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The German Federal Climate Change Act includes binding annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets for the economic sectors energy, industry, buildings, transport, agriculture and waste. For sectors that fail to meet their targets, climate policy measures have to be implemented immediately. However, some sectors may only have achieved their targets thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, while others may have missed their targets because of COVID-19. For policy making, it is therefore important to disentangle the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic from the effects of policy and other drivers on emissions. In this paper, the effects of the pandemic on GHG emissions in Germany in 2020 are estimated at the national level and at the levels of the economic sectors. Counterfactual emissions are estimated here based on autoregressive econometric models, thereby distinguishing between different factors of emissions based on decomposition analysis. The findings at the national level suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic lowered GHG emissions in 2020 in Germany by about 41 Mt CO2-eq (5.15%) compared to counterfactual emissions. Accordingly, about 58% of the reduction in emissions between 2019 and 2020 in Germany may be attributed to the pandemic. The findings at the sectoral level imply that without the COVID-19 pandemic, all sectors with the exception of the transport sector, would have met their emissions target in 2020 as set in the Federal Climate Change Act. The transport sector would have missed its emission target in 2020 without COVID-19, suggesting that existing policies were not strong enough to bend the curve of emissions trends sufficiently down. In contrast, the buildings sector failed to meet its target in 2020 because of COVID-19, prompting immediate climate policy measures in this sector. The COVID-19 pandemic lowered greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Germany in 2020 by 5.5% compared to counterfactual emissions and accounted for about 58% of total estimated reductions between 2019 and 2020. Without COVID-19, all sectors but the transport sector would have met their emissions targets. Climate policy response should take into account the effects of extraordinary events like COVID-19 suppressing GHG emissions based on counterfactual emissions because failure to implement measures early on may turn out to be costly in the medium term once the transitory emissions reductions no longer occur. Counterfactual emissions should be considered prior to crediting emissions surplus or deficit to subsequent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Norwegian climate policy has been marked by several shifts with regard to adopted targets and measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Three knowledge-based discourses – respectively a tax discourse, a quota discourse and a technology discourse – have been influential throughout. By tracing the development of Norwegian climate policy from 1989 until 2008, it is shown, however, that while significant in early phases of policymaking, the discourses lose influence in the phase when policy solutions are designed and implemented. Those ideas and ambitions that characterise the ruling discourses in Norwegian climate policy are not necessarily materialised in actual policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a broad literature that suggests that neoliberalism is the predominant force structuring climate change policy. However, analyses that focus only on the creation of carbon markets as neoliberalism's effect on climate policy are too restricted. Focusing on the United States, as the paradigmatic neoliberal state, it is demonstrated that, because neoliberal states must nevertheless intervene to promote accumulation, and because system-wide regulation of greenhouse gases has been impossible to achieve, the United States has developed a range of alternative means by which to pursue emissions reductions. These means derive from the ‘strategic selectivities’ (or historical path-dependencies) inherent in federal policy development in the United States. The focus is on three ways that this has occurred: the growth of sub-national regulation; the use of executive authority; and in particular the deployment of a dense network of research and development infrastructure through which the development of new energy and environmental technologies is supported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued here that stringent, early emission reductions are necessary in order to minimize 'dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system' (DAI), the stated Objective of Article 2 of the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). Given probability distribution functions (pdfs) for climate sensitivity and the temperature threshold for harm consistent with currently available evidence, and accepting a 10% risk of unacceptable damage as the threshold for 'danger', it is not possible to avoid DAI. Having adopted a precautionary approach in setting emission trajectories, the possibility arises that future resolution of uncertainties concerning climate sensitivity and the harm threshold may show the climate sensitivity to be low (1-2 K) and the harm threshold high (2 K rather than 1 K). Using a simple coupled climate-carbon cycle model, it is shown that if the climate sensitivity were to be definitively determined to be 2 K in 2020, then the emission reductions achieved by that time and planned for the next two decades are still fully needed. Only if climate sensitivity is very low (1 K) and the harm threshold is high (2 K) would the emissions achieved by 2020 not have been fully necessary. However, this would still lead to changes in ocean chemistry that are likely to be highly detrimental to marine life. Thus, when the full spectrum of impacts is considered, there is no plausible set of assumptions under which stringent near-term emission reductions are rendered unnecessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is first to provide empirical evidence of what can be seen as a rather remarkable change in EU’s position on the use of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading (ET) in climate policy, from the role of a sceptic in the run-up to Kyoto towards more of a frontrunner. The paper argues that there is a synergistic and multilevel mix of explanatory factors for this “U-turn”, including developments at the international, EU, Member State, sub-national, and even down to the personal level. Second, the paper explores and discusses the philosophy behind the Commission’s proposal for a directive on GHG ET. Third, the paper examines the prospects for ‘success’ of a scheme for EU-wide ET using a multifaceted set of metrics. In brief, we argue that output success—the chances for having a directive adopted—hinges on the resolution of two key issues. First, whether the preliminary phase is to be mandatory or voluntary, and second, incompatibilities with domestic ET schemes. Outcome success—steering and cost-effectiveness—will in turn depend on factors like the coverage of the scheme and inclusion of project-based credits, while more long-term political implications hinges on the successful adoption and operation of the scheme.“The Proposal on emissions trading represents a major innovation for environmental policy in Europe. We are de facto creating a big new market, and we are determined to use market forces to achieve our climate objectives in the most cost-conscious way […]. The emissions trading system will be an important cornerstone in our strategy to reduce emissions in the most cost-effective way”.Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstro¨m. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Official figures submitted in 2002 showing the trends of GH gases during the period 1990–2000 indicate that Spain is a long way from in attaining its commitments with the international and national programmes on climate change. Both structural and cultural factors are used to explain the evolution in climate politics and the growth of its emissions with particular emphasis given to the lack of public participation in this respect. It is also argued that Spain will have either to buy emission reductions abroad or/and find new ways to reduce GH in a more decentralised manner in tune with its current Autonomous Communities’ (ACs) political organisation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]