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How does China signal foreign policy intentions to domestic and international audiences during territorial conflicts? While China can signal its resolve by provoking nationalism at home, doing so may risk appearing threatening to neighbouring countries in the region. We argue that China resolves the dilemma by sending different types of messages to domestic and international audiences. Focusing on China’s maritime conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, we examine China’s narratives regarding the maritime disputes through the analysis of state-run media. Our findings from text mining and topic analyses of more than 31,000 state media reports from 2002 to 2021 suggest that China signals to the international audience on international cooperation emphasising diplomatic and peaceful resolutions while relatively less so in domestic media. The analyses have implications for how China signals foreign policy intentions amidst rising nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the complex process of symbolic boundary-making of 'Hongkonger' cultural identities through the lens of the controversial 2015 film Ten Years, which is a celebrated omnibus production comprised of five short segments that picture a dystopic end to Hong Kong's cherished way of life in the year 2025. The article is premised on an interdisciplinary approach engaging with cultural studies and film studies. On one hand, it explores how Ten Years functioned as a boundary object, a vast terrain within which cultural identities of what it means to be a Hongkonger are constructed, banished, imagined, and performed under the rubric of bodily performatives. On the other hand, it offers blurring encounters into unfamiliar and precarious territories where the formation and formulation of Hongkonger identities and sense of belonging are negotiated, evacuated, and inhabited. In the end, the key tropes in Ten Years suggest that boundary work in post-Umbrella Hong Kong affectively negotiates with state-level nationalism advocated by the central government in Beijing through establishing and reformulating notions of 'localism' and Hongkonger identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Chinese cyberspace, mass media and opinion leaders struggle over socio-political discourses. While the former propagates positive views on national policies, the latter often expresses dissenting opinions that challenge authoritarian rule. In the context of China–US competition, do citizens still perceive non-state sources as more credible? Taking the Belt and Road Initiative as the issue, this experimental study investigates how Chinese netizens process conflicting information from a government-owned news agency and two opinion leaders with varying levels of source credibility. Our findings reveal that high-credibility propagandistic news is effective, whereas low-credibility propaganda is not. Furthermore, an opinion leader perceived as independent surpasses government propaganda in influence, regardless of information credibility. However, when an opinion leader is perceived as backed by a rival nation, the former's influence is counterproductive unless their message credibility exceeds that of propaganda. This study sheds light on the prevalence of nationalistic sentiment in China, which has raised concerns about the manipulation of Chinese netizens by hostile forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how the nationalist, business-centric, elite-led and labour-subsuming logics of development in contemporary China are mirrored in contingent and locally-mediated ways in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In China's present 'de-revolutionary' moment [Wang, 2006], non-elite populations are conceived as labour inputs to be used and moulded in the pursuit of national development through market means. This same developmental ethos, mediated by a plethora of Chinese and non-Chinese actors, underpins the authoritarian tendencies of BRI-branded projects across the world. While authoritarian practices in China have both Leninist and capitalist genealogies and drivers, I argue here that Global China's most tangible and remarkable impacts on international authoritarianism are found in the practices required to secure capital accumulation along the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China's power grows, a widespread perception is that China is more willing to respond to nationalist demands and act assertively in international incidents. In reality, China has not supported and accommodated nationalism in all events but has cooled down nationalism in some cases. An important unanswered question is, why does the Chinese government demonstrate selectivity when responding to nationalism and take different foreign policies concerning nationalism in various incidents? This article provides a coherent and testable framework to answer this question and uses five cases to test the congruence and validity of the analytical framework. The core argument is that the primary concern of the Chinese government in dealing with nationalism is its legitimacy. When policymakers perceive severe threats to China's regime security and stability, they will open a 'safety valve' to embrace nationalism, allowing nationalism to unleash its anger under the government's monitor and escalating disputes to defend national interests and appease nationalism. When there are few threats to the regime, three factors will affect China's choice: the economic value of the diplomatic relationship, elements of China's core interests, and the viability of reaching an agreement that sets aside the dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Australia relations have experienced a rapid deterioration in the past half-decade. From genial ties centred around trade and exchange, the relationship has descended into mutual hostility, prompting the editor of China's Global Times to notoriously liken Australia to a blob of gum on the bottom of a shoe. To explain the deteriorating relationship, scholars have proposed numerous ideas, pointing to factors as wide-ranging as 'Chinese influence', poor diplomacy efforts, and ontological (in)security touched off by neoliberal governmentality. The current paper examines these ideas in a literature review, then synthesises such ideas to provide its own explanation of why things 'went wrong'. It also addresses corollary questions such as why Australia adopted a uniquely assertive China policy, and why this occurred specifically around 2017. We argue that the breakdown in relations can be attributed to the rise of nationalist, sovereignty-oriented movements in the West, and the spillover effect this had on Australian leadership; the profound uncertainty attending the election of Trump and his isolationist tendencies; and the shift to a more rigid, authoritarian approach to foreign affairs under Xi. This perspective adds to the literature by identifying failings on both sides while underscoring significant yet underappreciated global trends, such as nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on Chinese football fans' reactions to the Japanese national team and their fans' behaviour during the World Cup 2022. Despite the historical and contemporary problems that make friendly relations with Japan difficult to achieve, football fans in China largely welcomed the good performance of the Japanese national team. This attitude may be described as 'thin cosmopolitanism' because Chinese fans' major frame of reference was still nationalistic. For them, the impressive performance of the Japanese national team means that Asians and the 'yellow race people' can also play good football. However, the Japanese fans, whose cleaning up of stadia received wide coverage during the World Cup, were criticized by the Chinese fans who interpreted the Japanese fans' action as reinforcing the existing global racial order. The findings of this paper help reveal the limits regarding football's role in contributing to a more cosmopolitan worldview. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents new arguments on the role of trust in the government and nationalist sentiments in fostering policy-compliant behaviors. In July and September 2020, we launched two waves of a COVID-related survey in China with stratified quota sampling, and formed a longitudinal panel dataset of 822 responses. Based on the data, we examined how risk perceptions and nationalist sentiments jointly elicited trust in government agencies and, consequently, support for the state-sponsored immunization program. We argue that increasing concern about the risk to the state posed by the pandemic motivated Chinese citizens to rally around the government and comply with its vaccination drives. Nationalist sentiments simultaneously elevated risk perceptions, reinforcing their impact on trust in the government. Our findings contribute to the literature on crisis governance, offering new evidence on how trust in the government and nationalist sentiment may influence the dynamic interplay between risk perceptions and policy compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the Chinese party-state's production of visual racism towards Uyghurs as a discursive foundation for its ethnic policy, as globally reproduced and disseminated by non-state actors. The paper draws from theoretical literature on the relationship between visual politics and affect, stressing the need for visual literacy to reflect on how images emotionally affect audiences' identities and insecurities. It focuses this analysis on education texts in China's post-2012 'de-extremification' and 're-education' campaigns, specifically on how images tell stories about life-or-death security issues that define Chinese identity. Chinese education about Uyghurs tends to frame Uyghur identities as racialised, culturally external existential threats to be defeated by state violence or teaching them to be Chinese. However, Uyghurs' own visibility strategies in global advocacy counter the party-state's imagery by centring their lives and experiences. The article shows how these strategies can be used as resources for teaching about Chinese politics and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we discuss the Confucian tradition in today's multicultural China from two perspectives: that of the mandatory school curriculum, which represents 'official knowledge', and that of students from ethnic minority and/or religious backgrounds who are located on the cultural margins in China. The analysis draws on curricular narratives of the Confucian tradition for six major school subjects and semi-structured interviews with a group of university students from non-Han ethnic minority and/or religious backgrounds, whose lived experiences are rarely included in the national curriculum narrative. The analysis suggests that the interpretation of the Confucian tradition is a monopolising and dominant discourse that reinforces the cultural hierarchy between different cultural groups. However, the students appear to regard the Confucian tradition as only one culture and worldview in China, which can benefit from the critical reflexivity of other cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of the rising tension between Hong Kong and mainland China, Hong Kong's Chief Executive Carrie Lam blamed the city's education system for its inability to develop a sense of 'I am Chinese' national identity and vowed to step up 'national education' from preschool. This article explores how 188 young preschool teachers perceived their national identity and viewed the applicability of national education in Hong Kong preschools. Data were collected using both quantitative and qualitative measures. The findings showed that even though the participants strongly resisted their Chinese identity, they agreed that national education could be introduced in preschools if it would be rendered rational and apolitical. Nevertheless, they suspected that the administration's motive behind national education was political indoctrination. They also noted several pedagogical difficulties. Finally, the implications are discussed against the changing socio-political context, serving as lessons for local and international readers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an increasingly popular standpoint that the rise of Taiwanese identity has transformed Cross-Strait relations. The discourses of pro-unification are regarded as the antithesis of pro-independence. Seemingly, the shift from Han Chinese identity to Taiwanese identity has been a rupture in the recent development of Cross-Strait relations. This study sheds light on Wei Yung (Wei Yong, 1936–2004) and his concept of 'multi-system nations' to reassess this standpoint. Wei wanted to assist Taipei in recalibrating Cross-Strait relations in the late 20th century. He initiated the 'multi-system nations' concept to justify Taipei's adoption of dual recognition and parallel (international) participation. Wei used this concept to defend Taiwanese political scientists' collective representation in the International Political Science Association. However, the result was not as he had wished. Although Wei's concept of 'multi-system nations' is outdated and his wishful thinking about China's unification has become a path not taken for both Taipei and Beijing, this study shows that there is in fact common ground between the sympathisers of pro-independence and the advocates of unification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay traces the language of sacrifice used in a series of articles in the Protestant church magazine Tian Feng in the early 1950s to explore the ways in which sacrifice was demanded of Christians by church leaders, both to create an autonomous, indigenous church freed from imperialist association, and in service of the new nation. It explores the biblical tropes utilised to link sacrifice and nation, and the role of the Korean War in catalysing demand for physical martyrdom alongside ideological