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The article discusses Australia's approach towards world as revealed in Defence White Paper (DWP) 2013, released by Australia's former Prime Minister Julia Gillard on May 3, 2013. DWP mentions that Australia has approved several proposals for defence procurement including the unveiling of new aircrafts and has also signed strategic partnership agreement with China in an effort to strengthen its military system. Also discussed are Australia's good relationship with India and the U.S.

Presents the February 2000 white paper by the People's Republic of China about the relations of Mainland China and Taiwan. China's basis and prerequisite for achieving peaceful reunification; Questions involving the One China Principle in cross-strait relations; Adherence to the One China principle in the international community. INSET: PRC White Paper....

The article discusses about various issues related to the U.S. security policy on China. This discussion shows that, from China's perspective, the key to improving the U.S.-China relations is not stressing common interests in reality, but stressing China's long-term goodwill. The most important issue in the U.S.-China security relations is Taiwan issue. When dealing with Taiwan issue, China should also take into account how to influence the U.S. concerns about gains. The U.S., therefore, might adopt a more co-operative policy on China.

This paper addresses the underlying meaning of Chinese political ideas as represented in the Belt and Road discourse. It aims to contribute to overcoming the bias towards democratic systems in security studies. It challenges the argument that China's peaceful words can be taken at face value and compared with the ideas of democratic regimes. It delivers insights on new perspectives in the 'political threat versus desecuritization' discussion. This paper applies a qualitative discourse analysis with primary data collection of Chinese governmental and state institutional documents, Chinese think tank papers, and joint statements of EU-Chinese governmental officials. The data was analysed with NVivo Software. The empirical analysis shows that Chinese actors have built up a threat narrative idea which is hidden behind words such as 'trust, harmony, pluralism, community of a shared destiny'. Theoretically, this paper shows that the organizing principle, to apply Buzan's words, needs to be acknowledged when interpreting the way Chinese actors frame ideas in the BRI discourse. It challenges the argument of China as a desecuritization actor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines issues surrounding the national unity and territorial integrity of Taiwan. Significance of national reunification of China and Taiwan; Discussion on the civil war started by the Kuomintang; Position of the Chinese government regarding the settlement of the Taiwan question.

Evaluates the various factors that influence the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. Details on international factors; Factors originating in mainland China; Factors arising from developments within Taiwan.

On June 25th, 2021, the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China issued a white paper entitled "China's New Political Party System." This document argues that the political systems of Western nations are "outdated" and emphasizes the superiority of the political system of "Chinese democracy," as promoted by Xi Jinping. However, the Chinese government's official English translation leaves out the context of "newness" and does not emphasize the harmfulness of the West's "outdated" system. Why was the English version rewritten with little nuance? This could be because of a desire to avoid drawing international criticism for its plan to boost China's "international discourse power" (国际话语权 in Chinese), which President Xi Jinping has sought to shore up. This paper argues that China's "new political party system" was implemented as a political tool to formulate Xi Jinping's new social science theory. Thus, it did not bring about any major changes to China's political consultation system, in which "democratic parties" can consult with the Communist Party but basically cannot oppose or disagree. Additionally, the phrase "new political party system" was created amidst conflict around discourse power with the West and was an argument with strategic significance in its connection to foreign policy. Discussion of China's political system is likely to become all the more important amidst the current structural conflict between the US and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China remains reluctant in claiming unilateral economic sanctions as a valid form of statecraft. China has consistently withheld official acknowledgment of its use of unilateral sanctions despite using them in different disputes. This has resulted to observations arguing that China is increasingly approaching the use of sanctions in a stealthier, therefore, more aggressive manner. It begs to ask, how does China's reluctant attitude towards its use of unilateral economic sanctions fit into China's overall foreign policy logic? More specifically, how does China's victimhood discourse justify unilateral sanctions and at the same time, promote a positive identity of itself in light of coercion? This paper argues that China's consistent vague acknowledgment and denial in claiming a direct hand on unilateral sanctions comes from its broad foreign policy objective of maintaining a positive identity through its discourse of victimhood. To uncover this understanding, this paper analyzes China's official positions in six bilateral disputes where China has resorted to unilateral sanctions. While existing observations only stop at 'plausible deniability' as primary explanation for China's vague rhetoric, analyzing China's predication strategies provides a necessary nuancing in terms of how this peculiar behavior remains consistent with China's overall foreign policy logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employing insights provided by the theory of monopolistic markets in economics and Great Power behaviour in the discipline of international relations, this paper aims to provide an alternative understanding of India's refusal to join the BRI beyond the immediate bilateral security, domestic politics, and economic considerations in Sino-Indian relations. We argue that BRI is an effort by China to position itself as the leading firm in the market for international development – a space for long dominated by Western development providers. The paper argues that India's efforts to contest the BRI can be seen as a natural outcome of other rising powers resisting China's efforts to monopolize the development market. In doing so, it provides a template of why rising powers compete with each other in providing developmental aid even when cooperation may create mutual benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents an excerpt from China's national defense white paper published on July 28, 1998, which deals with China's strait relations with Taiwan.

