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Väitöskirja käsittelee myöhäiskeskiaikaa ja sukuverkostoteemaa. Työssä selvitetään Ingeborg Aakentyttären ja hänen sukunsa - Tott - toimintastrategiaa suvun ja sen yksittäisten jäsenten valta-aseman säilyttämiseksi Ruotsin valtakunnassa. Tutkimuksessa selvitellään valtakunnan mahtiryhmittymien keskinäistä valtakamppailua, Tottien maaomaisuuden kehittymistä sekä Tott-suvun suhteita talonpoikaiseen paikallisyhteisöön ja kirkollisiin piireihin. Tott-suvun strategiassa mahdin kulmakiviä olivat avioliittojen solmiminen, perinnönjaot ja maaomaisuus. Ylhäisen naisen elämän ja tekojen sekä häntä tukeneen suvun ja verkoston analyysi syventää uudesta näkökulmasta kuvaa myöhäiskeskiajan yhteiskunnasta. Three generations of the heirs. Ingeborg Åkesdotter (Tott) and her family (ca. 1460-1507)

Historian unohtamat - Suomalaiset vapaaehtoiset Venäjän armeijassa 1. maailmansodassa 1914-1918 on ensimmäinen kokonaisesitys niistä sadoista suomalaisista, jotka värväytyivät Venäjän armeijaan 1. maailmansodan aikana. Teoksessa tarkastellaan vapaaehtoisia sekä sotilaallisesta että sosiaalihistoriallisesta näkökulmasta. Historiankirjoituksessa aiemmin lähes kokonaan sivuutetut Venäjän armeijan vapaaehtoiset - noin 700 värväytynyttä miestä - ovat mielenkiintoinen ja merkittävä osa Suomen historiaa aikakaudella, joka yleensä on mielletty venäläisten sortotoimien ja jääkäriliikkeen ajaksi. Tutkimuksessa selvitetään vapaaehtoisten motiivit värväytymiselle sekä heidän lopulta varsin uhrautuva palvelunsa Venäjän armeijassa. Kansainvälisesti mitattuna vapaaehtoisjoukon tappiot olivat yhtä suuret kuin maailmansodassa kaikkein raskaimpia tappioita kärsineiden kansallisuuksien tappiot olivat. Enemmän kuin joka neljäs ei koskaan palannut sotaretkeltä kotimaahansa. Uutta tietoa saadaan myös vapaaehtoisten osallistumisesta Suomen sisällissotaan, jossa heillä oli varsinkin sodan alkuaikoina merkittävä osuus erityisesti valkoisten puolustustaistelulle. Myös punakaartin historiassa on aiemmin lähes täysin sivuutettu Venäjällä sotilaskoulutuksensa saaneiden vapaaehtoisten olemassaolo ja toiminta punaisten riveissä. FORGOTTEN HISTORY: Finnish volunteers in the Russian Army in World War I, 1914-1918 After several centuries under Swedish rule, Finland became part of the Russian Empire in 1809. For most of the 19th century the relations between the Finns and the Russians were good. Thousands of Finnish officers served in the Russian Imperial Army and even the units of the Finnish Army occasionally took part in conflicts where Russia was involved. In those conflicts abroad, where the participation was economically possible, the Finns showed that they were interested in voluntarily defending the interests of the Empire as long as relations between the Finns and the Russians were still on a firm footing. However the so-called Russification process ­ starting officially in 1899 ­ quickly impaired the relationship. One of the consequences was that the Finnish Army was disbanded and therefore the Finns were not under the Military Service Law when World War I broke out in August 1914. At the beginning of the First World War the Finns ­ to the amazement of the Russian authorities ­ showed no signs of disloyalty. Instead there were obvious signs of loyalty. The Finnish officials did all they could to help the Russian military with their mobilization and the public showed enthusiasm as they cheered the Russian troops leaving for the front. The Finns had their reasons for loyalty, as they were afraid of a German invasion, which might have included the destruction on Finnish soil not only by the enemy, but also through the activity of the retreating Russian troops. The Finns were also hoping that by showing loyalty during the war, the Russians might restore their full-scale autonomy. Besides, there were not so many alternatives. The Germans and the Austrians, the chief enemies of Russia, were also fighting against Great Britain and France and it was unlikely that the Germans could hold out for long. Clearly the only realistic alternative was to support Russia. However as the situation was complex ­ especially with the heritage of the continuing Russification process ­ Finnish loyalty was still searching its limits in August and September 1914. Despite the obvious loyalty, nobody from the top of the Finnish society was willing to risk his political carrier by expressing this view officially. It was simply impossible. However, there seemed to be a widespread interest in the war and the atmosphere of loyalty encouraged many Finns to attempt to enlist in the Russian units as early as the beginning of August. However, the Russian units stationed in Finland did not have any instructions regarding the recruitment of Finnish volunteers and they turned them down. The commander of the 22th Corps stationed in Finland was for military reasons interested in the Finnish volunteers. As they possessed knowledge of the local terrain and the local languages, they might be useful to the Russian troops in repulsing a German invasion of Finland. As the Russians became aware that the Germans had no immediate plans to attack Finland, they changed their plans. It was now decided to attach the Finnish volunteers as part of the field army fighting against the Germans and Austrians in Poland, Galicia etc. Even Czar Nicholas II became interested in getting the Finnish volunteers into his army and gave official approval on 26 August 1914. The approval of the Emperor was at least partially influenced by the interest shown by the Finns. Besides those Finns ­ mainly from the lower classes of the society ­ who had been trying to enlist directly in the Russian military units, there were also several inquiries from educated youngsters regarding the Russian military schools. The interest shown by the people encouraged V. A. Lavonius, a member of the political group of Young Finns, to even suggest the reorganization of the Finnish Army. His own party rejected the idea and the Young Finns were also keen on keeping the proposal away from the public eye. Since the Czar had given his approval for the Finns to volunteer for the Russian Imperial Army, the opportunity became an attractive alternative, especially for workers from the lowest urban social groups. But it was also a short-lived option. Most of the common people, joining as private soldiers, volunteered in a period of only one and a half weeks in early September. Starting from mid-September 1914 there were only a small number of recruits joining the Russian Army as private soldiers. The main reason for this was probably the harsh policy of the Russian authorities, which in autumn 1914 slowly destroyed the spirit of loyalty. Later in the war a relatively high share of volunteers were educated Finns who were planning their future career as officers or who wanted to use this position as a springboard to advance in their civilian careers. It was a tempting opportunity to get an officer s rank after only four-months studies. The overall picture of the volunteers During the First World War there were around 500 privates, an estimated 130 military school students, five former officers (who were not regarded as reservists, but voluntarily joined the army) and three doctors (serving in the military units) who voluntarily joined the Russian Army. Moreover, there were around 100 men who actually recruited themselves in Helsinki, but who decided to opt out of the military when they were to be transferred to Russia for training in a few days. The Russian military officials did not treat these men as deserters and they could freely return to civilian life. On the whole there were therefore over 700 recruited Finns of whom around 600 actually served in the Russian Army. The loyalty shown at the beginning of the war was an essential element for hundreds of Finns joining the Russian Army. However, despite the common loyalty regional differences were vast, indicating that the anti-Russian feeling was stronger in some areas. Therefore in the provinces of Vaasa and Turku and Pori there were relatively few volunteers. Naturally most volunteers came from areas where the people were more favourably disposed towards the Russians, or at least maintained a more neutral attitude. Therefore two provinces ­ Häme and Uusimaa ­ provided many more volunteers given their polulations. Of all the volunteers Häme contributed 19.3 per cent and due to the high interest of men in Helsinki, Uusimaa contributed as many as 44.4 per cent. Whereas the more neutral attitudes towards the Russians made it possible to join the army, the reasons were mostly social. The real supporters of the Russian administration were only a marginal group among those joining the army. The provinces of Häme and Uusimaa were so prominent probably because there were so many uneducated casual workers in industry and construction. Moreover, there was proportionally high share of urban people and the local Russian garrisons also had a positive influence on the subject. Around 60 per cent of the volunteers came from the cities, whereas only over 15 per cent of the entire Finnish population (1914) lived in cities. The social reasons for enlistment were especially decisive for the lower classes of society. The outbreak of war caused serious unemployment and as casual workers were used to being unemployed in winter even during ordinary times, they found it made economic sense to join the ranks to avoid the hard times. Army would supply them with food and other necessities at the same time as their families would get financial aid from the state. Thus even though the volunteers included a notable share of youngsters excited about the war, there were also more mature people in this group than in the Jäger movement or among those Finns who fought as volunteers in East Karelia or in Estonia after World War I. The share of men over 30 years was 10.6 per cent and the share of married men was also around 10 per cent. The chief motive of the educated Finnish volunteers ­ former officers, doctors and those who enlisted in the military schools ­ was professional. This also gave them a better opportunity to explain their decision even when it was made after the first enthusiasm of 1914. Almost 90 per cent of all the privates enlisted already in 1914, whereas the share of those starting at the military schools in 1916 was still as high as 20.1 per cent of the total share of the war-time recruits in these schools. Life in the Russian Army After the first hesitation the Russian Army incorporated almost all their Finnish volunteers in the field army fighting against the Germans and the Austrians. The frontline against Turkey was held almost entirely by troops from the local population and the Finnish volunteers there were extremely rare exceptions. Before going to the front the Finns ­ who were untrained civilians, the few exceptions being veterans of the Finnish Army ­ had to go through military training. For this purpose, the enlisted Finns were usually sent by train to St. Petersburg, where the training usually lasted approximately one month. The unluckiest ones were trained for only two or three weeks. In St. Petersburg the Finnish volunteers were also assigned to their military units. There were three kinds of units were they were deployed: 1) The regular regiments with their training battalions in the area of St. Petersburg 2) The regular regiments deployed near St. Petersburg and were supplemented there before transportation to the front 3) The reserve regiments composed entirely of reservists from St. Petersburg While deciding where they should send the Finnish privates, the Russian military officials took into consideration that their units should maintain their military capacity and therefore the Finns ­ who were almost entirely ignorant of the Russian language and only hastily trained ­ were distributed among various regiments. Most volunteers went to the famous Preobrazhenski Guard Regiment, which received around 100 Finns. On the whole approximately 40 per cent of the privates ended up serving in the units of the Russian Guard. Most of the others served in various infantry regiments. The deployment of the Finns was done rationally. If a private soldier had a civilian profession which might be useful for the army, this was often taken into consideration. But as many Finns could not speak Russian, they usually ended up serving as regular rifleman. About 90 percent of all volunteers ­ the war-time officers included ­ served in the infantry. Deployment to the navy, artillery or cavalry was possible only for educated Finns with Russian skills from school. However, in some cases even their skills were quite elementary. It seems obvious that the Russians trusted the Finnish volunteers quite a lot, because the educated ones were allowed to enlist at the Russian coast artillery units and their border troops stationed in Finland even when the Russians had become aware of the pro-German Jäger movement. After the March Revolution in 1917, the Finnish war-time officers were more likely to be transferred to Finland as the Provisional Government preferred a more liberal policy towards national minorities. The volunteer privates reached the front at the end of October 1914. In the meantime the Germans had launched their attack on Warsaw thus almost every unit ­ including those containing volunteers ­ was sent to Poland. Some of these units took part in the battle of £ód immediately after they had reached the front in mid-November. This battle caused heavy casualties for the volunteers, at least partly due to their short training, which had also been affected by their ignorance of Russian. In total over 160 Finnish volunteers lost their lives in World War I ­ most of them killed in action in their first battles in 1914 and 1915. The casualties of the Finns were even heavier than the average losses of the Russian Army in World War I. There were several reasons for this. The major part of the Finnish volunteers already went to the front in late 1914, whereas many Russian soldiers were conscripted later in the war. Also, whereas many older Russians served in the rear, the Finns were almost exclusively used in the front-line units. Moreover, as mentioned before, nine volunteers out of ten served in the infantry, which suffered the heaviest casualties in