sacrifice. The essay suggests that the radical vehemence of the period masks continuities in theological expression with the earlier twentieth century and that much closer attention needs paying to the Chinese construct of 'nation' and its historic connotations in addressing the question of Chinese Christian nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the mid to late 1920s, the Chinese film industry experienced a severe setback. Driven by the Ming Xing Film Company and the 'Merchant Movement', the Shanghai Film Guild was established in September 1927. It was the first filmmaking industry guild in the history of China. It was relatively outgoing in safeguarding the interests of the industry. It played an important role in maintaining the image of the industry, forcing the film censorship authority to revise its policies, and resisting those foreign films that insulted China. However, it did not form effective industry regulations to address industry autonomy. It did not change the vicious competition in the industry significantly, either. The establishment and operation of the guild was obviously affected by the wave of nationalism at the time, which caused it to perform more intensely in some situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops the concept of 'patriotic consumer mobilization' to explain how China uses informal boycotts as economic coercion. Patriotic consumer mobilization employs citizens as the unit of action, facilitating manipulability, uncertainty, and plausible deniability. It manages public sentiment for domestic legitimacy and foreign policy goals. Citizens are mobilized via propaganda that underscores national humiliation, frames boycotts as grassroots patriotism, and signals resolve to foreign countries. After outlining conditions for use and a case comparison with Taiwan, we draw on Chinese-language sources to examine Beijing's coercion of South Korea over a missile defense system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay offers a timely analysis of how the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian warfare is observed in China through a gendered prism. Accounting for an anti-West axis in China's current political climate, we articulate how misogyny and nationalism converge in Chinese social media users' discussions about the military crisis currently unfolding in East Europe. This is revealed by a vulgar interpretation of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship and the sexualisation of Ukrainian/Russian women, which are both widespread in the Chinese-language social media sphere. With the patriarchal specificities of the Party-State polity in mind, the discussion yields a feminist perspective to foreground China's nationalist politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines how India – both as a modern nation-state and a symbolic geography – is digested by Chinese self-cultivators to negotiate their belonging in China's spiritual nationhood, defined as the landscape of belief that corresponds to the geo-body of the nation-state. It follows the practitioners of Oneness (Heyi), one of the most popular Indian new religious movements in China today, for whom such negotiations are riddled with tensions. While Oneness practitioners align themselves with political orthodoxy disseminated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), emphasizing China's special role as a spiritual leader for humanity, they engage in quasi-religious heterodox practices, risking being labeled an "evil cult" (xie jiao). These frictions occur at the junction of two contrasting notions of spiritual nationhood, one derived from lingxing (spirituality) and the other from jingshen, a secularized notion of spirit that situates the CCP as the sacred center of the polity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study systematically examines, deconstructs, and maps the quotidian nationalist discourse among Chinese netizens and analyzes their 'liking' behavior on the social media platform, Zhihu, in order to investigate what and how they talk about nationalism. The analysis of the quotidian expression of nationalism marks a shift from the previous practice of relying on high-profile nationalist movements as evidence which may create an incomplete or inaccurate impression that much of Chinese nationalism is virulent and over-zealous. This study finds that Zhihu users are critical nationalists who are competitive but judicious. The existence of levelheaded nationalists in China's online space suggests the limits of strident nationalist contagion and nationalist mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patriotic campaigns and mass mobilization draw on existing xenophobic attitudes of the public, reinforcing the 'us vs. them' dualism between China and 'the West'. However, patriotic campaigns are not always top-down, state-led, nor are they always primarily driven by political ideology. Patriotic content appeals to a growing nationalist audience who consumes a mixed feeling of perceived victimization at the hand of foreign aggression and the pride arising from being a Chinese citizen. This paper argues that the profitability of patriotic content circulating on social media exacerbated the tension between market-driven grassroots patriotism and state-led patriotic campaigns. The tension grows out of, and is manifested in, the online popular debate around economically driven, grassroots 'patriotic' content that can challenge the state state-led patriotic rhetoric. While the state sometimes strategically co-opts some patriotic contents into its own patriotic narratives, it also delegitimises other undesired ones through labels such as 'high-level black' (gaoji hei) or 'low-level red' (diji hong). These labels were initially used to differentiate meticulously crafted political satire and parody from incompetent, illogical and vulgar propaganda pieces that unintendedly blemish the state's patriotic campaigns, but later evolved into an exercise of power to distance the CCP from undesired patriotic content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular nationalism increasingly dominates public debate in mainland China. This article examines the impact of this trend on Chinese policymaking by looking at the public consultation procedure for new regulations on foreigners' permanent residency in February 2020. Following an unexpectedly large online outcry of anti-immigrant sentiment in response to the draft regulations, government actors shelved the proposal, which constituted a long-delayed step towards a more comprehensive immigration framework. Drawing on textual analysis, expert interviews, and survey data, the article analyzes elite-public interactions before, during, and after the controversy, asking what factors contributed to this miscalculation of public sentiment, and what the P.R. debate can tell us about the role of public opinion in Chinese policymaking today. It argues that popular nationalists can play a bottom-up politicizing role on previously marginal