Since the United States and China established diplomatic relations, this relationship has been encountered many difficulties; for example, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the 1999 US-led NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the 2001 US-China aircraft collision in China's Hainan Island, and China's 15-year World Trade Organization accession negotiation process and its disputes later with the United States under the WTO, etc. Needless to say, the two great powers also have serious debates and arguments on the Taiwan issue. Under this long-term US-China strategic competition and conflict, Southeast Asian countries therefore have their views and considerations. They smartly have cooperated with China on trade and economic issues while are eagerly or kind of faithfully inclined toward the United States on political and militarily issues. This paper therefore wants to review first the neorealist assumptions on great powers' relations, and then examine US-China strategic competition and rivalry in the Pacific. Also, it introduces Singapore's domestic politics and foreign policy as well as its strategic hedging considerations and choices under US-China power rivalry and make a conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte government (2016–2022). During this period, Philippine foreign policy is widely acknowledged to have undergone dramatic shifts, with the government making friendly overtures towards China at the cost of its traditional alliance with the US. From a foreign policy analysis perspective, this paper explicitly focuses on the role of political leadership in guiding national foreign policy. This paper argues that the Duterte government made strategic use of political marketing in promoting its populist foreign policy. Thus, political marketing is used as an analytical lens with which to examine much of the rhetoric and behaviour of the Duterte government, particularly in regard to its response to the US–China rivalry. By engaging in this supposedly diplomatic game, the Duterte government tried to sell its foreign policy promises and outcomes as products even when its rhetoric was at times disconnected from its actual performance. Overall, this paper develops an alternative perspective from which to add to our understanding of the role of populist foreign policy initiatives in a fragile democratic setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a conceptual and analytical framework of states' legitimacy-seeking to comprehensively investigate the motivation behind China's climate and environment policy. While previous research has largely overlooked political factors that underlie China's climate policy, this paper argues that these factors are crucial in understanding China's policy changes, which are evident at both domestic and international levels. By examining sources such as government documents, leaders' speeches and authoritative literature, this study contends that China's climate change initiatives are part of a broader effort to enhance domestic and international legitimacy. The issue of climate change has become highly politicised in China under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, and it serves as a crucial test of the ruling party and the state's capacity to govern effectively. As such, legitimacy-seeking is the key driver that links China's domestic measures and international commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has been contributing to new approaches to global governance. The Health Silk Road (HSR), a significant component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was proposed by China in 2016. This paper claims that HSR is a new institution introduced alongside the existing WHO-led multilateral health system, and its relationship with the existing system can be described as layering. Having explored the new development of HSR during COVID-19, this paper further argues that while HSR has its unique strength in making contributions to global health governance and economic recovery, it faces a prominent issue of securitisation in the context of China-U.S. strategic competition, suspicion of the quality of medical products and sectoral fragmentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the growth of the military capabilities of China. The author looks into the comprehensive force modernization program of China, as well as the possible implications of China's military capabilities to the national security and national interests of the U.S. He states that it is important for the U.S. to cooperate bilaterally with China, because China is an important factor in international relations. He also talks about the modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Comparing China's 2006 and 2015 Africa policies, this article reveals how China's political discourse has become more confident, practical, and depoliticised. In particular, this paper shows how education is allocated, promised, and embedded in China's 'shared' agenda, which is centred on development co-operation and mutual learning. It then reflects on the extent to which China may move towards traditional donors. This paper concludes that, despite fragmented convergences in the discourse and an increased recognition of a Chinese model, China maintains its distinctive role and position in the post-2015 era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking a spatially sensitive approach to evaluating China's quest of soft power, this paper conducted a media discourse analysis of European countries' perceptions of China's growing international influence in general, and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in particular. Preliminary analysis reveals regional diversity in media coverage of the BRI that was partially caused by a country's position as a 'discourse leader', 'discourse responder' or 'discourse follower'. In terms of the contents, this paper noticed a huge discrepancy among the European countries towards the potential impacts of the BRI and China's rise in international affairs, and recorded a shift from a rather positive to a cautious attitude among the European Union's leaders. It is suggested that China's spatially blind approach to using soft power to promote BRI in Europe may be partly to blame for its limited success so far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China grows in international importance and influence, more and more countries worry about how it will behave, and are preoccupied with the hard question of how to tame it. As a middle power Australia has sought ways to influence the thinking and behaviour of Chinese policymakers. The Australian approach to taming China represents an academically puzzling and politically intriguing