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The author comments on Australia's Defense White Paper entitled "Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030," which was released in May 2009. It is suggested that Australia's new defense policy was created in response to the rapid speed of globalization and increasing economic interdependence, as well as the declining power of the U.S. The author also argues that the policy document is beset with contradictions and there are no details of immediate challenges.

The Indian Ocean is a region of increasing importance, with booming economic opportunities, shifting power dynamics and rising geopolitical competition. To manage this transition some Australian policy-makers are advocating the practice of defence diplomacy as a mechanism to help mould cooperative practices and to build regional trust while dissipating potential or ongoing regional flashpoints. Australia's 2013 Defence White Paper identified Australia as an agent who can play a critical part in the emergence of certain types of norms as a means of conflict prevention and crisis management in the Indo-Pacific region. This paper explores the use of defence diplomacy as a means for seeking regional influence. It uses an innovative new framework of norm entrepreneurship to examine the choices facing Australian policy-makers in increasingly complex security environment. This paper argues that while Australia should aim to promote defence diplomacy as a central part of rising security dialogue and practice with ‘like-mined’ countries, there must also be careful reflection to ensure that this objective is a constructive use of a middle power's limited resources and influence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How does America's greater focus on Asia impact the security policies of Japan and Australia? How does it change the nature of the Japan-US-Australia security partnership? This paper attempts to answer these questions by looking at Japanese and Australian responses to the Obama Administration's new security policy toward Asia called “rebalancing.” After examining them, it argues that the regional allied response to America's new security posture has generated greater momentum for both allies to collaborate in wider areas in a more timely and effective way than before. It concludes asserting that, in the era of rebalance, Japan, the United States, and Australia have not only deepened their existing cooperation, but also have expanded potential areas of cooperation toward a more “dynamic” partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the post-war period Australian Prime Ministers have played a proactive role in formulating foreign policy towards Japan. This paper explores the role of executive leadership towards Japan and its impact on the bilateral relationship. The Howard period and current Rudd-led initiatives on whaling, nuclear disarmament, climate change and regional architecture are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'new' terrorism has not escaped Southeast Asia. Within this region, the Malay Archipelago has the world's largest Muslim population and Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country. In the context of the struggle between radical Islam, and the West and its allies, the region assumes great, long-term strategic significance, particularly to the USA. The threat of terrorism to Australia, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks at Bali in 2002 aimed at its citizens, has also ensured Australia's active interest and engagement with the littoral states of the Malay Archipelago. In addition, arguably the world's most strategic waterway and chokepoint, the narrow Straits of Malacca, is located within this cauldron. More than half the world's trade and oil passes through this strategic straits. By comparison, oil flows through the straits are three times more than through the Suez, and fifteen times greater than the Panama Canal. Not surprisingly, key Western states and their allies that have a deep interest in the security of the Straits of Malacca and in the global war on terrorism have paid special attention to the Malay Archipelago. Indeed, the idea of a Trilateral Security Dialogue centred on the USA, Japan and Australia was first mooted in 2001, and has since involved discussions on Asian security between senior officials of all three countries. In 2005, it was elevated to the level of the foreign ministers of Japan and Australia, and the US Secretary of State. This dialogue process is the third leg in the triangle between the two bilateral US alliances with Japan and Australia. It is obvious that all three are key strategic partners in Asia, with a strong common interest in maritime security and terrorism issues, particularly in Southeast Asia. It is the contention of this paper that this evolving trilateral extra-regional security nexus has benefited greatly from cooperation with Singapore, which has been doing everything it can to encourage and facilitate the regional involvement of these extra-regional powers. In fact, Singapore has become a critical regional ally of all three. On Singapore's part, this represents a striking success in foreign policy as security, political and economic allies enhance its own ability to better manage the new terrorist threats that have emerged since 9-11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deals with relevance of the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty to Australia's young people. Security arrangement between Australia and the United States; Public debate about defense; Younger generations' experiences of Australia in military conflicts; Perceptions of threat and alliance.

Introduces a series of articles on the development of the Australia-United States alliance relationship. Informative range of perspectives on the history of the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty; Sign of continuing United States commitment to the region; Major foreign policy achievement of the Howard Government.

The article offers information on the report of a task force established by Australia India Institute (AII) director Amitabh Mattoo concerning security in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). It mentions that the Task Force was comprised of both Indian and Australian international relations scholars. The three sections of the report deals with the changing security dynamics in the region, the multidimensional security concept, and the roles of Australia and India in Indo-Pacific security. Moreover, the research and policy recommendations of the report include the development of cooperative mechanism, cooperation of Australia and India in maritime security issues, and collective action.