policy issues such as immigration, surprising and constraining the state. Such politicisation further limits both public and elite policy debate, impairing state information gathering and exacerbating the tension between Chinese policy actors' desire to both control and understand public sentiment. In addition, the permanent residency debate demonstrates the relevance of public opinion to China's non-democratic immigration policymaking, which displays a trajectory of gradual politicisation similar to other early-stage immigrant-reception contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-feminism and misogyny online have intensified globally over the last decade, bringing substantive challenges to feminist identification and activism. This article explores the strategies for silencing and expelling feminists via the deployment of an anti-feminist discourse online, in response to feminism's increasing visibility in China. Data was collected via observation of 23 influential feminist accounts on Weibo. This was bolstered by data from 10 semi-structured interviews with feminist Weibo account contributors. By applying critical discourse analysis (CDA), four strategies used to demonise feminists and depoliticise feminism online in China are identified: feminists as deviant women, as betraying the nation, as connected to Islamists, and as "fake-feminists." The article highlights a kind of intertwined anti-feminism that draws power from distinct features—nationalism and Islamophobia. It argues that by interlocking Chinese historical and structural conditions as well as cultural context, anti-feminism diverts public attention away from systematic gender inequality, and onto antagonisms between feminists and anti-feminists, which further restricts the discussion of intersectional oppressions that affect women's lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines how the Chinese government has adopted authoritarian digital populism to justify its political programs through its official social media sub-accounts. Through discourse analysis, we investigate textual material concerning the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) posted on a representative WeChat account, Xiakedao. We find Xiakedao performing digital populism through stylistic-emotional manipulation to portray the benefits of the BRI to China, BRI countries, and the world, or, put succinctly, to legitimize the BRI. Specifically, in 2014–2016, through mixing informal and formal language, Xiakedao based its legitimization on stirring up a sense of hegemonic superiority by painting it as a strategy capable of significantly advancing China's interests. Since 2017, Xiakedao has shifted to emphasizing its massive global contribution to stimulate nationalist pride and exploiting a trauma complex to bestow a counter-hegemonic aura on it. Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, we argue that Xiakedao has utilized the terms "China" and "BRI" as an empty signifier and a floating signifier, respectively. We unravel its discursive strategies of fixing their meanings and (re)drawing antagonistic frontiers to legitimize the BRI during different periods. The study contributes to theoretically understanding how an authoritarian state legitimizes the same political programs from disparate stances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"'Us' and 'Others': The Chinese Diaspora in Japan and the Negotiation of Their Membership in the Sphere of Chineseness" examines the way first-generation Chinese diaspora in Japan make sense of their relationships with the Chinese nation. With empirical evidence collected from both the in-depth interview with 69 informants and the media ethnographic observation with 26 research participants, this thesis contributes to conceptualize the diasporic experiences as well as the identity politics of the Chinese diaspora who live in a crucial era – while we have witnessed China's rise and its transition from a diminishing to a returning power, as a response to this Japan has continuously articulated a "China threat" discourse, which not only further promotes its ethno-nationalistic ideology, but also directing the ethnicity-based marginality toward the Chinese diaspora in Japan. In this context, this thesis contributes to present that while these events create complex Sino-Japanese power dynamics, the presence of digital media means that the Chinese diaspora in Japan are influenced by them in a new way – "new" in the sense that the digital mediation fills those power and forces into every dimension of their lives, making their daily reality a constant identity negotiation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on Chinese nationalist discourse in the late Qing era rarely consider the role of settler-colonialism in the development of nationalism, instead assuming that anti-colonialism was the dominant ideological source. This article transcends the traditional binary discourse of the colonised and the coloniser by exploring how settler-colonialism helped to project a borderless China in late Qing utopian fiction. I argue that this body of literature, as exemplified by Lü Sheng's A Madman's Dream, is a useful lens for exploring how Chinese settler-colonialism developed a (trans)national imagination. China, as a non-Western settler-colonist, had a dual identity: its experience of being colonised by the West resulted in its acting as a settler-colonist, while its efforts to promote a 'new China' overseas were intended to create solidarity with others who had suffered from colonisation. This article thus contributes to the growing body of scholarship about Qing expansionism as an instance of colonialism by demonstrating the internal tensions within Chinese discourse on colonialism in that era. I illustrate that Chinese settler-colonialism displayed a unique blend of discourse about expansion in the past, the experience of suffering in the present, and imagining the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few years, Chinese 'boys' love' television dramas (dangai) have attained immense popularity within China and globally. While state authorities are known to censor LGBTQ content, the Chinese state media has used guofeng ('national style') language to laud some such series, including The Untamed and Word of Honor, in nationalistic terms. Through effusively praising depictions of traditional Chinese culture while downplaying or obscuring the texts' origins in homoerotic novels, such commentary has sought to recruit dangai series towards advancing Chinese cultural power while containing the texts' queer transgressiveness. We refer to this phenomenon as brand nohomonationalism, or the undergirding of nationalist ideology by particular configurations of normative sexual discourse, which expands on the insights of Puar's 'homonationalism', Iwabuchi's 'brand nationalism', and Williams' 'brand homonationalism' in the broader Asian context. Although brand nohomonationalist commentary has been curtailed since recent injunctions against 