling party had been and how just the new regime would be. Accomplishing both goals proved difficult: by allowing the deposed leaders to tell their version of events, the trials provided an opportunity for defendants to offer an alternative account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2011, Africa witnessed 7 different forms of popular uprisings leading to the overthrow of ruling heads of state. This includes the situations in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, Burkina Faso in 2014, Zimbabwe in 2017 as well as the recent cases in Algeria and Sudan in 2019. During these uprisings, the African Union (AU) is criticized for its lack of responsiveness to government crackdown, but quick action to condemn the military-supported revolution. Using the case of Sudan, this article examines the complexities of popular uprisings in Africa and AU's challenge in managing the situation. The paper argues that the AU faces the dilemma of protecting the rights of peaceful protesters in a sovereign state and ensuring long-term stability, including preventing the history of military adventurism on the continent. Yet, its role has often leaned disproportionately toward maintaining stability, which raises criticisms that it favors state regimes as opposed to its human-centric and democratic commitments. To enhance its credibility, the AU must adopt proactive roles to protect protesters against government crackdowns. Additionally, the AU needs to augment its existing African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) with actionable policy guidance for protesters, governments, and security agencies during popular uprisings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 2020 general election, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 920 of the total 1,117 seats, which was upped by 61 seats from its win in the 2015 election. The main opposition party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won 71 seats, down 46 from the 2015 election when it won 117 seats. The election result gave a strong mandate to the NLD for another five years. On the other hand, the USDP accused the NLD of engaging in electoral fraud including the buying of votes, and called for fresh elections in coordination with the military. Following a complaint from its proxy party, the USDP, the military initially said it would conduct an investigation in 218 townships where the military personnel and their family members cast their votes, which it expanded to 314 townships in all states and regions across the country; this finally led to the declaration of a state of emergency rule (the military coup) on 1 February 2021. Ethnic parties also alleged that the NLD government made certain pre-poll decisions that disadvantaged the ethnic minorities. This paper analyzes the electoral process and its outcome in an attempt to understand whether the election led to the deepening of democracy or the widening of division in the country's democratization process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports on a study that was situated at the intersection of fake news and the daily news production practices of mainstream journalists during the November 2017 "soft coup" in Zimbabwe. There is a paucity of research on journalists' responses to fake news, during military coups, despite increasing research on the influence of fake news on traditional news production practices. Conceptualised on social organisation of news work, the study deployed qualitative interviews with purposively selected political reporters from mainstream press newsrooms in Zimbabwe, to explore how they responded to fake news during the coup. The study found that faced with an avalanche of fake news, the journalists responded by re-evaluating their news sourcing routines and engaged in collective efforts to identify sources and pressure points of fake news that interfered with their work. Yet, overt reliance on unreliable websites and social media sources to produce news still persisted. Based on this and other related findings, the authors recommend that journalists should evolve their own platforms and mechanisms to verify and challenge fake news prevalent on social media and websites. They further recommend a "triangular approach" that can, in the long term, reduce the influence of fake news. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers several commonwealth countries news briefs. Topics include that India's foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, has defended Delhi's controversial Citizenship (Amendment) Act; Lesotho's prime minister, Thomas Thabane, failed to appear in court to face murder charges; and the British government announced that it would withhold discretionary funding from the Commonwealth Secretariat.

The brain can be severely injured even without the skull being fractured by the impact to the head. For example, when the head is stationary and struck by a moving object the brain shifts inside the skull which results in injuries at point of impact and opposite the side of impact, i.e. coup and contrecoup injuries, respectively. This article presents the results of three-dimensional computational fluid– structure interaction simulations of a frontal impact to the head using a comprehensive finite-element model of the head. The cerebrospinal fluid flow inside the head surrounding the brain is modelled using smoothed-particle hydrodynamics. For the first time, the cerebrospinal fluid is modelled using a fluid domain. The numerical method is validated against known cadaveric experiments by comparing the coup and contrecoup pressure responses. The results of the fluid–structure interaction analysis are compared with those from structural only analysis. It is demonstrated that the impact to the frontal lobe has the potential to cause injuries on both sides of the brain and brain stem. Additional high stress values are also found on the parietal lobe. The use of fluid-structure interaction analysis provides additional information and is more realistic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how different