case, which, unfortunately, has not been studied in detail. The paper has argued that the concept of taming offers significant intellectual advantages in its reconsideration of Australia's China policy and has called for Australian scholars and policymakers, to critically rethink unspoken and understudied Australia's taming practices and policies. To this end, this paper has proposed an experience-based theory of taming as a key research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of 'revisionism' has caught the attention of international relations scholars amid intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. It is a trademark of rising powers, and China was likewise expected to become a revisionist power, intent on changing the status quo. However, history tells us that not all rising powers necessarily become revolutionary states, seeking to overturn the prevailing order and replace it with another through hegemonic wars. This paper presents a novel understanding of revisionism by distinguishing between strategic 'contestation' and 'challenge'. In the context of declining unipolarity, a dissatisfied rising power will contest the rules and principles of issue-specific regimes and demand legitimate adjustments that better reflect the new distribution of power. A challenge emerges when demands are rejected, and a contestation leads to 'deconcentration' and 'delegitimation' of the established order. The establishment of the AIIB can be examined as an example of contested multilateralism that falls short of a challenge. This paper concludes that China is 'contesting', not 'challenging' the liberal international order and suggests a set of countermeasures that the U.S. can think of: selective accommodation, reinforcement of alliances and partnerships, and overcoming domestic challenges such as populism that undermine the liberal values, constitutive of the liberal international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revises the bellicist theory of state-making by examining the interconnection between state-making and nation-building in the Third World. It argues that nation-building mobilisations for the purposes of self-preservation and aversion of unbalanced wars are equally crucial. By focusing on the People's Republic of China's involvement in the Afro–Asian cultural cooperation in the 1950s, this paper elaborates on how internationalism plays a role in the state-driven mobilisation of the general public for the purpose of nation-building in China. It looks at the role of transnational exchanges of cultural productions and cooperation in spurring social empowerment and nation-building in the post-World War II Afro–Asian world under the framework of the Afro–Asian solidarity movement. The Afro–Asian cultural cooperation was intended to create alternative visions to the West-centric narratives of modernisation among the general public. These visions in turn inspired the general public to be involved in nation-building movements in respective Global South nations. This synchronic relationship between national independence and internationalism in China is crucial in understanding the state-making in the Global South as a process of political, economic and, more importantly, cultural decolonisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some observers expected a drastic change in the Philippines' diplomacy toward China when Rodrigo Duterte said goodbye to the United States in 2016. However, after six years, the Philippines has remained an allied partner of the United States. The Philippines' defense establishment bolstered its maritime domain awareness capacity thanks to financial and technical support from the United States. Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) maintained the award from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) favoring the Philippines over China. This paper sheds light on the Philippines' policymaking process by framing the politics of grand strategy in an emerging state. The grand strategy is an intellectual architecture to clarify the general direction of foreign policy shaped by multiple state actors who are not limited by the foreign affairs office. Neither asymmetrical power relations nor presidential power can dominate the direction of the Philippines' diplomacy. The president, the DFA, and the defense establishment have developed institutional foundations to craft particular policies. Once they designed the grand strategy in the 1990s, successive policymakers did not remove it but rather incrementally changed it, especially in the 2010s, when they faced a series of assertive actions from China. In an emerging state with limited state capacity, Filipino policymakers do not always coordinate well with each other but still maintain a certain level of autonomy to create particular policies. Against the dominant framework of the weak state, this paper argues that Filipino policymakers demonstrate the state's capacity to achieve their policy goals, even with limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given that China and Türkiye are direct successors of former empires, i.e., the Qing and Ottoman Empires, they share common feelings of century-long Western humiliation, constrained maritime space, and unfinished territorial unification in modern times. However, the two countries chose divergent paths of modern national building, which result in their turbulent bilateral relations in the 20th century. While the old structural disagreements are not completely fading away, China and Türkiye have tended to build a more cooperative relations in 21st century as both of them struggle to adapt to the common challenges of neoliberal world order, which leads to more convergences than divergences in their second nation building process. Based on this historical comparison, this paper suggests that the nation building processes and its reflections on foreign affairs are the structural factor in China-Türkiye relations, which defined potential issues of cooperation and division between the two countries in different times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of significant international events like the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s assertive diplomacy, the recently developed concept of strategic corruption has been increasingly employed to discuss how corruption infiltrates international affairs. Unlike traditional corruption, strategic corruption is commonly understood to be a sophisticated mechanism that states use to achieve geopolitical objectives, intertwining economic and security concerns. This paper explores this concept, analyzes its relationship with related phenomena, and proposes a theoretical framework to contextualize strategic corruption within