'effeminate men' and danmei (boys' love) content, it is part of the Chinese government's broader efforts to exercise ideological authority over popular culture. Analysing the phenomenon provides new insights into how sexual and national identities are co-constructed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The legitimation of Chinese medicine has long been a politically and morally charged subject in China since the early twentieth century. In recent years, there is an apparent surge of enthusiasm in developing and promoting Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), as evidenced by the state's frequent lauding of its advantages and the implementation of a series of supportive policies and regulations. During the Covid-19 pandemic in China, TCM has again gained ample attention in major state-owned media outlets due to its proclaimed effects in treating Covid-19. In this article, I will conduct an interdisciplinary study of the semiotic work dedicated to legitimating TCM treatment of Covid-19 in the social media account of an official TCM institution. Drawing on critical discourse analysis and textual analysis supported by reference to history and anthropology of medicine, I will examine closely how the above-mentioned semiotic work is achieved through reference to a range of theoretical and moral arguments. Moreover, the paradoxes and inconsistencies in this process of semiotic construction will be discussed to shed light on the deeper issues concerning the entangled relationship of health science and politics in China, as well as the epistemological difficulties in promoting TCM inside and outside China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of citizenship in China has become popular not only as a research topic but also as a praxis that seeks to influence citizenship-related policies and address structural injustice. Analysis of the trajectory of developing citizenship research over the decades indicates that scholarship focusing on socioeconomic injustice has affected various policy actions, and the struggle associated with the cultural dimension of citizenship seems to have intensified. This special issue deconstructs the state's monolithic interpretation of culture and examines the cultural underpinnings of citizenship discourse and practice in China. We take a broad view of cultural traditions, which have been deeply rooted throughout history and have shaped the underlying relationships between the state, society, and citizens in modern China. The articles in this special issue reveal the culture-informed citizenship practices enacted by various actors, including the government forces, cultural minorities, and grassroots activists. They suggest that spirituality is a site of experiencing and negotiating citizenship in the Chinese context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Football has developed to different degrees in Europe and Asia. Wu Lei, who played for Reial Club Deportiu Espanyol, was the only Chinese footballer in the top five European football leagues from 2019 to 2022. Applying critical discourse analysis, this study examines how Chinese and Spanish news reports have constructed Wu Lei's identity and represented the political and economic forces that supported Wu Lei in becoming the only Chinese player in La Liga in Spain. The research reveals the same subject was constructed by nationalism in China and Orientalism in Spain. Chinese nationalism is reproduced through the semi-colonial memory of an underdeveloped China and articulated in tandem with neoliberalism. Facing aggressive investments from Chinese private capital, Spanish media reproduced Orientalism by constructing the image of China as an economic hegemon and site of political otherness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transformation of Chinese cities has engendered new forms of spatialized urban inequality. Research on these processes of segregation has captured the attention of urban researchers, generating a large and varied body of work. Yet its influence on urban theory remains constrained, reflecting the concern with the parochialism of urban theory. A review of segregation research on Chinese cities presents several intertwined findings: Chinese cities are framed in terms of their difference, mostly in contrast to Euro-American cities. This framing renders findings intelligible for an audience familiar with Chicago, but perhaps not Shenzhen. In translating the findings, the research often resorts to a methodological nationalism, which contextualizes Chinese cities in terms of their "Chinese-ness," a reductionist heuristic that elides the diversity of these cities and construes residential segregation as incommensurate with the experience of cities elsewhere. The effect of this is to limit the potential of this research to contribute to a "more global urban studies," by inscribing a kind of exceptionalism into Chinese cities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last 15 years, Chinese videogames and fan communities have become a site where state-sanctioned gender norms are reproduced, altered and challenged. This article analyzes the representation of masculinity in the MMORPG Jian 3 and how fan-fiction writers transform this representation. The videogame predominantly evokes soft masculinity, a sexually ambiguous form of masculinity that represents men with traditionally feminine characteristics but not as explicitly homosexual. Much of the fan-fiction removes this ambiguity, transforming the game's soft masculinity into an explicit form of homosexual masculinity. This diminished ambiguity has political valence in the Chinese context, where national identity is intertwined with a specific form of heterosexual masculinity. The fan-fictions serve to disentangle the relationship between nationalism and masculinity by advancing an alternative form of masculinity and decoupling it from the national project. These two textual strategies – the advancing of a homosexual form of masculinity and the decoupling of masculinity and nationalism – are present in other Chinese games and their fan-fictions, and indeed can be found in other media forms too. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the intersections between state and fashion in China by examining the facilitation of a new fashion identity in a fashion edutainment program produced by national television. It argues that the state-sponsored (re)appraisal of traditional sartorial esthetics from which a decolonized fashion identity is expected to evolve is intimately interweaved with the state's metanarrative of national revival. The study interprets the reversion back to native historical traditions to counter and offer an alternative to Western cultural episteme as an inherently decolonial effort. With an emancipated fashion identity, the state aims to reclaim cultural authorship from the dictates of colonialism and orientalism. The paper examines how sartorial nationalism is given new expressions and highlights the question of authenticity working within state-prescribed parameters. The desire for international recognition however undermines the decoloniality of this undertaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sketches out the mode and influence of the sports culture of martial arts, from Republican China to Southeast Asia's Chinese societies. The Chin Woo Athletic Federation was the first non-governmental sports organization in Republican China after the feudal monarchy. In the 1920s, it began to expand its organizational territory to Southeast Asia, and its development reached its peak in the 1930s. This paper focuses on the spread of Wushu to Southeast Asia against the background of the rise of overseas Chinese nationalism. It interprets how it embodied the Chinese immigrant nationalism, especially contextualizing the conflict between tradition and modernity in the early twentieth century, which is a rarely discussed topic. The results show that the dissemination of Chin Woo organizations was a form of organizational cloning of 'mother' organizations in the mainland. The association between different Chin Woo athletic associations suggests an attempt at cloning the organizations and their practice in the interests of building a form of quintessential Chinese-ness, at the initiative of Chinese business and other community leaders. The physical training and performance of the Chin Woo members was a manifestation of Southeast Asian Chinese immigrant nationalism. Finally, Wushu was a cultural element in the historical identity of Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the Covid-19 pandemic has swept across the world, the wearing of medical facemasks has become a hot topic on social media. In China, the relevant discourses are entangled with codes of medical science, national self-esteem and appropriated modernity. These discourses can be dated back to the narrative established by Dr Wu Lien-teh, the great fighter in the Manchurian plagues of 1910–1911 and 1920–1921. This paper reveals that Wu and his colleagues used different strategies when displaying to the Western world their achievements in the anti-plague battle and when proving the effectiveness of the Western medical and hygienic system to Chinese people. Wu and his colleagues used metonymies, analogues and metaphors on or related to medical facemasks to illustrate the possibility of building a modernised nation with sovereignty. Because the construction of a sanitary system in China has always been labelled as a patriotic movement (Rogaski, Ruth. 2004. Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 285–298), the wearing of medical facemasks has constituted an important part of the narrative of nationalism and hygienic modernity. This discourse continues to play a significant role in today's campaign against the coronavirus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study applies CDA and story grammar analysis to investigate how Chinese language textbooks for primary schools foster Chinese national identity through their depiction of Chinese people struggling against foreign invaders. The analysis was conducted on 12 textbooks and the findings were based on stories featuring a range of ages, from children to soldiers and artists, who all displayed patriotic spirit and were willing to risk their lives for China. The textbooks also highlight China's past humiliation, such as the Nanjing Massacre and the loss of territories such as Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The authors of those textbooks seek to encourage the students' national identity by promoting a sense of patriotism, sacrifice, vigilance against foreign threats, affirmation for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and putting the interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC) ahead of personal interests. Additionally, students are expected to have a strong sense of territorial sovereignty, recognizing Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as parts of China. However, the results also show that the portrayal of Chinese national identity is Han-centric, excluding ethnic minorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID-19, as a major public health crisis, has triggered nationalism to different degrees all around the world. This study utilises an online survey to explore the relationships between media use, media trust, and nationalism in China during the COVID-19 pandemic. We found that the level of nationalism was still considerably high in China at the time of the pandemic and that the role of the media in nation-state building enterprises remains significant. It becomes more pervasive after the news media's adoption of digitalisation. Our study argues that contemporary China's expression of nationalism is socially constructed by media and rooted in its Chinese Confucian culture. Meanwhile, the Chinese government is increasingly designing the news media and manages social media. It has already successfully constructed a sense of nationalism to facilitate its own interests in response to the national crisis. This has led nationalism being embodied in the media's constructed social reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1949, ethnic minority nationalism in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has consistently concerned the People's Republic of China. Most previous studies on nationalism in XUAR focused on organised visible nationalist movements and ignored everyday life, particularly regarding interactions between the government and citizens or between the majority and the minority. This study investigates daily practices of ethnic minority nationalism in XUAR within the framework of everyday nationalism. It explores daily life in Altay City to determine how members of ethnic minority groups produce and maintain their sense of ethnic identity in this context. The article found that members of ethnic minority groups are engaged in a struggle to retain their sense of ethnic identity by resisting state nationalism and expressing antagonism towards Han Chinese in their everyday lives. This study reveals a covert nationalist movement involving almost everyone in XUAR. Ethnic nationalism is central to XUAR society and will continue to shape its social relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades, against the backdrop of multiple anti-Japanese protests in China, the rise of Chinese nationalism has been much debated. By taking the 2010 and 2012 Sino–Japanese crises over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a case study, the article applies discourse analysis to media articles and interviews to ascertain the Chinese government's propaganda toolbox in shaping the nationalist discourse, as well as to substantiate the defining features of anti-Japanese nationalism. The findings reveal a combination of strategies and techniques that the propaganda apparatus uses, such as the creation of an 'us-versus-them' dichotomy, galvanised inclusiveness, censorship, and 'card-stacking' to mould nationalism. The article substantiates