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In the early 1920s the Greek Consul General in Queensland, Christy Freeleagus, attempted to persuade Australian politicians, diplomats and immigration officials to grant assisted passage and allotments of land to Greek refugees. Making representations in the United Kingdom and Australia, Freeleagus claimed that Greek refugees, who were displaced due to an imposed transfer of populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923, would make ideal agricultural settlers. While Freeleagus' representations for a Greek land settlement scheme were ultimately unsuccessful, his advocacy reveals how Australia's preference for British immigration overshadowed any likelihood that displaced Greeks could be humanitarianly assisted to immigrate and resettle in Australia as farmers. By focusing on Freeleagus' advocacy and the refusal of Australian immigration officials to assist displaced Greeks, this article ties Australian history to studies on Greek-Turkish population exchange. It also reveals how the interwar dynamics of land settlement and immigration restriction in White Australia were interlinked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on rules-based Indo-Pacific Region addressing economic and geostrategic challenges, and building Indo-Pacific cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic with Australia-France-India Trilateral Dialogue. It mentions cooperation on marine global commons; potential areas for practical partnership at the trilateral and regional level, including through regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indian Ocean Commission; and the challenges and priorities of multilateralism. It also mentions separate evolution of the bilateral partnerships.

In the three decades following World War II, Australian assistance to Papua New Guinea (PNG) comprised around 80 per cent of the Australian 'aid' budget. The large amount of colonial spending has led many observers of contemporary Australian policy to reflect on the 1960s as a time of Australian generosity in the field of foreign aid. Examining this history through the prism of Australian colonial policy complicates the story of Australian generosity. From the immediate postwar challenges of Eddie Ward's 'New Deal' to the Paul Hasluck period and the immense changes of the 1960s and 1970s, foreign aid and colonial development were inherently (if not explicitly) linked. By bringing these fields of policy together, this article demonstrates that the narrative of Australian foreign aid generosity is challenged by the historical imperatives of colonial administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how the Australian government began to formulate its approach to space research, exploring the way it approached the establishment of American tracking stations from 1956, proposals for a civilian space research program in 1959, involvement with British space research and, from 1960, the negotiations for the European Launcher Development Organisation use of rocket testing facilities at Woomera. It argues that financial and strategic considerations were foremost in the minds of the Menzies government in shaping its approach to space policy, in particular in the context of rocket testing at Woomera. Ultimately, while the decisions taken between 1956 and 1962 laid the foundations for significant and often celebrated Australian involvement in space during the 1960s, the way in which these decisions were made reflected a reluctance to be involved at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear cooperation has been a consistent feature of the Australia-US alliance. In the 1950s and 1960s, Canberra explored transferring US nuclear weapons to Australian forces operating in Southeast Asia. Since the 1960s, Australian governments have supported hosting joint facilities that contribute to America's ability to execute global nuclear operations. And Australia has regularly invoked the nuclear umbrella as part of the alliance. We explain the key sources of nuclear cooperation in the alliance by leveraging realist and institutionalist theories of alliance cooperation. While realism explains limits to US nuclear commitments in the 1950s, institutional explanations are more relevant in pinpointing the sources of nuclear cooperation and in explaining why Australia has often achieved its policy preferences as the junior partner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many years Australia ignored or downplayed the role of values in foreign policy, preferring to focus on economic issues and engagement with Asia. Recently, however, values have re-emerged as a central aspect of Australian foreign policy, both rhetorically in government White Papers and through initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue comprising the established democracies of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. This commentary charts the rise of values-based language in Australian and Japanese speeches and policy documents, and argues that core concepts such as shared democratic values have an important – and under-appreciated – relevance in the new era of a rising autocratic China and in the framing of the Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China in recent decades has forged closer naval bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific region. Amongst these