national and international arenas. The framework depicts strategic corruption as a multifaceted process spanning three spheres: domestic (source), international, and domestic (target). Each sphere involves unique pathways aimed at corrupting institutions in the target domain. This approach contributes to our understanding of the complex dynamics between corruption, national security, and foreign affairs, offering a coherent tool to address these challenges within the fields of international relations and anti-corruption studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bio-medical model of 'mental health' and 'mental illness' that relates to the relationship between wellbeing and distress informs psychopathology and dominates conceptualisation in many Western Educated Industrialised Rich Democratic (WEIRD) populations. This paper aims to critique the model, questioning the appropriateness of psychopathology as a conceptual framework when working as a Western trained clinician with populations such as in China, Japan, Asia, the Middle-East and Africa. The paper also considers the cultural appropriateness of western notions of psychopathology when working inter-culturally in relation to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings, and the Review of the Implementation of the IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By conducting discourse analysis on Chinese textual materials around 1962, this paper tries to inductively explore the national identities of Chinese people during the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. It finds that China perceived itself as a persistent and resilient nation in the ongoing fight against invasion and oppression. The predominant social discourse around 1962 showed a strong enmity and resistance toward the imperialism which was then imposed on India. These national identities have formed a natural response as maintaining a tough stance toward incursion and repression, and have contributed to China's resolution to defense its territory with resorting to military force, even though it might not be beneficial in terms of diplomatic relations and economic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores hedging in a theoretical thinking and applies it to the foreign policy of India in an era of growing USA–China power rivalry. In this regard, hedging is defined as insurance seeking strategy under situations with high uncertainty, where rational actors (both middle and small states) will try to avoid taking sides and to pursue room for autonomy in decision-making. While Washington and Beijing dislike middle and small countries' hedging, they both overlook that it is the uncertainties stemming from their own behaviors that push middle and small states to hedge. As uncertainties deepen, most countries in Indo-Pacific region will prefer to use hedging policies to reduce their possible losses. For India, unless USA–China rivalry escalates into a direct military conflict, or unless Washington retreats its commitment to regional security in Indo-Pacific, then India will stop hedging and moving to bandwagoning with China; or if Beijing's actions directly undermine India's vital interests in security, then India's hedging will be replaced by balancing against China. In short, hedging is a passive response, not an active choice; India's hedging strategy is very likely to persist on making ambiguities in the USA–China–India strategic triangle and entanglement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the strategic partnership between China and the UAE. It begins with an analysis of the concept of strategic partnership, based on the existing literature on the topic in international relations. Since there is no consensus as to the meaning of the term strategic partnership, the paper applies Thomas Wilkins's model or framework to explain the UAE's partnership with China. Wilkins is among the few to develop a conceptual framework or analytical model of the term. The paper then focuses on the foundation of the strategic partnership between the two countries, and goes on to analyze the prospects for the future of this partnership. The paper argues that although this partnership is strong, its future depends on two important factors. The first is UAE's alliance with the United States, and the second, China's relations with Iran. Driven as it is by economic considerations and a mutual desire for closer security and political cooperation, the partnership cannot, however, ignore these two important aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzing North Korea is essential for examining international relations in East Asia as a whole, but North Korea's tight control over information makes this difficult. Another factor complicating analysis of North Korea is its "special relationship" with China. The aim of this paper is to examine four factors contributing to the "special relationship" between China and North Korea, how that relationship came about, and how it functions within the context of international politics today. This paper is a structural analysis of China–North Korea relations that describes four factors behind their "special relationship." It continues by analyzing China–North Korea relations under Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un up to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. The "special relationship" between China and North Korea is based on four factors. What is distinctive about these factors is that they can bring the two sides together but also push them apart. In terms of national security issues, the force bringing them together has ultimately prevailed. Socialist ideology issues have surfaced much less frequently now and have lost their capacity to both bring the two together and push them apart. In the area of traditional ties, the two leaders are attempting to use their personal relationship to have closer relations, but this is not having much lasting effect. Where economic relations are concerned, Beijing and Pyongyang have become even more dependent on each other and this is a strong force pushing them closer together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental changes in the Arctic region attract global attention. China, with its growing power, has been steadily increasing its presence in the region and in January 2018 published its first Arctic policy paper. At the same time, there are numerous actors within China that are interested in the Arctic and have the capacity to influence China's Arctic decision-making process. However, what is less clear, is how China's Arctic policy is being formulated across the Chinese government and what role different subnational actors play in its formulation and implementation. This research