types of governance systems shape different forms of political violence. We identify four governance types by combining the “institutional” dimension of coalition size represented by a minimum winning coalition (MWC) and the “ethno-political” dimension represented by the size of ethnic groups participating in the governing coalition. This study hypothesizes that (a) an exclusive system (small MWC; narrow-based ethnic coalition) is likely to engender civil war, (b) an oversized system (small MWC; broad-based ethnic coalition) is likely to generate a coup, and (c) an undersized system (large MWC; narrow-based ethnic coalition) is likely to stimulate riots or protests. Statistical analyses confirm all three hypotheses, implying that opposition groups choose alternative forms of conflict that maximize their chances of accessing power under different governance configurations. The article concludes by identifying three possible paths toward inclusive governance and suggesting that institutional reform before ethnic inclusion makes a transition toward inclusive governance far less dangerous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the failure of the abortive coup in 2016, Turkey announced that it would derogate from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) during the pronounced state of emergency. While the derogation was claimed to be necessary to eliminate the remaining hostile factions, a sweeping purge followed and human rights organisations have raised concerns over the deteriorating situation. This evokes the question of whether human rights can actually be derogated or suspended during coup situations. This article will analyse whether coup d’état can be regarded as ‘an emergency that threatens the life of a nation’ under Article 4(1) of the ICCPR and Article 15 of the ECHR. Moreover, this article will assess whether a coup could also be invoked to suspend the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The political role of the military and its impact on the emergence, persistence and consolidation of new democracies has generated a large body of scholarship. In the light of military coups in a number of Third Wave democracies such as Ecuador (2000), Thailand (2006 and 2014), Honduras (2006) and Mali (2012), the return to electoral competition in a number of military-dominated regimes, and the military’s pivotal role during the Arab Spring, this research has recently focused on the forms, reasons and consequences of military contestation on democratic development. This special issue contributes to this recent scholarship by analysing both the potentially beneficial as well as the deleterious implications of military contestation on democratic transitions, quality and persistence in different world regions. This article introduces the special issue by providing a broader context for the four individual contributions and relates their findings to the recent theoretical and empirical literature on the military’s role as a midwife or gravedigger of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article responds to Fabiano Santos and Fernando Guarnieri's dispatch, published under the title “From Protest to Parliamentary Coup: An Overview of Brazil's Recent History” in the December 2016 issue of JLACS. I start by pointing out several errors in the authors' use of terms such as “fascism” and “coup.” I proceed to map out the omissions that allow them to portray Rousseff's impeachment in a moral and Manichean light, as a coup of malignant social actors against innocent victims. I then reconstruct the chronology of Rousseff's long-winded downward spiral of self-inflicted agony, from the electoral larceny of October 2014 through the gigantic popular protests of March 2015 to the final vote in August 2016, showing how the authors chose to omit every fact that revealed Rousseff's and the Workers' Party's own responsibilities in the economic collapse and the political crisis of the country they governed for five and a half and thirteen and a half years, respectively. I conclude by pointing out the contradiction between the authors' claim that there was a parliamentary coup in Brazil and their claim that the country's political system has remained intact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is more institutional coup-proofing (ICP) better or worse for leaders’ chances of political survival? Are coups less or more likely to occur and succeed as a state’s military structure becomes increasingly divided into rival branches, organizations, and factions? The article evaluates two competing perspectives on the effectiveness of counterbalancing as a regime protection measure. Seeing strength in numbers and the prospects for divide-and-conquer tactics, most scholars take a more-is-better view, suggesting that higher levels of ICP should increase the effectiveness of counterbalancing. Some scholars, however, advance a more-is-worse perspective, suggesting that collective action problems confronting larger numbers of military organizations decrease the effectiveness of counterbalancing. Through a qualitative analysis of eight coup events in the Philippines during 1986–1987, strong evidence is found in support of the causal mechanisms and predicted outcomes for the more-is-better view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that different narratives involving sacrifice compete to ascribe meaning to the 11 September 1973 coup against Socialist President Salvador Allende, and as a result, structure contemporary Chilean constitutional politics. From that event, it is contended, three competing narratives emerged, each seeking to make sense of political sacrifice, and each providing a basis for the constitutional projects of the Left, the Right, and the Center. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thailand is the only country currently ruled by a coup-installed military government. The 2014 coup aimed not only to abolish the influence of Thaksin Shinawatra but also to shift Thailand's politics in an authoritarian direction. While the army authored the coup, the professional and official elite played a prominent role in engineering the coup and shaping political reforms. This article examines some historical antecedents of this authoritarian turn, first in the broad trends of Thailand's modern political history, and second in the emergence and political evolution of the Bangkok middle class. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been long believed that prolonged political instability harms economic growth and development. This paper contributes to this growing empirical literature by studying the case in Fiji, which has faced a long period of political instability caused by a series of coups, military administrations and frequent changes in government since 1987. The impact of political instability on growth is hard to identify empirically because the counterfactual is unobserved and it is difficult to find valid comparisons. To solve this problem, we use the recently developed Synthetic Control Method to construct a counterfactual (or synthetic Fiji) that predicts the growth of a politically stable Fiji. The difference in per capita growth trajectories of the synthetic and the actual Fiji can thus be attributed as the impacts of political instability. Our findings show that the political instability caused by a series of coups since 1987 has indeed led Fiji onto a lower growth path, and that the accumulated effect is getting larger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Of all the island states of the Southwest Pacific, Fiji’s foreign relations have been the most fraught since the advent of independence in the region, due largely to a succession of coups d'état. These have invariably precipitated adverse responses from major partners and aid donors, notably Australia, New Zealand, the United States and the European Union. The last coup in 2006 also unsettled relations in Fiji’s more immediate region, especially among some of its smaller Polynesian neighbours, contributing to Fiji’s unprecedented suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum. This article reviews Fiji’s foreign relations from the time of independence in 1970 through the period of successive coups to the 2014 elections. It also examines Bainimarama’s strategies in extending foreign relations in the broader international sphere as well as issues surrounding the ‘normalisation’ of relations with its traditional partners. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The USA's role in fomenting and responding to military coups remains an understudied and politically contentious subject despite it being a recurring foreign policy problem exemplified most recently in both Egypt and Mali. To the extent this topic has been addressed in any depth by scholars, it is mainly limited to an examination of a small number of coups that occurred during the Cold War that the CIA was accused of sponsoring. However, this emphasis on well-known cases to the exclusion of lesser-known cases has resulted in a biased view of omnipotent US power. This limitation is reflected in the case of South Vietnam, in which the focus has been placed on the 1963 coup that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem, whereas the numerous other coups that occurred have received little or no attention. In this article, a more inclusive approach will be taken in which US policy will be examined with respect to all of the main coups and coup attempts that occurred during the period 1954–1975. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Twenty-five years since the first military coup in 1987, Fiji continues to muddle through both politically and economically. The promise of a general election under a race-free constitution remains the fervent hope of all citizens. Economically the country continues to slide downwards, reflected in poor economic growth in 2010 and 2011. A poor level of private sector investment remains a feature of the macroeconomic picture, and it is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. This article provides an overview of the Fiji economy and reflections on future prospects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did Mauritania, an Arab League member, undergo a short-lived democratic transition after a successful coup in 2005? Mauritania's democratisation is puzzling because it occurred despite the presence of two conditions that are thought to hinder the prospects of democracy: poverty and strategic importance to the West. We trace the democratisation process undertaken by Mauritania's successful coup leaders in 2005 by focusing on the regime's foreign aid sources. We find that because coup leaders overthrew a Western ally, they feared aid flows would decline. The coup leaders therefore calculated that democratisation would shore up ties by signalling that the new regime was committed to maintaining a strong relationship with Western donors. Our findings have important implications for top-down democratisation in North Africa and the Middle East. Strategic importance appears to be a matter of degree, and states with modest importance to donors, such as Mauritania, may use democratisation as a means to posture themselves as valuable to powerful external actors. Democratic reforms, however, can have sticking power and trap future aid-dependent elites who attempt to strategically manipulate domestic reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1987 there have been six coups altogether in Fiji. The article examines the reactive and transformative nature of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, hereafter referred to as Fiji military, and coups and their impact on the small multi-cultural country of 850,000 people. The coups in Fiji have to be seen in the light of the two separate but related developments, namely the historical dynamic interplay between politics and ethnicity and secondly, how the military itself has evolved as a state institution and how it perceived its role in the modern state system. Although the military is modelled along the lines of a praetorian institution, its perceived role has often shifted from being guardian of indigenous