World War I. The casualties of the Finnish volunteers were proportionally as heavy for instance as those the Scots sustained on the Western Front and only those nationalities ­ for instance Turks ­ who were seriously affected by illnesses, suffered higher losses than the Finns. All in all, approximately every fourth volunteer died in the war. The casualty rate of the private soldiers was over 32 per cent, whereas the officers casualties were only 6.5 per cent. The Finnish volunteer officers were not so keen to die for Russia as, for instance, were those Finnish officers already serving in the Russian Army before the First World War. The main reason for the low casualties among the war-time officers was that their main interest was not to serve the Russian Empire. In general only few volunteers were pro-Russian. On the contrary, it can be proved that many others were keen supporters of the nationalist movement in Finland. This was especially the case with most war-time officers. Besides, many future participants of the Jäger movement first either joined or planned to join the Russian Army; there were at least 34 of them. Finally, eleven of them served in the Russian Army only to desert it later to join the Jäger Battalion in Germany. There must have been a notable number of wounded among the volunteers, especially during the heavy fighting of 1914 and 1915. A rough estimate says that at least 250 volunteers were wounded. Moreover, from 80 to 90 men became prisoners of war. More than 10 prisoners died before being released from their camps. The first prisoners were released even before World War I ended. This was because Germany became involved in the Civil War in Finland in spring 1918. At the request of the Finnish authorities the Germans began releasing their POWs. The first volunteers released from Germany were war-time officers, whereas the enlisted men were mostly kept in captivity as the Finnish and German authorities were more interested in sending home those Jägers still left in Germany. Most of the volunteers were then sent back to Russia in late 1918 and early 1919 after the capitulation of Germany. Because the border between Finland and Russia was closed, their repatriation to Finland was mostly delayed until 1921 and 1922. The atmosphere in Finland Those volunteers returning home either on leave or released from the army due to illness or wounds, found life in Finland hard. Most of them had no property and as their first act had to apply for free transportation to get home. The authorities were able to find jobs for only the educated volunteers, whereas soldiers with elementary education had to be satisfied with the fortification works ­ if they were healthy enough. Some volunteers had to fall back upon stealing to avoid hunger. Whereas the volunteers had enlisted during the atmosphere of loyalty, they now came back to Finland where the wind had changed. Though not all the Finns shared the spirit of pro-German Jäger movement, it was clear that loyalty to Russia had come to an end. As this was quite clear to everyone in Finland and even to the Russian Governor-General F. A. Seyn, those Finnish officers joining the army before World War I were still hoping that by recruiting volunteers the Finns could get concessions from Russia when the war was over. The most notable Finnish officer in the Russian Army, General Gustaf Mannerheim, was on leave in Finland early 1916 and in a private conversation he suggested that the Finns should recruit a unit of volunteers to join the Russian Army. There were also a few other Finnish officers making the same proposal before and after the March Revolution of 1917 as these officers ­ who like Mannerheim had been in Russia for some time ­ were not familiar with the atmosphere in Finland. All these plans failed as they lacked support in Finland. During the war those volunteers repatriated to Finland to recover from their wounds or diseases, found it difficult to return to the army. They had already faced the hard life of the front lines and the contrast between that and life in peaceful Finland was so great, that the temptation to stay at home was almost irresistible. Even though desertion was a serious problem in the Russian Army, the conditions in Finland seem to have caused the Finnish volunteers to be even keener on deserting than their Russian counterparts. Already before the March Revolution 30 Finnish volunteers deserted from the Russian Army. Most of them had not returned to their units after leave, but a few even deserted from their training battalions in St. Petersburg. In Finland it was relatively safe to hide and the authorities managed to capture only one third of the deserters. After the March Revolution the Finnish authorities refused to co-operate with the Russian military authorities and from now on the deserters lived semi-publicly. As the revolution slowly destroyed the order in the Russian Army, even many war-time officers wanted to leave the army. Some of them tried to obtain posts as police chiefs in Finland, but this was not possible until autumn 1917 as the Russian Army refused to give up their officers. Resignation from the army was practically impossible until December 1917, when the demobilization of the army began. This enabled both the war-time officers and the private soldiers to return home. However, the actual return was still hampered by the difficulties in transportation. Officers were especially concerned about their security during the journey. The Civil War in Finland Finland proclaimed their independence on 6 December 1917. However, a confusing atmosphere prevailed in Finland and the country was split into two hostile groups, the Whites and the Reds. Both groups already began to create their military organisations in spring and summer of 1917 and the work was intensified later that year. As there were only a few Finns with modern military education ­ the major part of the Jägers were still in Germany ­ the volunteers from the Russian Army should have had an excellent opportunity to be attached to these new military organisations. But it was a complex situation. The Whites ­ lead by activists who for several years had been planning the liberation of their country ­ were suspicious of the volunteers serving in the army they were planning to fight against. Their distrust became even stronger as the war-time officers set up their own military organisation trying to overthrow the existing organisations of activists as the leaders of the liberation movement. However, the new organisation was short-lived as it lacked the support in the country. As the activists were leading the formation of the White Guards, it was natural that the volunteers of World War I were not much involved in training these new troops. Besides they were hampered by the fact that many of them were still part of the Russian Army at the end of 1917 and in early 1918. The volunteers themselves were apparently not interested in training the local White Guards and became more involved only when the first officer s vacancies in the regular troops of the Finnish White Government opened up in early 1918. The Reds ­ led by the leaders of the working class, who hoped for aid from the Russian soldiers stationed in Finland ­ were lacking a functional organisation to make more systematic use of their former volunteers, which they needed even more than the Whites. The Whites had many former officers and even some Jägers to train their troops, but the Reds had only individual soldiers who had served in the Finnish Army at the turn of the 19th century. It is estimated that from 25 to 30 former volunteers took part in training the local Red Guards before the Civil War broke out in January 1918. That was more than the Whites could achieve. The White Guards were declared government troops in January 1918 and Finland was definitely divided on January 28th when hostilities broke out. Although the Whites controlled the major part of the country, most of the volunteers of the Russian Army were living in the southern regions held by the Reds. Moreover, even those volunteers still on their way home from the battlefields of World War I and living in the northern part of country, had to stay in southern Finland and in some cases found their place in the ranks of the Red Guards. The lack of co-operation between the war-time officers of the Russian Army and the activists caused some 40 officers to remain in the southern part of Finland or in St. Petersburg when war broke out. Only a few of them managed to cross the front line to the north and most of them had to join the secret White Guards in the Red controlled area. In Helsinki, and especially in Viipuri, they had an important role leading these units, but militarily they were quite insignificant. Only the White Guard of Kirkkonummi, which was led by several war-time officers, played more important role in the war. As part of educated society, the war-time officers favoured the Whites and only one of them joined the Red Guards. Otherwise most of the enlisted men of World War I living in the south served in the Red Guards and those living in the northern part of the country fought for the Whites. Of course there were also exceptions and in southern Finland especially many volunteers did not join the Red Guards at all or did so only when they had no other choice. On the whole there were around 110 former volunteers fighting for the Whites and almost exactly the same number serving in the Red Guards. The major impact of the former volunteers of the Russian Army ­ mostly officers ­ for the White cause was at the beginning of the war. During the first days of the war a few of them led the local White Guards of southern Finland northwards, where they were desperately needed to form the front-line against the Reds. These troops enabled the Whites to repel the front-line attacks of the Reds in February and early March 1918. The impact of the former volunteers as leaders of the White troops was considerable, especially in the front lines of Vilppula ­ Ruovesi, Karelia and Sysmä ­ Heinola. However, when the main forces of Jägers arrived from Germany at the end of February and were attached to the army, they also took the leading role as commanders of the White troops. During the last part of the war, starting from the mid-March, the former volunteers held mostly secondary positions. The Germans invading the southern Finland and the Jägers leading the Whites were the definitive winners of the Finnish Civil War. Throughout the whole Civil War volunteers serving with White Guards had to face an atmosphere of mistrust coming both from their subalterns and their subordinates. In the worst cases the troops refused to serve under the leadership of the former volunteers. The Jägers also made it quite clear that they were unwilling to serve with these former enemies . The volunteers were in the best position to accomplish their task, when they were operating near their home area where they were better known ­ and where the mistrust was therefore less ­ or when they were serving under the high-ranking former officers of the Russian Army. Despite all this, the Whites were able to take more advantage of their volunteers than the Reds did. The whites also managed to attach the former volunteers in their army quite well in keeping with their military training, whereas the Reds failed badly in this. As the Reds had only one war-time officer fighting for their cause, they were compelled to deal with the former private soldiers. As they were recruited mostly from the lower classes of society, it was not easy for them to achieve the highest command posts in the Red Guards where the leaders usually came from the labour organizations. A few former volunteers managed to become battalion commanders or a front-line leaders, but the main impact was at the level of company commander or platoon leader. However, even these were not very active during the war and in those rare cases where they had command of an operation, the success was minimal. The former privates lacked the training for military leadership and had been waging a different kind of war on the Eastern Front than they faced in Finland. The major impact of the former volunteers in the Red Guards was that they were able to communicate directly with the Russian military personnel supporting the Reds. This was especially important for front-line leaders, as the Reds were short of people who could speak Russian. Moreover, the former volunteers were able to teach the Reds how to use a machine gun ­ a weapon totally unknown to the otherwise highly respected former soldiers of the Finnish Army. The forgotten history In the Civil War the Whites were victorious and therefore in a position to dictate how the history of the war was written in the next two decades. Finnish history saw the Jägers as great heroes of the war, whereas the volunteers of the First World War were either disgraced or more usually simply forgotten. In the same way society and the new Finnish Army supported the Jägers and the former volunteers were mostly forced out of the ranks during the 1920s. The former volunteers also themselves contributed to their being forgotten. As the winners of the Civil War, the Whites were decidedly hostile towards the Russians and also the new leaders of the labour movement were also reluctant to recall a period of fraternization with the Russians. The former volunteers themselves understood it was better not to look back and kept quiet. Even after World War II it was politically incorrect to recall the former volunteers of the Imperial Russian Army. Time is a great healer. After 90 years the Finns serving in the Russian Army in World War I no longer give rise to heated debate. Probably they did not deserve such treatment in the first place either. The Finnish activists dismissed them as traitors or at least adventurers. However, only a few Finns serving in the Russian Army had pro-Russian sympathies, whereas many others had only a neutral attitude towards the Russians or were even keen supporters of the Finnish national cause ­ if not of independence, then at least full autonomy. Therefore, although they had no wish to serve the Czar and his empire, they faithfully fulfilled their military oath to him; every fourth of those serving in the Russian Army lost their lives in the First World War.