the Indo-Australian maritime ties have been a noteworthy development. Beijing's expanding maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region and growing influence in the South China Sea have become a core convergence in Indo-Australian cooperation. China's approach of asserting its rise as friendly while simultaneously becoming more aggressive in boundary claims has increased security concerns for Australia and India, thereby prompting maritime security convergences through the AUSINDEX exercises, increased trilateral engagements and establishing a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD). However, the maritime convergence is not only based on hedging, as there are common views of maintaining an inclusive security framework with China to address non-traditional maritime security threats affecting the region. In examining the China factor, this article also draws in other players such as USA, Japan and the ASEAN states with stakes involved in the region as also influencing Indo-Australian relations in their considerations of China. This article will explore China as a strong point of interest in India-Australia maritime cooperation; the roots of which can be traced from 1991 and have culminated into synergies of collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More than ever as the uncertainties of a digitalised world are upon us and where power shifts to and within the region disrupt the familiar patterns of engagement, the acquisition of the knowledge and competencies necessary for Australia to be a trusted international partner are pressing matters. So too, in the development of both personal and professional skills, our pedagogic remit to students guides us to assist them in learning more about themselves in the process. How, then, should we teach Australian foreign policy and in doing so grow the conjunctive tissue of student self-learning in order to prepare students for the world of diplomacy necessitated by Australia's international workspace? Here, experiential learning can have a powerful effect in the teaching of Australian foreign policy and in the development of students' life and professional skills. Both in-person simulations situated within the context of a thoughtful curriculum, and short-term international mobility study tours can contribute to an effective mix of learning experiences and assist us in moving closer toward effective practice in the current uncertainties and an era of digital transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australian foreign policy is often taught in a purely descriptive way or as a case study for critiquing various international relations theories. Neither approach does justice to the rich historical traditions in foreign policy making in Australia or to the trends shaping the way students are exposed to foreign policy issues in the digital age and teaching can be enhanced if these trends are engaged with. Reflection on Australia's unique strategic culture can provide a pluralistic narrative plot that connects both IR approaches to particularistic attributes of AFP practice and also the lived experience of students with current events as they unfold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the current higher education context there are strong incentives for the development of work-ready skills for graduates. In this article, I reflect on the challenges of mediating between developing vocational skills and emphasising the immediate practical and policy relevance of coursework on one hand, and the development of critical thinking and research skills on the other, in the context of teaching Australian Foreign Policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If we are to help students develop opinions and perspectives on world politics, and understand at the same time what it means to hold these opinions and perspectives in the Australian context, we need to bring the world to the classroom. Information overload has led to feelings of alienation among students, and the way we teach needs to instil in students a sense that they are stakeholders in Australian foreign policy, and help them develop strategies for incorporating the complex information environment into their learning. In this short piece I propose two forms of assessment that authentically place the focus on these learning outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whaling has been a consistent theme in Australia's relations with Japan since the 1930s, Australia having endeavoured to regulate, restrict, or bring to a complete halt Japan's Antarctic whaling virtually since it began. Australia's motivations have been mixed, involving at various points, some combination of protection of Australia's coastal whaling industry, concern for Australia's security, for safeguarding Australia's Antarctic territorial claim, and more recently, concern for Australia's whale-watching industry and/or for the whales. Since environmental consciousness became a primary factor in the 1970s, Australian policy has been aligned with that of anti-whaling non-governmental organizations (NGOs), albeit that certain actions of NGOs have caused difficulties for the Australian Government. Law – inclusive of legal argument in the course of diplomacy, domestic laws, and international litigation – has been a mechanism of influence used by the Australian Government and NGOs. This paper traces