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In 2023, the Swedish Competition Authority adopted a decision accepting commitments from Finnair to reverse a policy implemented with online travel agencies. Specifically, Finnair was preventing online travel agencies from marketing Finnair airfares at a discounted level (relative to the airfares offered by Finnair to the online travel agencies) to customers who were searching for Finnair tickets online, in particular on metasearch websites. This case is noteworthy for three reasons. First, this commitments decision has commercial and strategic implications for the sector across the European Union. Second, while conflicting legal arguments were raised, the economic assessment was quite unequivocal, pointing to the challenged conduct being very likely to generate anti-competitive effects. Third, the Swedish Competition Authority's investigation overlapped with the entry into force of the 2022 European Commission's Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and showed some potential ambiguity in its interpretation and application, which the investigation's outcome has hopefully alleviated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines policy uncertainty on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in South Africa, emphasising the extensive regulatory review by the Competition Commission under the 'public interest consideration' criterion. It aims to identify the cost implications and uncertainties associated with M&A transactions to propose measures to reduce these uncertainties. Utilising qualitative methodologies, the study gathers empirical evidence through interviews with companies and competition lawyers involved in the M&A processes. The findings reveal significant concerns about economic uncertainty, merger control, and policy and regulation impacting investment decisions. Policy uncertainty, particularly in the context of merger regulation, imposes substantial cost implications and delays on M&A activities, negatively affecting investment, growth, and economic development. It emphasises the necessity for a regulatory framework that minimises disruptions and costs to business participants. The findings suggest that addressing policy uncertainty and streamlining regulatory processes are crucial steps towards enhancing South Africa's attractiveness as an investment destination and fostering economic growth and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a framework of bilateral agreements governing cooperation in competition policy since 1991, the European Union (EU) and United States of America (US) established a new Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue in 2021, which was different from previous cooperation and separate from the transatlantic Trade and Technology Council. Drawing from the principal-agent literature, this article argues that the choice to establish the new Joint Dialogue can be understood as an exercise of discretionary authority by agents in different jurisdictions with similar preferences who responded similarly to the common external factor of digitalisation. Facing new and shared challenges arising from the digital economy, the EU and US competition authorities undertook a new effort at cooperation – the Joint Dialogue – through which regulatory agents at various levels can interact, exchange information and improve enforcement in a rapidly changing business environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital market regulations respond to technological changes and global dynamics, but also to how political actors shape markets. Focusing on the Digital Markets Act, this article explains the EU's marketcraft as the result of a struggle in the policy field between political actors promoting competing economic ideas in a rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical context. We show that significant discursive and policy change in digital market governance has occurred because of shifting coalitions between three constellations of actors, which we call market-correctors, market-busters, and market-directors. Tracking the ongoing campaign to challenge Big Tech and define the meaning of digital sovereignty, we argue that market-directors have ushered in potentially comprehensive policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several theoretical propositions suggest that changes in economic activity can explain the decision to form a cartel. The majority of the propositions claim that cartel formation is more likely in expansionary and less likely in contractionary phases of the business cycle. The propositions are re-examined theoretically and by using data on detected cartels for the European Union. In both cases, the results cannot confirm that more cartels are formed in any of the business cycle phases and that correlated economic growth rates create higher incentives to collude. Furthermore, it cannot be confirmed that more cartels form shortly after respectively the trough or the peak in the business cycle. The conclusion is that cartel formation is unaffected by changes in the business cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the use of algorithms has become increasingly prominent in the digital market, such algorithms are often opaque and prone to risks of making biased decisions. Algorithms could also be used to harm competition, such as by facilitating cartels. Such developments make it necessary to examine the readiness of existing competition law to tackle cases involving algorithms. This paper focuses on analysing Indonesian competition law to address the following issues: (1) how current Indonesian competition law deals with algorithms-related cases; (2) which indicators could detect anti-competitive algorithms; and (3) which competition policy approach could be considered in Indonesia to tackle the problem resulted from the use of algorithms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Snowden revelations, Cambridge Analytica, and a policy vacuum created by technological convergence and neoliberal reforms, policy efforts to articulate oversight of digital platform markets gathered policymaker