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Japan's war reparations began to be paid to Burma and the Philippines in 1956 and ended in 1976. Approximately 65 years have passed since the reparation payment began. The nature of Japan's Official Development Assistance, which has been based on economic infrastructure and prioritises Asia, began with war reparations. Although post-war reparations are relevant to Japan's economic statecraft, previous studies have analysed only the negotiation process for individual countries. No comprehensive historical analysis of war reparations has been conducted so far. This paper fills this gap by analysing the declassified materials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the state-of-the-art Japanese literature based on those materials. It also clarifies the characteristics of war reparations as part of Japan's Official Development Assistance by looking at the projects and goods paid by the reparations in each country. Furthermore, this paper challenges the conventional understanding of previous research on Japan's economic re-entry into Southeast Asia through reparations. The study concludes that reparations were unimportant in increasing Japan's exports to Asian countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bio-medical model of 'mental health' and 'mental illness' that relates to the relationship between wellbeing and distress informs psychopathology and dominates conceptualisation in many Western Educated Industrialised Rich Democratic (WEIRD) populations. This paper aims to critique the model, questioning the appropriateness of psychopathology as a conceptual framework when working as a Western trained clinician with populations such as in China, Japan, Asia, the Middle-East and Africa. The paper also considers the cultural appropriateness of western notions of psychopathology when working inter-culturally in relation to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings, and the Review of the Implementation of the IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's shift to balancing through the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) in 2003 is not solely accounted for by the structural incentives in conventional realism. Rather, it is because of a dynamic interaction of the structure and domestic politics, which is more nuancedly captured by neoclassical realism. This paper posits that the concept of 'vested interests' such as economic ones, and not necessarily leaders' perception of threat, plays a crucial role as a hidden driver of Japan's remilitarisation regarding BMD. The existing literature does not accurately capture 'how' Japan chose the option of BMD as a means of balancing, 'why' Japan shifted to balance and 'when' it completes the shift and begins balancing. Therefore, by supplementing the existing realist paradigms, the paper intends to establish a theoretical bridge between structure and foreign policy outcome with unit-level variables, the value of which lie in the level of maintenance of theoretical rigour with strong explanatory power. The paper contributes to the substantive debate on why, when and how Japan's shift occurred to begin balancing from its previous behaviour, with further contributions to a broader theoretical debate on how a major state responds to a rising power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a summation of material drawn from 18 papers written by Professor Toshio Kuwako of the Tokyo Institute of Technology. The purpose of the paper is to present an overview of Kuwako's approach to consensus building and make it available to the English-speaking world. The papers written by Professor Kuwako are largely experiential accounts with reflection on and analysis of that experience. The organization given to the present paper is that of the present writer. Given that doubts are sometimes raised about consensus building in regard to intractable issues where no agreement seems possible, and that it is precisely these kinds of issues that are the focus of Kuwako's work, his contribution would seem important. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper is concerned with the changing informal views of Japan held in Britain in the decade after 1931. It investigates the relationship between understanding and policy, and how the needs of policy, most significantly the subordination of Asia to Europe, impinged on understanding. In looking in microcosm at where Japan Watchers, made up of newspapermen, missionaries and businessmen, interacted with formal diplomats and government officials, this paper focuses on the lectures and journals of learned societies in London, especially the Royal Central Asian Society, which served as one conduit through which knowledge of Japan passed to an audience with a regional interest. A wider audience was reached through newspapers. In trying to influence the reading public, the importance of ideas having to resonate with the concerns of the reader is stressed. It is emphasized that influence on perception is often dependent on a particular time. The views of Old China Hands came to supplant those of Japan Watchers in influencing the British image of Japan by the late 1930s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic links between Japan and Europe during the Cold War were limited. During this period the IISS helped bridge the gap between the two, exposing its membership base to the international affairs of Asia and Japan and providing Japanses scholars, strategists and diplomats with a platform from which to amplify their voices in the West. Analyses by these experts often appeared in IISS publications, but the Institute also gained key insights through its well-established conferences and lecture series. These initiatives illuminated Japanese strategic thinking and perspectives on contemporary critical issues in Japan's and Asia's foreign, security and defence policy. This Adelphi book, through its collection of earlier analysis, helps the reader to understand the evolution of Japanese strategic thought from the 1960s until today, and shines a light on the continuities and changes in this thinking. New, original analysis of the material seeks to