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Despite current global trends towards diversification in policy responses to illegal drug use, including growing criticism of the War on Drugs, Japan continues to retain an ardently prohibitive approach. This article explains the reproduction of prohibitionist policies in Japan throughout the post-War period through use of the Multi-Centred Governance (MCG) thesis. This thesis acknowledges the facilitative power of exogenous shocks to the policy process, the causal power of particular policy actors, whilst also emphasising the importance of dispositional power, the rules of meaning and membership that integrate and bind policy actors into rival agendas of crime control, in maintaining policy agendas despite facilitative and agentic pressures for change. In these terms, the MCG provokes discussion of how alleged global trends in crime and control are mediated by a politics of risk and justice, constituted through the interplay of the facilitative, causal and dispositional circuits of power found in particular contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the biggest puzzles facing policy makers in India is the likely trajectory of China's future military power in South Asia and the broader Indian Ocean region. Protecting China's interests overseas: Securitization and foreign policy: by Andrea Ghiselli, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2021, 304 pp., £75 (Hardback), ISBN 978-0-1988-6739-5 In I Protecting China's Interests Overseas: Securitization and Foreign Policy i , Andrea Ghiselli helps us better understand the answers to these questions. [Extracted from the article]

There is a growing understanding among maritime security practitioners of the importance of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as an essential enabler of maritime security. This article describes Australia’s efforts to develop an integrated national MDA system that brings together data and intelligence from a range of military and civil agencies and commercial sources to which a risk-based assessment is applied. This has become an essential tool to combat transnational maritime security threats in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. But inherent limitations of national MDA systems are also pushing Australia and other countries to cooperate in trying to improve MDA. This paper then examines ways in which Australia can promote MDA cooperation in the Indian Ocean. It considers the effectiveness and limitations of current and proposed multilateral information sharing arrangements in the region. It concludes that Australia should primarily focus on working with selected Indian Ocean partners to enhance information sharing and help develop integrated national MDA systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia’s Cocos Islands and Christmas Island are remote islands with potentially great significance for Australia’s strategic role in the eastern Indian Ocean region and the wider Indo-Pacific. This paper explores the growing militarization of islands throughout the Indian Ocean in the context of growing strategic competition in the region. It then considers the strategic value of Australia’s Indian Ocean territories and makes recommendations about the further development of defense infrastructure to potentially support Australian air operations in Southeast Asia and the eastern Indian Ocean. Upgraded facilities on both Cocos and Christmas would provide Australia with valuable leverage in its relationships with regional defense partners and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Control over access to the Indian Ocean is often seen through a highly securitised lens. Strategic actors have long sought to use geographical constraints to maintain the region as a relatively enclosed strategic space. It has only a few narrow maritime entrance points and the littoral is not well connected to the interior of the Eurasian continent. These factors have contributed to the historical domination of the Indian Ocean by a succession of extra-regional maritime powers and the virtual exclusion of Eurasian land powers such as China and Russia. This paper considers how the physical geography of the Indian Ocean has contributed to its control by some powers and the exclusion of others. It then discusses China’s Maritime Silk Route/One Belt One Road initiative, which includes growing interests in Indian Ocean ports and plans to build new overland pathways to connect China with the Indian Ocean. The paper concludes that while China’s growing maritime interests in Indian Ocean are strategically important, it is the new overland routes connecting the Eurasian hinterland with the ocean that have the potential to change the entire geostrategic character of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Persian Gulf is a crucial strategic space for India. Given India's size, its growing economic and military power, and its proximity, one might expect that India would be a natural regional security provider or even a hegemon in the gulf. But India's ability to project its influence in the area is severely constrained by ideological factors, domestic politics, and longstanding patterns of alignment and rivalry. This article explores India's contemporary security relationships with the gulf in light of these structural constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper looks at the key strategic issues faced by China in the Indian Ocean within the context of growing Sino-Indian rivalry. It makes two basic arguments: first, that China has considerable strategic disadvantages in the Indian Ocean as compared with India; and second, that India has had more success than China in developing security relationships in the region. These propositions differ from a more common narrative, according to which China is establishing security relationships throughout the region that seriously threaten India. This paper argues that, on the contrary, China faces a strategic dilemma right across the Indian Ocean that it will only be able to partially mitigate in the short to medium term. Perhaps we should be asking how China's strategic vulnerability should be best managed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is sometimes claimed that India has ambitions to become the leading power in the Indian Ocean. This article examines the different streams of Indian strategic thinking about the Indian Ocean and how they will likely contribute to future Indian strategic behavior. It argues that although many among its elite aspire for India to eventually become the leading power in the Indian Ocean, there is little conceptualization as to what India needs to do to achieve this. For several reasons, including an attachment to ideas of non-alignment and strategic autonomy, Indian strategic behavior in the Indian Ocean will likely continue to be relatively reactive and constrained. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article will ask whether Sino-Indian strategic competition in the Indian Ocean should be properly understood through the lens of a security dilemma. It examines the strategic positions of India and China in the Indian Ocean and concludes that India has an overwhelming strategic advantage that China cannot realistically mitigate in the foreseeable future. This advantage precludes any real security dilemma arising between them. In fact, both China and India have good reasons to keep strategic competition under control while they each broaden their regional influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our mental maps of the world, including our perceptions of where regions begin and end, can have profound consequences on strategic behavior. For decades there has been a sharp division between what we understand to be the regions of South Asia and Southeast Asia. The line between them effectively cuts the Bay of Bengal in two. These perceptions have inhibited a proper analysis of the strategic dynamics of the area. This article argues that the Bay of Bengal increasingly matters as a strategic space. Like, the South China Sea, security issues in the Bay of Bengal and its littoral states need to be understood and addressed in a coherent manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses India's national defense in regards to Southeast Asia and its implications for India-ASEAN relations. The Indian Navy's promotion of maritime security in Southeast Asian waters is addressed, with focus given to the potential for conflict between India and China regarding the territorial waters of Myanmar. India's ability to balance the growth of Chinese power in the region through increased defense cooperation with ASEAN nations is then examined.

