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This paper attempts to introduce sentiment analysis technology into the task of exchange rate prediction, and studies the impact of sentiment factors on short-term fluctuation of exchange rate based on the theoretical support of behavioral finance. Firstly, the relevant network social media data generated during the new round of trade war between China and the United States were obtained, and the sentiment analysis technology was used to quantify the data to form the sentiment score sequence. Then the nonlinear model LSTM based on machine learning is used to model and predict the high-frequency exchange rate sequence. The empirical results show that the accuracy of the exchange rate forecasting model with the sentiment factors of public opinion is improved, which provides a new idea for the exchange rate forecasting method based on the technical analysis method.

Looking back at the last four years of media headlines, a picture of an adversarial relationship between China and the United States appears as the central narrative; a bilateral relationship that is highly stressed. This narrative includes tough rhetoric focusing on the ongoing trade war, threats of technological decoupling, and the use of harsh economic statecraft in the form of sanctions and high tariffs. Ties with Beijing were tense and contentious under the last U.S. administration, where strong man and militaristic language was the norm. Think of U.S.–China trade war, and the verbiage against China. Former President Trump made China a target of harsh rhetoric with the aim to limit China’s growing global power. What U.S. foreign policy failed to consider was how far ahead China was in many of the areas the United States had historically led on, and how China was undergoing its own national and international security repositioning. It was and remains a contest for power, but where does energy and climate come in, are these areas also prone to discontent?

This is an introduction to the history of trade wars. We will touch on the trade war that may have led to the Great Depression in the 1930s and the many trade wars since 1945. The interest in the subject of this introduction is derived from the ongoing trade wars between the United States and its important trading partners, such as China, the European Union (EU), and Japan, that started in 2018. This section of the book will elaborate on how the seemingly insignificant complaints of blue-collar workers in the United States in the 1970s converged into the elective power of anti-globalization, which smoothed the way for the Trump presidency.

This chapter discusses the impact of Brexit, the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union, on UK universities’ relations with East Asia. Following the referendum in June 2016, the UK Government has developed a series of policies in response to Brexit while the negotiations between the UK and EU are still ongoing. This chapter assesses the likely impact of these policies on UK universities’ main activities, namely student recruitment and student and staff mobility, research funding, recognition of qualifications and transnational education (TNE) activities/operations, in particular in East Asia. The findings suggest that Brexit will have a positive and indirect impact on UK universities’ relations with East Asia, in particular with the People’s Republic of China, in terms of student recruitment and student and staff mobility, research collaboration, including funding and TNE activities/operations. Brexit will not have an impact on the mutual recognition of academic and professional qualification between the UK and East Asian countries. This chapter also identifies a number of factors that influence UK universities’ relations with East Asia that are not related to Brexit, but to more general economic, social, political and cultural trends. The most important of these factors are the ongoing trade war between the United States and China and the COVID-19 pandemic, which affect the number of students from East Asia in the UK, and a growing competition from East Asian universities.

The new economy based on internet has changed the way of doing business. The impacts of the US-China trade war are even more far-reaching. On top of it, the threat of corona virus has totally changed the horizon of all business. This chapter uses Taiwanese SMEs as examples to extract several useful strategies to concur the challenges, including leveraging Japan’s resources, putting more emphasis on ASEAN markets, taking advantage of One Belt and One Road Initiative, and introducing peer advisory board to enhance the quality of decision making.

At present, Family firms in mainland China are generally facing the challenges of transformation and upgrading. Meanwhile, They are also entering the critical phase of succession. Accomplishing transformation and upgrading during succession becomes a necessary path to be taken by family businesses in order to adapt to new conditions. So, This chapter will elaborate on transformation and upgrading from three aspects: innovation, Internet, and internationalization, and explore the relationship between succession and transformation in family businesses. Furthermore, we also discuss new challenges and solutions for family businesses under the Trade War.

We explain that a new global phase of conflicts from the perspective of geopolitics starts to be projected in U.S.-China relations. This is stated by the military escalation, with the increased reach of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, in the context of the South China Sea and in the U.S. military and intelligence documents in affirming China as a “strategic competitor,” along with Russia. This is resulting in the elaboration of a great strategy toward China.