identify areas where such thinking was prescient and remains relevant to the contemporary strategic environment, and other areas where predictions failed or assumptions were proved wrong. These new essays were also informed by interviews of Japanese senior scholars and diplomats who spent time with the IISS. This book seeks to frame, educate and guide strategic thinking on the most pressing issues of today, both in and outside Japan and Asia, and will be of great interest to analysts, practitioners and students of international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is abandoning its once unidirectional foreign security policy towards the USA, two notable examples of which are its increasingly comprehensive and substantial security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. Putting these burgeoning Japanese security partnerships front and center, this paper asks the following questions: What are the characteristics of Japan's maturing security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent emergence? What promotes and constrains their future development? What do these maturing Japanese non-US security partnerships reveal about Japan's direction as a security actor in and beyond East Asia? The paper finds that these two Japanese security bilaterals, which have six basic characteristics in common, are fundamentally driven by the contemporary shift in the balance of power and the strategic challenge that China's emerging maritime power and ambitions present Japan. It moreover argues that the substantiation of these security partnerships have been pursued under American auspices and further invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms. Notwithstanding these encouraging factors, however, domestic and geo-strategic constraints and counter incentives lead this paper to expect further substantiation, but limited military significance in the future of these security partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This short paper examines a forgotten episode in the early 1870s when a steamship flying under the flag of the Bey of Tunis unexpectedly arrived in the port of Yokohama. This steamship, the Zadkia, immediately became involved in a legal dispute regarding the debts of its owner and the status of the ship itself as a vessel from a non-Treaty Power. The Zadkia story was significant in several respects. First, it revises our understanding of when and how Japan and the Islamic lands re-established contact in the modern period. Second, it throws additional light upon the history of the treaty revision movement in Japan. Finally, it represented a new phase for native Japanese journalism when a Japanese reporter attended a European-style trial for the first time. This paper is based upon newspaper reports as well as diplomatic correspondence between London, Tokyo, Yokohama, and Tunis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the defense interdependence between Japan and the United States (US) in the short and long run and to investigate whether Japan is a follower or a free rider of the “US” over the 1975–2009 period. Given that mutual aid between Japan and the US has been maintained, the empirical results suggest that Japanese defense has a stable relationship with US defense. Furthermore, the results reveal that Japan is not a free rider but rather a follower in the period under consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Strategic links between Japan and Europe during the Cold War were limited. During this period the IISS helped bridge the gap between the two, exposing its membership base to the international affairs of Asia and Japan and providing Japanses scholars, strategists and diplomats with a platform from which to amplify their voices in the West. Analyses by these experts often appeared in IISS publications, but the Institute also gained key insights through its well-established conferences and lecture series. These initiatives illuminated Japanese strategic thinking and perspectives on contemporary critical issues in Japan's and Asia's foreign, security and defence policy. This Adelphi book, through its collection of earlier analysis, helps the reader to understand the evolution of Japanese strategic thought from the 1960s until today, and shines a light on the continuities and changes in this thinking. New, original analysis of the material seeks to identify areas where such thinking was prescient and remains relevant to the contemporary strategic environment, and other areas where predictions failed or assumptions were proved wrong. These new essays were also informed by interviews of Japanese senior scholars and diplomats who spent time with the IISS. This book seeks to frame, educate and guide strategic thinking on the most pressing issues of today, both in and outside Japan and Asia, and will be of great interest to analysts, practitioners and students of international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2001 Tokyo and Brussels had very ambitious plans on paper for international economic, political and security co-operation when they adopted the so-called EU-Japan Action Plan for Co-operation (also EU-Japan Action Plan). However, to date, few of the envisioned joint international policies in the areas of global and regional politics and security have actually been implemented since 2001. The EU Commission has repeatedly referred in its recent so-called ‘information notes’ and official documents to the outcome of envisioned joint EU-Japan policies as being ‘disappointing’, acknowledging that the Action Plan suffered from a lack of focus and sought to tackle too many issues and areas without sufficient resources and adequate instruments. Without dismissing out of hand the achievements of EU-Japan on-the-ground cooperation in the areas of international politics and security, much more could have been done together in international conflict prevention, peace-building and other areas of non-military security cooperation given the resources, instruments and capabilities available in both Europe and Japan. This article analyzes why this did not take place, and is unlikely to take place in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the