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Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) has influenced research on action and perception across the past two decades. It integrates several seminal empirical phenomena and it has continued to stimulate novel experimental approaches on the representational foundations of action control and perceptual experience. Yet, many of the most notable results surrounding TEC originate from an era of psychological research that relied on rather small sample sizes as judged by today's standards. This state hampers future research aiming to build on previous phenomena. We, therefore, provide a multi-lab re-assessment of the following six classical observations: response-effect compatibility, action-induced blindness, response-effect learning, stimulus-response binding, code occupation, and short-term response-effect binding. Our major goal is to provide precise estimates of corresponding effect sizes to facilitate future scientific endeavors. These effect sizes turned out to be considerably smaller than in the original reports, thus allowing for informed decisions on how to address each phenomenon in future work. Of note, the most relevant results of the original observations were consistently obtained in the present experiments as well., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Which task is easier, doing arithmetic problems of specified form for some specified duration, or carrying a bucket of specified weight over some specified distance? If it is possible to choose between the "more cognitive" task and the "more physical" task, how are the difficulty levels of the tasks compared? We conducted two experiments in which participants chose the easier of two tasks, one that involved solving addition or multiplication problems (Experiment 1) or addition problems with different numbers of addends (Experiment 2) for varying amounts of time (in both experiments), and one that involved carrying a bucket of different weights over a fixed distance (in both experiments). We found that the probability of choosing to do the bucket task was higher when the bucket was empty than when it was weighted, and increased when the cognitive task was harder and its duration grew. We could account for the choice probabilities by mapping the independent variables onto one abstract variable, Φ. The functional identity of Φ remains to be determined. It could be interpreted as an inferred effort variable, subjective duration, or an abstract, amodal common code for difficulty., (© 2021. The Author(s).)

The present study investigated how listeners understand and process the definite and the indefinite determiner. While the definite determiner clearly conveys a uniqueness presupposition, the status of the anti-uniqueness inference associated with the indefinite determiner is less clear. In a forced choice production task, we observed that participants make use of the information about number usually associated with the two determiners to convey a message. In a subsequent mouse-tracking task, participants had to select one of two potential referents presented on screen according to an auditorily presented stimulus sentence. The data revealed that participants use the information about uniqueness or anti-uniqueness encoded in determiners to disambiguate sentence meaning as early as possible, but only when they are exclusively faced with felicitous uses of determiners.

The present study investigated participants' ability to introspect about the effect of between-task crosstalk in dual tasks. In two experiments, participants performed a compatibility-based backward crosstalk dual task, and additionally provided estimates of their RTs (introspective reaction times, IRTs) after each trial (Experiment 1) or after each pair of prime and test trials (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the objective performance showed the typical backward crosstalk effect and its sequential modulation depending on compatibility in the previous trial. Very similar patterns were observed in IRTs, despite the typical unawareness of the PRP effect. In sum, these results demonstrate the reliability of between-task crosstalk in dual tasks and that people's introspection about the temporal processing demands in this complex dual-task situation is intriguingly accurate and severely limited at the same time.

The authors regret that some errors that had been addressed during the proofing process were not corrected by the publisher. Most of these errors are of a stylistic nature and do not change the substance of the article. Please note, however, that the corresponding author's e-mail address is christoph.naefgen@uni-tuebingen.de. We apologize for any inconvenience caused by this.

Response times (RTs) for free choice tasks are usually longer than those for forced choice tasks. We examined the cause for this difference in a study with intermixed free and forced choice trials, and adopted the rationale of sequential sampling frameworks to test two alternative accounts: Longer RTs in free choices are caused (1) by lower rates of information accumulation, or (2) by additional cognitive processes that delay the start of information accumulation. In three experiments, we made these accounts empirically discriminable by manipulating decision thresholds via the frequency of catch trials (Exp. 1) or via inducing time pressure (Exp. 2 and 3). Our results supported the second account, suggesting a temporal delay of information accumulation in free choice tasks, while the accumulation rate remains comparable. We propose that response choice in both tasks relies on information accumulation towards a specific goal. While in forced choice tasks, this goal is externally determined by the stimulus, in free choice tasks, it needs to be generated internally, which requires additional time.

The Backward Crosstalk Effect (BCE) indicates that response features of Task 2 in a dual-task paradigm influence even Task 1 performance. However, it can be assumed that responses are represented with multiple features in the cognitive system. In this regard, Ideomotor Theory suggests action effects as one central response feature in human action control and an earlier study by Janczyk, Pfister, Hommel, and Kunde (Cognition 132: 30-43, 2014) already provided some evidence that action effects are a crucial determinant of the BCE. The present study aimed to further investigate which response features are critical for the BCE. Therefore, a crossed-hands manipulation was implemented in two experiments to examine whether the spatial position of the actual response and thus its associated action effects or the body-side of the effectors' anatomical connection determine the BCE. Analyses revealed that even when participants press a left response key with the right hand and vice versa, the usual BCE occurs. These results indicate that the BCE depends on spatial features of the action effects rather than on anatomical features and thus provide additional support for the assumption that action effects have an important influence on the BCE and on action control in general.