seeks to fill this gap. Drawing on fieldwork and Chinese texts, this study aspires to further develop our understanding of the workings behind Chinese state policy formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the introduction to the special issue on 'Contesting liberal internationalism: China's renegotiation of world order', this paper outlines the theoretical framework of the special issue, namely international order and order contestation, and the main arguments of the four papers included in this special issue. Recently, a, albeit not the, key challenge to the liberal international order stems from the leadership aspirations of non-Western, non-liberal states, and their increasing demand for a greater voice, most notably China under the leadership of Xi Jinping. This special issue is constructed as a debate concerning the alleged challenges posed by China to both the political and economic spheres of the liberal international order. The four case studies and papers are grouped into two core themes: the impact of China's state-capitalist development model and practices on the liberal economic order, and China's attempts to transform norms and rules in security-related matters. The four papers aim to appraise Chinese discursive narratives and practices that would collectively challenge American liberal hegemony. Altogether they argue that a hybrid of order-building norms and practices is likely to co-exist alongside the prevailing liberal international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how ideas of "race" and racial identification have, in different ways, been central in the construction of modern nation-states, both in East Asia and in postcolonial Southeast Asia, helping to entrench notions of racial difference as a fundamental element in nation-building. Processes of human racialization – and consequently, the homogenization of racialized identities and essentialization of human inequality – are thus persistent structuring devices that organize the workings of human societies. The paper focuses especially on the complex and contradictory ramifications of the racialization of "the Chinese" inside and outside of China, threatening to take on a perilous turn in the current era of China's rising global power and heightened Sinophobia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Australia relations have experienced a rapid deterioration in the past half-decade. From genial ties centred around trade and exchange, the relationship has descended into mutual hostility, prompting the editor of China's Global Times to notoriously liken Australia to a blob of gum on the bottom of a shoe. To explain the deteriorating relationship, scholars have proposed numerous ideas, pointing to factors as wide-ranging as 'Chinese influence', poor diplomacy efforts, and ontological (in)security touched off by neoliberal governmentality. The current paper examines these ideas in a literature review, then synthesises such ideas to provide its own explanation of why things 'went wrong'. It also addresses corollary questions such as why Australia adopted a uniquely assertive China policy, and why this occurred specifically around 2017. We argue that the breakdown in relations can be attributed to the rise of nationalist, sovereignty-oriented movements in the West, and the spillover effect this had on Australian leadership; the profound uncertainty attending the election of Trump and his isolationist tendencies; and the shift to a more rigid, authoritarian approach to foreign affairs under Xi. This perspective adds to the literature by identifying failings on both sides while underscoring significant yet underappreciated global trends, such as nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the Philippines form its foreign policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC)? Existing work on the Philippine foreign policy toward China explains the country's stance solely through geopolitical or domestic factors. By examining the political calculus of, and the policy formulation by, the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016), Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022), and Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (2022-) administrations, I argue that a combination of domestic politics, geopolitical considerations, and economic realities have shaped the approach of the Philippines toward China. Rather than focus on one factor to explain the Philippines' foreign policy, I suggest that the combination and interaction of these three factors accounting for how various Philippine administrations have operated explains the Philippines' China policies. Furthermore, I nuance these three factors through the lens of political survival. I suggest that leaders stay in power by accumulating political power and staving off challengers. In the Philippines, I suggest that leaders capitalize on criticizing or deviating from the prior administration's China policies, which have resulted in economic or political effects that generate resentment from the population. As a result, Presidents often reverse or modify the policies set about by the previous administration, resulting in a new set of approaches toward China. Data on this paper was facilitated by years of fieldwork conducted in the Philippines between 2017 to 2020. I interviewed officials in the Aquino, Duterte, and Marcos administrations, Filipino oligarchs, political brokers, lawyers, political party representatives, and in-country observers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors have contributed to the evolution of bilateral relations between the smaller states in the Indo-Pacific region and China? How much agency do the smaller nations have vis-à-vis the superpower candidate? This paper introduces the pentagonal model, the analytical framework of a joint study organized by the JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development on these topics. The pentagonal model identifies five factor areas: domestic politics, economy, international relations (global), international relations (regional), and peace and security. Applying this common framework allows us to identify and compare the dynamics of the evolving relationships between China and the smaller states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examine what factors played a determining role in creating new and dynamic bilateral relationships between the "sixteen" smaller European states and China, particularly the Republic of Serbia. Our research will notably examine the expressed capacity of the local actors in Serbia and their main drivers to accept and support China's initiatives. A new chapter in cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC) resulted from the