post-war period Australian Prime Ministers have played a proactive role in formulating foreign policy towards Japan. This paper explores the role of executive leadership towards Japan and its impact on the bilateral relationship. The Howard period and current Rudd-led initiatives on whaling, nuclear disarmament, climate change and regional architecture are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author presents information about the creation of the joint Japanese-Chinese historical research project and attempts to identify and clarify some of the misconceptions that have arisen as a result of this joint effort. The article notes that differences arose between the two nations in 2005 after Japan requested a reform of the United Nations Security Council. China protested the reform and suggested Japan should reflect on history. The author discusses the media's portrayal that the teams from the two countries were unable to agree on anything and that little was accomplished.

This article reexamines the conventional wisdom that characterizes Sino-Japanese energy relations as predominantly competitive, but views Sino-Japanese environmental relations as essentially cooperative. Using sociological theories of risk, it is argued that Sino-Japanese cooperation is more likely in both the energy and environmental areas when common risks are perceived and relative gains are minimized. Despite their many conflicting strategic, political, and economic interests, as energy importers who are vulnerable to supply interruptions in the Middle East and competitors for global energy supplies, China and Japan share common risks to their energy security. Consequently, there actually may be increasing opportunities for China and Japan to address their common concerns through bilateral and multilateral cooperative practices, such as common positions on pricing or energy conservation initiatives. Although one would expect China and Japan to highlight their mutual interests in tackling environmental problems such as air pollution, in fact relative gains often impede cooperation. Japan increasingly views China as an economic competitor and is reducing environmental aid, while China continues to set a priority on economic growth, which sets limits on the use of costlier Japanese green technologies. By examining a selection of scholarly articles, reports and newspaper articles by Chinese and Japanese analysts, as well as material from interviews in Beijing and Tokyo in May-June 2007, the paper shows how environmental and energy issues in Sino-Japanese relations may be framed as threats, requiring counter-measures, or common risks, which can be addressed through cooperative practices. Lastly, the paper discusses the possibility of the development of an energy security 'risk community' as cooperative practices develop between China and Japan. Nonetheless, conflicting political interests, strategies, and self-images, accentuating relative gains, may provide obstacles to their cooperation in both energy security and environmental protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of 'the rise of China' on the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and its implications for Japan. Japan has traditionally enjoyed a dominant position in the Bank, as it has enjoyed a dominant position in Asia. However, with the balance of power in the region tipping in China's favour, one might expect that this would be reflected in the ADB as well. This paper argues that despite the worsening Sino-Japanese relationship, the ADB has facilitated the development and maintenance of shared expectations between the two parties over the future direction of development assistance, representing an oasis of liberal institutionalism in a relationship increasingly characterised in realist terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decade, essentially since the Asian crisis of 1997-98, the economic integration of Northeast Asia has been marked by three overarching trends. Economic relations have become: 1) more institutionalized; 2) more "Asian;" and 3) more China-centric. These macro-trends are demonstrated and analyzed in the paper. But by way of anticipation, numerous counter-cutting facts need also to be kept in mind. In essence, recent trends, notable as they are, have by no means reversed three counter-realities: 1) economic ties are still largely driven, less by governments and formal arrangements, than by corporations in search of profits and production efficiencies; 2) despite growing economic interdependence across Northeast Asia and between that sub-region and Southeast Asia, Japan, China and South Korea remain heavily linked to global, and particularly US, markets; and 3) though China is an ever important hub in Northeast Asian trade and investment, Japan remains by far the most powerful economic player in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US-Japan and US-EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US-Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade has brought remarkable changes to the economic cooperation of North-West Japan (Hokkaido and Japan Sea coastal prefectures) and the Russian Far East, such as fast growth of intra-regional trade, great structural changes, a huge increase in the number of cooperating companies and thousands of Russians coming to Japanese ports, which until recently were closed to them. Similar trends were observed in Asian, European and American regions involved in trade with Russia. In Japan, the initial “Siberian euphoria” has gradually been replaced by a much more realistic approach. The reason is that liberalization of trade, globalization and regional development created a number of problems: the prevalence of geo-political over economic considerations in energy projects, the growth of the shadow sector in certain arrears of mutual trade, the very uneven distribution of benefits and losses from cross-border cooperation and the deep differences of public opinion in Japan and Russia. This paper argues that in terms of public finance theory, these problems can be considered as examples of a failure of market mechanisms, shadow economy, negative externalities and asymmetric information, which