We point out the problem of deindustrialization that both the United States and developed countries are going through. And the reasons of Trump administration gave to pursue an economic policy with a protectionist bias and the identification of U.S. unilateralist foreign policy with repercussions on the World Trade Organization (WTO). The ideological political composition of the Trump administration’s first echelon influences the trade war with China. The role of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) with Robert Lighthizer, the characteristics of foreign direct investment (FDI) in U.S.-China relations, the measurable impacts during the trade war on American agriculture, and some observations on the signing of phase one of the trade agreement between the countries are discussed deeply in this part. We end the chapter with the idea of The Globalization Paradox.

The Japanese economy was not jump-started even after the bad loans were resolved. While Japan succeeded in averting the trade war escalating into a full diplomatic showdown and the banking crisis propagating into a systemic meltdown, its economic size and per capita income came to be overshadowed by its peers, particularly those in Asia. Japan tried to transform itself when its growth model reached an impasse in the mid-1980s, but the efforts resulted in bubbles, and the ensuing long clean-up process may have distracted the country from the critical task of developing a new growth model.

We work from the perspective of the possibility of building of a G-2. As they are the two largest economies in the world, this conflict also highlights the spread of a “Trump Doctrine,” focused on the conflict as well as the result of American socio-economic inequality. The trade war now has a direct impact beyond economic matters and branches to multilateral institutions like the UN.

China’s growing influence on the world has generated profound effects on the political and economic decisions of her partner nations. Recent conflict escalation between China and western countries gives rise to widespread concern over the possibility of delinking China from global trade and supply chain. By drawing on utility theory, we suggest that the political relationship is a key determinant of collective emotions of consumers and trading companies and consequently the interactions between importers and exporters. We hypothesize that warmer relations lead to larger increases (or smaller decreases) in trade while cooler relations have the opposite effect. Based on monthly data of China and her twelve trading partners from 1981 to 2019, our study provides an empirical investigation into the association between political relationship and bilateral trade flows. Our results show that shocks to relations are highly persistent and frequently cause changes in trade. However, relations themselves are little influenced by changes in trade, changes that show little persistence. We also address the US-China trade war and the observation that innovations to China’s exports to the US improve China’s relations with the US while shocks to American exports to China worsen relations from China’s perspective.

Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the global economic and political order has entered a long period of great depression and transformation. The game between developed countries and emerging superpowers marked by the Sino-US trade war has profoundly reflected the difficulty and unpredictability of this transition process. The decline and transformation of the global order has its origin in the rise and fall of the national strength of rising powers and established powers, the reversal of neoliberalism and economic globalization, and the stagnation of the process of multilateralism. From the perspective of future trends, the transformation of international order is highly uncertain, and one of the core issues is the increasing right-wing populism in Western countries. In essence, right-wing populism is the result of the failure of developed countries to make timely adaptability adjustments to their domestic policies in the rapid development and combined effects of neoliberalism, technological change and globalization since the 1980s. However, in the uproar of irrational electoral politics and the so-called fair trade, anti-globalization aimed mainly at emerging countries has unfortunately become the root of all problems and a scapegoat for populism. As a beneficiary and promoter of economic globalization, and in the new round of reform and opening-up, China needs to change the traditional development concept of growth supremacism and nationalism and pay more attention to the spillover effects of its own economic growth so as to promote inclusive growth between and within various countries and finally realize the historic mission of building a shared destiny for mankind.

This chapter analyses the oft misunderstood aspects of the Sino-U.S. trade relationship. It highlights the dangerous historical precedent of restricting free trade in the 1930s wrought by the U.S. Congressional passage of the Smoot-Hawley Act (1930). A case is made for the Theory of Comparative Advantage by Nineteenth Century English statesman David Ricardo. Opportunities for continuing global growth or descending into global chaos is the stark choice ahead of us depending upon the willingness of the U.S. and China to work through trade differences.

BEIJING (MNI)—Chinese trade officials have quietly approached their U.S. counterparts seeking ways to minimize punitive tariffs on Chinese exports and avoid a full-blown trade war, MNI learned from a source with knowledge of the matter.

This paper investigates the most essential issues behind the ongoing U.S.-China trade war. In addition to the apparent bilateral trade imbalance, China’s status as a non-market economy, as labelled by the Trump administration, is one of the most fundamental reasons that the United States triggered the U.S.-China trade war. Accordingly, America’s most pressing request is to urge China to implement further structural reform. This paper argues that the current Chinese economy is quickly becoming a modern market economy with a unique Chinese character. This is evident from the ongoing structural reform to create a competitive environment between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprises, and through a further opening-up of the market by guaranteeing a wider and deeper market access for inbound foreign direct investment (FDI).