support and public attention internationally. In the U.S., examined here as a case study of these international policy efforts, competition policy emerged as a prominent governance mechanism over digital platforms, resulting in the current antitrust scrutiny of tech giants like Google and Meta. Drawing on policy documents, fieldwork, and expert interviews, I trace how antitrust reform proposals, pitched as reclaiming democratic governance over private markets, came to dominate platform policy discussions. I examine how policy efforts to address platform power via competition grappled with non-competitive harms arising in digital markets, such as threats to user privacy and disinformation flows. Finally, I show how these debates began to converge on the contours of an emergent governance paradigm for digital platform oversight. I argue that this governance framework, which seeks to optimize market mechanisms to discipline platform markets, has significant limitations, notably in addressing issues associated with big data commodification and quantification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In literature, most studies on mergers focus purely on competition-related aspects; additional conditions that can apply are labelled non-competition goals or public interest considerations (PICs). The imposition of these conditions is garnering more attention from the competition authorities as a means to assist the struggling economy in South Africa. This paper reports the impact that various independent variables can have on the probability of certain public interest considerations being imposed on merger cases in South Africa with the use of a quantitative logit regression model. The study sample consists of 221 mergers between 2010 and 2019, and only includes cases with PICs as conditions to merge, based on all small, intermediate, and large mergers collected from Competition Commission and Tribunal newsletters, case files and company websites, as well as the Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances. This research makes use of descriptive statistics and regression analysis from this unique database to analyse the data. The results indicate that for South Africa, the competition authorities focus on employment, supplier development fund programmes and Black economic empowerment conditions when considering which PIC to enforce on merger cases. The article contributes to the literature on competition policy and economics by adding to the minimal research already conducted and enhances our understanding of mergers with non-competition goals and the impact of these considerations in the South African merger framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition policy has been at the core of the European integration project from its very inception. The United Kingdom (UK) played a truly pivotal role in the development of European Union (EU) competition policy with the policy long presenting one of the best illustrations of Europeanisation. The public vote for Brexit in 2016 pushed the reset button for the UK's engagement with the EU and saw successive UK governments all pursuing a de-Europeanisation trajectory as part of their objective of 'taking back control'. State aid emerged as a contentious issue during the Brexit negotiations. The UK government hailed its new Subsidy Control Act (2023) as a clear departure from the EU state aid regime, but is this a case of de-Europeanisation or partial de-Europeanisation? This article argues that the UK has still not entirely broken free from EU's state aid regime and finds itself in a state of orbiting Europeanisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hu, Mizuno, and Song (Applied Economics Letters, 2021) compare the welfare effects of input price discrimination (IPD) and uniform input pricing (UIP) under passive partial ownership (PPO) where one downstream firm holds equity shares of its rival. This paper extends their setup to accommodate passive partial cross ownership (PCO) where each downstream firm holds equity shares of its rival. A common conclusion is that IPD improves welfare if the cost asymmetry is sufficiently low. Interestingly, this finding holds regardless of whether the more efficient firm is also the dominant partial shareholder. Indeed, it is found that the likelihood that IPD is welfare enhancing increases as firms become more asymmetric in terms of equity shares. However, the critical level of cost asymmetry differs under PPO and PCO, meaning that there are cases where IPD performs better in terms of social welfare under PCO but not under PPO, and vice versa. The main conclusion of this paper is that, compared to the PPO structure, PCO reduces the likelihood that IPD results in better welfare outcomes than UIP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The confluence of technological innovations in computation and communications has expanded the scope and increased the intensity of algorithmic applications in markets. Policymakers and regulators are increasingly concerned about tacit collusion among sellers using algorithmic pricing in concentrated markets driven by digital platforms with network effects. Indonesia's competition regulators have expressed similar concerns and noted the need for a greater understanding of the impact of algorithmic pricing, including the detection of anti-competitive business practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intensifying concerns about online platform firms' rapid rise, expansion, and growing asymmetric power have attracted political scrutiny and undermined the legitimacy of a minimalist regulatory regime that is giving way to intense debate and increasingly interventionist governmental policies and enforcement actions. First, we view the rise of, and recent political responses to, the often-predatory power and manipulative conduct of platform firm in terms of a 'Polanyian' double movement in which the destabilising and destructive effects of unchecked corporate activities and market development eventually generates political and regulatory responses to constrain private power that threaten the social, political, and economic