one-sided PRC initiative. Vulnerable to the consequences of the global economic crises and neglected by Brussels, member states among the "sixteen" were attracted to China's promise of market access for their products and investment. The Balkan states, severely affected by the civil war in the 1990s and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, were in an even grimmer condition and even further from substantial developmental assistance from Brussels. The domestic economic and somewhat political drivers were the main ones that existed with all the local agents and their willingness to engage. In the case of Serbia, there were also powerful peace and security issues. Additional drivers come from international relations, and major power rivalries became increasingly apparent with the rise of project numbers and values and China's growing political clout over the included countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the establishment of "friendly and cooperative relations' in 1992, relations between South Korea and China have been continuously elevated almost every 5 years. The two countries have achieved great advancements in expanding civil exchanges, bringing economic relations closer, finding common ground in foreign policy and security and elevation of political relations. Despite the honeymoon period that the two countries experienced after they established diplomatic relations, however, conflict is now arising due to differences in opinion and interests in various fields such politics, economy, society, culture, diplomacy, and security. This paper will examine Sino-South Korean relations using the four factor model, which is based on four approaches, starting with economic relations, followed by perception and emotions, diplomacy and security and lastly, these factors" influence on domestic politics. Following this analysis, this paper will argue that despite their continuous but rocky developments, Sino-South Korean relations will sustainably maintain their development. Considering the synergy effect of bilateral relations, two countries are standing on the opportunity to build a New Type of Sino-South Korean relations which would allow for resolution of conflicts and misunderstandings through dialogue and communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the extent to which the official Chinese discourse of Ecological Civilisation (shengtai wenming) is adhered to in practise. Ecological Civilisation (or Eco-Civilisation) is presented as a Chinese vision of human progress which purports to de-couple economic development from environmental degradation. Underpinning the idea are five overlapping pillars (environment, economy, society, culture and governance) which, it is claimed, provide a theoretical framework to promote harmony between humanity and nature. Advocates see the concept as an example of a new Chinese modernity based on socialist values and President Xi Jinping has declared China a torchbearer of the global endeavour for Eco-Civilisation. However, our paper casts doubt over this assertion when applied specifically to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although there is some evidence of a commitment to the principles of Eco-Civilisation, we identify a number of substantial and interlinking practical shortfalls relating to three core themes: inclusion, enforcement and transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) announced in 2015, is a $60 billion package of Chinese-led investment in roads, railways, energy, and industry. It is part of China's new Eurasia-wide Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The likely impact of CPEC is controversial. Some scholars argue that CPEC will generate prosperity, regional equality and rapid economic growth in Pakistan. Other scholars argue, however, that CPEC will lead to debt and to the economic and political subordination of Pakistan to China. The existing discussion of CPEC has a near exclusive inward-looking focus on Pakistan. Some scholars, mainly from outside of Pakistan, have looked in more detail at China, but principally from an international relations perspective. Missing from all of this discussion is how economic change in China, particularly in western China, will influence the likely economic outcome of the CPEC. This paper makes an effort to begin to fill this gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper maps out contemporary discourses of Chinese diplomacy that have proliferated under the aegis of 'major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics'. We examine how these narratives are underpinned by webs of relationality that see China promoting equal and win–win partnerships with other state actors, yet are also defined by hierarchical premises for such diplomatic engagements. These relational contradictions are most clearly manifested when we interrogate the spatial dynamics of China's diplomatic endeavours through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By scrutinising the geopolitical imaginations, sites and scales associated with the BRI, we turn attention to three spatial tensions that are closely bounded up with the relational contradictions of Chinese diplomacy: 'win–win' diplomacy promoting a 'harmonious world' versus territorially based diplomacy; periphery diplomacy versus the global ambitions of BRI; and the centralisation versus decentralisation dimensions of Chinese diplomacy. This allows us to make sense of the multiplicity of descriptors that have been affixed to Chinese diplomacy, in order to underscore the 'work' they perform to bequeath (at times, divergent and contested) meanings to China's new foreign policy approach. Hence, a relational and spatial understanding of Chinese diplomacy, we argue, can reveal a more nuanced picture of the promises, potential and disjunctures of China's rapidly expanding geopolitical and diplomatic actions on the international stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan occupies an elevated role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and hosts its so-called flagship project, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Existing literature has often interpreted this project from a geopolitical perspective, as a vehicle through which a rising China projects influence on a peripheral country and advances its own centrality in international affairs. While such motivations certainly played a major role in getting the project off the ground, they are not the sole determinant of its design, or the heated controversies it triggered within Pakistan. This paper seeks to capture both dimensions by analysing the development of CPEC, and the handling of the conflicts it sparked, through a lens of overlapping centre–periphery relations: one between China and Pakistan at the international level, and one between Islamabad and peripheral regions and groups within the country. I argue that this model best captures the pivotal position and resulting agency of national governments in shaping local BRI implementations. It also shows how the BRI is not a straight case of Chinese influence radiating outwards; rather, contestation by local actors in turn forces adaptations in Chinese foreign and security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does power shape foreign policy attitudes? Drawing on advances in psychological research on power, I argue that the sense of relative state power explains foreign policy hawkishness. The intuitive sense that "our state" is stronger than "your state" activates militant internationalism, an orientation centered on the efficacy of force and deterrence to achieve state aims. Beyond general orientation towards the world, this sense of power explains discrete attitudes towards pressing security issues, from threat perception in the South China Sea to nuclear weapons use against Iran. Five original surveys across the US, China, and Russia, as well as an experiment fielded on the US public, lend support to these claims. The psychological effects of state power overshadow dispositional traits common in behavioral IR, like individuals' personalities and moral proclivities. More surprisingly, power changes individuals, making hawks of even the most dovish. Taken together, the paper presents a "first image reversed" challenge to standard bottom-up accounts of foreign policy opinion and offers unique explanatory leverage in a potential era of US decline, China's rise, and Russian belligerence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When great powers such as the United States and China grow especially hawkish with more uncertainties, how does a smaller state react to such a complex and dangerous territorial conflict? Given the competing frames of influence between China and the United States, what are the underlying reasons for the shift in the Philippines' foreign policy? This paper focuses on the Philippines' changing foreign policy on the South China Sea dispute and examines the main rationale for its shift in strategy towards China. We use the perspective of neoclassical realism to unpack the constraining factors that underlie the Philippines' domestic politics and ongoing global exigencies. With changes in its domestic politics and the security challenges posed by the evolving geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, the Philippines is in a difficult situation, having to choose between a territorially hostile trading partner and its historical security guarantor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia is one of the founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and, next to China, one of its leaders. While being an active and engaging member of the organization, Russia's strategy towards SCO remains puzzling. Initially, it sought a pragmatic cooperation with China on solving numerous security issues that plagued post-Soviet Central Asia. However, Russia gradually developed alternative regional bodies (viz. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)) where it is a supreme leader, and which became its preferred tools for interacting with other states in the post-Soviet space. This impacted the place and role of the SCO in Russia's regional and global strategies. Moreover, Russia's growing power asymmetry vis-à-vis China added an additional dimension to its consideration of SCO. Hence, Moscow promoted several policies, especially the enlargement, which seemed to undercut SCO's development. This paper relies on a theoretical framework of the so-called theory of cooperative hegemony, especially the application of one of its main analytical variables – the commitment capacity – to examine Russia's policy towards SCO. Apart from considerable secondary sources, the article draws upon six semi-structured expert interviews, and a number of primary documents including but not limited to foreign policy concepts, declarations, and charters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China-ROK boundary disputes in the Yellow Sea and the associated fishing conflict are often neglected in the rich body of literature on China's maritime disputes. This article examines the question of why and how China has persistently pursued a de-escalatory posture in the Yellow Sea in the past decade despite having considerably hardened its posture in the East and South China Seas. I argue that the high stakes China has in its bilateral ties with South Korea create strong incentives for Beijing to deescalate maritime controversies whereas the absence of broad-based hawkish pressure at home creates a permissive domestic political climate for Beijing to pursue de-escalation. This paper also evaluates conditions that may facilitate a hardening Chinese position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investigating a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project in Myanmar, this paper contests the proposition that China's state-coordinated investments are, by nature, more accommodating to local people's demands than Western investments. Tension between Myanmar villagers and the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) in a copper mine project does not square with Beijing's "inclusive globalization" narrative. Drawing upon extensive semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in a Sino-Myanmar copper mine project, as well as other secondary data, this study finds that the Chinese SOE's operation was reactive to the ebb and flow of social resistance and the government's pressure amid the host country's democratization in the 2010s. Reforms were more likely to occur when the Chinese SOE observed more domestic constraints in its operation environment. It showed less incentive to improve its business practices when societal actors failed to display strong resistance, and the host government did not care about its legitimacy. Despite Beijing's efforts to craft an image of itself as a responsible power, conflicts in the BRI project should not be simplified as the SOE's defiance of the state's regulations. They are rooted in the state-centric foreign policy that systematically overlooks societal actors in state-coordinated investments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses papers published within the issue, including one on the response of China, Brazil and India to the responsibility to protect doctrine within the United Nations, another on the foreign policies of Brazil and South Africa and a case study of China's intervention to remove its civilians from the Libyan civil war.