Kenttäoikeudet on ensimmäinen kokonaisesitys punaisten ja valkoisten kenttäoikeuksista vuoden 1918 sisällissodassa Sisällissodan taistelujen ulkopuolella tapahtuneita väkivallantekoja, ns. punaista ja valkoista terroria, on selitetty yksityisinä kostotoimina, jotka tapahtuivat ilman kummankaan osapuolen sodanjohdon hyväksyntää. Laajaan lähdemateriaaliin pohjautuva tutkimus osoittaa, että huomattavaa osaa niin valkoisten kuin punaisten terrorista voidaan pitää rationaalisesti perusteltuna, organisoituna väkivaltana. Kyse ei ollut pelkästään yksittäistä rivimiehistä liikkeelle lähteneistä kostotoimista, vaan sotajoukkojen päällystön ja tätä toimintaa varten erikseen muodostettujen organisaatioiden toiminnasta. Se oli keino käydä sisällissotaa. Punaisesta terrorista noin kolmasosa, valkoisesta terrorista ehkä pääosa oli tällaista rationaalista rankaisutoimintaa. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan tilastollisesti kenttäoikeuksissa tuomittuja, tuomioita, tuomareita ja oikeuksien jäseniä. Punaisten osalta tarkastellaan useiden yksittäisiä tuomioita langettaneiden kenttäoikeuksien toimia sekä Toijalan ja Kouvolan terrorikeskuksia. Valkoisten harjoittamien rankaisutoimien osalta kuvataan Kemin, Värtsilän, Raahen, Varkauden, Hyvinkään, Hämeenlinnan, Lappeenrannan, Viipurin, Vihdin, Luumäen, Virolahden ja Viipurin läänin Uudenkirkon pitäjän puhdistusta kenttäoikeuksien pöytäkirjojen valossa. Kenttäoikeudet on ensimmäinen yleisesitys Suomen sisällissodan terrori-ilmiöistä yli 35 vuoteen. Tutkimus tuo myös, perehtymällä ensimmäistä kertaa kenttäoikeuksien pöytäkirjoihin, koko lailla uuden näkökulman sisällissodan väkivallantekoihin. Työ haastaa monella tavalla perinteiset tulkinnan sisällissodan väkivallanteoista. Court-Martial without Law. Punitive measures in the Finnish Civil War of 1918 Over 36 000 people died in the Finnish Civil War of 1918. In southern Finland the Finnish Red Guard staged a coup d´ état on 27th January 1918. The White Army, consisting basically of volunteer Civil Guards, started operations against Russian military troops and Finnish Red Guards at the same time in northern Finland. After three months of war the White Army prevailed in May, but the state of civil war persisted until the summer of 1918. In the Civil War about 5 000 Reds and 4 000 Whites died in battle. After the war was over 13 500 Reds died in POW camps, usually from hunger and disease. The most controversial part of the history of the Civil War in Finland was the question of the so-called Red and White terror. The Civil War in Finland, behind the front lines, was brutal. Both sides randomly shot their enemies after the battle. The Reds killed over 1 600 Whites or otherwise bourgeois people. At the same time, and also after the war, nearly 10 000 Reds were shot by the Whites. Red Guards ­ it has been told ­ killed in revenge and for individual and local reasons. After the Whites had occupied the areas that had been occupied by Reds, they, too, killed Reds in revenge. This is how the story of the Red and the White terror in the Civil War has been told for decades in Finland. For a long time the history of these killings has been covered by political myths and political interpretations. In the 1960s the historian Dr. Jaakko Paavolainen wrote the first studies on the Red and White terror. In these studies Paavolainen contended that Finnish terror, both red a! nd white, was summary execution for individual motives, by para-military soldiers. In this study the Red and the White terror are seen as a part of war, as tactics in the Civil War. In the Finnish Civil War both armies tried to legitimize their own violence against unarmed enemies. After the battle (the White or the Red) army continued fighting against potential and real enemies with acts of repression. A new perspective on this violence comes from the court-martial records, made by the Red Guard and White Army just after occupying areas. These records have not before been researched in a historical study. The Finnish revolutionaries used terror in three ways in the Finnish Civil War. First, with repressions the Reds took control of the occupied areas. Secondly, the Red terror had ideological underpinnings. The Whites and bourgeoisie were in this sense class enemies, who should be destroyed as a class. Rank-and-file men in the Red Guard had no idea of these ideological aspects, but the revolutionary leaders did have this ideological idea. In some areas ­ especially in Kymi industrial area and in Toijala near Tampere ­ they were also active in terror. Finally, the Red terror had individual motives, looting, and killings for individual motives and murders for revenge. The Red terror worked in two ways. Near the front were the Red Guard military courts. Usually the local Red Guard staff were members of this court. Behind the lines the terror was in the hands of the red investigation organs. On the battlefield, or after the occupation of an area, the staff of the local Red Guard formed a court from its own officers and judged counter-revolutionaries. Usually this meant shooting on the spot. When an occupied area was controlled for weeks, even months, the staff handed the investigation of counter-revolutionary activities over to a reconnaissance patrol, usually called a flying patrol. The Red courts usually seem to have worked in cases that were a foregone conclusion for the court. The red court condemned persons known to be guilty of the crimes they were accused of. In many cases this meant some kind of random killing, but in many cases those sentenced were indeed guilty. This study describes 120 cases in which the Red Guard investigated the victim before execution. In half (58 out of 120) of these cases the victims were the enemies of the Red Guard: Civil Guardists, white spies etc. Nearly all the other victims were ­ as the revolutionaries saw it ­ so-called class enemies: landowners, businessmen, industrial management. Even this small sample reveals some interesting aspects. The Red terror was not only indiscriminate violence from below, it was in many cases directed against the real and potential enemies of the Revolution. This Red terror was in the hands of the Red Guard leaders. During the war the para-military Civil Guards acted as a local police force in white-occupied Northern Finland. After the Whites advanced to Southern Finland, the local Civil Guards gained control of recently occupied areas. The orders to local Civil Guards were everywhere the same: round up all potential enemies, shoot the worst ones. The authorities everywhere gave the same orders to Civil Guards to seize power locally. Orders urged to list the revolutionaries now in three groups. Those in the first category could be shot on the spot after a short investigation and trial. Those in the second category could be taken prisoners and sent to POW camps. If the suspects were listed in category three, they were to be set free. This all means judgement by summary trial. It was made clear to local civil guardists and also to all local people, both sympathizers and enemies of the White movement. These purges lasted 2-3 weeks in White-occupied areas. Local guards arrested all Reds or suspects in their own area, tried them in the courts on and sentenced them. In Finnish history it has been reported that this White violence came from below, and as a reprisal, without the control and agreement of the White authorities. Court-martial records show us that in many ways this purge was very rational. And it happened as the authorities of the White Army ordered. The White Senate in Vaasa disagreed with how the White Army should be dealing with the rebels. On February 25 the commander of the White Army, General C. G. E. Mannerheim, gave orders not to use courts martial against Red rebels. Another order was given at the same time: it has recently been called the shoot on the spot order: if needed, it was possible to shoot the enemy on the spot ­ even if he was unarmed ­ in self-defence. The idea for the White military courts came from this. Because the officers wanted to use punitive measures against rebels, they used General Mannerheim´s order of February 25 as a decree. White officers made short investigations and gave their punishments according to this. Army organisations developed during the war for this investigative and punitive system: every military staff of the White Army had their own judges for this work. After April 6th 1918 the situation on the Red-White front changed to the Red´s disadvantage. Tampere, the revolutionaries´ stronghold city in Southern Finland, surrendered. From Tampere the White Army took over 11 000 men and women as prisoners of war after the battle. In this situation the White Army needed a military law to punish Red rebels. The General Staff asked vice president of the Vaasa Court of Appeal, K. Söderholm, if it was possible in this situation to use the wartime decree. In 1909 Czar Nicholas II had provided Finland with legislation for