Australia's legal opposition from its beginnings until Japan's announcement in December 2018 that it would end Antarctic whaling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the popular image of William Gladstone which gradually emerged and evolved in the Australian Colonies throughout the nineteenth century. By using a wide variety of newspaper sources and political speeches, the piece shows how Gladstone was extensively discussed and interpreted on the far side of the 'British World'. It tracks the ups and downs of the turbulent relationship Gladstone had with the Australian Colonies over his long career, as he influenced Australian history both directly through the policies he implemented and indirectly as an inspiration for local politicians. It concludes that although Gladstone repeatedly aggravated Australian opinion both through his time at the Colonial Office and the 'soft' foreign policy he pursued as Prime Minister, his domestic popularity as a successful liberal and democratic figure was enough to make him a hero in colonial eyes. This conclusion shows how 'British World' popular sentiment was able to trump nominal local interests. This demonstrates not only the predominance of Britishness in Australian identity during this time period, but also how as a simultaneously separate yet intimately linked part of the Empire, Australians abstracted their own significance and meaning from domestic British politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The connection between Aboriginal people and the British Crown is well established. Less understood is their appreciation of, and reliance on, British democratic traditions in their politics. Drawing on the archive of Aboriginal activist, William Cooper, this article explores the way he used the language and practices associated with British democracy to advance his political claims in interwar Australia. With Protestant Christianity, Britishness represented a cluster of values and attributes which Cooper claimed as the Aborigines' own. In drawing on an 'imperial ideology of democracy', he was part of a global black political renaissance characteristic of the times demanding justice, freedom and representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women in international affairs play powerful and influential roles in shaping laws and policies, negotiating on subjects of war, peace and security, and representing national interest. In Australia, women outnumber men at all levels of public service to executive level one. Yet, women remain under-represented in more senior ranks and appear to experience significant challenges gaining leadership in agencies involved in diplomacy and security. What are the gendered institutions at play in Australian international affairs? Using a comparative case study approach, this paper explores the experiences of senior executive level women leaders across the Australian Federal Government in four case agencies—the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Defence, Department of Home Affairs (DHA), and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Women's gendered challenges in international leadership are not surprising within a diplomatic history that has often restricted women's roles based off the 'appropriateness' of sending women as envoys to nations of varying safety and respect for their status. What is surprising is that women report greater sexism, discrimination and harassment from within their own agencies, not from countries in which they are hosted. This has important ramifications globally on gaining and retaining women in international affairs leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Synthetic biology is an emerging technology that will impact on the future security and prosperity of Australia. As a discrete policy area synthetic biology has not been explored in relation to Australian foreign policy. To begin this process an understanding of Australia's genetic endowment, Australia's agricultural endowment and those security concerns novel to synthetic biology need to be developed. The convergence of the biological sciences and the information sciences is creating novel security concerns that impact on Australian sovereignty, both mainland and the Antarctic Territories, plant and animal health, and defence medical infrastructure. These concerns cross many traditional disciplinary and policy boundaries, an awareness of this is required and a nascent national practitioner community can develop this further. Drawing from work conducted by the US and UK synthetic biology practitioner communities, this article lays out the unique touch points synthetic biology has on Australian foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advocates of foreign aid in OECD countries navigate a unique form of politics. The beneficiaries of foreign aid spending have little voice in elite level decision-making about aid commitments from OECD countries. Thus foreign aid spending has a form of politics unlike other areas of policy where there is more direct budget accountability with citizens. Scholarly attention has increased on this unusual domestic politics of aid spending yet there remains little examination of the opportunities, challenges and tensions for aid organisations in advocating to elected officials. This article focuses on the case of Australian foreign aid, and the Australian Aid and Parliament