order. Second, incipient legal changes, most notably the EU's proposed Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, indicate a shift in regulatory emphasis from competition (and antitrust) policy and law towards more intensive and encompassing forms of socio-economic regulation. Finally, these regulatory changes will likely vary in character and significance across political jurisdictions, and embody distinctive and possibly divergent developmental trajectories. The EU may have a first-mover advantage in regulating platform firms, but we are only at the very beginning of a protracted and conflictual transformational process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article engages ongoing policy debates concerning the relationship between concentrated economic power, democracy, and the rule of law, focusing on competition policy – known in the United States as Anti-Trust law. I analyze how Neo-Brandeisian jurists and advocates (who are named after the late, Progressive-Era U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis), have raised critical concerns in their critiques of how Chicago School jurists have conceived of and deployed the concept of "consumer welfare." As I argue, the crux of the Neo-Brandeisian intervention concerns the need to reevaluate the appropriate relationship between governments and markets. Yet, as I also explore, Neo-Brandeisians err in their depiction of market dynamics and the place of labor within them. To address these problems, I incorporate insights from Marxist legal studies and political economy. I present my argument in the historical evolution of competition policy, highlighting how one of its principal elements has been a concern with challenging concentrated economic power. My discussion highlights how a revised standard for competition policy, especially with respect to promoting democracy, is possible from synthesizing insights from Neo-Brandeisians with Marxists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conceived in the 1930s as a way to renew free market liberalism, neoliberal doctrines aim to institute a competitive order that would regulate the market as well as society. Yet, interpretations of how competition should be enforced have varied throughout history. The European Union, with its ordoliberal origins, tends to follow an interventionist approach while the United States, where the Chicago School has gained influence, fears that inadequate public interventions may diminish global efficiency. The digital revolution and the appearance of the Tech Giants introduces a new challenge. Faced with massive increasing returns to scale, the competition authorities initially reduced their interventionism to enjoy more market efficiency. But the emergence of digital platforms and the will to protect personal data from abusive uses pushes them now to adopt a new strategy for more interventions that goes beyond the economic and efficiency issues. This article argues that the neoliberal vision is no longer accurate to regulate the digital economy. It shows that the platform economy is not an alternative way to manage the market, but an alternative to the market itself. To face these issues, a completely new conception of public regulation is therefore needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Passive partial ownership (PPO) is commonly practised in many industries. When operating profits of stock-owned firms decrease, stock-holding firms will increase output to reduce capital gain through owned firms' stocks. In a vertically related market with downstream PPO, consumer and total surpluses when input price discrimination is allowed may be larger than when it is banned because PPO mitigates effects of reduction in output caused by higher input price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the EU competition regime is well-established and highly effective, EU policy actors may still need to rethink their tried and tested approach to competition regulation. This is what happened in the context of the European Commission's planned regulation of online platforms, embodied (in part) within the Digital Markets Act. This article reviews the interplay of the EU's competition regime with its relatively new Digital Single Market strategy to ask how a traditional ex-post approach to competition regulation came to be supplemented by a (proposed) ex-ante regulatory approach. Informed by the literature on policy change, the article examines the policy context, the Commission's experience gained in dealing with competition cases, and the input of lobbyists, advocacy groups and experts, to explain this shift in Commission policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most theoretical and empirical accounts of trade politics focus on political conflict among competing private interest groups and over policies between the dichotomy of trade liberalization and protectionism. This article challenges this conceptualization by arguing that issues of antitrust, market power, and competition are central to the politics over free trade, and that in this domain state actors are comparatively more important. Original archival evidence from the American New Deal and post-war foreign economic policy shows that post-war free-trade policies were heavily influenced by views, formed in the 1930s, about domestic industrial organization and antitrust. These preferences were then pushed into international economic policy during and after World War II through trade negotiations, extraterritorial application of American law, and pressure for domestic competition laws abroad. In one of the most prominent episodes of trade liberalization, an antitrust campaign and debate permeated trade issues, based in independent state learning and economic preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article informs a key aspect of the business-government interface; the evolution of competition policy and how firms adapt to it. Drawing on an extensive portfolio of inquiries, what constitutes 'the market' and the boundaries of the firm within it is described through the experience of the UK alcoholic beverages industry. In situating