This paper assesses the role of the BASIC countries — Brazil, South Africa, India, and China — in UN climate change negotiations. The paper explores the formation and evolution of the group, and focuses on how the four major developing countries of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have coordinated their positions and acted jointly to achieve an agreed outcome with other players in the recent UN Climate Change Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, based on an analysis of their country profiles and negotiation positions on a wide range of climate issues. The paper argues that the emergence of the BASIC Group is a reflection of the ongoing power shift from EU–US agreement to BASIC–US compromise in UN climate negotiations since the early 1990s. The rise of BASIC also has its roots in recent global market dynamics and further reflects the power transformation in the economic dimension of the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Asia's growing share of the global economy provides one of the strongest themes in contemporary analysis of international affairs. The remarkable economic achievements of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan over the past 50 years have been compounded more recently by the rise of the Chinese and Indian economies. While the significance of this change in the way international wealth is shared was beyond doubt before the onset of the current global financial crisis, many commentators expect that when the world eventually emerges from the crisis Asia's share of the global economy will have grown even further. This shift clearly has strategic importance: economic decisions made in Asia, whether by governments or business, are now more important for the rest of the world than they have been for centuries. If military power were moving in the same direction, and at the same pace, the strategic consequences would be even greater. This paper examines trends in Asian military spending and modernisation. It begins with a summary of defence spending among Asian countries.1 It next considers the nature of the capabilities and equipment they are acquiring, and comments on the way in which forces are being structured, commanded, and managed. It then comments on the range of different factors that are driving military spending and modernisation in Asia, and offers particular comment on China in this regard. The paper then concludes with brief comments on United States and Australian military spending and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to observe how China's exercise of economic statecraft changed with the growth of its economic power. While there is a widely accepted consensus that the distribution of economic capabilities has changed in favor of China over the recent decades, it still needs to be examined what effect this has had on China's actual bargaining behavior within that new power structure. The analysis is built on the framework of complex interdependence, arguing that the expansion of China's economic capabilities has led to greater levels of interdependence with other countries and has also tilted the power asymmetries in favor of China. The analysis operationalizes the change in China's exercise of economic statecraft, i.e., the use of economic tools in pursuit of national objectives abroad, as a foreign policy change and observes the quantitative change (how intensively the same economic tools were utilized), the qualitative change (what means specifically were employed) and the change in goals (what national objectives these economic means were aimed at achieving). The analysis demonstrates that China used the same economic tools more intensively as a result of higher capacity. Also, it turned to unilateral economic sanctions more often since 2007. Further, China embraced multilateralism in the exercise of its economic statecraft under the current leadership. The paper concludes that in the interdependent world, a very inertial process of power asymmetry shift to China's favor has started and China is likely to be increasingly able to translate its economic power into actual influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prevailing narratives in the discourse on China-Africa engagement are that China is developing Africa. This paper departs from those narratives because they disregard the agency of Africa's political elite. Basing its argument on the nature of the African political elite, the paper analyses their role in determining the impact of China's economic and trade engagement on economic development in their respective countries. To do that, it first discusses the nature and identity of African political elites, and examines how they control their states and scarce resources. Having done that, the paper then analyses their role in determining the nature and extent of development emanating from their countries’ economic engagement with China. It then concludes that it is not how much foreign states invest in African countries that determines Africa's rise, but rather political elites who influence the direction of their states’ development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]