Fijian interests to protector of the multi-ethnic state. The interventionist tendency of the military was largely in response to the way in which the interplay between politics and ethnicity had played a part in creating discord and tension. All the six coups in Fiji were linked and need to be understood in relation to each other. The 2006 coup was the most politically transformative as some of the most powerful institutions were weakened and reconfigured and a new order created under the guise of a 'clean-up campaign'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In rural Honduras, collaborating U.S. and Honduran researchers have elucidated indigenous technical knowledge and customs surrounding local uses for, and conservation of, an endemic cycad-Dioon mejiae Standl. & L. O. Williams (Zamiaceae)-that is an important food source for the lowest economic stratum of local society. Dissemination of research findings within the region has produced positive outcomes for the cycad's conservation without undermining the usufructuary rights of cycad-dependent families. This experience suggests the elements of an effective, low-cost approach to promulgating noncoercive, community-based resource stewardship. However, recent presidential elections notwithstanding, the 2009 coup has undermined the conditions under which participatory research and conservation can take place in Honduras, highlighting the need for researchers and practitioners to consider and confront the assaults on human rights, intellectual freedoms, and natural systems that transpire in the countries where they work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thaksin Shinawatra was not a populist when he rose to power in 2001, but became so in intensifying stages over the next five years. His populism went beyond redistributive policies to include rhetorical rejection of Thailand's political elite, and denigration of liberal democracy in favour of personalised authoritarianism. Fears provoked by this populism helped to mobilise the urban middle-class rejection of Thaksin which was background to the 2006 coup. Thaksin's populism was a response to the demands and insecurities of the large informal mass created by an outward-orientated strategy of development. Thaksin's populism resembles the neo-populism prevalent in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. Also like these regimes, Thaksin made no investment in mass organisation, and fell precipitately when subject to elite attack. In Latin America, this phase has been superseded by leaders with a more ideological message and greater investment in organisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thailand's 2006 royalist coup is best understood by reference to the historical context of democratisation. The dominant historiography of Thai democratisation is either a simplistic liberal view of anti-military democracy or a royalist one that is ultimately anti-democratic. This article offers a serial history of democratisation that allows us to see the long duration of layered historical processes. As democratisation is fundamentally a break from the centralised absolute monarchy, the monarchy and the monarchists, despite their up and down political fortunes, have probably played the most significant role in shaping Thai democracy since 1932. Despite that, their role and place in history has been overlooked due to the perception that they are "above politics." This article argues that, since 1973 in particular, the monarchists have assumed the status of the superior realm in Thai politics that claims the high moral ground above politicians and normal politics. With distaste for electoral politics, and in tacit collaboration with the so-called people's sector, activists and intellectuals, they have undermined electoral democracy in the name of "clean politics" versus the corruption of politicians. The 2006 coup that toppled democracy was the latest effort of the monarchists to take control of the democratisation process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Great many violent events happened during 1991-2005 in the 12 states that emerged after the collapse of the USSR but only a few civil wars are registered in the major datasets. That brings up a number of questions about the operational definitions of civil war that generally point in the direction of shifting the research attention from refining the quantitative parameters to grasping the essense of the phenomena in question. It is proposed that civil war partially overlaps with several other type of violent crisis: inter-state wars, civil unrest and revolutions, internal repression, military coups and mutinies, banditry and organized crime, and terrorism. These overlaps create six 'gray zones' where only very nuanced examination rather than application of rigid criteria could help in distinguishing civil wars from other crises. Therefore, data collection based on a single "robust" definition, which incorporates several verifiable parameters, is not necessarily the only path to scientific knowledge about civil wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the violent coup staged by businessman George Speight in Fiji in May 2000, accurate information about what was happening was often restricted to a handful of Fijian websites. On some occasions the only site still operating—and the only source of information for readers outside Fiji—was the one run by the journalism programme at the University of the South Pacific. Journalism students began to cover the unfolding events as an academic exercise but, before long, their newspaper and its associated website became vital links to the outside world. Despite attempts to suppress it, the student website was often the sole source of news for people outside Fiji as commercial websites went off line. Their work was rewarded with international acclaim, including awards for journalism education. Ten months later, the journalism students were again on assignment, reporting the complexities of the elections that followed the coup. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]