project, an initiative of Save the Children. This initiative facilitates exposure visits to aid recipient countries for Australian parliamentarians. Most aid advocacy projects in OECD countries rely on mobilising citizens of those countries to act as a proxy, advocating on behalf of aid beneficiaries. This project reveals the potential of advocacy efforts that focus on the direct 'presence' of aid beneficiaries in the experience of elected officials (from donor countries). Yet it also reveals several challenges, and tensions between advocates, about how aid commitments change, and the most effective role for advocacy groups to play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faced with eroding United States hegemony and the rise of a more multipolar distribution of global power, Australia has embraced a new foreign policy platform built around advocacy for a 'rules-based global order'. In this essay I first argue that the emerging characterisation of multipolarity overemphasises the centrality of the United States and overlooks the legacies of Asian colonisation, decolonisation, state-building and local norm development. I then consider the reasons for the embrace of the rules-based global order construct, locating it as an instinctive reaction to issues arising from the South China Sea dispute, the raw use of power, and the inclination to share the ideas of a close ally. I note, however, that linking Australia closely with the United States approach to global rules has drawbacks, given the United States' explicit attempts to reserve a right to use force outside the UN Charter. I suggest that Australia would be better served by clearly delineating a separation between its military alliance with a United States, a policy for worst-case scenarios, from its support for international law and institutions, which should form the mainstay and leading edge of its foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to examine Vietnam-Australia bilateral relations from 2000 to 2018. It will focus on political and economic dynamics of this relationship. Canberra and Hanoi established initial diplomatic contacts in 1973. After the first 27 years of approaching each other, they both recognized that it is in their mutual interests to strengthen and deepen their political and economic linkages. Therefore, from 2001 to 2018, Hanoi and Canberra continued to take practical steps to create political establishments and economic chances for greater successes in their relations. Like any other bilateral relations in world politics, there may be differences between Canberra and Hanoi, yet these differences have not prevented them from bringing their relationship to a new height. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the foreign policy discourse that surrounded the Abbott government's 2014 decision to fight the Islamic State (IS). An analysis of parliamentary Hansard reveals that the debate featured three prominent axes: the legacy of the 2003 Iraq War; the strategies and objectives of the 2014 mission; and Australia's domestic terror threat level. Throughout, the Abbott government not only marginalised dissenting views, but also justified its renewed engagement in the Middle East via a highly securitised and elitist foreign policy discourse. This finding has consequences beyond the battle against the IS. It reveals a deep-seated tension between the ideals of democratic pluralism and the reality that securitised and elitist foreign policy discourses protect governments from serious scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on several aspects of Australia's defence and foreign policy for protecting and upholding international criminal and humanitarian law (ICHL). It mentions that Australia has signed and ratified the Rome Statute in 2002 that underpins the International Criminal Court. It also mentions about important role of Australia in drawing up the United Nations (UN) Charter, drafting the universal declaration on human rights, and the establishment of the UN Security Council.

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper emphasises the importance of 'maximising' Australia's power and influence. However, the White Paper and much of the commentary on Australian foreign policy do not clearly conceptualise 'power' or indicate how it ought to be increased. The Lowy Institute's recent Asia Power Index implies one possible strategy via its resource-based approach to measuring power. We outline a different approach and argue that power should be conceptualised and evaluated as a specific relationship causing behavioural change, rather than as a general attribute of its wielder. To complement the Lowy Institute's carefully catalogued database, and facilitate a more focused conversation about maximising power and influence in Australian foreign policy, we offer a typology identifying five pathways through which states can translate their material and non-material resources into outcomes that serve the national interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit that was held in Sydney, New South Wales in March 2018. Topics discussed include shared commitment to free and open markets; signing of a memorandum on combatting terrorism and violent extremism; expressing a regional identity based on a series of strong and deeply different national identities; and need for Australia to build a Eurasian foreign policy.