HONG KONG—Chinese and American officials will be trying to defuse tensions pushing the world’s two largest economies toward trade war in meetings beginning Thursday where analysts say chances for a breakthrough seem slim given the two sides’ desperate rivalry in strategic technologies.

With the rapid modernisation of its naval forces and the launch of the BRI, China has accelerated disputes with countries in its near seas and unveiled its ambition to control the Indo-Pacific region. The Donald Trump administration in the US has asserted that China is a strategic competitor, challenging America’s power, undermining US security and prosperity and seeking to replace it in Asia. Washington has objected to China’s military strategy in the South China Sea (East Sea of Vietnam), asserted its freedom of navigation in the region, and promoted an Indo-Pacific strategy with greater vigour to bring regional states together into a new security network such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprising the US, Japan, India, and Australia, for example. In addition to security tensions, the US and China have now begun a trade war where the two sides have targeted each other’s goods with punitive duties. This chapter will analyse the recent increase in strategic competition between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region, especially under President Trump. It also discusses the factors leading to recent tensions in US-China relations and the impact of their strategic competition on cooperation and development in the wider region.

One way to forecast the prospects of China’s Belt and Road Initiatives (BRIs) is to analyse the commitment of other major economic powers to this plan. From this perspective, this chapter reviews Japan’s response to the BRI during the past seven years. The first section discusses Japan’s perceptions on the BRI in a bilateral context between Tokyo and Beijing. The next section studies Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s global diplomacy in response to the BRI. Despite his refusal to accept China’s proposal at the initial stage, by 2017, Abe decided to compete with China under the new flag of ‘quality infrastructure building’ based on his economic rationality. Owing to the China-U.S. trade war, Abe achieved outstanding success in persuading China to accept Japan’s conditions on the BRI. This has increased the potential for the BRI architecture to grow into a network of countries with several small and big cores distributed in the system rather than into a hub-and-spokes system.

Trade disputes between the United States and China greatly intensified recently as the two countries announced a 25% tariff hike on $50 billion worth of products imported from each other, raising the risk of a trade war between the two giant trading economies. Based on a standard multi-sector, multi-country general equilibrium trade model with input-output linkages, we evaluate the cost of a trade war in which the United States and China both increase their tariffs to 45% for all imports from each other. We find that the United States would be more likely to be the bigger loser and that the cost for China would be moderate.

One of the most dynamic elements of the Chinese economy is its technological progress. In this chapter, Matt Sheehan examines the disruption of an important aspect of the US–China tech ecosystem: talent. Visas for Chinese high-skilled workers and graduate students may be under threat as the technology has become a focal point of the Trump administration’s trade war with China. Many voices seem to argue that Chinese researchers are stealing intellectual property and compromising national security. Yet many of the top Chinese tech talent, particularly in AI, appears to want to stay and work in America as part of the global talent pool that underpins innovation in Silicon Valley. How this competition for talent plays out could have significant implications for innovation.

The trade war between China and the United States could go on for another decade and hurt Americans more, experts warned on Monday during a seminar at the Renmin University of China, where 10 Chinese academics gave their analyses on the ongoing dispute. They believe that with strategic thinking and staying power, China can use the situation as an opportunity to upgrade its economy.

The anti-globalisation rhetoric of candidate Donald Trump’s election campaign has shaped the trade policy of the new Administration. Bilateralism is the favoured approach but unilateral measures have also been taken to pursue the protectionist agenda. A number of trade policy actions have focused on China, inducing a trade war. The unrelenting opposition by the US to appointments to vacancies in the Appellate Body has caused a crisis in the WTO and given rise to doubts on its commitment to the rules based multilateral trading system.

This chapter examines Chinese international relations (IR) scholars’ perceptions of the US–China relations. We show that a majority of Chinese IR scholars hold a neutral view on bilateral relations, pointing out both challenges (Taiwan and South China Sea disputes) and shared interests (nuclear non-proliferation and anti-terrorism) between the two nations. We further note that Chinese IR scholars take into account both historical patterns and current domestic political cycles within the United States when assessing the current status and future trajectory of US–China relations. They are also biased toward security issues, which might explain why many were taken aback by the recent deterioration in bilateral relations after Trump launched a trade war against China in 2018.