Doing two things at once is hard, and it is probably hard for various reasons. Here we aim to demonstrate that one so far barely considered reason is the monitoring of sensory action feedback, which detracts from processing of other concurrent tasks. To demonstrate this, we engaged participants in a psychological refractory period paradigm. The responses in the two tasks produced visual action effects. These effects occurred either immediately or they were delayed for the first of the two responses. We assumed that delaying these effects would engage a process of monitoring visual feedback longer, and delay a concurrent task more, as compared to immediate effects. This prediction was confirmed in two experiments. We discuss the reasons for feedback monitoring and its possible contribution to dual tasking.

According to the ideomotor principle, behavior is controlled via a retrieval of the sensory consequences that will follow from the respective movement ("action-effects"). These consequences include not only what will happen, but also when something will happen. In fact, recollecting the temporal duration between response and effect takes time and prolongs the initiation of the response. We investigated the associative structure of action-effect learning with delayed effects and asked whether participants acquire integrated action-time-effect episodes that comprise a compound of all three elements or whether they acquire separate traces that connect actions to the time until an effect occurs and actions to the effects that follow them. In three experiments, results showed that participants retrieve temporal intervals that follow from their actions even when the identity of the effect could not be learned. Furthermore, retrieval of temporal intervals in isolation was not inferior to retrieval of temporal intervals that were consistently followed by predictable action-effects. More specifically, when tested under extinction, retrieval of action-time and action-identity associations seems to compete against each other, similar to overshadowing effects reported for stimulus-response conditioning. Together, these results suggest that people anticipate when the consequences of their action will occur, independently from what the consequences will be.

The Perception-Action Model (PAM) claims to provide a coherent interpretation of data from all areas of the visual neurosciences, most notably data from neuropsychological patients and from behavioral experiments in healthy people. Here, we tested two claims that are part of the core version of the PAM: (a) certain actions (natural, highly practiced, and right-handed) are controlled by the dorsal vision for action pathway, while other actions (awkward, unpracticed, or left-handed) are controlled by the ventral vision for perception pathway. (b) Only the dorsal pathway operates in an analytical fashion, being able to selectively focus on the task-relevant dimension of an object (Ganel and Goodale, Nature 426(6967):664-667, 2003). We show that one of these claims must be wrong: using the same test for analytical processing as Ganel and Goodale (2003), we found that even an action that should clearly be ventral (left-handed awkward grasping) shows analytical processing just as a dorsal task does (right-handed natural precision grasping). These results are at odds with the PAM and point to an inconsistency of the model.

Humans appear to act in response to environmental demands or to pursue self-chosen goals. In the laboratory, these situations are often investigated with forced- and free-choice tasks: in forced-choice tasks, a stimulus determines the one correct response, while in free-choice tasks the participants choose between response alternatives. We compared these two tasks regarding their susceptibility to dual-task interference when the concurrent task was always forced-choice. If, as was suggested in the literature, both tasks require different "action control systems," larger dual-task costs for free-choice tasks than for forced-choice tasks should emerge in our experiments, due to a time-costly switch between the systems. In addition, forced-choice tasks have been conceived as "prepared reflexes" for which all intentional processing is said to take place already prior to stimulus onset giving rise to automatic response initiation upon stimulus onset. We report three experiments with different implementations of the forced- vs. free-choice manipulation. In all experiments we replicated slower responses in the free- than in the forced-choice task and the typical dual-task costs. These latter costs, however, were equivalent for forced- and free-choice tasks. These results are easier to reconcile with the assumption of one unitary "action control system."

Choosing among different options is costly. Typically, response times are slower if participants can choose between several alternatives (free-choice) compared to when a stimulus determines a single correct response (forced-choice). This performance difference is commonly attributed to additional cognitive processing in free-choice tasks, which require time-consuming decisions between response options. Alternatively, the forced-choice advantage might result from facilitated perceptual processing, a prediction derived from the framework of implementation intentions. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 were PRP experiments and showed the expected underadditive interaction of the SOA manipulation and task type, pointing to a pre-central perceptual origin of the performance difference. Using the additive-factors logic, Experiment 3 further supported this view. We discuss the findings in the light of alternative accounts and offer potential mechanisms underlying performance differences in forced- and free-choice tasks.

As the empirical study of action control via ideomotor effect anticipations continues to uncover more and more aspects of this fundamental process, it is time to look back to the 19th century roots of the theory to assess which classical ideas are supported by contemporary research. In turn, classic ideas might stimulate studies on aspects of the ideomotor mechanism that have not yet been addressed empirically. The present article is a tribute to this classical work-more precisely to the article "Der apparat des willens" [The apparatus of will], published by Emil Harleß 150 years ago. At a closer look, Harleß does not only present a concise description of the ideomotor mechanism; he also presents a wealth of intriguing ideas that deserve empirical investigation.

In counter updating tasks, responses are typically faster when items repeat than when they change (item switch costs). The present study explored the contribution of stimulus-response bindings to these item switch costs. In two experiments, we orthogonally manipulated the repetition/switch of to-be-counted items and the repetition/switch of required manual responses. Item switch costs were considerably lower when item switches were accompanied by response switches than when accompanied by response repetitions. Experiment 2 showed that, although there was also a smaller contribution from stimulus-stimulus bindings (i.e., shape-location), the major part was due to stimulus-response bindings. These results show that in the widely used standard version of the counter updating task, a considerable portion of item switch costs is caused by the unbinding of stimulus-response bindings rather than by processes of switching items in working memory.