wartime. Because this legislation came in the years of oppression, the lawyers, and The White Senate disagreed on its legality. When Söderholm approved the use of this legistlation, the White Army leaders started to use Russian military law as grounds for sentencing. The prosecution of cases in occupied towns in Southern Finland was now given into the hands of the local Commandant. The Commandant worked as a part of the White Army: he had military patrols for all the work needed. In towns this was under the Commandant and his staff, in rural areas the local Civil Guards did the same work. For this interrogation work the Commandant had a Commandant´s office. The Office collected information about the Reds and their crimes during the war. This work was organised systematically in a few days after the occupation. In a couple of weeks the Commandant´s intelligence office had collected large amounts of intelligence on POWs and their crimes. Commandants set up three-men courts to conduct the investigation. They were called inquiry commissions. These inquiry commissions worked as described before, dividing Reds into three groups: first, second and third. The first group comprised all the Red Guard leaders, war criminals, murderers, looters and the main leaders of revolutionary civil organs. They would suffer capital punishment. The second group comprised all other men and women in the Red Guard and those who worked for it. They were imprisoned in POW camps. The third group was the innocent people. They were set free. Nearly all the members of the inquiry commissions were local people. Over 90% of all the members of these inquiry commissions lived in the same district where the commission was set up and gave its judgements. The members of these commissions were not those who had suffered the most from the Red uprising, neither were they those who worked for the Civil Guard or its staff. Most of these were ordinary bourgeois people. The largest social groups among these members were landowners (23.4 %), businessmen (21.8 %) and officials or local civil servants (12.0 % + 9.7 %). Twelve courts martial have been considered in this study. First, every court martial has been considered with a historical account, then charges, sentences and the social status of the suspects are considered statistically. Ten of these courts are considered together statistically. These courts give us data on over 2 500 persons regarding the sentences and the suspects. Two courts are considered by samplings of 100 (Varkaus) and 369 (Viipuri) persons: in Varkaus the total number of suspects was over 1 250 persons, in Viipuri nearly 12 000 people were interrogated. Of all the suspects three quarters had taken part in the revolutionary movement. Only 27 % of all suspects had taken part in a battle, armed and in the Red Guard. About 14.8 % of all the suspects had been in so-called requisition detachments. These groups worked as a part of the Red Guards´ maintenance. The members of these detachments were especially hated. To most of the landowners they were only looters. In many cases these men were even more hated than the local revolutionary leaders. Nearly all the revolutionary leaders and commanders of the Red troops were brought before a court martial before they were shot. Even the guiltiest men should be put on trial, and be duly sentenced. Courts martial meted out sentences to nearly all the suspects. About 40.6 % of them were set free, 25.3 % were sent to POW camps. Nearly the same proportion of all the suspects in the courts martial got capital punishment (13.4 %), or did not have a sentence at all (13.3 %). Of all the suspects nearly 19.3 % died in 1918. Most of them, 73.4 % were shot, and only one fifth of all of those who died in 1918 died in POW camps.

Karjalankannas Suomen väkivaltaisimpia alueita Aiemmin rauhallisesta Karjalankannaksen rajaseudusta tuli 1900-luvun vaihteessa yksi Suomen väkivaltaisimpia alueita ja pahimmilta osiltaan myös kontrolloiduimpia. Tutkimus käsittelee tätä väkivaltaa ja sen kontrollia Äyräpään kihlakunnassa vuosina 1885­1917. Se etsii väkivallan osallisten ja todistajien muodostamia ja jakamia väkivallan merkityksiä kytkien ne yhteiskunnallisiin ja kulttuurisiin yhteyksiinsä. Tutkimus yhdistää tilastollisia ja laadullisia menetelmiä päälähdeaineistonaan alioikeuksien pöytäkirjojen väkivaltajutut. Kun historiallinen väkivaltatutkimus on Suomessa aiemmin tarkastellut lähes yksinomaan henkirikoksia, tässä työssä on otettu huomioon myös lievä väkivalta. Tämä mahdollistaa tähänastista vivahteikkaamman kuvan luomisen väkivallan kulttuurisista lähtökohdista. Lievä väkivalta yleistyi alueella 1890-luvulla, vakava vuonna 1905. Määrän vaihtelut seurasivat Terijoen erityisen väkivaltaisen huvilaseudun vilkastuvan talouselämän suhdanteita. Väkivalta oli valtaosaltaan nuorten ja nuorehkojen miesten aikaansaannosta. Osallisten sosiaalinen jakauma noudatti yleensä koko väestön koostumusta. Vuosittain väkivalta keskittyi huvilasesonkiin, syksyn tanssikauteen ja vuotuisjuhliin. Väkivallasta tapahtui yksityisessä piirissä noin puolet, kylän ja suvun yhteisöllisessä tilassa kymmenesosa, julkisessa tilassa n. 40 %. Huvila-alueella väkivalta keskittyi julkiseen tilaan. Kotien ja juhlien väkivalta kontrollin ulottumattomissa Yksityinen väkivalta sijoittui koteihin, pihapiiriin ja tilojen maille. Isännän perheelleen ja palkollisille pitämä kuri oli räikeimpiä tapauksia lukuun ottamatta hyväksyttyä. Vieraiden kotirauhan loukkauksiin isäntä vastasi pakkotilanteessa väkivalloin. Perheen miesten välisiä konflikteja syntyi etenkin tilanhoidosta ja perimyksestä. Maiden valvominen oli vaikeaa, minkä takia isäntien asenne rajojen ylittäjiä kohtaan oli aggressiivinen. Yksityiseen tilaan sijoittui suurin osa raiskauksista, ja uhreiksi joutuivat useimmin piiat, vuokralaiset tai elätit. Yhteisöllisen väkivallan keskeinen vaikutin oli miehinen kunnia. Häät olivat yhteisöllisistä juhlista väkivaltaisimpia. Isännät alkoivat ajan mittaan karsastaa vieraiden leveilevää käytöstä, mikä johti häätappelujen kovenemiseen. Nuorten miesten ryhmät esiintyivät väkivaltaisesti myös juhlapäivinä, ja aiemmin hyväksytty yöjuoksu rappeutui paheksutuksi häiriköinniksi. Samoin suhtautuminen nurkkatansseihin muuttui kielteiseksi vuosisadan vaihteessa niiden sisäisen kontrollin lamauduttua juopumukseen ja väkivallan ihannointiin. Rituaaliset kylätappelut olivat Kannaksella yleisiä. Vuosisadan vaihteessa kylätappeluiden hyväksyntä väheni samalla tavoin kuin muidenkin maalaisnuorison huvien. Kirkon ja paikallishallinnon kontrollipyrkimysten tukena Kannaksella oli kuvernöörin asettama kylähallinto, jolla oli vaatimattomat järjestysvaltuudet. Sen merkitys jäi vähäiseksi. Vuosisadan vaihteesta kunnat ja niitä yllyttäneet kansalaisjärjestöt vastasivat rauhattomuuteen asettamalla tehottomia rajoituksia juoppoudelle ja muulle huonotapaisuudelle. Katutappelut poliisin koetinkivenä Julkinen väkivalta keskittyi huvila-alueelle ja poikkesi maaseudun tappeluista poliisivalvonnan vuoksi. Katutappelut kuuluivat useimmiten työmiesten humalaisiin kapakkakierroksiin. Maalaiskylien julkinen tila laajeni yhteisöllisyyden kanavoituessa yhdistysten iltamiin, joissa tappeluita syntyi eri kylien nuorten välille. Julkinen väkivalta perustui miesten aggressiiviseen ennakkoasenteeseen, ja konfliktitilanne eteni haasteeksi tulkitusta ärsykkeestä vihamielisen vuorovaikutuksen ja toverien yllytyksen kautta laukaisevaan iskuun. Suunnitellut hyökkäykset varsinkin venäläisiä vastaan tulivat tavallisiksi 1910-luvulla. Kesäasutuksen kasvaessa huvila-alueen nimismiespiirien miesvahvuudet ylsivät suhteessa pääkaupungin tasolle. Poliisikontrolli voimistui samaa tahtia kuin väkivalta ja jäi siis tehottomaksi. Poliisimiehistön tasoa ja arvostusta heikensi suuri vaihtuvuus, huono palkkaus ja varustuksen puutteellisuus, ja konstaapelit saivat tasapainoilla kohteliaisuuden ja pakkokeinojen välillä. Väestö pyrki pitämään poliisin kiistojensa ulkopuolella, mutta selvän kielteisesti siihen suhtauduttiin vain itsehallintoa tavoittelevassa, salakapakoistaan tunnetussa Raivolan venäläiskylässä. Väkivalta poliisia kohtaan oli tavallisesti vastarintaa takavarikon, ratsian tai pidätyksen yhteydessä. Pidätyksissä vastarintaa helpotti se, että poliisi useimmiten oli yksin, ja pidätetyn toverit pyrkivät usein vapauttamaan toverinsa. Eri tasojen väkivaltaa yhdisti pyrkimys tilan hallintaan. Isäntävallassa tilan kontrolli oli perimmäinen päämäärä. Yhteisöllisen väkivallan kontrolli suuntautui tappeluryhmiä vastaan niiden alettua riehunnallaan alistaa yhteisöllistä tilaa. Poliisin järjestystehtävän keskeinen osa oli juuri julkisten paikkojen ottaminen virkavallan haltuun. Väkivallan merkitys sosiaalisen aseman määrittäjänä riippui ympäristöstä. Ryhmän sisäisessä hierarkiassa väkivalta oli varma keino menestyä, mutta kyläyhteisössä suhtautuminen väkivaltaan oli ristiriitaista, ja yleistä mielipidettä käänsi sitä vastaan kristillis-siveellinen ja kansallinen mielipiteenmuokkaus. Väkivallan merkityksiä