empirically both top-down and bottom-up strains of nationalism, and their interaction through the four key themes of sovereignty, history, mistrust and reactivity. It finds that Japan bridges these strands of Chinese nationalism, but in its absence alternative views of nationalism are articulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nation-building in modern China at the beginning of the twentieth century had to manage the strain between ethnic nationalism and the claim of a multi-ethnic national identity. This study focuses on how history textbooks defined China and addressed this paradox. Based on the qualitative content analysis of eight popular middle school history textbooks about imperial China, this paper demonstrates how Han nationalism and the multi-ethnic nationality of China evolved in the textbooks. While these two features of national concept contradict each other, the thesis of Hanhua may serve as a bridge between them within the symbolic framework of Chinese nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese idol fans have been identified among the main forces in cyber nationalist activisms in recent years, acting as the nationalist fans protecting the state as an idol in response to external political shocks. Their skills in acknowledging, involving, and even reinventing the image of the state and national pride in cyber nationalist activisms do not emerge in a vacuum. This article examines how idol fans involve and reinvent the nationalist discourse in their everyday fan activities – idol promotion. We focus on the pandemic in 2020 as it provides a specific social and political context that allows us to understand better the interaction between idol fans and the state in their mundane fan activities. We construct our analysis under the computational grounded theory framework with over 6 million fan posts collected from Weibo and 11 in-depth interviews with active idol fans. Our findings show that when engaging in pandemic-related discussion, idol fans actively borrowed official discourse on nationalism and strategically responded to key political and social events in their idol promotion activities. The idol images they built are not only positive but also nationalist. Therefore, they play not only the commercial logic commonly seen in the Japanese and Korean K-pop/idol culture but also the political logic propagated by the state in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a rise in Chinese public diplomacy efforts in the Philippines, Filipino perceptions of China have mainly remained negative during the Duterte period. This article examines why and how China's public diplomacy efforts have primarily failed despite President Duterte's pro-China position. It draws on constructivist approaches to demonstrate how national identity mediates the impact of Chinese influence. In particular, Chinese incursions in the West Philippine Sea, and an influx of China-based offshore gaming businesses in the country, have elicited a strong nationalist response from Filipinos, perpetuating perceptions of China as untrustworthy and threatening. Evidence is drawn to determine correlation between an increase in Chinese public diplomacy and a decrease in public trust towards China. This is followed by process-tracing how national identity dampens any positive effect Chinese public diplomacy may have on Philippine attitudes towards China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do information and communication technologies (ICTs), which seemingly bring people to a boundless world, contribute to the reproduction of the imagined community of a nation? Challenging the conventional approach that sees ICTs as merely the channel through which nationalism or activism is expressed or mobilised, this article draws on anthropological and historical studies of technology to develop a conceptual mapping of the important factors that configure specific nation-bounded, ICT-centric socio-technical imaginaries. Taking as the entry point technological nationalism in the context of the Sino-American trade war in recent years and based on long-term fieldwork in the Pearl River Delta region, this ethnographic study explores how ICTs have become the lens through which educated professionals imagine China’s transition from sweat-shop modernity toward techno-modernity. This sociotechnical imaginary is shaped by larger forces including the state discourse, political economy, material culture, and the platformised lifestyle, and mediated through work experience and consumer choices. Nationalism driven by this ICT-centric imaginary is subjected to state manipulation for the reproduction of political legitimacy. This study sheds light on larger conceptual questions on how ordinary citizens experience and make sense of ICTs and how such meaning-making processes sustain, challenge and reconfigure political processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Literature played an important role in the construction of a modern nation-state in late Qing China, when fiction as a literary genre was endowed with strong political and ideological agendas. In fin-de-siècle China, the emergence of political novels through translation from the West, as an important subgenre of "new fiction", was essentially a response to the nation's severe national crisis engendered by colonial threat. Against this backdrop, the practical value of literary translation was strikingly emphasized, as progressive Chinese intellectuals took the translation of western-derived political novels as a vehicle of intellectual enlightenment and political engagement, appealing to constitutionalism, nationalism and patriotism. In this context, translators deliberately put political priority over linguistic faithfulness or aesthetic value, turning the process of literary translation into "transcreation", to propagate their ideals for sociopolitical reforms. Thus, as an important instrument for constructing the nationalist imagination, the translation of political novels served as a fictional prescription for national emancipation in late Qing China, manifesting both a process of cultural (re)construction and an important facet of East–West interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Changes in relative power between the rising and dominant state have been consistently recognized as a key contributor to international conflicts, as they can lead to convergence within both societies in threat perceptions of each other. In the case of China, a dominant view assumes that China's increased power leads to wide social support for nationalism, which unifies the Chinese threat perceptions of key rivals such as the US and Japan. Based on a large-scaled survey among China's elite youth, this study examines the relationship between their perception of China's power asymmetry and threat with respect to the US and Japan. The findings show that the dominant view has clearly overlooked the divergent voices within the youth, and they also challenge the common assumption that China's growing