can only be solved by effective public policy and state intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China is rising as the fastest growing largest economy and thereby leading a market-driven economic integration in East Asia. At the same time, nationalism is also rising and constraining East Asian countries from forming a state-driven regional community. This paper examines the political economy of interdependence and nationalism that is taking place in East Asia. Simply put, its central theme is that the degree of interdependence, especially between China and other countries, is deepening, and as a result, is pulling East Asia toward regional integration, but due to the rising tide of nationalism, it is far short of forming an actual community. In order to build a community, therefore, such economic trend must be propelled by political leadership and will. In elaborating on this thesis, the paper analyzes the trade and production networks centered on China, the efforts to promote regional integration in ASEAN + 3, the nationalist rivalry between Japan and China in negotiating FTAs, and the difficulties in achieving Sino-Japanese reconciliation. Finally, the paper proposes a Northeast Asian Forum among Japan, South Korea and China while the US remains as a stabilizing force in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the Japanese position on East Timor and highlights tension in bilateral relations between Australia and Japan on East Timor during the year 1999. The sources of tension were over leadership, appropriate policy towards indonesia and the style of diplomacy conducted by Australia. In many respects the tension over East Timor shook complacency in bilateral relations. By January 2001 tension was resolved and bilateral ties have been strengthened in the areas of security and regional cooperation. What does this episode reveal about the bilateral relationship? Quite clearly, and despite the depth of networks that have been established over the decades, there was insufficient consultation on East Timor. In pan, the extraordinary events that unfolded after the results of the ballot in East Timor were announced on 4 September 1999 and Australia's leadership role in the international Force in East Timor (INTERFET) can explain the lack of consultation. Also, a drift in relations that had been evident for several years was a significant factor. Finally, the paper argues that despite the substantial improvement in bilateral relations, policy towards Indonesia will remain a potential source of friction between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Asian financial crisis, which violently thwarted the east Asian miracle in the summer of 1997, has subsequently led east Asia to the building of a new financial architecture. This paper argues that the new financial architecture, modelled after the globally influential, market-centred US system, clashes with Japan's regionally active, state-centred financial system. And it explores the implications of these two financial systems for urban development in Asian capital cities. The paper concludes that Asian capital cities will do better with the state-centred financial system than with the market-centred financial system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The content of Japanese history textbooks became the focus of much media and academic attention after the internationalization of the issue in 1982 when Japan was accused by the Chinese government of attempting to re-write its wartime invasion of China in school textbooks. The issue threatened to disrupt the celebrations for the tenth anniversary of Sino-lapanese normalization and, according to some observers, set back Sino-Japanese relations by ten years. In recent years Japanese textbooks have been seen in a more positive light, with progress being made on the inclusion of references to the comfort women and, more recently, Ienaga Saburō's partial victory in his long-standing legal battle with the government. Some have argued that it was the events of 1982 which sparked off the movement to 'liberalize' Japanese textbooks, and that after that date descriptions of Japanese wartime activities in Asia became more 'truthful'. This paper examines the events of the 1982 textbook issue, focusing on the response of the Japanese government to Chinese (and Korean) protests and assessing Japan's foreign policy making vis-à-vis China. Japanese governments are often considered to adopt a 'grovelling' foreign policy with respect to China, giving in to Chinese demands whenever the issue of 'history' is raised. This paper assesses the validity of this claim, using the textbook issue as a case study, and questions whether the textbooks really were radically altered as a result of this diplomatic controversy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations. The continuing crisis has had substantial repercussions for both sides, not only in bilateral affairs but also in the international trading system. With the end of the Cold War, the government-to-government cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats in Washington and Tokyo has decreased as was evident in the summit between U.S. President George Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in 1991. According to the author, a formal treaty will be needed to regulate and guarantee the U.S.-Japanese economic and political relations.

The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one by Takashi Inoguchi on the current debates and possible developments in Japanese foreign policy and another by Takamichi Mito on the constitutional restraints and their implications for Japanese foreign and defense policies.