competition policy in its historical socio-economic context, this study traces three overlapping eras; family ownership and control, network and conglomerates organisation, and specialisation and financialisation. Issues emerge that inform wider debate, notably the nature of portfolio and network effects, a central and contested theme in contemporary competition policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of 'behind-the-border' issues has become a major challenge for the global trading system. Why are some trade-related issues integrated in the strongly judicialized WTO with its dispute settlement system, while others are governed in isolation from the trade regime? Contributing to the literature on WTO issue boundaries, the paper highlights the role of uncertainty and demand for transgovernmental regulatory cooperation as drivers of regime outcomes. I argue that high technical and political uncertainty delays GATT/WTO integration of trade-related issues in favour of a soft-law trade pathway. A further-reaching separation from the trade regime occurs when uncertainty remains high and national regulatory authorities exhibit a demand for trade-separate cooperation with foreign counterparts. Case studies on government procurement and competition policy substantiate the argument. Government procurement has been integrated into the GATT/WTO trade regime under a market access agenda pursued by EU and US trade actors, but only after uncertainty had been reduced in technical soft-law trade talks at the OECD. Conversely, in competition policy – despite repeated efforts at GATT/WTO integration – cooperation has thrived in less judicialized transgovernmental networks such as the International Competition Network, driven by competition agencies eager to solve regulatory cooperation problems independently from the trade regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on international advice, most countries in the APEC region have now adopted competition laws. The more competition, the better – especially for the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that most need to compete. Yet, 'better' competition laws (as measured by a range of characteristics commonly associated with competition law and policy rankings) may actually hurt trade and growth. In this article, we provide a model of SME competition in the APEC region – and show how innovativeness determines the effectiveness of competition law from international data. We show how countries like Singapore and Hong Kong benefit from competition policy reform – because they already have vigorous innovation policies. For countries with such policies – like Brunei – freer trade and competition could actually hurt GDP growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Competition Commission of India's (CCI) journey with "control" has been the subject of much discussion in Indian competition law circles. As we witness an increase in reliance on technology as well as a consolidation in conventional industries, both catalyzed by the Covid-19 pandemic, there is a marked increase of activity in the Indian merger market. It is therefore crucial for businesses contemplating mergers and acquisitions, to have a clear sense of the hurdles they need to cross, particularly if the merger activity in question falls in the same or a related industry. The CCI would thus need to provide clarity on what constitutes control, and when transacting parties should approach the CCI. The CCI must also be transparent about control transactions resulting in anti-competitive effects. This paper proposes that the CCI provide guidance on what amounts to control, from the perspectives of both notifiability and competitive effects, to resolve the CCI's control quandary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the effect of the European Union Competition Authority's block exemption towards R&D cooperatives in a horizontal market structure, valid as long as the combined product market share is not too large. Two less efficient firms attempt to catch up with a technological leader, and may use the safe harbour provided by the legislation. We consider when the incentives of the R&D-performing firms are aligned with those of consumers, and when increases in the market share limit improves welfare. We show that an effective policy within this framework might be elusive. The market share restriction must be set in order that it is optimal for firms to use the safe harbour, and that this leads to more R&D than under competition. Even in this case, further increases in the market share restriction can harm welfare. This has widespread implications for how the EU Competition authority should respond to calls for an increase in the market share restriction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As algorithmic pricing becomes more widespread, the discussion about the extent to which the use of algorithms results in an increase of collusion also intensifies. While some scholars argue that algorithms are able to collude on their own (algorithmic collusion), others claim that only the use of code to enforce collusion (collusion by code) is a serious threat. In this paper, we discuss both scenarios as well as the conditions under which collusion is likely to occur. As detection and prosecution seems rather challenging, we also discuss possible remedies. These include statistical analyses of market data, an increase in trained staff for competition authorities or even a general ban of specific classes of pricing algorithms. While current competition law seems to be prepared to tackle current issues, it might be adapted for possible future challenges, in case that autonomous algorithms become greater concerns in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special issue on business responses to European competition policy considers the development of research in the field of European competition policy. It is argued that existing analyses have concentrated on the development of policy over time and that we know surprisingly little about the response of business to the demands of competition policy. This is important because it is