As India expands its strategic reach in the Indian Ocean, it will need friends that it can count on. The island state of Mauritius has long been one of India's closest allies in the region. This article discusses India's plans for a military intervention in Mauritius in 1983 to prevent a feared coup that may have threatened India's interests. A naval task force was readied, but the intervention did not proceed because of disagreements in India's leadership. Instead New Delhi facilitated a political solution to the crisis that firmly consolidated its special role. This previously undisclosed episode sheds light on India's thinking about the Indian Ocean, the alignment of India's interests with the United States, and India's military capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, India's strategic horizons have moved beyond its traditional preoccupations in South Asia. India is developing a strategic role in East Asia in particular. At the same time India's strategic thinking has undergone a revolution, as the country that prided itself on non-alignment has moved closer to the West. But India's culture, history and geography still fundamentally shape its worldview. In engaging with East Asia, India is guided by a mosaic of strategic objectives about extending its sphere of influence, developing a multipolar regional system and balancing against China. The interplay of these objectives will frame India's role in East Asia in coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Many Australian observers see Australia and India as 'natural' partners whose strategic perspectives are likely to become ever closer in coming years. This article will examine recent developments in the Australia-India security relationship and consider some possible limits to the strategic convergence of Australia and India, particularly in Indian Ocean security. It argues that Australia's challenge in coming years will be not only to address areas of common interest but to also actively engage with India on the interests and expectations of littoral states and extra-regional powers in the security of the Indian Ocean. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2008, India and Japan made a joint security declaration while asserting that a strategic partnership between the two countries would become an essential pillar for the future architecture of the region. This article examines whether the security declaration is a step toward building an enduring security partnership. It will consider perceptions in Japan and India of the bilateral security relationship, proposals for how to give it substance, and key issues that may impede the deepening of the relationship. This article will conclude that although there is no clear consensus as to the substance of the relationship, the relationship between India and Japan is likely to grow in coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented wherein the editor discusses various reports in the issue on topics including matters discussed during the second Indian Ocean Dialogue (IOD) held in Perth, Australia in September 2015 such as maritime governance structures and international maritime law.

In recent years, India and Singapore have developed a strong bilateral security and economic partnership that has assumed a central position in India's strategic engagement in Southeast Asia. Having sought strategic engagement with India for many decades, Singapore has now successfully positioned itself as India's leading political partner and economic gateway to the region. At the same time, India and Singapore have actively pursued close defence ties, including frequent joint training and the assumption of an active maritime security role by India in Southeast Asia. The recent decision by India to allow the Singapore air force and army to operate long term training facilities on Indian territory represents a significant development in Indian strategic practice and may presage a more permanent Indian security presence in East Asia. This article will examine these developments and consider to what extent the emergent security relationship between India and Singapore should be seen as a desire to balance China's growing economic and political dominance of the region and to what extent it reflects a 'natural' strategic sphere for India stretching from Aden to Singapore and beyond into East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than 40 years, India and Vietnam have consistently stood together in resisting Chinese domination of Indochina. The relationship represents one of the few longstanding political partnerships between East and South Asia. In recent years, the two have been seeking to recalibrate their relationship in the context not only of China's growing economic and military power but also India's own security ambitions in the region. What are India's aspirations to project naval power into the South China Sea and how is this perceived in the region? This article looks at this longstanding political alliance in light of India's attempts at strategic engagement with Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Serum insulin and glucose were measured in young male rabbits after a single intraperitoneal dose of 1 or 50 ug/kg of 2, 3, 7, 8‐tetrachlorodibenzo‐p‐dioxin (TCDD). Serum insulin levels in the high dosed rabbits were significantly decreased between 15 min and 8 h post treatment, equivalent after 24 h, significantly elevated 48 h post treatment, and they were not different at 10 days post‐treatment when compared to weight matched and pair‐fed controls. At the low dose, rabbits showed no differences in serum insulin from controls. In the high dose group, serum glucose levels were generally not different between treated and control animals, though there was a transient hyperglycemia 1 h after treatment, and both treated groups became hypoglycemic after ten days. The results indicate that TCDD altered serum insulin levels which were not coupled to changes in serum glucose. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]