muutti voimakkaimmin yhteiskunnallisten instituutioiden vaikutuksen kasvu. Kun kristillis-siveellisen näkemyksen mukaan rahvaan riehunta oli sen sivistystason mukaista, kansanvalistajat pitivät väkivallantekijöitä yksilöllisesti vastuussa kansalaisuuden ihanteelle. Disciplinarians and knife heroes. Violence and its control in the Karelian Isthmus border, 1885-1917 The subject of this study is violence and its control in the Äyräpää jurisdictional district on the Karelian Isthmus, 1885-1917. The purpose is to explore the meanings of violence created and shared by those involved in violence and its witnesses, and to place them in their cultural, social and situational contexts. The general survey was done using quantitative methods, and the analysis of the situations of violence using qualitative methods. The main sources are the regional court records of the cases involving acts of violence. As a basis for analysing the meanings of violence, the study examines the structural changes in society and economy in the area as well as the quantity of violence and its perpetrators, victims and situational factors. The land reform on the Karelian Isthmus, the spread of the Russian summer villa settlements across the border, and the forestry economy activated the economic life of the area. The economic development and violence fluctuated simultaneously. There was a rise in minor violence to the highest Finnish level in the 1890's, and in major violence in the year 1905. Violence decreased sharply after the outbreak of the First World War. The most violent region was the coastal summer villa settlement area of Kivennapa. 95 % of violence was committed by men, while 86 % of victims were male. The age range of the perpetrators was quite wide, from 18 to over 30 years. The victims were usually somewhat younger. The perpetrators' average age fell slitghtly during the period. Their social standings usually followed that of population as a whole, but in Kivennapa the working class was overrepresented because of the violent summer villa settlements. Over the year, the violence peaked during the holiday season, the dancing season in autumn, and the church feasts. Regarding the social space, about half of the violence took place in the private sphere, a tenth in the communal sphere of village and kin and about 40 % in the public sphere. In Kivennapa a major part of the violence was public. The role of alcohol was greatest at feasts and in public places. Private violence occurred in homes, courtyards and private premises. It was accepted for the master of the house to maintain violent discipline towards his wife, children and servants. Intervention in unreasonable punishments was rare, and especially the mentally ill and foster children were treated roughly. Regarding invasions of privacy, the master of the house responded violently when it was unavoidable. Strangers experienced harsher treatment with the acceptance of the community. Within the family, conflicts arose between equal men, usually about the management of the farm or matters of inheritance. With the change of the master came leadership disputes, and impulsive violence might accompany the division of the farm. The guarding of the farm was difficult, which caused the farmers to behave aggressively towards trespassers. Most rapes took place in the private sphere, and the victims were usually maids, tenants or lodgers. The central motive for community violence was aggression on grounds of honour. Weddings were the most violent of the communal gatherings because of drunkenness, honour-challenging gift ritual and antagonism between contracting families. The aggressive behaviour of the friends of the bridegroom was a part of the marriage ritual, but during the period observed this came to be disapproved of, which resulted in more severe wedding fights. A similar change of role was experienced by interlopers, with the same results. Groups of young men also behaved violently at feasts, which offered an opportunity to settle old grudges. Night prowling, previously accepted as a part of the marriage ritual, degenerated into unruly invasions of farmyards. Similarly, the attitude towards youth dances became negative. Ritualistic village fights were common on the Karelian Isthmus. The fight started with a challenge and a war of words, leading to an attack at an agreed sign, and it was brought to an end when the opponent was routed from the battlefield. At the turn of the century village fights became despised, like the other rural youth amusements. The church and the local administration tried to control violence as a feature in the immoral popular customs, mostly by restricting the communal pastimes. The village councils, established by the governor, shifted the responsibility for order to the inhabitants. They could make decrees, help the authorities in maintaining order, observe the customs of youth and mediate disputes. However, they could not achieve much significance. From the turn of the 20th century the local control, on the initiative of civic associations, tried to respond to the growing unrest by concentrating on marginal groups. The governors also issued decrees on order, especially for the summer villa settlement region. The most direct measure against violence was the 1911 ban on carrying knives in public, after the role of knives used in burgeoning homicides and other violence had been brought to public attention. Public violence was concentrated in the summer villa district. It differed from rural violence through the presence of the official control. Violence flared up easily because of the free-time drinking of workers. Speakeasies were likely places for fights because of spirits, hard drinking and dense crowds. The group of workers drifting from joint to joint resembled the rural night prowling group with its defiance of jointkeepers and the police. In rural villages the public space was extended when the communal pastimes were channeled to the social evenings of the civic associations, where fights broke out between youngsters from different villages. Public violence was based on the aggressive attitudes of the violent subcultures, and the violent situation persisted from the negatively interpreted signal via increasingly hostile interaction and the incitement of peers, to the decisive strike. Premeditated attacks became commonplace in the 1910's, and the only provocation needed was the symbolic status of the victim. Violence was understood as protecting the community, especially against the Russians. The relative strength of the jurisdictional districts of Raivola and Terijoki, the summer villa region, reached the level of the biggest towns in Finland. The police control was strengthened as the violence increased, and thus seems to have been inefficient. The explanations for the sudden decline in violence after the outbreak of the war lie in the restrictive alcohol policy and the strict wartime regulations in the area. The police chiefs maintained an authorative image and used force personally, but the constables had to balance between courtesy and sanctions. The police used violence with restraint on patrol, but turned to it when it was safe. People tried to keep the police out of their disputes, but, in the most difficult situations, police assistance was expected and collaboration offered. In the Russian village of Raivola the police chief became involved in a conflict with the self-government of the village, which he suspected of condoning its widespread liquor trade. The police experienced violence usually on occasions where there was resistance against confiscations, raids or arrests, in which the opponent's obduracy was often increased by the fact that the police officer was alone, and his associates were willing to free him. The violence in the different social spheres shared the aim to control the space, which was the stronger the closer violence and control were connected. In disciplining the farmhouse, the purpose of the master's violence was control. The control of the community violence was targeted at the fighting groups when they started to encroach on the communal space. The central part of the official keeping of the peace was the securing of the public places under police control. The importance of violence in determining the social status depended on the milieu. In the internal hierarchy of a subculture, group violence was a sure way to succeed, but in the village community attitudes differed, and public opinion was turned against it by religious and national propaganda. In the police controlled communities, violence was even more obviously of a marginalising quality. The meanings of violence were changed most strongly as the importance of the institutions of society grew. While the Christian moralists saw the unruliness of the common people as a self-evident part of their level of cultivation, in the public educators' view the perpetrators of violence were individually obliged to the ideal of citizenship.

