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Reputational theory holds that an agency's reputation is a valuable political asset. However, since Daniel Carpenter's influential contributions, reputational studies have focused on reactions to reputational threats, rather than on reputation as such. Therefore, there is a curious lacuna at the heart of reputation studies: A lot is known about reactions to reputational threats, but fundamental questions about reputation per se are left unexplored. This paper investigates the dimensionality of the reputational concept, its variation across types of audiences, and its consistency across agency subunits. This is done in the context of the EU Commission, the core executive institution of the European Union. While this case is interesting in itself, its main value is to suggest what a research agenda focusing on the core building blocks of reputational theory might look like. Our survey of actors in the EU's Transparency Register provides mixed, but mostly supportive evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues for the inclusion of regulations in studies of EU policy implementation and compliance. Although both EU directives and EU regulations are to be implemented by the member states, the literature has devoted almost exclusive attention to directives. This is because, first, directives are considered more important than regulations. Second, the notification of the transposition of directives provides a convenient way to compare implementation records. Third, the transposition of directives allegedly introduces an extra implementation step. However, upon closer inspection all three reasons are flawed. Regulations – like directives – often require national rules to enter into effect, a fact long accepted by the European Court of Justice. This creates a situation remarkably similar to the transposition of directives. By analysing two case studies, we contribute by detailing this politico-legal situation, demonstrating its empirical relevance and sketching a new research agenda on the supplementation of EU regulations with national rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governmental entities such as the EU Commission regularly consult societal stakeholders. In such consultations, a variety of different tools are used ranging from open online consultations over stakeholder conferences to discussions in closed policy fora. Recent research has demonstrated how the range and diversity of the consulted actors vary across these consultation formats. Yet, we know little about the value societal stakeholders attach to their participation in consultations. In this paper, we argue that some consultation formats facilitate an insider match between the motives of societal stakeholders and the Commission with clear potential for also affecting Commission initiatives. Other consultation instruments are more likely to facilitate an outsider match where stakeholders may draw public attention to their views and the Commission enhance the perceived legitimacy of its decisions. We find support for these expectations based on data from a survey administered to stakeholders registered in the EU transparency register. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU Commission regularly consults with external actors when preparing policy proposals. This paper investigates possible bias in the voices the Commission listens to across all policy areas and consultation instruments. We map the full range of consultation instruments used by the Commission and analyse variation in group representation across types of consultations and policy areas. Our analysis draws on a dataset of more than 350 major Commission proposals between 2011 and 2016. We find that the Commission has established a consultation regime with the widespread use of standard consultation instruments, including open online consultations, stakeholder conferences and consultation in closed fora. The range of consulted actors depends on both consultation instruments and policy types. Open online-consultations are most inclusive. Our findings indicate that the Commission may be able to counteract the influence of business by selecting the most appropriate format for consultation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most European Union rules are made by the Commission, not the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. But although the Commission is an important rule-maker, it is not autonomous. The member states have always taken care to install committees to control the Commission (comitology). However, the Lisbon Treaty introduced alternative control mechanisms (delegated acts) and a reform of the comitology system (implementing acts). This article investigates how the post-Lisbon control system works in daily legislative practice. It represents the first investigation of the institutional preferences of the Council, the Parliament and the Commission in the new system. Further, it utilizes better data than previous studies. The analysis is based on data on the control preferences of all actors before the first trilogue meeting for a large number of cases in the period 2010–13. The results indicate that the institutional battle over the control of delegated rule-making is far from over. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Information is at the heart of politics. However, since information is always sent by someone who is more or less powerful, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of information from the power of the sender. Drawing on a standard model of attitude formation, we argue that presenting information can affect preferences of politicians regardless of the power of the sender. We test this proposition in a survey experiment with 1205 Danish local politicians in which the experimental groups were presented with varying levels of cost information but where sender remained constant. The experiment shows that even in a setting where the information is not disclosed by a powerful sender, information may have a stronger impact on political preferences than other well-known determinants such as committee and party affiliation. Our findings speak to learning theories, knowledge perspectives and the literature on the determinants of politicians’ preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The history of the EU is characterised by rapid and complex institutional development. This leaves European Affairs Committees (EACs) in national parliaments with a moving target problem in their endeavours to control the government's EU policies. This paper investigates how EACs react to this challenge. Building on the rational delegation literature, it is argued that EACs are likely to adapt control instruments in tandem with institutional changes at the supranational level. Using McCubbins and Schwartz (1984, American Journal of Political Science, 28, 165–179), it is further argued that EACs are likely to want to impose both police patrol and fire alarm control on the government. These arguments are investigated in the case of Denmark during the 50-year period since the first Danish application for EU membership in 1961, and considerable support is found for the authors' hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article provides advice on how to meet the practical challenges of experimental methods within public management research. We focus on lab, field, and survey experiments. For each of these types of experiments we outline the major challenges and limitations encountered when implementing experiments in practice and discuss tips, standards, and common mistakes to avoid. The article is multi-authored in order to benefit from the practical lessons drawn by a number of experimental researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that experimental methods are underused in public management research. This is lamentable, since this research field faces especially severe endogeneity problems. We introduce five different experimental designs together with a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses in public management research: lab, survey, field, natural, and quasi-experiments. We also discuss whether experiments are low on external validity. This objection is often raised, but we think it is false. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Comitology is an important part of the EU’s regulatory framework. Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the comitology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases, aviation safety and CO2quotas. Based on Bouwen’s rationalist theory of access goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament. The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology system and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the EU political system. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Reforming the public sector often means imposing immediate costs on well-organised interests in return for longer-term, diffuse benefits to voters and taxpayers. Nonetheless, reforms sometimes are carried through. Investigations of this puzzle have followed two approaches: The first is structural and explains reforms as a consequence of the institutional setting in which policymakers operate. The second focuses on human agency. It investigates how reformers search for ways to overcome structural obstacles. This approach has lived a quiet life in recent decades. In this paper, we investigate recent attempts to reform the regional government level in Norway and Denmark. Despite very similar structural settings and political preferences, the reforms failed in Norway, but were successful in Denmark; failure and success being defined by the two governments' intensions. We argue that the explanation lies in the different reform strategies pursued by the central governments in the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Lisbon Treaty introduces a distinction between legislative, delegated and implementation acts and thus represents a new approach to delegated decision-making in the EU. This will lead to a reform of the comitology system. Against this background this contribution takes stock. What do we know about the comitology system? Can the existing literature help us understand the post-Lisbon changes? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely assumed that policy considerations are important when parties form government coalitions. But if this is so, and if coalitions are negotiated in multi-dimensional policy spaces with no majority parties, then a rapid turn-over of coalitions should be observed, cf. the chaos theorem. However, we rarely witness this. Here we analyse two of the most prominent theories that address this puzzle: Laver and Shepsle's portfolio allocation model; and Warwick's policy horizon hypothesis. We do not analyse the 'usual suspects' (i.e. national government formations in Europe), but present a new empirical testing ground: Danish local governments. We rely on Laver and Shepsle's Winset programme to identify 'strong parties' in the portfolio allocation model but develop a new measure of Warwick's policy horizons that better deals with problems of multi-dimensionality. In a conditional logit analysis of survey data from 3000 local councillors, we find support for the policy horizons model, but not for the portfolio allocation model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Government coalitions should be minimal winning. However, it is an empirical fact that oversized coalitions exist. Several theories have been offered to explain this phenomenon, but they are seldom put to a systematic empirical test. When empirical tests are performed, they are typically based on data on national government formations in post-war Europe. Since these are the data that gave rise to the theories in the first place, there is a risk of post hoc hypothesis reformulation. The purpose of this paper is to test explanations of oversized coalitions systematically in a new empirical setting and thus avoid this circularity problem. We focus on local governments in Denmark and have collected data by a survey sent to almost 3,000 local councillors. We draw hypotheses from three broad theoretical perspectives on oversized coalitions and test them in a logit regression analysis. The analysis shows that oversized coalitions cannot be explained by traditional coalition theories. Our results question the minimalist behavioural logic inherent in most coalition theories and suggest that parties may be motivated by norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2–300 comitology committees monitor the EU Commission's use of delegated powers. Why should there be this unique and peculiar solution to a parliamentary control problem that is well known from all national political systems? This article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the exact choice of comitology can only be explained by the actions of the Commission. The idea of comitology was introduced by the Commission, and it functioned as a focal point in the member states' negotiations on supranational administration in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The argument is substantiated in an analysis of the first uses of comitology within three widely different EU policy areas: agriculture, development aid, and customs policy. The general lesson is that the EU Commission can be an important informal agenda-setter in areas where it has no formal powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyse who controls the implementation of EU cohesion policy. The main argument is that EU control mechanisms are weak and that the goals formulated at the EU level are likely to be remoulded in the implementation process in order to suit the preferences of the implementing actors at the national level. In order to make this argument it is necessary to move beyond the traditional approach to EU cohesion policy, i.e. the multi-level governance model. I suggest the principal–agent framework as an alternative approach. An inspection of EU cohesion policy through the lenses of this approach uncovers serious implementation problems. The empirical relevance of this argument is demonstrated in a study of the implementation of a selected area of EU cohesion policy, the Urban Community Initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The renter illusion hypothesis holds that renters underestimate their property tax burden and therefore support excessive levels of local expenditure. A number of studies have reached results that are consistent with the hypothesis. But so far empirical investigations have proceeded from the assumption that renter illusion is a fact and have investigated the implications of this fact. No-one has investigated renter illusion as such. In other areas of fiscal illusion, survey analyses of voter perceptions have yielded considerable insight into the validity of illusionary hypotheses. This paper follows this method and investigates a representative sample of 1000 Danish renters' and home-owners' perception of the local property tax system. The evidence raises doubts about the renter illusion hypothesis. The survey findings are corroborated by an analysis of property taxation in Danish municipalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the authors discuss the shortcomings and ways to improve the research on public service motivation (PSM). They mentions that in public management research logic for PSM concepts are imported but a broader insights to social science audience is not imported. They state that there is no appropriate scale which can be used to measure PSM. They also opine that knowledge about PSM can be validated with the help of exogenous factors actual job selection and work environment.