power has fostered a generation of youth with unanimous support for more assertive Chinese foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The North China Ice Games (NCIG, Huabei bingyunhui, full name: Ice Performance of the 19th North China Games, Dishijiujie huabei yundonghui bingshang biaoyan dahui) were held in Beijing in 1935. As the first regional Ice Games independently were held by Chinese people in modern times, it showed the achievements of ice sports in North China, especially in Beijing and Tianjin. In the past, due to the limitation of data, the investigation and research on the North China Ice Games were insufficient, mainly focusing on the schedule and results. However, there was little research on its background, preparation process, and significance. Based on previous studies, the methods of literary and historical analysis were taken as the main research methods, based on the rich collection of modern books and newspapers in National Library of China and relevant databases at home and abroad, to fill the gap in relevant research. Although there are a lot of imperfections in the North China Ice Games, it still left a significant mark in modern Chinese sports history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transitioning into the post-revolutionary era, China in the 1980s saw a variety of uncertainties. State policies, popular sentiments, and individual psychologies were all in constant fluctuation. Despite these uncertainties, efforts to understand the past and a strong desire for a prosperous future characterized the general spirit, widely reflected in the increasingly active and diversified cultural life of the Chinese people. In 1983, Chinese Central Television (CCTV) held a Spring Festival Gala that was broadcast live nationwide for the first time. As one of the first cultural milestones of the New Era, the gala painted a joyful and harmonious picture of the country amidst various complexities and ambiguities. Studying the organization and content of the 1983 gala, this paper argues that the gala responded to the ongoing historical transition by replacing the previously dominant revolutionary discourse, which stressed class struggle, extreme collectivism, and politicization of daily life, with a nationalist discourse, which aspired for China's integration into a highly modernized world as a prosperous world power. Such replacement was demonstrated in the gala's depiction of the relationship between individuals and the state, memories of revolution, and new connections between traditions and the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated public beliefs in coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) conspiracy theories in China. It also examined the dynamic mechanisms underlying these beliefs. On the basis of a national sample (N = 1,000), three types of COVID-19 conspiracy theories were identified. Type I relates to the pandemic's foreign origin. Type II is defined as "China as culprit" conspiracy theories, and Type III refers to the virus as being primarily a Western creation. The results revealed that nationalism and scientific literacy were significantly associated with conspiracy beliefs. There was a relationship between scientific literacy and a weaker belief in almost all COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Nationalism was associated with a stronger belief in theories favorable to China and a weaker belief in "China as culprit" theories. Media trust and attitudes toward science were also associated with conspiracy beliefs. However, the association depended on the nature of the media outlets and conspiracy theories. These findings are indicative of the multifaceted nature of conspiracy beliefs in China and the robust political dimensions of the relationship between such beliefs and science or media factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shaping of people's identities as members of the Chinese nation is crucial to China's nationalist discourse at school. What kind of image of the Chinese nation does the state intend to transmit to its new generation of citizens? Does the constitutional separation of religion and education prescribe a secular image for the collective identity of the Chinese nation? This study explores how the interpretation of religion is manufactured during the discourse of constructing the nation in Chinese school textbooks. The findings reveal that different religious traditions are assigned strikingly different roles in the national curriculum's interpretation of the Chinese nation as a construct and the distinction between China and the external world. The integration of religious narratives and the agenda of shaping the national cultural identity of Chinese students reveal the changing role of religion in contemporary Chinese society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research applies the analytical lens of 'cosmopolitan nationalism' to examine how 'non-traditional' international high schools interweave cosmopolitan and nationalistic tendencies in Shenzhen, China. In-depth interviews with parents (n = 16) and students (n = 60) explored the motivations for choosing international schooling, experiences of international schooling, whether cosmopolitan identities are emerging amongst students and, if so, with what characteristics. The findings demonstrate the utility of 'cosmopolitan nationalism' in illuminating the nature of international schooling in China and extends it by applying it to denote the identities expressed by students, who confidently project the national into the global with their expectations for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a contextualised examination of whether Xi Jinping Thought, the latest rendition of Marxism-Leninism that functions as China's ideology, has made China's political system more sustainable. By scrutinising Xi's speeches and writings since he came to power in 2012, we demonstrate that his vision is premised on modifying consultative Leninism, China's post-Deng Xiaoping political framework, with strongman rule. This is intended to revitalise the Chinese Communist Party as a Leninist instrument to deliver comprehensive leadership, upgrade China's economy, Sinicise Marxism, nurture a party-centric nationalism, enhance legitimacy and claim global leadership on the world stage. In the process, he has revived the Maoist mass line to induce people to embrace national goals set by the Party, ultimately to persuade them that China's Leninist party-state is more 'democratic' and better at serving them than any other political system. We found that Xi's measures have enhanced the capacity of China's consultative Leninist state and thus the resilience of the regime in the short term. However, the substitution of collective leadership by strongman rule, and the end of predictable power transition by abolishing a term limit for himself, have undermined institutionalisation and reduced the endurance of the system in the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]