Tässä tutkimuksessa selvitetään, mitkä tekijät vaikuttivat suomalaisen ravintolan ominaispiirteiden syntyyn 1900-luvulla? Suomalaisen kehityksen pääpiirteitä haetaan vertailemalla suomalaisen kehityksen merkittäviä käännekohtia erityisesti saksalaiseen kehitykseen. Saksalainen Eurooppa on valittu vertailukohteeksi, koska myös se oli vaikutteita vastaanottava alue. Toisaalta Saksassa ei ollut alkoholimonopolia. Vertailun avulla on mahdollista löytää kehityksen syitä: mikä johtui alkoholipolitiikasta ja mikä muista tekijöistä kuten esimerkiksi eri aikakausille tyypillisistä kotimaisista tai kansainvälisistä muoti-ilmiöistä. Ravintolan erityisasema Suomessa näkyy esimerkiksi suomalaisten ihmisten suhtautumisessa ravintolaan eri aikakausina. Ravintolaan on haluttu, ravintolaa on vihattu, ravintolaa on pelätty, ravintolaan on päästy ja ravintolaan ei ole päästy. Mielenkiintoinen ryhmä Suomessa oli paheksujien ryhmä, joka ei itse käyttänyt ravintolapalveluja mutta joka halusi kuitenkin voimakkaasti vaikuttaa ravintoloita koskeviin päätöksiin. Tutkimuksen taustana on eurooppalaisen ravintolaelinkeinon kukoistuskausi eli belle epoquen aika vuosina 1871 - 1914. Suunnilleen samaan aikakauteen ajoittuu Suomen historiassa ajanjakso, jona luotiin ihannekäsitys suomalaisuudesta. Viimeistään 1860-luvulta lähtien fennomaanit alkoivat korostaa vakavahenkisyyttä, luterilaista uskonnollisuutta ja voimakasta kansanvalistusta. Painotuksillaan suomalaiskansallinen liike teki myös pesäeron pääosin ruotsinkieliseen liberalismiin. Ihannesuomalaisen tuli olla isänmaallinen, siveellinen ja raitis. Suuri osa fennomaanien aatteellisesta perinnöstä siirtyi 1900-luvulle ja punoutui monella tapaa käsityksiin hyvästä valtiosta ja hyvästä kansalaisesta ­ mutta myös hyvästä työläisestä. Voimakas raittiuden korostaminen kansalaishyveenä ei voinut olla vaikuttamatta samaan aikaan kehittyvään ravintolakulttuuriin ja suomalaisten käsityksiin ravintoloista. Tutkimus päättyy vuoteen 1991, joka oli lamavuosi Suomessa. Vuonna 1991 hyväksyttiin myös uusi majoitus- ja ravitsemisliikkeitä koskeva asetus, joka ei enää määritellyt ravintolaa tietyllä tavalla. Asetuksessa puhuttiin vain ravitsemisliikkeistä, joiden nimi oli suhteellisen vapaasti yrittäjien valittavissa. Anniskelu- ja ravintolatoimintaa alettiin voimakkaasti rajoittaa 1870-luvulta lähtien raittiusliikkeen vaatimusten mukaisesti. Vaikka majoitus- ja ravitsemiselinkeino kehittyi Suomessa lähinnä kaupungeissa, maaseudulla oli lakisääteinen matkustamista palveleva majatalolaitos. Paloviinan ja oluen anniskelu kiellettiin maaseudulla lainsäädännöllä 1800-luvun loppupuolella. Kun muualla Euroopassa majatalolaitos alkoi elää uutta kukoistuskautta 1800-luvun lopulla, se alkoi anniskelukieltojen vuoksi näivettyä Suomessa. Suomen maaseudulle ei päässyt syntymään kansanomaista kyläravintolaa, joka olisi toiminut paikallisten miesten kokoontumispaikkana. Maaseudun majataloista ei Suomessa kehittynyt paikkoja, jotka olisivat laajamittaisesti jalostaneet talonpoikaista keittiötä. Sekä maaseutuväestön että kaupunkien työväestön ravintolakäytöstä tuli epämääräistä ja sopimatonta huvia. Rahvaalle myös luotiin kauhukuvia alkoholista ja kapakkaelämästä. Ravintoloiden kaupunkilaisuus ja yläluokkaisuus alkoivat entisestään korostua Suomessa. Kaupunkilainen, vierasmaalainen ja suurimmalta osaltaan ruotsinkielinen ravintolaelämä jäi siten tuntemattomaksi ja pelottavaksi kulttuurimuodoksi suomenkieliselle rahvaalle, mikä näkyi kehityksessä lähes koko 1900-luvun. Raittiusinnostus huipentui Suomessa kieltolakiin, joka oli voimassa vuosina 1919-1932. Kieltolain olisi pitänyt lopettaa alkoholiin liittyvät ongelmat, mutta todellisuudessa se aiheutti laajan salakuljetuksen ja salakapakoinnin. Kieltolain jälkeen ravintola joutui vuonna 1932 Oy Alkoholiliike Ab:n tiukkaan säännöstelyyn. Suomalaisille on syötetty ravintoloissa pakkovoileipiä, baarit ovat olleet kiellettyjä, tanssi on ollut kiellettyä. Väärissä vaatteissa ravintoloihin ei ole päässyt. Naiset ilman miesseuraa eivät ravintolaan päässet. Ravintolat katsottiin aina 1960- luvulle saakka kansan tapakouluiksi. Vähitellen 1960-luvulta lähtien niihin on tullut yhä enemmän vapautta. Vuonna 1967 naisesta ilman miesseuraa tuli virallisesti hyväksytty ravintola-asiakas. Uusi alkoholilaki ja laki keskioluesta vuonna 1969 mahdollistivat anniskeluravintolatoiminnan myös maaseudulla. 1980-luvun loppupuolella ravintolaelinekeino vapautui säännöstelystä periaatteessa kokonaan ja ravintoloiden määrä lisääntyi huomattavasti. Ravintoloiden lisääntyessä ne joutuivat kilpailemaan asiakkaista yhä enemmän. Asiakkaat alkoivat nyt toden teolla muokata ravintolaa. Ravintolat eivät enää muokanneet asiakasta. Vanhasta ravintolaelämästä tuttuja sääntöjä ja valvontaa asiakkaat eivät tahtoneet enää sietää. Ravintolaelinkeino monipuolistui ja erityyppiset ravintolat suunniteltiin eri kohderyhmiä varten. Kaikkien ravintolatyyppien esikuvat haettiin muualta Euroopasta. Useat ravintolat tuottivat sisustuksensa suoraan ulkomailta niitä valmistavilta yrityksiltä. Vaikka 1980-luvun ravintola-asiakkaat kokivat olevansa eurooppalaisia ja kaupunkilaisia, niin suomalaisen ravintolan menneisyys heijastui silti asiakkaan suhtautumisessa ravintolaan. Suurimmalta osalta suomalaisista puuttuivat omat lapsuuden muistot ja perinteet ravintoloista. Tämän vuoksi ravintolaperinne haettiin ulkomailta tuotujen rentojen kitsch-sisustusten avulla. Hotelli- ja ravintola-alan 1980-luvun lopun kukoistuskausi päättyi 1990-luvun alussa Suomen jouduttua harvinaisen syvään taloudelliseen lamaan. Ensimmäistä kertaa 1900-luvun aikana myös hotelli- ja ravintola-alan henkilökuntaa joutui suuret määrät työttömiksi. Toisaalta myös asiakkaiden vanhat asenteet ravintoloita kohtaan nousivat pintaan 1990-luvulla. Kun talous heikkeni, ravintolapalveluista tingittiin heti ensimmäiseksi. Tähänastisten käsitysten mukaan suomalaista ravintolaelinkeinoa alettiin säädellä voimakkaasti, koska suomalaiset asiakkaat eivät osanneet käyttää alkoholia. Käsitykset alkoholin vaarallisuudesta suomalaisille syntyivät kuitenkin jo ennenkuin ravintolatoimintaa alettiin rajoittaa. Ravintoloiden säännöstely perustui siis puhtaasti oletukselle suomalaisen asiakkaan kyvyttömyydestä käyttää alkoholia. Nimenomaan alkoholipolitiikka muovasi suomalaista ravintolaelinkeinoa 1900-luvulla. Uudet kansainväliset ja kotimaiset muoti-ilmiöt omaksuttiin nopeasti Suomessa, mikäli ne eivät olleet ristiriidassa alkoholipolitiikan kanssa. Tämä tutkimus vastaa kysymykseen, miksi suomalaista ravintolaelinkeinoa on säännöstelty niin voimakkaasti ja miksi ravintola on ollut monille suomalaisille mystinen paikka. Mielenkiintoinen jatkotutkimuksen aihe olisi se, miten ravintolat ovat kehittyneet vuoden 1991 jälkeen. Kuinka paljon elinkeinoon vaikuttaa edelleen pitkään jatkunut säännöstely ja miten ravintolatoiminta on kehittynyt vapaan kilpailun kaudella? CONTROLLED ENTERTAINMENT - The Finnish restaurant in the 20th century Modern restaurant culture was born at the end of the 16th century in Paris, out of which it spread, during the 17th century, into other European countries. Emblematic of the modern restaurant culture are the following features: restaurants became vanguards in gastronomy, the custom of table d hôte was given up, the upper class began to use restaurant services and the word restaurant was taken into use. The growth of cities and the spread of the hotel industry seemed to go hand in hand. Modern restaurant culture also began to develop in 19th century Finland. The focus of development moved from Turku to Helsinki when the latter became the capital of Finland. The actual period of development began, however, at the end of the 19th century. Simultaneously with the development of the industry, means to restrict and control the growth and spread of restaurants were introduced. Behind these restrictions was the temperance movement that was emerging powerfully in Finland, and which saw restaurants as places of excessive drinking and decadence. As an effect of the temperance movement, Finnish restaurant culture took a decisively different turn than elsewhere in Europe. This thesis aims to discover the factors that formed the distinctive features of the Finnish restaurant in the 20th century. The general outline of developments in Finland is sought after by comparing its most notable turning points to those that took place elsewhere, in Germany in particular. Germanic Europe is chosen as an object of comparison because it too was an area open to foreign influence. On the other hand, there was no alcohol monopoly in Germany. By comparing, it is possible to discover the causes behind various developments. Which were caused by the country s alcohol policy and which by other factors such as national or international fashions typical of certain historical periods? The special position of restaurants in Finland can be seen, for example, in the attitudes of Finnish people towards restaurants at different periods of time. People have wanted to go to restaurants, they have hated restaurants, they have been permitted or refused entry to restaurants. An interesting group in Finland was the group of condemners, who did not use restaurant services themselves but who wanted nevertheless to have a powerful say in decisions concerning restaurants. The background for the study is the bloom of the European restaurant industry, that is, the period of the belle epoque in 1871 - 1914. At approximately the same time in Finland the idealized image of the Finnish identity was created. Since the 1860 s or earlier, the Fennomans had been emphasizing the values of sobriety, Lutheran religiousness and popular education. By these alignments the Finnish national movement also separated itself, by and large, from the liberalism of the Swedish speaking Finns. The ideal Finn ought to be patriotic, moral and sober. A great part of the Fennomans ideological inheritance was carried over to the 20th century and was intertwined in many ways with conceptions of the good state and citizen - but also of the good worker. A strong advocation of temperance as a civic virtue could not but affect the restaurant culture and Finnish thinking about restaurants that were developing precisely at the same time. Year 1991, a year of economic depression, is the end of the scope of this study. In 1991 a new statute regarding the hospitality industry was issued, that no longer provided a definition for the name restaurant . The statute referred only to catering businesses, that could be named relatively freely named by their owners. Only a brief glance will be taken at developments in the 1990 s. According to the original research plan, alcohol and alcohol policy were supposed to fall outside the scope of the thesis. However, the attempt proved to be impossible, for the restaurant has usually been defined in Finland through alcohol. On the other hand, a strict alcohol policy and state supervision meant that a considerable amount of information regarding restaurants was documented in the 18th