With fast-growing economies, defence capabilities and international interests, China and India are becoming increasingly active as contributors of public goods in international security, such as anti-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, capacity-building, stabilisation and peacekeeping. This article examines the drivers and characteristics of China's and India's growing roles in contributing to security public goods. It also considers the extent to which modernisation of these rising Asian powers' conventional military capabilities is suited for these roles; the conditions under which China and India might expand such activities; and some of the possible consequences of enhanced Chinese and Indian roles in protecting the commons using military means. Those effects include potential impacts on the management of transnational security problems, the extension of Chinese or Indian geopolitical influence, the worsening of Sino-Indian strategic competition, and the ways other powers might respond, particularly in situations where China or India act unilaterally. Policy implications for existing public goods providers, such as Australia, are briefly considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article1 reviews the seminal influences on Australian national security planning and outlines a methodology for assessing national security risk which provides a workable analytical framework for prioritising Australia's national security challenges and allocating scarce resources in a systematic and integrated way. The authors argue for a System of Systems approach that addresses the most serious security challenges as a whole rather than treating them as independent, compartmentalised issues. The ability to develop effective analytical tools for assessing national security risk will be a key determinant of strategic success in the twenty-first century. Nations adept at anticipating developments, discerning trends and evaluating risk among the clutter of confusing and contradictory change indicators will be significantly advantaged over those which are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically evaluates Australia's ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, encapsulated in the three pillars of the Labor government's foreign policy platform. It notes that each pillar has been accorded specific roles in the implementation of Australian foreign policy and makes particular reference to the government's preference for multilateral engagement. The article subsequently demonstrates that such an agenda actually impedes a creative approach to key issues such as trade, climate change and non-proliferation challenges, as well as Australia's participation in Asia-Pacific order-building. It then offers some suggestions for a more flexible posture that is not inconsistent with past Labor approaches, but which also better appreciates regional and global complexities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

North-South issues as such do not figure prominently in Australia's international policy but are mostly implicit. These issues arise particularly in the context of Australia's relations with countries in its immediate vicinity, including the South Pacific, Indonesia and East Timor. There are also some global issues in the North-South context where Australia is affected. Australian governments, in developing policies relating to this context, have been influenced by a 'practical realism' that puts first priority on Australian interests as perceived by governments at any given time. The way in which those policies have been developed, in both the regional and the global contexts, can be assessed through an examination of issues relating to security and international economic relations. Australia's alliance relationship has a strong bearing on the way Australia approaches the security issues. In relation to international economic issues there are many commonalities with fellow producers of raw materials in the Global South. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the early post-war era, a Japanese revival was a source of profound concern to members of the Commonwealth, especially Australia and New Zealand. Britain, having abdicated the leading role in the Western Pacific to the United States, attempted to retain some influence in the region, but economic frailties and lack of Commonwealth unity undermined these efforts. Under American guidance, diplomatic, commercial and (to a lesser extent) security ties with Japan were later promoted, but elements of cooperation and competition persisted in Commonwealth relations with their former enemy. Ultimately, Britain, Australia and New Zealand placed their respective regional identities ahead of their Commonwealth loyalties. Japan took advantage of this situation to promote its own national interests. Hence, the wider aperture of the 'Commonwealth lens' throws into sharp relief the contours of a number of members' bilateral relationships with Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that, over the decades, Australians have held three different, coherent, long-lived 'visions' of nuclear weapons and strategy. Those visions—which we have labelled Menzian, Gortonian and disarmer—compete on four grounds: the role that nuclear weapons play in international order; the doctrine of deterrence; the importance of arms control; and the relevance of nuclear weapons to Australia's specific needs. We believe this 'textured' framework provides a richer, more satisfying, and more accurate understanding of Australian nuclear identity, both past and present, than previous scholarship has yielded. Moreover, the competition between the three visions might not be at an end. Changes in international norms, in proliferation rates, in regional strategic dynamics, or even in the deterrence doctrines of the major powers could easily reawaken some old, enduring debates. Australian nuclear identity faces an uncertain future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses factors that cause China to have different approaches to different regional multilateral security institutions. Current research not only has little to say about China's motivation to participate, but also little regarding the level of its participation in or support for regional security institutions. To explain why China's post-cold war participation in regional multilateral security institutions varies, this article argues that threat levels help explain China's conditions for participating in multilateral security institutions, and security interests help explain China's behaviour as a member of such institutions. The author stresses that these are useful variables that can explain China's behaviour with respect to regional multilateral security institutions. In the foreseeable future, China's general posture toward regional multilateral security cooperation will be passive participation and strong support. Australia should not only consider strategies which emphasise strengthened bilateral relationships between Canberra and Beijing, but also continue to positively support regional multilateral security institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the focus on international security within the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) overseas aid program. The intervention of Australian forces in fragile Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific governments is described, including activity in the Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, and Papua New Guinea (PNG). These efforts, termed the securitisation of AusAID, are reportedly intended to increase regional security through the reduction of poverty. The cooperation of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in mitigating transnational risk is mentioned. The influence of neo-liberalism on state building and risk management is also discussed, as well as the implications of the 2008 change in Australian government.

