1. Technical efficiency in firm games with constant returns to scale and $$\alpha $$-returns to scale
- Author
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Marc Dubois, Stéphane Mussard, Walter Briec, Détection, évaluation, gestion des risques CHROniques et éMErgents (CHROME) / Université de Nîmes (CHROME), and Université de Nîmes (UNIMES)
- Subjects
021103 operations research ,Returns to scale ,[QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin] ,0211 other engineering and technologies ,General Decision Sciences ,02 engineering and technology ,Management Science and Operations Research ,Incentive ,Theory of computation ,Econometrics ,Generalized mean ,[MATH]Mathematics [math] ,Merge (version control) ,ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS ,Mathematics - Abstract
Under a technology based on the generalized mean of inputs and outputs with constant returns to scale (CRS), the firms have incentive to merge (in a firm game) in order to improve their technical efficiency. A directional complementarity property in inputs and in outputs is introduced. It is shown that the core of the firm game is non-void whenever the aggregate technology of each coalition exhibits complementarity in outputs and CRS. In the case of $$\alpha $$ -returns to scale, the firms have incentive to merge (improvement of technical efficiency) when there are both directional complementarity in inputs and in outputs.
- Published
- 2021
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