This article argues that the creation of ‘strategic partnerships’ as an alternative form of alignment represents an effort by Tokyo, and other US-allies, to ‘decenter’ their respective security policies from their erstwhile over-dependence on Washington. By examining the nature, purpose, and dynamics of strategic partnerships more closely, and investigating the empirical case of Australia, we can gain a greater appreciation of their significance both to Japan's evolving security policy and the broader role they play in the Asia Pacific security landscape. The article argues that Australia has been the most significant and successful of Japan's new strategic partnerships to date, has therefore come to represent the template for other new alignments, and hence provides a yardstick against which their effectiveness can be measured. It concludes that while the strategic partnership certainly represents a new departure for Japanese security policy - ostensibly independent of the US-alliance - closer inspection reveals how this relationship remains fundamentally bound to the broader American-hub-and-spokes system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brexit vote will fundamentally transform the European Union (EU) and will change how the UK relates to Europe and the rest of the world. What are the implications for Australia at this critical juncture? The UK has been a major player in the Australia-EU relationship, and Australia will now need to recalibrate its approach to both the UK and the EU across a range of policy areas. This article examines the future of Australia-UK and Australia-EU relations in the wake of Brexit, and assesses Australia’s options going forward. The authors advance three considerations. Firstly, Australia’s national interests are best served by adopting a pragmatic rather than nostalgic approach towards future relations with the UK and the EU. Secondly, Australia should avoid pursuing one relationship at the expense of the other and creating a zero-sum dynamic. Finally, Australia’s future strategy must consider broader global developments, such as events within its own region and the US presidency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper identifies major themes and recommends preferred strategies in Australia’s engagement with the world. These themes and strategies relate to geopolitics, economics and the ‘new international agenda’; there is also a more specific focus on Australia’s Pacific island neighbours and Timor-Leste. There is a strong emphasis on perceived Australian national interests throughout the document. The geopolitical discussion is primarily ‘realist’; economically the document is pro-globalisation; the discussion of the ‘new international agenda’ involves an Australian-oriented pragmatism; there is an assertion of Australian leadership in the South Pacific. With some minor criticism, Labor has accepted the general direction advocated in the White Paper. The document is thus indicative of the likely future direction of Australian foreign policy. Lack of US response indicates declining US engagement with Australia and the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. China, as the other major power highly significant for Australia, has been low-key in its criticisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers his views on the foreign policy of Australia. Topics discussed include the foreign policy White Paper released in March 2018, indications that the post-war global order has ended, and the changes that Australia has to make in order for it to be heard in the global arena. Also discussed are the three different kinds of public opinion dealing with foreign affairs, namely, the interest groups, the interested generalists, and the general public.

This article reflects on the recent literature comparing employment relations in Australia and New Zealand. It begins by returning to the ‘Accord and Discord’ article by Bray and Walsh, published in this journal in 1995, and the wave of comparative analysis that surrounded it. Developments since then, in both the real world of Australian and New Zealand employment relations and theoretical debate, are reviewed. They suggest two trends in comparative analysis. First, there is a need to go beyond institutionalist analysis in exploring the similarities and differences between the two countries. Second, it is possible that trends in Australian and New Zealand employment relations should be located in wider trajectories towards neoliberalism. Both trends offer great potential for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canberra's exposure to great-power conflict is arguably more complex and ambiguous than during the Cold War. Drawing from scholarly literature on entrapment and recent developments in outer-space security, this article explores Australia's position in a hypothetical US-China war over Taiwan. The shifting military balance in outer space, recent war games by the US military and regional trends in defence planning all raise the possibility of a scenario opening with Chinese cyberattacks against information networks shared between Australia and the USA. As a result of its growing dependency on space systems, Australia may be entrapped in a novel way which poses questions for scholars and policymakers. These findings should encourage further study of regional crisis management, with the need for a shared understanding of strategic behaviour in outer space and cybernetworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the history of Australia's engagement with Antarctica through music, from the earliest songs and an opera created by the first Australian explorers to Antarctica, to the popular Antarctic-related classical music of Australian composer Nigel Westlake and the soundscape-based compositions of Australia-based sound artists Philip Samartzis and Lawrence English. Drawing on the field of musicology, but also the scholarly turn to the senses as part of the broadening reach of cultural history, the article argues that Australia's musical engagement with Antarctica constitutes a significant, though understudied, aspect of our aural heritage. Further, deeper and critical appreciation of this music as cultural and aural heritage enhances our ability to reflect on the full extent of Australia's relationship with, and contribution to knowledge about, its 'Great Frozen Neighbour' and its identity as a 'gateway' to the Antarctic region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we assess the drivers of, and prospects for, further security cooperation in the Australia–Japan bilateral relationship. We argue that while balance of threat and capability gaps may restrain the pace of deepening Australian-Japan security relations, these gaps are diminishing and are, in any case, secondary to the specific shared interests we posit as the primary drivers of Australia–Japan security cooperation. These specific interests, however, are shaped not only by a commitment in both countries to liberal-based principles and freedoms at home and in inter-state relations, but also by a common awareness of the importance of