Japan's economic and political relationship with South Africa has been characterised historically by ambiguity. Throughout the twentieth century, economic ties were underpinned by mercantilist and strategic considerations. During apartheid, this placed Japan in an uneasy position as it sought to balance a relationship of expediency with wider foreign policy objectives in the rest of Africa and beyond. The demise of apartheid created the space for new forms of engagement centred on the pursuit of cognate goals. This has seen the intensification and deepening of economic ties in particular. Yet relations, especially at the political and diplomatic levels, have also been more complex than anticipated, and in recent years, the rise in Africa of other players from Asia and the Global South has had a bearing on South Africa–Japan ties. In this paper, it is argued that two related dynamics pivoting on policy elites’ changing conceptions (or self-view) of the nature of the state they are running and its place in the wider world order help explain the post-apartheid evolution of the South Africa–Japan relationship. First, there has been an apparent shift in South African foreign policy elites’ self-view, mediated by a changing systemic context. The development and manifestation over time of a stronger Global South self-conception in South African foreign policy, fashioned in juxtaposition to what have been considered in the past key Global North relationships, had direct consequences for South Africa–Japan ties. Second, meso- and micro-level dynamics – the role of the general operations in the diplomatic (i.e. bureaucratic) arena, and the personalities and shifting political preferences of individual executive leaders – had major impacts on how South Africa engaged with Japan in the past two decades. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper investigates the risk presumably involved in the narratives of non-Western international relations theory (IRT) by focusing on a similar historical case in Japan. It reveals the risk of uncritically accepted geographical division, and particularly focuses on the discourses of the Kyoto School's theory of world history as an example of non-Western narratives in the past, which was to ‘overcome’ the Western civilization similar to the contemporary non-Western IRT. However, they are also infamous for providing justification for the wartime regime in Japan for their aggression in the Asian continent. What is the connection between their philosophy and support for the imperialist regime? If there is a connection between them, is there any possibility of the resurrection of the same results in the case of non-Western IRT? To answer these questions, the article introduces the philosophy of Tosaka Jun who was critical of the School but, unlike Kyoto School philosophers, stubbornly fought against the mainstream politics of the time. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper deploys the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and consent in order to explore the process whereby nuclear power was brought to Japan. The core argument is that nuclear power was brought to Japan as a consequence of US hegemony. Rather than a simple manifestation of one state exerting material ‘power over' another, bringing nuclear power to Japan involved a series of compromises worked out within and between state and civil society in both Japan and the USA. Ideologies of nationalism, imperialism and modernity underpinned the process, coalescing in post-war debates about the future trajectory of Japanese society, Japan's Cold War alliance with the USA and the role of nuclear power in both. Consent to nuclear power was secured through the generation of a psychological state in the public mind combining the fear of nuclear attack and the hope of unlimited consumption in a nuclear-fuelled post-modern world. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Baseball is not only a popular sport, but also a central cultural and social symbol in Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese societies. These nations have produced some tremendous performances internationally, from the World Little League Competition to the Olympic Games. Most significantly, in the recently instituted World Baseball Classic, Japan won all previous tournaments – 2006 and 2009 – with South Korea winning Silver in 2009 and Bronze in 2006. Baseball in the region has, however, always been embroiled in the maelstrom of domestic politics, international relations and economic difficulties. Exchanges at all levels between these three nations have rarely been congenial, proactive or stable. As the world and baseball enter into a new era of globalisation and internationalisation, this triangular sporting relationship appears to be awkward and clumsy, even though player mobility, media exposure and international competitions continue to grow. This paper overviews the historical development of baseball in these powerhouses of Asian baseball, with an emphasis on the inevitable and fragile relationships between them, discussing the social and political factors underpinning these relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the evolution of Japan-Southeast Asia security relations over the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. It makes two main points. First, Japan's relationship with Southeast Asia is slowly overcoming its traditional aversion of security affairs in defining its relations with Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period. Japan has moved beyond economics to gradually carve out a more proactive role in the security affairs of Southeast Asia in the areas of multilateral security dialogues, peacekeeping missions, disaster relief provision, combating piracy, and others. Second, Southeast Asian states have become more amenable to Japan assuming a security role in the region. Not only have the new security roles contributed to enhanced trust and confidence between Japan and Southeast Asia, but Japan has also achieved the status of being a core security actor in Southeast Asian affairs. This role will continue to flourish in the post-Cold War period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1593, 1609 and 1616 three very different attempts were made by the rulers of Japan to establish formal diplomatic and trade links with Taiwan. The 1593 approach consisted merely of a letter that proved impossible to deliver, while the others involved sending well-equipped fleets to the island. Both the latter expeditions were led by prominent Christians in efforts that ultimately came to nothing, in spite of being backed up by very meaningful threats of military intervention. This paper argues that it was largely the nature of Taiwan itself that frustrated Japan's schemes. Taiwan had no overall ruler who could participate, willingly or not, in the accepted modus operandi that had been applied to Korea in 1592 and Ryukyu in 1609. This was an approach based on the tributary model. Instead Taiwan's fragmentary structure of aboriginal tribes laid it open to a more western-style form of development involving the establishment of a military base and colonisation, a means that was to be exploited by the Dutch in Taiwan a decade later to the astonishment and rancour of the Japanese. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1624, the Dutch East India Company established a colony on Taiwan. When Dutch authorities moved to tax and restrict Japanese traders, who had been sailing to the island for a number of years, they encountered immediate resistance spearheaded by Suetsugu Heizō, a Nagasaki official and merchant heavily invested in the Taiwan route. As part of his struggle against the Dutch, Heizō attempted to drag the Japanese state into the conflict by engineering a fake embassy formed of 16 aboriginal men recruited from a village in Taiwan and transported to the center of Tokugawa power in Edo. This paper explores the embassy and uses it to consider why powerful Asian states like Tokugawa Japan displayed so little interest in overseas expansion, creating a vacuum of power that European overseas enterprises rushed enthusiastically to fill. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines why Japan is not perceived to be attractive by foreign technical talent even though there is growing demand for such professionals. It examines three sets of barriers: Japanese business practices, immigration policies and social-cultural factors. Given Japan's sluggish growth and demographic crisis, the study also suggests that countries and cities, when playing the globalisation game of attracting talent for national competitiveness, must balance domestic and expatriate needs. Based on both published data from Japanese and other sources as well as primary data collected through field surveys of Indian technical professionals in Japan and India, this study places Japan in the wider context of globalisation and mobility of international talent. Based on the patterns of Asian flows of talent, especially Chinese and Indian talent, the paper concludes that Japan must create a conducive professional and social environment to attract talent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's constitutional revision and resultant remilitarization can affect the balance of power in the international system beyond its national borders. This paper critically analyzes the constitutional revision debate in contemporary Japan and the implications for Japan's foreign relations if or when it becomes constitutional for the island nation to possess military forces. It argues that justification for constitutional revision is based on political myth rather than historical reality and rational analysis, and also that a militarized Japan will not enhance its independence or international prestige. Rather, there is the great fear that a new Japan will be further subordinated to the United States as a critical part of the latter's global strategy and defense mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the impact of recent upgrades in security ties between Australia and Japan and their implications for the bilateral relationship. In particular, the development and future of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) is assessed. It is argued that former Prime Ministers Abe and Howard encouraged the enhancement of security ties to unprecedented new highs, but that the rise of China and leadership change in Japan and Australia in 2007 will make the prospects of a full security treaty unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of 'human security' was created by the UNDP in 1994 when the international community became aware of emerging transnational threats following the Cold War. Since then, the Canadian government has developed the idea into an emerging norm of 'responsibility to protect' which requires the international community to rethink traditional notions of state sovereignty and seriously consider guidelines that encourage humanitarian intervention, an approach that has been widely endorsed. The Japanese government, in contrast, has promoted the idea of human security as poverty reduction and human empowerment. This paper examines the limits of Japan's human security policy by examining its background in the geopolitics of the Asian region and its consequent grounding in the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. It concludes by suggesting that the success of Canada's human security policy reflects the transformation of the security paradigm after the Cold War and that Japan has not yet become fully aware of this profound transformation in its own security considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'new' terrorism has not escaped Southeast Asia. Within this region, the Malay Archipelago has the world's largest Muslim population and Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country. In the context of the struggle between radical Islam, and the West and its allies, the region assumes great, long-term strategic significance, particularly to the USA. The threat of terrorism to Australia, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks at Bali in 2002 aimed at its citizens, has also ensured Australia's active interest and engagement with the littoral states of the Malay Archipelago. In addition, arguably the world's most strategic waterway and chokepoint, the narrow Straits of Malacca, is located within this cauldron. More than half the world's trade and oil passes through this strategic straits. By comparison, oil flows through the straits are three times more than through the Suez, and fifteen times greater than the Panama Canal. Not surprisingly, key Western states and their allies that have a deep interest in the security of the Straits of Malacca and in the global war on terrorism have paid special attention to the Malay Archipelago. Indeed, the idea of a Trilateral Security