apparent that ever stricter legal provision has not removed the problem and where there appears to be a considerable degree of recidivism. The aim of the special issue is to begin to address these issues by examining the response of different companies and sectors to the existence of EEC/EU competition policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shows how companies can circumvent competition legislation by developing new informal ways of cooperation. We focus on the case of the Nordic pulp and paper industry which was particularly eager to set up cartels. Scholars analysing this sector can utilise exceptionally rich sources that reveal how industrialists reacted to the introduction and development of European competition policies. The article shows that companies defended their collusive practices by making them less transparent and more informal than before, a change that did not automatically lessen their effectiveness. Tougher competition policies also encouraged industrialists to create new giant companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1958 the European Commission has been in charge of monitoring a progressive reduction of national aid to shipbuilding. However, a large gap existed between theory and practice, especially during the severe crisis that hit Western European shipbuilding from the late 1970s onwards. This article gauges the real influence of state-aid control on companies' restructuring by examining both the Commission's papers and the archives of the French shipyard of Dunkirk, which was the second French shipbuilding company in the early 1980s before collapsing in 1986. It argues that the closure of the yard was due to a progressive assertion of European Economic Community (EEC) state-aid control, but also to the company's internal weakness as well as changes in the French state's industrial policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores through the lens of the British company Babcock and Wilcox Ltd the response of a group of European companies to the threat posed to their activities by the new EEC competition policy in the early 1960s. Regulation 17/62 was set to ban the market-sharing agreements which had been in place for many years between the companies in Europe. The article tracks their deliberations over the most suitable response that would allow market sharing to continue while minimising the risk of discovery. This rare insight into the inner discussions of cartel arrangements also highlights the role of legal advice in the solution adopted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the first time, this paper investigates the influence of ordoliberalism (OL) at both the ideational and regulative levels of European integration processes regarding agricultural policy (i.e. CAP), competition policy, and economic and monetary policy (i.e. EMU) in comparison. The analytical key is an operationalisation of OL into five elements. The paper generally confirms the hypotheses proposed that OL was and remains an ideational influence of some importance, without exaggerating this influence, for European integration processes, both at the constitutive level as well as – but less so – at the practical level. However, there are differences in the degree of influence across the various policy areas. The influence is weakest in CAP and strongest in competition policy, but only since the Internal Market was proposed in the mid-1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a little-known fact that Canada adopted its own antitrust law one year before the landmark Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. The Anti-Combines Act of 1889 ('the Act') was adopted after a decade in which 'combines' (the Canadian equivalent of 'trusts') had grown more numerous. From the combines' numbers, Canadian historians, legal scholars, and economists have inferred that consumer welfare was hindered. However, price and output evidence has never been marshalled to provide even a first step towards assessing the veracity of this inference. This paper undertakes that task. I highlight the fact that the output from industries accused of collusion increased faster than national output in the decade before the passage of the Act and that their prices accordingly fell faster than the national price index. I argue that these findings militate for the position that the origins of Canada's Anti-Combines Act were partially rooted in rent-seeking processes similar to those that American scholars have found driving the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few policy issues are more challenging than complex weaponry's procurement and employment. Technology drives weapon costs upwards faster than economies are growing and militaries struggle to maintain increasingly sophisticated arms. Certain governments have adopted a reform agenda rooted in neo-liberal economic theory to address these challenges. Two broad policies – enhancing inter-firm competition for contracts and outsourcing activities to the private sector – emerged as central to this reform agenda. Although rarely presented as such, these reforms present a significant intellectual challenge to the hitherto predominant statist model for military power's provision. Surprisingly, in light of neo-liberal policies' adoption by militarily active states, no study has systematically examined these reforms' content and impact. My article fills this lacuna by examining the state – the United Kingdom – that most consistently enacted neo-liberal defence reforms. To preview the conclusion, neo-liberal reforms initially generated small initial efficiencies, but then produced significant adverse consequences when pursued beyond a certain minimal level. Britain's competition policy, for example, ultimately incentivized firms to consolidate into monopolies, which narrowed the scope for future competition and prevented the state from upholding fixed price contracts. Outsourcing, likewise, proved detrimental once policymakers sought to extend its scope beyond a limited range of simple services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A comprehensive competition policy for talent introduction was first implemented in Xi'an in February 2017 and has been imitated by many cities in China ever since. Although turned out to be useful in alleviating the problem of talents loss in the lower-tier cities, the policy has been criticized for its potential effect of driving up housing prices. Using the synthetic control method proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), we explore the influence of the competition policy for talent introduction on housing prices in Xi'an. Based on the monthly data of Xi'an and 62 control cities across 30 provinces in China from January 2015 to April 2018, we find strong evidence for the positive effect of the competition policy on housing prices. Specifically, the policy increased housing prices in Xi'an by approximately 43% until April 2018. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ubiquitous process of digitization changes economic competition on markets in several ways and leads to the emergence of new business models. The increasing roles of digital platforms as well as data-driven markets represent two relevant examples. These developments challenge competition policy, which must consider the special economic characteristics of digital goods and markets. In Germany, national competition law was amended in 2017 in order to accommodate for digitization-driven changes in the economy and plans for further changes are already discussed. We review this institutional change from an economics perspective and argue that most of the reform's elements point into the right direction. However, some upcoming challenges may have been overlooked so far. Furthermore, we discuss whether European competition policy should follow the paragon of the German reform and amend its institutional framework accordingly. We find scope for reform particularly regarding data-driven markets, whereas platform economics appear to be already well-established. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organised business played a significant role in the formal policy processes developing the competition regime after apartheid up to and including the drafting of South Africa's competition law. The social organisation of business and its participation in formal policy processes were shifting and changing rapidly. Exploring several published accounts of the drafters of South Africa's first democratic competition law and policy framework reveals the narrative context for the politics of the regime. The process of negotiating and drafting this legislation took place both in National Economic Development and Labour Council (a formal tripartite negotiating organisation) where business was influential, and in Parliament. Big business pursued its interests in competition policy and achieved significant results during this time. The current period differs from the post-apartheid period in light of the much less prominent role of conglomerates in the South African economy, the rise of organised black business structures, and the increasing importance of Parliament as opposed to the NEDLAC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sasol was established and supported by the apartheid state in South Africa for its strategic position as a liquid fuel and chemical producer. The evolving government treatment of Sasol through various policy measures, and Sasol's changing corporate strategy under a liberalised economy, represents a key part of South Africa's transition under democracy from 1994. The article takes Sasol as a case study of industrial policy, regulation and business strategy. We analyse the terms on which the post-apartheid government continued to support Sasol along with the decisions to release Sasol from obligations to repay subsidies it had received and not to impose a tax on windfall gains. We then evaluate the regulatory regime for fuel and gases, the advantages that it bestowed on Sasol, and the ability of competition authorities as regulators of last resort to address Sasol's entrenched market position. Sasol's impact on downstream diversified industrial sectors, which rely on it for inputs, is assessed as part of the bigger questions about the failure of South Africa to develop diversified manufacturing capabilities over the last 25 years. The article draws conclusions relating to the political economy of industrial policy, regulation and competition law in addressing Sasol's entrenched position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Appropriate port regulation and competitive forces tend to be related to higher levels of operational and economic performance of ports. From a policy-making perspective, pursuing efficiency and securing competition in ports to reach a level playing field is a two-step process requiring (1) ex-ante regulations to set the rules that maximize the competition for the market, especially when the policy objective is to attract private operations to ports on competitive concession processes and (2) ex-post competition policy to monitor and preserve competition in the market. This paper studies port regulation in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) from a competition perspective, analyzing both ex-ante and ex-post policies implemented in the region. The analysis reveals that the competitive environment in LAC is low, giving room for possible anticompetitive practices in the LAC port sector. Since the end of the 1990s, approximately 80% of container terminals in the region were granted to only five companies. Chile and Mexico have been found to be the best practices in the region, with better conditions assuring robust competition in the market. The main policy implication from this analysis is the need for a stronger involvement of antitrust agencies throughout the port concession processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present contribution seeks to provide a normative justification for the better consideration of employment and its negative social consequences in the area of mergers. First, it challenges the widespread rhetoric of competition policy when advancing economic efficiency as a goal of competition policy. Second, it argues that the promotion