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What motivates states to provide others with military assistance? Traditional explanations naturally focus on the security interests of the sender state. But could domestic considerations – intra-party politics, for example – also be a factor in some cases? This analysis, which examines the British decision to send a Military Advisory Team [MAT] to the newly federated United Arab Emirates [UAE] in 1971, answers in the affirmative. It demonstrates that the MAT was primarily, albeit not exclusively, a means by which the British government of Prime Minister Edward Heath could stave off sharp criticism from fellow Conservative politicians that under his leadership that Britain was cutting and running from its overseas responsibilities. Furthermore, because the MAT was in inception a political tool, its military utility in assisting the UAE, or the influence Britain derived from its presence, was minimal at best and counterproductive at worst. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the developments that are relevant to banking and finance law as well as matter regarding the sovereign immunity and foreign state interests in Great Britain. It discusses the amendments of the Financial Markets and Insolvency Regulations 2010 to the Financial Markets and Insolvency to the Financial Markets and Insolvency Regulations 1999 and to the Financial Collateral Arrangements Regulations 2003. It further mentions the indirect enforcement of a foreign sovereign interest and the act of state doctrine as well as exercise of rights and waivers of defaults.

In seventeenth-century England, most proposals for new banking institutions focused on addressing contemporary obstacles to creating confidence in the proposed institutions. In proposals for banks of charity in the first half of the century, bank proposers were concerned primarily with usurious pawnbrokers, and with ameliorating the problems they caused. In proposals for Lombard banks that appeared in the 1650s, proposers employed terms such as ‘pawn’, ‘fund’, and ‘security’ rhetorically in emphasizing the security of the envisioned institutions. The struggle for confidence over the course of the century shows that institutional credit neither emerged fully formed nor swept disorder away. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After a wait of seven years, we now have the first English case on the question which lies at the heart of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003: what degree of control must a collateral-taker be given over financial collateral to enable it to obtain a "security financial collateral arrangement"? The case is important to all who take and rely on charges over financial collateral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author discusses the Companies Act 2006 enactment for the registration of company charges in Great Britain. She highlights the unforeseen difficulties may be encountered by the legislator in accommodating two European measures on financial intangibles. Also investigated is the failure of the provision of Financial Collateral Arrangements (FCA) Regulations of the Rome I Regulation that damages the 2007 Act.

The article reviews the developments of law in Great Britain in relation to international finance and banking. It highlights the amendments of the Settlement Finality Directive and the Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive by European Council (EC) Directive and its implementation by the Member States on December 30, 2010. It outlines the changes to the Settlement Finality Directive including the extension of protection to transactions that occur across linked designated systems. It notes that the extension on the concept of financial collateral to include credit claims is the most important change to the Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive.

The article offers information related to administration proceedings in Great Britain. The Privy Council rejected the appeal from the Court of Appeal of the British Virgin Islands in the matter of Curkova Finance International Ltd. and stands that there is a sensible allocation of the financial collateral for the purposes of Regulation 17. In the matter of Nortel Networks, English court's letters of request are improbable to be formally binding on courts. In the Jefferies International Limited v Landsbanki Islands HF, there was no reason for the English court to adopt a different approach since the Islandic insolvency regime would permit such claim followed in Iceland.

The article discusses a court case of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) wherein the company created a multi-user secured obligation programme which issued notes to investors which is served as collateral. It is noted that after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers (Europe) including the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the documents of the companies were under the English court. The companies file a chapter 11 protection which resulted of not paying the noteholders but an Australian manager files a proceeding in the English court to Lehman to prioritize the payment of the noteholders. It is cited that the English court is waiting for the U.S. court issue under the U.S. bankruptcy law due to Lehmans main's office is in the U.S.