Dialogue centred on the USA, Japan and Australia was first mooted in 2001, and has since involved discussions on Asian security between senior officials of all three countries. In 2005, it was elevated to the level of the foreign ministers of Japan and Australia, and the US Secretary of State. This dialogue process is the third leg in the triangle between the two bilateral US alliances with Japan and Australia. It is obvious that all three are key strategic partners in Asia, with a strong common interest in maritime security and terrorism issues, particularly in Southeast Asia. It is the contention of this paper that this evolving trilateral extra-regional security nexus has benefited greatly from cooperation with Singapore, which has been doing everything it can to encourage and facilitate the regional involvement of these extra-regional powers. In fact, Singapore has become a critical regional ally of all three. On Singapore's part, this represents a striking success in foreign policy as security, political and economic allies enhance its own ability to better manage the new terrorist threats that have emerged since 9-11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facing the surge of "resource nationalism" in energy-producing countries and the rapid growth of energy demand in China and India, the Japanese government has decided to play an active role in securing its energy import, which decision seems to have received the solid support of the people. Effective support by the government to business, needless to say, is welcomed. However, experience teaches that excessive intervention in energy procurement by non-business sectors would do no good and a lot of harm for Japan's stable energy supply in the future. Furthermore, foreseeing a future energy balance in Japan, the country should refrain from engaging in the so-called "scramble for energy" occurring globally. This paper sets out in detail the argument that it is in Japan's best interests to eliminate to as great an extent as possible any political dimension from an energy product such as oil in order to reduce its importance as a strategic commodity and strengthen its characteristics as a market commodity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the development of the Six-Party process through to the joint statement by the parties on September 19, 2005, considers the subsequent decision by North Korea to stage a nuclear test in the context of the apparent stasis of the process, and then reviews the international condemnation that was the result of those tests. North Korea's decision to return to the talks is then discussed in light of the policy issues that must be solved if the September 19 principles can be realized in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the Tokyo campaign became meaningful to Japan not only because the Tokyo Olympics represented an avenue of continued cultural diplomacy for 1930s Japan, but also because the bid effort became enveloped by the larger issues that confronted inter-war Japan. The Tokyo campaign actively challenged the universalistic claims made by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and argued that the Olympic Games would not be truly universal until they were held outside the West. The campaigners for the Tokyo Olympics worked for several years with novel forms of Olympic diplomacy, which included state-to-state negotiations and an all-expense-paid trip for the IOC President to Japan. The IOC responded by selecting Tokyo to be the inaugural Asian Olympics, the first held outside Europe and the United States. The success of the Tokyo bid for the 1940 Olympic Games was ultimately predicated on the fact that for both Japan and the world in the 1930s, the Olympics could no longer be considered solely as a Western monopoly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Japanese and South Korean host-nation support (HNS) policies toward American forces deployed in those two countries from a comparative perspective. It finds that both countries provide substantial support for US forces, contrary to the expectations of collective action theory and the assumptions of many international relations theorists about free-riding. Northeast Asian HNS support tends to be both quantitatively substantial and to involve an unusually elaborate range of common support programs, thus constituting a distinctive Northeast Asian model of “burden-sharing.” The specific programs supporting US forces in these two countries were generally designed by local politicians and bureaucrats, with only minimal input from the US, albeit under American pressure. They were implemented in discontinuous fashion, at critical junctures, as during the Gulf War and the first Korean nuclear crisis. These results thus provide useful elaboration of “reactive state” and “critical juncture” interpretations of how East Asian policymaking relates to domestic and international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the transformation of postwar Japanese “one-country pacificism” toward development into diplomacy based on the concept of human security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to reassess the dominant images of popular militarism or stoic suffering in wartime Japan, this paper takes a street-level view of provincial society during the major conflict with Russia, 1904–1905. It focuses on three main sites of wartime contact between the community and the military: the rail station, the cinema, and the cemetery. By mining local press reports and especially letters to the press from local people, it exposes the diversity of public attitudes towards the war, the military and those in authority; these attitudes include a healthy cynicism and satire towards elites or propaganda, as well as a readiness to express discontent rather than suffer in silence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between about 1890 and 1919, the dominant discourse in Japanese nationalism emphasised Japan's status as a great modern nation, in contrast to earlier concerns about weakness and vulnerability in the face of Western imperialism, and despite continuing insecurities of various kinds. This paper revisits the ‘discourse of