continued US primacy to the ongoing maintenance of those interests. Thus, in the absence of any fundamental change in how Australia and Japan understand their respective interests and the US role in the region, Donald Trump's recent and unexpected election as US president notwithstanding, we conclude that the case for further security cooperation – via additional cross-bracing of their respective US alliance relationships – will almost certainly remain compelling for both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The entanglement of politics and science in Australia’s engagement with Antarctica, an emerging topic of historiographical debate, is particularly evident during the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year. Drawing on extensive archival research, this article utilises Australian–Soviet relations as a case study to assess the influence of political and scientific factors on Australia’s approach to Antarctica. It identifies a dissonance between anti-Soviet policy and friendly on-ice attitudes, with broader implications for contemporary understandings of Australian Antarctic policy and the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Aside from NATO, the Five Eyes intelligence network between the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand is the world’s most enduring multilateral arrangement of its type. While the Five Eyes network does not constitute a formal security alliance in the classic sense of the term, it does emulate significant features of how alliances operate in practice, including active burden-sharing and intra-alliance bargaining. Most analysts claim that the USA dictates in hierarchical fashion the terms and conditions of how the Five Eyes network functions, and that junior partners have little alternative but to fall in line if they want to preserve the flow of high-grade intelligence from Washington. Using Australia as a case study, this article shows that a more fluid relationship has been at play, one that challenges conventional assumptions about asymmetrical alliances and the role of junior partners. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article critically evaluates the relationship between public opinion polling and foreign affairs. It plots key trends in public opinion polls of Australian attitudes towards Indonesia from the 1940s to the present day. Despite variations in polling companies and questions, Australian attitudes to Indonesia appear surprisingly stable, especially since the 1970s. Reading across multiple polls over this period reveals that, both as a mass and among individuals, Australians held complex views in which positive appraisals of Indonesian people and culture co-existed with an underlying fear of Indonesia as a potential military threat. Yet rather than accepting these findings at face value, this article calls for nuanced scrutiny of the role played by polling companies and the media in the construction and representation of so-called “public” opinion. Sensitive to recent developments in the historiography of public opinion polling, it suggests that public opinion polls not only attempted to measure Australian attitudes towards Indonesia, but also helped construct Indonesia as an object of popular and political concern. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the contested public uses of the phrase “Asian Australian” and the relationship between Asia and Australia through the lens of local community associations, their objectives, publications and activities. It examines the historical context in which these associations were established, according to three distinctive postwar historical periods; it examines the cultural milieu in which the phrase Asian Australian has assembled meaning; and it locates the role of the term as both an identity marker and as a basis for intra-ethnic mobilisation. The article finds that iterations of the combination of Asia and Australia—as either adjectives or nouns—have consistently delineated between identity and nation, nation and belonging, belonging and territoriality. Through the embodied passions and politics of associational life, this article investigates the figurative boundary between Asia and Australia and shows how the paired use of these terms has often reflected profoundly if not epistemologically divergent worldviews. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over recent years, Australia and Timor-Leste’s bilateral relationship has been consumed by contested maritime boundary claims in the resource-rich Timor Sea. Intractable disagreements over the right to build a petroleum export pipeline have led Timor-Leste to reinvigorate its pursuit of permanent maritime boundaries as ‘a national priority’. This article examines Timor-Leste’s interests in the Timor Sea and assesses its strategies for achieving its foreign policy goals. It argues that Timor-Leste’s attainment of its stated goals relies on Australia shifting its Timor Sea policy, which has been largely consistent since the 1970s. Timor-Leste’s key strategy is a public diplomacy campaign that positions permanent maritime boundaries as the final stage of its independence struggle, and presents Timor-Leste as owning the disputed Greater Sunrise gas field under international law. While the public diplomacy campaign aims to win enough Australian ‘hearts and minds’ to put pressure on the Australian government, it ultimately fails to negotiate the strategic and historical realities of the interests that define Australia’s realpolitik approach to the Timor Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Contrary to popular belief, the conclusion of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty did little to encourage an immediate closer political relationship between Australia and New Zealand. The Tasman powers disagreed on major strategic issues and cooperation was minimal (and in some cases entirely absent). Focusing on the development of trans-Tasman relations between 1951 and 1955, this article examines Australian and New Zealand views pertaining to the scope and implementation of the ANZUS Treaty, proposals for the Five Power Staff Agency in Southeast Asia, the “United Action” proposal during the 1954 Indochina Crisis and the “Operation Oracle” project during the 1954–1955 Quemoy–Matsu Crisis. This article advances the conclusion that Australia and New Zealand mainly disagreed on these issues due to competing views about their respective political relationships with the United States and Britain. In other words, in the immediate post-treaty period, closer trans-Tasman political relations were ultimately hindered by strong divisions over accepting the United States instead of Britain as the cornerstone of their respective foreign policies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the proposed environmental resettlement of communities from Nauru to Australia. The planned relocation aims to help Pacific island communities at risk from the effects of climate change particularly the impact of phosphate mining on the Nauruans. The refusal of Nauruans to the plan due to losing distinctive identity is also mentioned.