The March 2007 Japan-Australia Security Declaration has garnered more than its share of hyperbole. Described variously as an historic milestone for peace or an agreement designed to encircle China; the declaration's actual strategic consequences are somewhat unclear. The purpose of this article is to provide a critical analysis of the security declaration and to assess its impact in the context of the changing patterns of the region's security setting. Some have argued that it marks a small but qualitatively significant shift in the essential features of the regional security architecture. The article assesses this claim and argues that while the declaration is of some diplomatic importance, and clearly contributes to improving cooperation in disaster relief and other humanitarian operations, it is of little strategic significance to the broader patterns of East Asian security over the short to medium term. Each side's operational constraints, their different strategic priorities, most obviously their perceptions of China, as well as the continued military predominance of the US, means that the agreement will be of little immediate significance for East Asian security. That said, it remains an important development for the respective parties and is a leading edge indicator of broader forces for change that are increasingly present in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia in 2006 reaffirmed its close relationship with the United States while deepening engagement with other major power partners, with further agreements concluded with China, cooperation extended with Japan, and the profile of ties with India enhanced. Australia continued to navigate through the sometimes sensitive relations among the major powers, amid additional pressures arising from North Korea's nuclear test. Tensions with Indonesia were followed by a new security agreement, though increased confidence was needed in the relationship at both official and public levels. Internal disorder in several southwest Pacific states challenged Australia's capacities to provide effective short and medium term responses. Involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq continued, with the latter situation particularly problematic. Growing demand for energy in the Asia-Pacific region directed further attention towards Australia's uranium resources, as climate change issues assumed a higher profile in domestic debate and multilateral activities.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent triumph of the Howard government at the polls confirms Australia's emergence as an increasingly important ally for the United States. It is willing to be part of challenging global missions, and its strong economy and growing self-confidence suggest a more prominent role in both global and regional affairs. Moreover, its government has worked hard to strengthen the link between Canberra and Washington. Political and strategic affinities between the two countries have been reflected in - and complemented by - practiced military interoperability, as the two allies have sustained a pattern of security cooperation in relation to East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the last five years. This growing collaboration between the two countries suggests that a reinvention of the traditional bilateral security relationship is taking place. At the core of this process lies an agreement about the need for engaging in more proactive strategic behavior in the changing global security environment, and a mutual acceptance of looming military and technological interdependence. But this new alliance relationship has already tested the boundaries of bipartisan support for security policy within Australia, and will continue to do so despite the latest election results. Issues of strategic doctrine, defense planning, and procurement are becoming topics of fiercer policy debate. Such discussion is likely to be sharpened in the years ahead as Australia's security relationship with the United States settles into a new framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The policies of Australia's current government have been so close to the United States as to invite comparisons to an Australian `deputy sheriff' executing the interests and policies of a US global marshal. Advocates of the ANZUS alliance disagree, citing the immense politico-strategic benefits Australia extracts from that relationship and insisting that ANZUS objectives are commensurate with a stable and just world order. Recent developments in international security politics such as the Iraq conflict and the persistence of global terrorism may now challenge that proposition and test the Australian electorate's future support for the American alliance. A greater determination by Australia to cultivate a more balanced approach to alliance politics will underwrite its national security interests more effectively than a sustained and rigid adherence to alliance loyalty under any circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deals with security alliance between Australia and the United States. Critical objective of Australian strategic and defense policies; Abandonment of principle of 'dependence' in favor of 'self-reliance'; Maintenance of British and American military facilities in Australia; Australia's involvement in United States ballistic missile defense efforts.

Introduces a series of articles on the relationship between Australia and the United States. 50th anniversary of the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty; Australian Prime Minister John Curtin's cordial relationship with the American General Douglas MacArthur; Defense alliance without a specific threat designation.

Focuses on role of Australia's External Affairs Minister Percy Spender in the formation of Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty. Importance of including domestic politics when exploring strategically-minded politicians engaged in policy-making; Examination of state of international relations; Anticipation of what lies ahead in relations between parties to the treaty.

Deals with impact of bilateral military alliance between Australia and the United States on security politics in Northeast Asia. Survey of Australian-Japanese relations; Revised United States-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines.

The article evaluates the boundaries that are set by Australian public opinion on overseas military intervention using survey data collected at the 1993 federal election. In this context, the authors also examine public opinion towards the broader but related issues of defence expenditure and threats, the importance of the ANZUS treaty with the U.S. and the potential for new security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. The views of a representative sample of parliamentarians that were collected immediately after the 1993 federal election were also addressed.