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Implicit evaluations reflect people’s gut response toward an attitude object and are based on associative processes. They are the starting ground for more reflective processes and subsequent explicit evaluations. The present research examined determinants and consequences of implicit evaluations in a rape case. Situational (i.e. specifics of the rape case) and personal factors (i.e. rape myth acceptance) were demonstrated to influence both explicit and implicit judgments of the rape case. Moreover, sex of participant influenced participants’ implicit evaluations but affected explicit judgments only indirectly via the implicit evaluation. People’s gut response was shown to affect their explicit judgment of the case, and this effect was particularly pronounced for people with a low need for cognition (i.e. people who do not like to engage in effortful processing). The discussion focuses on the role of implicit cognition and implicit biases in judicial decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

People with mental illness experience discrimination, paternalistic treatment, and avoidance. To facilitate assessment of such experiences, the authors developed the Multifaceted Stigma Experiences Scale. It assesses four dimensions of experienced stigma in interpersonal interaction: hostile discrimination, benevolent discrimination, taboo, and denial. The influence of stigma experiences on mental health was modeled in a two-wave panel with persons with mental illness (N = 367, 79% repeated response rate). Results indicate that both subtle and blatant forms of stigma constitute a barrier to recovery and may be interpreted as attempts to increase social distance and reinforce the existing social order. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Feedback about a reference group's rape myth acceptance (RMA) has been shown to affect men's rape proclivity (Bohner, Siebler, & Schmelcher, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 286-297, 2006). In two experiments with male university students (total N=294), this research was extended by varying the in-group vs out-group status of the reference group. Results showed that feedback about other men's RMA influenced self-reported RMA (Experiment 1) and rape proclivity (Experiments 1 and 2). Overall, participants' rape proclivity was affected by feedback about both in-groups' RMA and out-groups' RMA. The strongest reduction of rape proclivity was produced by low-RMA feedback about an out-group that participants expected to be high in RMA (Experiment 2). Implications for theory and intervention are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individual differences in preference for consistency (PFC) and their interplay with situational variables were studied in relation to effects of counter-attitudinal advocacy on prejudice. German adults (N = 202) who initially had relatively high prejudice toward Turks generated counter-attitudinal arguments favoring integrated housing of Turks and Germans. Freedom of choice (low, high) and self-threat (low, high) were manipulated; PFC (low, high) was measured and used as a third independent variable. Control participants generated arguments on a neutral topic. Dependent variables were discomfort at integrated housing and generalized prejudice toward Turks. Results showed that PFC moderated effects of choice and self-threat: Discomfort and prejudice were lowest for high-PFC participants who had generated counter-attitudinal arguments under high choice and high self-threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two studies demonstrate that minority and majority source information implies consensus, that is a self-generated representation of the numerical strength of the influence group (e.g., 20% for a "minority"). Such consensus inferred from minority/majority source information is contrasted with consensus explicitly provided (e.g., "20%"). Inferred and explicit consensus influence attitudes interactively. When explicit consensus markedly deviated from self-generated inferred consensus (e.g., a "majority of 52%" may appear small), the direction of this discrepancy determined judgments: With relatively high (low) explicit consensus, social influence increased (decreased). In addition, Study 2 showed that the mismatch between inferred and explicit consensus facilitated recall of consensus. Results are discussed within a consensus approach to studying minority and majority influence situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The processes that mediate the effectiveness of 2-sided advertising were studied. We predicted that (a) 2-sided (vs. 1-sided) advertisements increase perceived source credibility and that (b) the logical relation between the negative and positive product attributes mentioned in the 2-sided ad (e.g., little space, implying a cozy atmosphere) facilitates favorable inferences about the positive attributes, especially when recipients have sufficient time to process the message content. Results supported these predictions. However, the effects of message type and processing time on attitudes were mediated by inferences about positive attributes but not by perceived source credibility. Implications of these findings for consumer judgment and decision making are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on the generic dual-process model of persuasion, called the Heuristic Systematic Model, proposed by Kruglanski and Thompson. Challenges posted by the proposed model to the persuasion community; Reasons for the need to distinguish different classes of information; Comparison among the different modes of processing.

This article explores the effects of mood on elaboration and judgment, using a persuasive message in two neutral-mood conditions. In the present study researchers explored the effects of mood on elaboration and judgment, using a different persuasive message and two neutral-mood control conditions. The subjects were 104 students at the University of Mannheim, Germany. The presence of positive affect during the encoding of a persuasive message results in a weaker effect of argument strength on attitudes than the presence of negative affect does; this pattern is reversed, however, when mood is present at judgment. These findings can both be explained by the notion that positive mood reduces systematic processing, whereas negative mood enhances it. Thus, the presence of positive mood during encoding should decrease message elaboration and thereby reduce the impact of argument strength on subsequent judgments. To contrast, positive mood during judgment should facilitate the recall of a simplified representation of the message, whereas negative mood during judgment should facilitate the recall of a detailed representation of the message. The former process is likely to result in more extreme judgments; thus, judgments that are made in a positive mood should reflect argument strength to a greater degree than judgments that are made in a negative mood.