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We compare the utility of Maximum Likelihood Difference Scaling (MLDS) and Ordinal Difference Scaling (ODS) for the measurement of emotion intensity. MLDS and ODS are both nonmetric probabilistic scaling methods based on difference measurement; however, MLDS uses quadruple comparisons (comparison of pairs of stimulus pairs) as input data, whereas ODS uses graded pair comparison judgments, where participants indicate the size of the difference between two stimuli on an ordinal response scale. In two studies using different kinds of emotional stimuli (disgust-inducing pictures, and descriptions of situations eliciting relief), quadruple comparisons and graded pair comparisons of the stimuli were collected and submitted to MLDS and ODS respectively. The scaling solutions were compared in terms of the reliability of the estimated scale values and their correlations to direct ratings of emotion intensity. The findings of both studies suggest that ODS performs at least as well as MLDS on these criteria. In addition, in most cases, good to high agreement between the scale values estimated by the two methods was found. Hence, ODS may be used as an economical alternative to MLDS for the difference scaling of emotional stimuli.

Based on an earlier model of the processes elicited by surprising events, the present studies provide evidence for one of these processes, the evaluation of the surprising event's relevance for ongoing activities (action-relevance check). The central prediction tested was that, if unexpected events elicit among other processes an action-relevance check, then response delay on a concurrent task will be more pronounced in a condition where this process is more elaborate and hence takes more time. In accord with this prediction, Experiment 1 found that an unexpected appearance change of the imperative stimulus in a choice reaction time (RT) task caused greater response delay than an equivalent appearance change of a distractor stimulus. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and tested several additional predictions that concerned the effects on response delay of a second appearance change of either the imperative or the distractor stimuli. These predictions, which were also mostly confirmed, were derived by combining the logic underlying the first study with the assumption that once made, appraisals of unexpected events are stored as part of the situational schema and are reused when the same or similar events reoccur leading to an abbreviation of appraisal processes. Experiment 3 once more replicated the basic finding of the previous studies and ruled out a possible alternative explanation. It is suggested that the proposed RT method of process verification may be of broader interest as a tool to study appraisal processes in emotion.

Four empirical studies of cognitive appraisals in emotion are reported. In studies 1 and 2, a simplified version of the repertory grid method was used to determine subjectively salient dimensions of cognitive appraisal. For a representative sample of 30 emotions, subjects considered pairwise comparisons of remembered eliciting events (study 1) or those typically conducive to the emotions (study 2) and indicated attributes on which the situations differed. The attributes were classified using a category system derived a priori from the theoretical and empirical literature. Some evidence was obtained for the majority of the 25 distinguished potential dimensions of appraisal, and no further dimensions of appraisal were suggested by the data. The most frequently mentioned dimensions—accounting together for 85% of the attributes—were subjective evaluation, causality/agency/responsibility, focus of event, controllability, importance, moral evaluation, stability, social relation positive-negative plus close-distant, self-evaluation, time of event, evaluation of others, intentionality/activity and expectedness. A reduced set of 22 dimensions for which some evidence was obtained in the grid studies was further examined in studies 3 and 4 using a nominal scale analogue of the rating method. It was found that (a) the appraisal dimensions which emerged as the most salient ones in the grid studies tended to be those relevant for the greatest number of emotions, (b) the dimensions were largely statistically independent within the investigated domain of emotions, and (c) they permitted from moderate to good statistical classification of the situations into the emotion categories. Potential limitations of the grid method as well as the issue of the criteria for cognitive appraisals in emotion are discussed.

Two studies examining dimensions of cognitive appraisals in emotion are reported. In study 1, a simplified version of the repertory grid technique was used to empirically determine dimensions of appraisal perceived as salient by individuals. Subjects were presented with a subset of the possible pairings of appraisal-characterized situation descriptions for each of 23 common emotions, and were asked to indicate attributes on which the compared situations differed. Evidence for at least 10 potential dimensions of cognitive appraisal was obtained, with those related to valence, causality/agency, social relationship aspects, and temporal aspects being mentioned most frequently. Although all dimensions were at least roughly comparable to appraisal dimensions postulated by previous investigators, some of them have only been given marginal attention so far, and several proposed dimensions could not be recovered. Study 2 was performed to validate and further clarify the appraisal dimensions suggested by the first investigation, using a grid with columns prelabeled by items designed to assess these dimensions. Most of the dimensions could be validated; together, they permitted the correct statistical classification of 64% of the individual emotion ratings. The results attest to the usefulness of the repertory grid technique in investigations of dimensions of emotional appraisal. The article concludes with a number of suggestions for further research using this method.

An experiment was conducted to test Zillmann's hypothesis that misattribution of residual arousal in the excitation transfer paradigm is influenced by the salience of perceived arousal symptoms at the point of potential misattribution. Eighty subjects in a 2 x 2 x 2 design were either physiologically aroused or not aroused, and were subsequently subjected to a procedure designed to induce either positive mood (elation) or negative mood (depression). Simultaneously, they were either made self-aware or not. It was reasoned that self-focused attention wouM lead to heightened awareness of resMual arousal and that, if the salience of arousal hypothesis is correct, this wouM prevent misattribution of arousal and the resultant intensification of experienced emotion from occurring. In accord with this reasoning, it was found that aroused and self-aware subjects experienced residual arousal significantly more intensely, were less prone to misattribute it, and did not show an excitation transfer effect. These results were, however, obtained only for subjects in the negative mood condition. Research on emotion during the last two decades has been strongly influenced by Schachter's two-factor theory of emotional state (Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962). Basic to this theory is the assumption that an emotional state is the result of the interaction of two components: (a) diffuse physiological arousal, which influences the intensity, but not the quality, of the emotional state, and (b) a cognition that characterizes the situation in an "emotional" way and, by providing the individual with a