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Both coming from conservative Anatolia, Fethullah Gülen and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have, respectively, set up a movement and a political party that continue to make their mark on Turkey. Based upon the same vision of Islam and with a strategy of neutralizing their common opponent, the Kemalist establishment, an alliance, was founded between the two in 2002 when the AKP came to power. However, as it had been ambiguous from the start, this alliance did not resist the gradual emergence of numerous political and social differences between the two leaders. Less than 10 years after it was founded, the alliance between the two cracked and then shattered in 2013. Since then, the Gülen movement has been banned in Turkey and its representatives exiled abroad, particularly in Western countries. Under Gülen's leadership, still based in the United States, they are trying to reorganize themselves into a new political structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fethullah Gülen’s Turkish socio-religious movement has been active in Europe for over a decade in the spheres of education and interfaith dialogue. Operating outside Turkey and with relative freedom of association and expression, the Gülen movement has begun to carve out its niche in European Islam. Unlike in the United States, where supporters have chartered full-time schools, members of the Gülen movement in France and Germany mostly offer after-school tutorial services. It is within these programs that Fethullah Gülen’s moral and ethical worldview is being exposed to increasing numbers of young people of mainly Turkish descent. These activities elude easy categorization as religious commitment. Yet the Gülen movement remains an Islamic organization that is directly implicated in the religious sphere because of its explicitly universalistic and humanistic approach. Rather than aiming at literally spreading the religion of Islam, the organization works to improve Islam’s public image in Western contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After two centuries of close relationships, especially under the Mughals, Islamic ties between India and Central Asia have been considerably weakened, first after the Tsarist colonization and then by Soviet religious repression and ideological isolation. However, when Central Asian post-Soviet republics became independent in 1991, they renewed all kinds of links with the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, the revival of Central Asian Islam benefited from inspirational international Islamic sources from Turkey, the Arab countries and India. The latter drew less attention from analysts than other sources of influence, although it has gained ground all over the region in past years, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where the India-based Jama'at al Tabligh has achieved significant success. This Islamic organization, established in British India in the 1920s, defines itself as a non-radical and non-political movement, promoting ‘basic’ Islamic faith and practice. So far, the Jama'at al Tabligh has been tolerated by local authorities who would rather use them as a shield against the more radical Islamic groups that are openly opposing the regime. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper explores Islam in Georgia and analyses empirical results from preliminary field research in Tbilisi, more particularly in Kvemo-Kartli, whose inhabitants are predominantly Shi'ites and ethnic Azeris, as well as in Adjaria, where Sunni Adjars are resisting attempts at (re)-Christianization. Moreover, field inquiries were carried out in the Pankisi Valley, where approximately 6000 Kists live. Most publications dealing with Georgia's history neglect the role of Islam in the process of nation and state building and tend to forget that it was at some point in time one of the constituent components of the country's consolidation as a state. Most scholars insist on recalling that, right after Armenia, Georgia was one of the first nations to adopt Christianity as state religion. Therefore, when referring to Islam, the latter is often presented as an alien, extraneous and aggressive element. After 70 years of Soviet atheism, the newly independent state ideologically and strategically promotes Orthodox Christianity as central element of Georgian identity. All Islamic communities and institutions in Georgia, be they Sunni or Shi'ite, are theoretically under the central authority of the imam of Tbilisi's central mosque, Akhund Hadji Ali, himself dependant on the Baku-based Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus. The reality shows, however, that there are two major separate Muslim communities living in Georgia: the Shi'ite Azeris and the Sunni Adjars, who scarcely co-operate. The place of Christianity in the national ideology and the promotion of Christian values tendentiously lead to the marginalization or exclusion of Muslims from the national community. However, in their day-to-day life, Muslims are not discriminated against, and most of the time all religious communities live together in good harmony. In general, Islam is considered as a 'traditional' religion, and as such is tolerated by the Georgian authorities, which differs very much from the way they reject 'non-traditional' religions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Islam in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Islam was imported in today's Azerbaijan as early as 639 when the Arabs, under the command of Hudayfa Ibn al-Yamdu, intended to take over the whole Caucasus. By 652, the Arabs got as far as Derbent (in today's Dagestan), but from 639 to 693 control was loose, as they occupied the region at times and at others retreated to more central regions of the Empire. Scholars agree on 1828 as a turning point in the history of Shiism in Azerbaijan. Once signed, the Turkmanchai Treaty made the Araxes River the new border between Russia and Persia, and Azerbaijan, until then a group of small khanates more or less subjected to Safavid Persia, found itself divided into two separate entities, belonging to two different empires.

Examines activist Fetullah Gulen's missionary schools in Central Asia. Role of Gulen in the spreading of Turkism and Islam in the area; Relationship of Gullen with Nurcu Movement founder Said Nursi; Analysis of the ideology of the Nurcu movement.

Studies the fluctuations of Uzbek identity among an exile community in Saudi Arabia. The majority of the Uzbeks there arrived in the 1930's during the tumultuous events that shook Turkestan, the Soviet Union, and China. Uzbek (or Turkestani) identity has experienced a resurgence in recent years, not because of the emergence of an independent Uzbekistan, but rather because of an increase in the number of Uzbek hajj pilgrims to Mecca and Medina and a resulting increase in the number of Uzbeks returning to visit their homeland.