This article presents a liberal-institutionalist conceptual framework drawn from Middle Power theory to analyse Australian foreign policy approaches towards Asia Pacific regionalism. Building on precedents set by the former Keating administration, the Labor government of Rudd/Gillard (2007–13) undertook high-profile efforts not only to engage, but to champion, the regionalism process in the Asia Pacific. This enterprise became fused with a self-proclaimed identity as a ‘creative middle power’. Through an analysis of regional community building, regional security architecture and regional order, the article identifies the strong linkages between the theory and practice of ‘middle power’ diplomacy, and the concept of ‘regionalism’ itself, in Australian foreign policy. The article thus contributes to the theoretical literature by exposing the important intersections between the two concepts and concludes that despite Rudd’s prolific attempts to harness Australia’s middle power credentials, Canberra was not able to significantly affect the process of Asia Pacific regionalism unilaterally. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In October 2012, Australia's parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade recommended that a mediation support unit should be created within the Australian Agency for International Development, a department now amalgamated with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The question is: Does Australia possess the motivation and capacity to implement active and effective international mediation by building the capacity of intermediaries to deploy various peacemaking methods to hasten de-escalation at different stages of a conflict? If not, is a mediation support unit an appropriate initiative to address this capability gap? This article draws on quantitative conflict data sets and an expert panel to conclude that Australia's track record demonstrates significant capacity to undertake international mediation, but that the mediation personnel and processes available to government are insufficiently resourced and coordinated to readily provide policymakers with accessible tools to undertake the diverse range of mediation strategies advocated by conflict scholars. While a mediation support unit would address some of these issues, at present it conflicts with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's institutional philosophy based on diffused expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the Bali Process in the context of Australia's securitised approach to migrant smuggling, and the consequences this has for both the Australia-Indonesia diplomatic relationship and the Bali Process overall. The Bali Process is the premier regional forum for combating migrant smuggling and is well placed to discuss and develop regional cooperation policies on irregular migration within the region. In particular, the Bali Process remains a key domain where Australia and Indonesia can contest and amend the norms and practices around the human rights of refugees and asylum-seekers. This article traces and analyses the emergence of Australia's bilateral agreements for offshore processing and resettlement between 2011 and 2014, which Australian political elites aligned rhetorically to the Bali Process, but which the authors argue remain in tension with stated Bali Process objectives in terms of rights and protections for asylum-seekers and refugees. This article identifies that Australia's security-driven policies and regional disagreements over humanitarian responsibility remain an ongoing tension within Bali Process states, and provides commentary on the implications of this for future Australian policy relating to regional cooperation on irregular migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which topics within the issue are discussed which includes Australian diplomacy, Australia's foreign relations and Peter Varghese, secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).