century. Many of the sources of this study were originally produced to serve the needs of the alcohol administration. Magazines and journals of the hotel and restaurant industry have also been important sources. Entrepreneurs in the restaurant industry began to publish their own magazine already in the 1920 s, and the year 1933 saw the birth of a journal specifically for workers in the restaurant industry. The collections of the Hotel and Restaurant Museum also include useful material for this study, from collections of newspaper clippings to menus. It is possible to distinguish a small-scale upswing in Finnish restaurant culture at the end of the 19th century. Progress took place mostly in Helsinki and other urban centres of Finland. Finnish restaurant life was very international, for a considerable number of restaurant and hotel owners at the end of the 19th century were of foreign origin. In Finland there was still a lack of both capital and possibilities for education in top-class hotels. Restaurant life started rapidly to differentiate according to class. At the turn of the 19th century the town councils of Helsinki and Turku divided restaurants into three categories. The first class consisted of the biggest and best kept hotels that were patronized by the upper class. The third class consisted mostly of eating houses used by the working class. Restrictive measures were speedily taken to control especially the restaurants frequented by the lower classes. The Finnish temperance movement continued to increase its numbers at the end of the 19th century. Adherence to the temperance movement continued to grow in spite of the fact that the consumption of alcohol was on the decrease at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The explanation for the popularity of the movement does not lie, however, in the enormous drinking problem of the Finnish nation, which later studies have proved to have been mere propaganda of the temperance movement and the justification for its operation. Only a small portion of the Finnish people had the right to vote at the end of the 19th century. At the same time, Finland struggled under the threat of Russification and periods of Russian oppression, due to which all political action was of a very restricted nature. Many associations offered an opportunity for people to gather and act in this difficult political situation. Irma Sulkunen has shown in her doctoral thesis that from the 1880 s to the year 1906, the temperance movement functioned as an early form of the Finnish labour movement. The general strike of 1905 was the culmination of the temperance movement s activity. After that, membership in the movement declined rapidly, for some of its supporters moved into political parties. There were changes within the temperance movement as well, because of the victory of the supporters of the prohibition act. At the same time, the educated classes began to form the ideal of a sober and industrious model citizen. This explains why it was desired that both the peasants and the urban workers were not to indulge in the corrupting night life of taverns or restaurants. Often the people themselves adopted this ideal image of the Finnish citizen. Many of the restrictions regarding restaurants concerned only the restaurants of the lower classes. As to the educated classes, they were regarded as capable of using alcohol in the correct fashion and therefore it was not deemed necessary to restrict their practices. From the 1870 s onwards, the hotel and restaurant industry was placed under heavy restrictions, according to the demands of the temperance movement. A statute that came to force in 1876 made it possible for a monopoly of the serving and retailing of spirits to be given to a company founded for that particular purpose and which did not need to aim for largest possible profits. After the implementation of the statute a local licensing company was established in every Finnish town except Kemi and Joensuu. Restaurants and wine sellers had to operate as renters and retailers for the company. Licensing companies might also operate as restaurant keepers. They operated mainly restaurants aimed for the working class, and in them there was an attempt to keep the consumption of alcohol as low as possible through interior furnishings that were basic or even uncomfortable. Even though the Finnish hotel and restaurant industry developed mostly in towns, there was a statutory organization of inns operating in the countryside. In 1865 a statute was issued that allowed the serving of spirits only to travellers who were also eating customers. In 1892 the serving of spirits was completely prohibited in the countryside but in travellers inns it was still allowed. In 1895 the selling of beer was prohibited in the countryside, but it could still be sold to non-locals, if the local municipality gave its consent. The restrictions made at the end of the 19th century had lasting consequences for later restaurant culture. When the inn organization began to flourish again elsewhere in Europe at the end of the 19th century, in Finland it withered due to the licensing prohibitions. The typical village tavern that would have served as a gathering place for the local men, never existed in the Finnish countryside. The country inns in Finland never developed into places that would have for example cultivated the provincial kitchen. English translation checked by Jonathan H. Lutz, Master of Science, Bachelor of Arts

Tässä tutkimuksessa selvitetään Nokian tehdasyhdyskunnan sosiaalista järjestystä ja sen muutosta vuosina 1870-1939 sekä tämän muutoksen syitä ja seurauksia. Sosiaalisella järjestyksellä tarkoitetaan sitä kirjoittamatonta tapaa, jonka mukaan yhteiskunta toimi. Maaseudun tehdasyhdyskunnat olivat yhteiskuntarakenteeltaan ja toimintatavoiltaan kaupunki- sekä maaseutuyhteiskunnista poikkeavia omaleimaisia tehdas- ja työväenkeskuksia. Yhdyskunnat olivat huomattavia alueellisia vaikuttajia, sillä ne levittivät teollista elämänmuotoa, yhteiskunnallisia aatteita ja vaurautta maaseudulle. Tutkimuksen kohteena oleva Nokian paperi- ja kumitehdasyhdyskunta oli vanhin Suomen lukuisista paperiteollisuuden varaan syntyneistä tehdasyhdyskunnista. Nokian yhdyskunnan tekee erityisen mielenkiintoiseksi sen sisäisen rakenteen muutos. Suomen paperiteollisuuden uranuurtajan vuori-insinööri Knut Fredrik Idestamin puuhiomosta alkunsa saanut Nokian tehdaskylä oli 1900-luvun alkuvuosiin saakka tyypillinen suomalainen yhden tehtaan paperitehdasyhdyskunta, mutta vuonna 1904 Nokialle siirretystä Suomen Gummitehdas Oy:n kumitehtaasta kasvoi sotien välisenä aikana Nokian suurin tehdas. Kumitehtaan työyhteisö sekä työorganisaatio ja -kulttuuri poikkesivat selvästi paperitehtaasta. Tämä rikkoi tehdasyhdyskunnan yksinapaisuuden ja vaikutti keskeisesti paikallisen järjestyksen muutokseen. Tutkimuksessa käytetään kokonaishistoriallista metodia ja tutkimusote on vertaileva. Vertailun avulla Nokian tehdasyhdyskunnan ilmiöt saadaan oikeisiin suhteisiinsa ja samalla se antaa mahdollisuuksia tehdä tutkimustuloksista laajempiakin tulkintoja. Tutkimus koskee nimenomaan koko tehdasyhdyskuntaa ei pelkästään tehdasyhteisöjä. Näin voidaan selvittää tehdasyhteisöjen vuorovaikutusta muiden väestöryhmien kanssa ja sitä mikä oli tehtaiden luoman järjestyksen merkitys koko yhdyskunnalle. Tutkimuskysymykseen vastataan seuraavien osatekijöiden avulla: yhteiskunnan rakenne eli väestöryhmät ja niiden muodostuminen, yhteiskunnan hierarkia ja sosiaaliset suhteet, tehdasjärjestelmä, työolot ja -ehdot, eri väestöryhmien elinolosuhteet, poliittinen ja aatteellinen toiminta sekä ulkoiset vaikutteet. Nokian tehdasyhdyskunnan sosiaalisen järjestyksen voi jakaa neljään vaiheeseen: 1. Tehdaspaternalismi 1870-1905, 2. Kansalaisyhteiskunnan läpimurto 1905-1918, 3. Poliittisuuden nousu 1919-1928 ja 4. Totaalinen herruus 1929-1939. Nokian tehdaskylää leimasi 1900-luvun alkuvuosiin saakka paperitehtaan tehdaspaternalistinen hallintatapa. Tämä varsinkin paperitehtaissa yleinen järjestys perustui tehtaan johdon hallitseman hierarkian mukaisiin sosiaalisiin suhteisiin ja sen vastapainona työväelle tarjottuun huoltojärjestelmään. Tehdaspaternalistinen järjestys joutui Nokialla kuten muissakin Suomen tehdasyhdyskunnissa kansalaisyhteiskunnan noustessa voimistuneiden muutospaineiden alle erityisesti vuoden 1905 suurlakon jälkeen. Samoihin aikoihin kumitehdas mursi paperitehdasyhdyskunnan rakennetta ja siihen liittyen jo pelkkä väkiluvun nopea kasvu muokkasi järjestystä. Kysymys paikallisesta järjestyksestä kiteytyi erityisesti vuoden 1918 sisällissodan jälkeen yhä selvemmin poliittiseksi valtakamppailuksi. Nokialla yhteiskunnan sisintä, työnantajien ja työntekijöiden välistä suhdetta, koskeva suora yhteentörmäys tapahtui muihin tehdasyhdyskuntiin verrattuna myöhään vasta 1920-luvun lopulla. Tällöin kumitehtaan lakon päättyminen työntekijöiden täydelliseen tappioon yhdistettynä pula-ajan ja yleisen oikeistosuuntauksen luomaan ilmapiiriin antoi tehdasvallalle Nokialla vielä jatkoaikaa. Kolmikymmenluvulla tehdasyhtiöt hallitsivat Nokian yhdyskuntaa taloudellisen mahtinsa ja poliittisen kontrollin avulla vahvasti niin taloudellisesti, poliittisesti kuin kulttuurisestikin. Tämä valkoinen valta päättyi sota-aikaan, jonka aiheuttama yhteiskunnallinen murros vei laajalta paikalliselta tehdasvallalta viimeisetkin edellytykset. Tämä muutos on myös luonteva tutkimuksen päätepiste. Hallitsevia tekijöitä Nokian tehdasyhdyskunnan järjestyksen muutoksessa olivat yhdyskunnan sosiaaliset suhteet, sisäinen rakenteellinen kehitys ja ulkoiset vaikutteet. Teolliset suhteet olivat yhdyskunnan järjestyksen ydintä, jota yhdyskunnan sisäiset tekijät ja ulkopuoliset reunaehdot muokkasivat. Ulkoa tulleet taloudelliset, poliittiset ja kulttuuriset vaikutukset olivat merkittäviä, mutta ne koskivat eriasteisina kaikkia muitakin yhdyskuntia. Erot yhdyskuntien välillä syntyivätkin pääasiassa niiden sisäisistä tekijöistä eli siitä kuinka niissä reagoitiin näihin ulkoisiin vaikutteisiin. Nokialla paikallinen järjestys sai voimakkaasti suuntansa tehdasyhtiöiden ja työntekijöiden keskinäisistä suhteista. Paternalismista siirryttiin lopulta selkeisiin voimapoliittisiin suhteisiin. Yhdyskunnan järjestystä ohjasi koko tutkimusaikakauden tasapainoilu työrauhan ja tehtaan menestyksen takaamiseen tähtäävän tehdasvallan ja työväen työelämässä sekä koko yhdyskunnassa tavoitteleman sosiaalisen tasa-arvon ja omaehtoisen vaikutusvallan välillä. Nokian tehdasyhdyskunnan sosiaalisen järjestyksen selvittäminen on tärkeää, jotta voidaan ymmärtää näiden omaleimaisten yhdyskuntien merkitystä Suomen yhteiskunnalle. Tehdasyhdyskunnissa muodostui erityislaatuinen sosiaalisten vuorovaikutussuhteiden verkko, jonka avulla on hyvä tutkia myös kansalaisyhteiskunnan läpimurtoa suomalaiselle maaseudulle ja koko agraarin Suomen teollistumista ja sen aiheuttamaa yhteiskunnallista muutosta. Tehdasyhdyskunnissa nämä muutokset näkyivät voimakkaina. Yhteiskuntaa muokkaavaa vastakkainasettelua syntyi teollisen