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U radu nastojimo da rekonstruišemo Kvajnove argumente usmerene protiv pojma analitičnosti i konvencionalističkog shvatanja logičkih istina. Na početku ćemo razmotriti neke od osnovnih ideja koje je Karnap, glavna meta Kvajnovih prigovora, zastupao u ovom kontekstu. Ovo će nam omogućiti da jasnije uočimo pozadinu Kvajnovih radova, kako onih ranijih u kojima je Karnap podvrgnut eksplicitnoj kritici, tako i onih kasnijih u kojima se Kvajn, naizgled, bavi problemima koji nisu neposredno u vezi sa prethodnim. Samo naizgled jer, kao što ćemo videti, postoji značajna sistematska dimenzija Kvajnove pozicije čije previđanje često dovodi do nerazumevanja nekih od njenih ključnih mesta. Videćemo da su za odbacivanje pojma analitičnosti ključni Kvajnov holizam kao i teza o neodređenosti prevođenja. Napuštanje ideje da su iskazi osnovni nosioci značenja kao i da se o značenjima može govoriti nezavisno od celokupne teorije, zajedno sa Kvajnovim bihejviorizmom, tako baca novo svetlo na probleme kojima se Kvajn sistematski bavio tokom čitave svoje karijere., The aim of this work is to offer a recontruction of Quine’s arguments directed against the notion of analycity and conventionalism about the logical truth. We start by investigating some of the ideas which Carnap, the main target of Quine’s attacks, held in this respect. This will enable us to make a firmer footing on the background of Quine’s papers, both early ones offering the critique of Carnap’s standpoint as well as later ones that allegedly, deal with problems not so tightly related to the ones mentioned before. This change of focus is only apparent, as we shall show that there is a significant systematic component of Quine’s thought which, if disregarded could lead us astray regarding some of the most important aspects of Quine’s position. We shall see that, regarding the rejection of the notion of analycity, Quine’s holism as well as his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation plays a prominent role. Forbearing the idea of propositions as the basic units of meaning, as well as the idea of a sensible talk about meaning independent of the complete body of a theory, coupled with Quine’s behaviorism, sheds new light on some of the problems Quine was facing during the whole course of his career.

Piter Rejlton je moralni realista, naturalistički kognitivista i redukcionista. On je realista u smislu da postoje moralne činjenice. Ove moralne činjenice su konstituisane prirodnim činjenicama. U tom smislu je Rejlton naturalistički realista. Međutim, da bi mogao da zastupa svoju realističku tezu on mora da pokaže da moralne činjenice imaju eksplanatornu funkciju, tj. da mogu da doprinose aposteriornim objašnjenjima nekih važnih odlika našeg iskustva. Ovaj uslov, koji se mora zadovoljiti da bi se s pravom mogao zastupati naturalistički realizam, on naziva generičkom strategijom naturalističkog realizma. U prvom delu ovog rada, pokazuje se na koji način Rejlton dokazuje da ova generička strategija važi u slučaju ne-moralne dobrote (non-moral goodness) i u slučaju moralne ispravnosti (moral rightness). U zaključku rada ću pokušati da pokažem da je jedna od najvećih zamerki koje se mogu uputiti Rejltonu neadekvatno objašnjenje vrednosnih standarda. Pored toga, njegovo stanovište ne pruža jasan odgovor na mnoga važna pitanja., Peter Railton is a moral realist, a naturalistic cognitivist, and a reductivist. He is a moral relist because he believes that moral facts exist. These moral facts are constituted by a complex set of natural facts (this is why Railton is a naturalistic realist). In order to make his naturalism plausible, Railton has to prove that moral facts (which are constituted by natural facts) can satisfy certain important conditions. Namely, he has to show that moral facts can have both explanatory and normative role. In the first part of this paper I shall attempt to demonstrate Railton's arguments with which he proves that these conditions are satisfied in the area of non-moral goodness and in the area of moral rightness. In the conclusion of this paper I shall attempt to show that the most serious argument against Railton's position is that Railton does not and cannot give a plausible answer to some very important questions about moral standards.