In the decade preceding the election of the Abbott Coalition Government in 2013, a so-called ‘golden consensus’ governed Australian aid policy. During this period Australia’s aid spending increased by over 80% in real terms. However, after winning government the 2013 Federal Election, the Abbott Government made a series of significant and unexpected aid policy decisions, cutting the aid budget three times in fifteen months and integrating AusAID, Australia’s aid agency, into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This article considers the future role of aid in Australia’s diplomacy primarily by engaging with a prior question: how was it possible for the golden consensus to be uprooted so easily? Conducting a post-mortem reveals that Australia’s development constituency bears some responsibility for the fragility of the consensus. This analysis also reveals the critical role the development constituency will play in determining the extent to which Australia is able to embrace the ‘beyond aid’ agenda. To meet this contemporary challenge, the development community must heed the lessons of the collapse of the golden consensus and, in particular, overcome its reticence to engage in broader foreign policy debates. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An interview is presented with Kim Beazley, Australia's Ambassador to United States. He discusses topics such as Australia's relations with United States, diplomacy and rise of China in international relations. He also discusses topics including United Nations, Vietnam War and the Kuwait War. G20 countries are also mentioned.

Humanitarian diplomacy has always been a crucial element of humanitarianism, however it is now becoming a more prominent element of states’ foreign policies. It holds many attractions and much promise. It provides states with a way of expressing important qualities of international empathy and solidarity and can also enhance a state’s international reputation and provide valuable means for building relationship of trust and cooperation. This can in turn can be conducive to a state’s broader foreign policy objectives. However, there are also perils to the incorporation of humanitarian diplomacy into a state’s foreign policy. It can generate ambiguity and even conflict within a state’s diplomatic endeavours due to tensions between humanitarian and broader national interests. In exploring these issues it is useful to distinguish between humanitarian diplomacy and humanitarianismasdiplomacy. This article explores these issues in relations to Australia’s diplomacy. It argues that Australia has actively engaged in humanitarian diplomacy and humanitarianismasdiplomacy. Whilst the two are often complementary, there are areas in which they have been in tension and even at odds. This has implications for Australia’s international reputation but also for its capacity to undertake genuine and effective humanitarian action. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Economic diplomacy—that is, informal and formal processes and links between states and non-state actors on international economic issues—is a current focus of Australian foreign policy. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s stated economy diplomacy aims are liberalising trade, boosting economic growth, encouraging investment and assisting business. If Australia is to embrace a genuine and effective notion of economic diplomacy there are two problems to be overcome. First, DFAT’s economic diplomacy framework is incomplete and misses the bigger economic picture, particularly the role of Australia’s key economic agencies, Treasury and the Reserve Bank of Australia. Second, DFAT does not consistently apply economic principles to foreign affairs issues including trade, foreign aid and the global investment agenda. Going forward, Australia should abandon the focus on the four narrow pillars and instead focus on developing a clear, coordinated international economic strategy that articulates Australia’s core international economic objectives and priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A table of contents for the issue is presented.

Since 2013, the Nauru government has undermined democracy by reducing the independence of the judiciary, treating opposition MPs as potential traitors, curbing freedom of speech and restricting visits by variously defined groups of people who include journalists, Australians and New Zealanders. New Zealand responded by suspending its aid to Nauru’s justice and border control department. Australia, by contrast, has said little. The Nauru government would not have acted so boldly in curbing civil freedoms and weakening the rule of law if Australia had been less dependent on its goodwill to act as host for Australia’s Regional Processing Centre, which houses asylum seekers who have attempted to reach Australia by boat. Australia’s reliance on Nauru – driven by urgent domestic political considerations – has fostered an atmosphere where the principles of good governance can be flouted with little fear of significant criticism from Canberra. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The treatment of asylum seekers at the Manus Island Regional Processing Centre in Papua New Guinea (PNG) has attracted much international attention, but there has been little analysis of its local and transnational impact. This article investigates the repercussions for the communities on Manus Island, on domestic affairs in PNG, and on the relationship between PNG and Australia. Overall, it concludes that the costs arising from the money, manipulation and misunderstanding generated by the centre seem likely to outweigh the purported benefits, particularly for Manusians and other ordinary Papua New Guineans. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]