työn ja elämäntavan organisoimisesta eli työnantajan ja työntekijöiden suhteesta. Toisin sanoen erilaisista näkemyksistä yhdyskunnan järjestyksestä. Nokian paperi- ja kumitehdasyhdyskunnan kehitys 1800-luvun lopun yhden tehtaan tehdaspaternalismista 1930-luvun valkoiseen tehdasvaltaan kuvaa laajemminkin tehdasyhdyskuntien järjestystä Suomessa. Social Order in the Factory Community of Nokia, 1870-1939 This research analyses the social order, the long-term changes of that order, and the causes and consequences of these changes on the factory community of Nokia in Southern Finland, near the industrial city of Tampere. The analysis of the social order reveals the social relationships, the operational dynamics and their preconditions in that factory community. In this research, local social order refers to the system and network of social relationships that guided and ruled the functioning of the community. Order describes the unwritten way in which the society functioned. The analysis of social order through one case study provides an opportunity to deepen the research. Through comparison it becomes possible to set the phenomena at Nokia in their correct proportions and at the same time to analyse the potential special characteristics of Nokia and those typical of other factory communities. Nokia is a particularly suitable subject of analysis because of its location and the changes that its internal structure underwent. The analysis of the factory community's internal structure also provides good opportunities for international comparison, as, all around the industrialised world, countryside based factories have developed very similar social structures. The legislation, traditions, culture, and the given field of industry in particular, caused differences in development patterns and schedules in different countries. This research expressly analyses the whole factory society, not only factory communities. Such a broad scope allows a study of the interaction of the factory communities and the factories governing the locality with other local population groups, as well as making possible a test of the significance and power of those factories within local society. Due to the dominant nature of the factories, the research focuses on the questions related to factories and the working communities. The method of the research is comparative and of total historical nature. The research problem is approached through the different segments of society - economy, population, living conditions, modes of thought, and policy. How did these factors and their relationships to each other affect the local order? In this research approach society is seen as an entity where all elements are in reciprocal relationships with each other and dependent on the various sectors of society. This comprehensive historical research method has also been called the social historical reciprocal model. Rural mill towns in Finland from the 1870s to the end of the 1930s were special localities governed by mill companies. With their one or two governing factories, their remote locations, and their bifurcated populations, they formed centres of habitation different from their surroundings in terms of population, economy, and politics. In these communities a strong, mutual interdependence developed between the factory leadership, which governed the society and the factory workers. This interdependent relationship between the company and workers largely determined social order at any given time. This order was shaped by the community's internal factors, but a major part of the direction and framework of the development came from outside the community. The specific nature of a particular factory community order was the result of the ways the locality responded to these outside economical, political, cultural, and legislative influences. The national development of Finland provided significant fringe conditions in the development of Nokia's factory community order. Until 1917, Finland was a Grand Duchy of Russia. In the situation created by the revolutions in Russia, Finland gained independence in December 1917. This gaining of independence was followed by a bitter Civil War in the winter of 1918, which in turn concretely affected Nokia as it had been in the hands of the losing Red side during the war. The Civil War divided the nation in two, and factory communities where the majority of the population consisted of workers felt the division keenly. The pace of Finland's industrialisation quickened after the war, but by the late 1930s the country nevertheless remained strongly agrarian. In the 1930s the country suffered deeply from the global depression, and right-wing political trends strengthened at the same time. Both of these phenomena were clearly discernible in Nokia. In November 1939, the Soviet Union at! tacked Finland and the country drifted into the Second World War. The war period of 1939-1945 spelled a strong social transition in Finland. The Nokia community began as a pulpwood mill founded by Knut Fredrik Idestam by the Emäkoski rapids in 1869. The mill soon grew into a paper mill company called Nokia Ltd, which was the forerunner of the current global telecommunications giant Nokia. At the end of the 1860s, manufacturing paper from pulp was a novelty even on the global scale. In Finland, Nokia's pulpwood mill was the first mill to gather a permanent settlement around it. Several other paper industry centres were also established along Finnish rivers in the 1870s and 1880s. Rapids providing the energy, forest resources, and transport infrastructure largely dictated their locations. In the 1870s Finland was still almost totally agrarian, but paper mill communities significantly spread the industrial lifestyle into Finland's backwoods. The city of Tampere, in the immediate vicinity of Nokia, was an important industrial centre, boasting several factories by the latter half of the nineteenth century. The biggest internal change factor in Nokia's development since the beginning of industrialisation was the arrival of another major factory, when in 1904 Suomen Gummitehdas Ltd arrived from Helsinki. In the 1920s and 1930s this rubber plant grew into a major enterprise employing almost two thousand workers and ruling Finland's rubber industry. Because of the new factory, the population of Nokia more than doubled during this time. At the start of the region's industrialisation there had only been 700 inhabitants, but by 1930 this had increased to 8116. In the 1930s almost two thirds of Nokia population gained its livelihood directly from either the Nokia Ltd factories or the rubber plant - a fact that underscores the importance of these companies for the community. The period covered in this research forms a distinct whole in the development of Finnish factory communities' social order - a time that could be called, with only slight simplification, the era of company rule. The temporal frame of the research is a natural one: beginning at the start of Nokia industry and ending with the year 1939. The war years of 1939-1945 created such an enormous social change that they provide a natural ending to the research. In early factory communities the dominant system was often the so-called factory paternalistic order, which was based on social hierarchy and the reciprocal interests of employers and employees. To make palatable the rule of the factory the employees were offered work-related social benefits and services. In Finland the rural paper mill communities were model examples of this kind of international factory community order. The remote location of the paper mills, the chain-like production process, and the affluence of the paper companies favoured such order and created the preconditions for it. In Finland the purest era of factory paternalism lasted until the early years of the twentieth century, after which the rise of the working-class movement and the general birth of the civil society created pressures to change this order based on subordination in terms of social relationships. This dynamic process governed the development of social order also at Nokia. Opposing ideas about the nature of social order - about how communities should function - gave birth to opposing forces that through time moulded society. The social order of factory communities was characterised by a shifting balance between the factory companies' imposed social order and the social equality demanded by the working population. In a factory-governed community the workers sought for opportunities to influence matters first through organisation and later through open political activities. In Nokia these attempts finally came to an open conflict during the rubber plant strike. The company managers who leaned on company authority constantly regarded the workers' independent equality demands as a threat to the successful leadership of the factory, to industrial peace objectives, and thereby to the success of the factories. The totality of these irreconcilable goals, coupled with external influences, created the local social order in Nokia. The ´unanimous´ support for company rule of the late nineteenth century flavoured by factory paternalism finally broke down in the tumult of the rise of the civil society in the 1930s. This breakdown triggered in the years prior to the Second World War the last effort of company hegemony, the total supremacy of factory communities by factory companies. Translation: Hannu Tervaharju, Tina Parke-Sutherland and Dave Hewitt

Vapaamuurarius on viime vuosikymmeninä ollut Suomessakin yleisen mielenkiinnon kohteena. 1930-luvulla esillä olleen Tattarisuon jutun, Upseeriliiton ja joidenkin kirkollisten piirien kielteisen asennoitumisen sekä äärioikeistolaisen painostuksen jälkeen vapaamuurariasia oli julkisuudessa erityisesti 1980-luvulla, jolloin yksinomaan lehdistössä julkaistiin puolisentoista tuhatta vapaamuurariutta käsittelevää kirjoitusta. Vapaamuurareiden nimilistojen julkaisemisen ja erilaisten intimiteettisuojaa loukkaavien parjauskirjoitusten tuloksena vapaamuurariudesta on tullut suomalaisen tiedotusyhteiskunnan viimeinen mörkö, jolla ihmisiä on peloteltu ja jota on saanut rankaisematta solvata. Reijo Ahtokarin Salat ja valat on ensimmäinen suomalaista vapaamuurariutta käsittelevä tutkimus; vapaamuurariutta on koko maailmassa kaiken kaikkiaan tutkittu tieteellisesti hyvin vähän. Teoksessa selvitetään suomalaisten vapaamuurareiden ja suomalaisen yhteiskunnan välille synnytetyn konfliktin syitä, kehittymistä ja ilmenemismuotoja. Erityinen paino on vapaamuurariuden julkisuuskuvan selvittelyssä ja niiden syiden analysoinnissa miksi kuvasta on muodostunut sellainen kuin se tänään on. Tutkimuksen tärkeänä lähdeaineistona ovat olleet vapaamuurareiden omat arkistot ja muut aikaisemmin käyttämättömät kirjalliset ja haastattelulähteet. Tekijälle on myös lähes neljä vuosikymmentä kestäneen vapaamuuraritaipaleen kuluessa kertynyt sellaista tutkimusaineistoa, jollaista ulkopuolisen tutkijan olisi ollut mahdotonta saada käyttöönsä.