national greatness’, focusing on its construction, limitations and consequences. Emphasis on Japanese greatness was evident in the press, in self-presentation at industrial expositions, and in substantial written works by Japanese intellectuals. Several factors explain the rapid spread of such a discourse, including the decline of class and regional identification, the considerable expansion of the press, and the stimulus of war. The consequences of the rise of the notion of Japanese greatness for the later development of Japanese nationalism were profound. They included the further subordination of regionalism, entrenchment of the gendered nature of Japanese nationalism, the further denigration of other Asian peoples and of Japan's own past, reinforcement of the yet fragile cult of the emperor, encouragement to conflate ‘nation’ and ‘state’, and a strong tendency to associate nationalism with military conquest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The period after 9/11 has been labeled the new post Cold War or 'post post Cold War': 1 an era of increased asymmetrical threats and terrorism, deeper global cooperation concerning counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), growing US unilateralism as well as isolation and the birth of the Bush Doctrine. Beyond 9/11, what is the meaning of the new post Cold War for the US-Japan alliance? This paper will address this question from the perspectives of both the United States and Japan in this new era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The integrated system of political-economic relations that has prevailed in the Pacific since the September 1951 treaty of peace with Japan, known here as the San Francisco System, is distinctive in comparison with subregional systems elsewhere in the world. This paper outlines key defining features, such as (1) a dense network of bilateral alliances; (2) an absence of multilateral security structures; (3) strong asymmetry in alliance relations, both in security and economics; (4) special precedence to Japan; and (5) liberal trade access to American markets, coupled with relatively limited development assistance. After contrasting this system to analogous arrangements elsewhere, especially in the Atlantic, it explores both the origins and the prognosis of this remarkably durable political-economic entity. Complementary domestic political-economic interests on both sides of the Pacific, reinforcing a brilliant original Japan-centric design by John Foster Dulles, account for persistence, it is argued, while forces for change center on the dynamic emerging role of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an overview of the philosophy, structure and key objectives of R&D activity in the Japanese construction industry. It argues that this unique model of a close partnership between industry, government and society is based on shared values, and delivers significant benefits not only for firms but for society at large. Additionally, the Japanese system acts as an efficient market entry barrier that protects the Japanese domestic market from foreign competition while concurrently providing the basis of Japan's competitive advantage in international markets. To illustrate how significantly different the Japanese model is from those of other advanced economies, an empirical comparison of the belief structures concerning responsibility for R&D of key players in the construction industries in Japan and Australia is presented. The results illustrate the point that, unlike Australia, Japanese contractors play a much more extensive role in society than do their Australian counterparts. This role incongruence may be the true barrier to penetration of the Japanese construction market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the relational nature of globalization between Japan and Britain, and addresses Japanization in this context. Japanization, defined as Japanese influence on UK management styles (particularly in the area of production management), will be examined through three case studieswhich illustrate the context of Japanization in terms of the convergence of British management towards human resource management (HRM). Hallmarks of Japanization are methods and techniques of production management which overlap with those of HRM. It is also significant that the diffusion of Japanization and HRM in Britain took place concurrently, leading to the conclusion that Japanization and HRM represent a synergistic relationship of managerial strategy, on the one hand, offering suitable conditions for Japanization, and, on the other, the enhanced diffusion of HRM in Britain through Japanization. This paper also examines how British academics have reflected Japanization in their research. In this way, it is also possible to pinpoint the influence of Japanese techniques and methods effective for production management. Although Japanization and HRM overlap both in content and period of diffusion, in the long term Japanization may be considered as an integral part of the general diffusion of HRM in Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades, against the backdrop of multiple anti-Japanese protests in China, the rise of Chinese nationalism has been much debated. By taking the 2010 and 2012 Sino–Japanese crises over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a case study, the article applies discourse analysis to media articles and interviews to ascertain the Chinese government's propaganda toolbox in shaping the nationalist discourse, as well as to substantiate the defining features of anti-Japanese nationalism. The findings reveal a combination of strategies and techniques that the propaganda apparatus uses, such as the creation of an 'us-versus-them' dichotomy, galvanised inclusiveness, censorship, and 'card-stacking' to mould nationalism. The article substantiates empirically both top-down and bottom-up strains of nationalism, and their interaction through the four key themes of sovereignty, history, mistrust and reactivity. It finds that Japan bridges these strands of Chinese nationalism, but in its absence alternative views of nationalism are articulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]