of efficiency-driven, fierce competition comes at the expense of other sensible social values, such as job creation. As evidenced by statistics, this contribution unravels how job cuts follow from mergers and acquisitions. It argues (i) in favour of an overhaul of the efficiency defence with the aim of focusing more actively on job creation, or at least on balancing the number of job cuts with the number of newly created jobs and (ii) against anti-competitive practices such as social dumping and camouflage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of big data is misleading twice over. Firstly, it suggests that big data are a homogeneous resource whose features are given and whose applications are known in advance, when they are nothing of the kind. Secondly, it draws attention towards a step of the data value chain, data collection, that is far less important than those of data processing and information production. The paper achieves the latter conclusion by showing that big data hardly meet the conditions of the European essential facility doctrine and do not lend themselves to be shared via viable compulsory licenses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I discuss some of the implications of globalization to the design and application of competition policy. My analysis is divided into three different areas: price fixing, mergers and abuse of dominant position. I also consider the importance of China as an emergent player in the global competition policy arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how contestable market theory (contestability) has come to reconfigure the economic and regulatory concept of competition in order to enhance the compatibility of Australia’s economy with international trade and investment agreements. Australia has recently negotiated and signed a raft of bilateral, plurilateral and regional agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the Australia–China Free Trade Agreement. In order to ensure that Australia meets its obligations and commitments to these agreements, two key advisory bodies—the Harper Panel on Competition Policy Review and the Financial System Inquiry—made recommendations, the majority of which were accepted by the government, to ready Australia’s competition governance and economic policy for greater global integration. Such impact is dependent on, among other things, how domestic competition policy meshes with the free market ideology underpinning such international agreements, which favours the breakdown of barriers to markets. Less well known is the role of contestability in radicalising ideology as it countenances monopolisation and privatisation in the guise of market access by justifying the substitution of actual competition with the mere threat of competition. The article concludes that the monopoly power of transnational corporations will be enhanced through the acquiescence of governments to the new governance regime of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which, supported by domestic policy, is set to redraw competition policy in the light of contestability theory. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Economists have long understood that consumers frequently depart from the ideal of perfect rationality, but we have only relatively recently appreciated that these departures are largely predictable and so provide opportunities for firms to exploit consumers. The flip side to this is that there are also opportunities for competition authorities and regulators to intervene in ways that significantly benefit consumers. In this paper, we first describe a number of consumer biases that are relevant to competition policy. We then provide five “threshold questions” that regulators or competition authorities need to answer before they can intervene on behavioural grounds. These are designed to avoid unnecessary or poorly thought out interventions. We then provide four lessons that regulators and competition authorities need to learn in a behavioural world. These are designed to maximize the probability of proposed remedies solving the competition concern identified. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since its launch in 2007, Android has become the dominant mobile device operating system worldwide. In light of this commercial success and certain disputed business practices, Android has come under substantial attention from competition authorities. We present key aspects of Google’s strategy in mobile, focusing on Android-related practices that may have exclusionary effects. We then assess Google’s practices under competition law and, where appropriate, suggest remedies to right the violations we uncover. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Urban water security in Australia’s major cities is now very high, reflecting in part recent policy interventions. Important indirect potable water reuse projects were completed but no direct potable reuse project was undertaken and none seems likely in the near term. Governments have much to learn from decisions to build very large desalination and recycling plants, particularly around timing and scale. Future water reuse decisions are likely to have a much greater commercial focus. Policies and regulations giving more flexibility to decentralized provision of water-related services could result in further growth of climate-resilient water resources and non-potable reuse. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines the factors determining fee levels set by independent schools, focusing on the impact of competition, cooperation and regulatory intervention in the sector. Results indicate that, once account is taken of factors such as the extent of local competition between independent schools, the impact of the 2003–2005 Office of Fair Trading investigation into the fee-setting cartel on independent school fees becomes insignificant. Meanwhile, the extent of competition between independent schools has a significant effect on levels of boarding school fees. Results highlight the importance of considering pricing strategies of groups within a cartel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally the UK brewing industry was vertically integrated with brewers owning and controlling pubs. This came to an abrupt end in the forced divestment of a large proportion of the major brewers' pub estates in the 1989 ‘Beer Orders’. The divested pubs spawned the independent pub companies. This study of regulatory policy and financial services interest in the UK brewing industry poses the question of whether the original industrial structure was preferable to what has emerged subsequently. The contribution of the article is in highlighting the risks and rewards of regulatory intervention in deeply-embedded organisation and the sustainability of alternative business models that emerge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The duration of merger proceedings held by competition authorities is an important determinant of the efficiency of the entire merger control process. A data set of 2953 Phase I and 92 Phase II investigations completed by the European Commission (EC) between 1999 and 2008 is used to examine the key determinants of their duration. Differentiating between authority- and case-related drivers, the findings show that while the duration of Phase I investigations largely depends on the type of decision and use of simplified procedure, the duration of Phase II investigations is driven by factors such as industry knowledge, the duration of the preceding Phase I investigation, the origin of the notifying firm, or the number of identified relevant markets. Evidence is also provided that the significant increase in average duration identified after the 2004 merger regulation reform does not imply a decrease in administrative efficiency, as the probability of in-depth investigations was correspondingly reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a competitive market, the exit of those suppliers who cannot offer an attractive product at an attractive price is seen as desirable. However, the consequences for consumers when their own supplier leaves the market in an unplanned or disorderly way may be undesirable. Exit regimes exist in regulated markets to ensure that consumers are not unduly harmed by these disorderly exits. This article considers the scope for an exit regime in the English higher education sector. It particularly considers how consumers (students) can be protected from the disorderly closure of their higher education providers, whilst retaining the principle of competitive neutrality, or the ‘level playing field’. The article also proposes actions which the sector could take in advance of Government regulation, in order to develop the form of exit regime which will give the greatest protection to students. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The GB retail energy market, and Ofgem's regulation of it, have been controversial. In 2014 Ofgem asked the CMA to investigate. ItsProvisional Findingsof July 2015 take a similar approach to that of Ofgem since 2008. Both find weak customer response allowing unilateral market power, and support various regulatory interventions. The specific characterisation of the CMA's benchmark well-functioning market, with its requirement that firms have efficient costs, seems attributable to Ofgem. Possible reasons for similarities include Ofgem's involvement in the process before the CMA reference, policies of previous Governments including an initial strategic Steer to the CMA, and the increasing influence of behavioural economics especially via the OFT. Now the present Government has put in place a new Steer, without emphasis on consumer behavioural issues and with strong emphasis on deregulation rather than regulation. Experience and thinking about behavioural economics also continue to evolve. The paper discusses implications for the CMA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article employs cultural political economy to explore, interpret, and explain the articulation of competition, competitiveness, and competition policies in Asia in the current neo-liberal era. It describes how this approach explores social order and change in terms of the interaction between semiosis and structuration in the context of four types of selectivity: structural, agential, discursive, and technological. It then outlines an analytical framework and methodology to apply this approach to the chosen case study. This concerns how these modes of selectivity have operated since the 1997 ‘Asian Crisis’ to produce changes in the policy discourses and practices of the World Bank and its Asian regional agencies with the declared aim of reducing poverty, enhancing competitiveness, and promoting corresponding forms of competition policy. Next it examines how these discourses and practices are assembling a newdispositivearound an emerging disciplinary and governmentalized socioeconomic-cum-legal order in the wake of the Doha conjuncture in Asia. The concluding remarks address some tensions and challenges in the making of this competitiveness order in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Investment in the face of entry is a strategy used by incumbents. Nevertheless, the concept applies to traditional sectors of industry and not for contemporary two-sided network contexts. This article reports a study examining the behaviour of incumbent local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications with respect to technology investments in the face of competitive entry over a 14-year period, 1988 to 2001. In the face of competitive entry, the incumbents have underinvested in broadband technology, an approach consistent with desires to constrain entry, reflecting an unwillingness to supply unbundled network services at low rates or an inability to be pro-active in making technology investments. The evidence displays interesting dynamics in the investment behaviour of incumbent telecommunications firms as their markets have become competitive. These dynamics are explained using behavioural economics, and the use of behavioural concepts is highlighted for designing regulatory and competition policy mechanisms in contemporary communications markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]