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Markets as objects of study in their own right have been given surprisingly little attention within neoclassical economics. The market has, in contrast, remained in the foreground for heterodox schools of economics, including market process theory. This essay suggests that the market remained in the analytical foreground for market process theorists even as it was increasingly absent in neoclassical economics on account of the different ontological commitments characterizing the two traditions. Attending to the ontological dimension of economic thought offers us a more complete understanding of how economics could become disconnected from the markets of the real world as well as why it was retained by heterodox economists.

Competition is a key feature of the market process assumed to improve market outcomes. But how strong is the relationship between competition and positive consumer experiences, and how does the relationship vary across space and type of competitor? Phoenix is a suitable setting in which to explore these questions because it is a major metropolitan area with thousands of unique restaurants rated on Yelp. The consumer experience is measured based upon Yelp user-generated reviews through July 2016, with higher ratings reflecting better customer experiences. Competition is defined in different ways depending upon the number of overall, same-price and same-type restaurants nearby. Given differences between chain and independent restaurants, competition is further segmented across these two types of establishments. After controlling for restaurant characteristics, census-tract-level demographics, census-tract fixed effects and sub-industry fixed effects the results suggest that spatial competition is only associated with better customer experiences for same-category independent restaurants within driving distance (1-5 miles). The association is not present for overall and same-price independent restaurant competition nor for chain restaurants. Consistent with the sprawling layout of the Phoenix area, the effect of competition is only for restaurants within driving distance. These findings are relevant for cities designing policies to attract residents by offering high-quality consumer amenities.

Coase’s publication of “The Lighthouse in Economics” (1974) sparked a polarizing debate over his claim that government intervention is not necessary for the existence of a private lighthouse market. The purpose of this paper is to reframe this debate by asking the following question: why was nationalization the outcome of lighthouse regulation? We answer this question by utilizing the Austrian theory of interventionism to illustrate how regulation of the lighthouse market distorted the entrepreneurial market process. We argue that the nationalization of the lighthouse market in England and Wales was a result of prior government failure to exclude private lighthouses from the market, not a failure of the entrepreneurial market process to privately provide lighthouses.

This paper re-evaluates the orthodox understanding of the role which the 1974 award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to F.A. Hayek had on the revival of Austrian Economics in the later part of the 20th century. The orthodox view, which focuses exclusively on the sociological role of the award on returning Austrian economists to the conversation among academic economists, omits the critical role of purely doctrinal developments. In particular, the work done in the decade 1937–1948 is argued to be central to the Austrian revival. In this decade, both Hayek and Mises independently developed new clarifications of Austrian thought which represented an extension of the subjectivist tradition in economics: Mises’ emphasis on human entrepreneurial action and Hayek’s exploration of the role of knowledge in the market process. The interest of a generation of younger academics to the ideas developed in that critical decade is thus understood to be the true cause of the Austrian revival, with the award of the Nobel Prize serving a catalytic rather than causative role.

Whatever F.A. Hayek meant by “knowledge” could not have been the justified true belief conception common in the Western intellectual tradition from at least the time of Plato onward. In this brief note, I aim to uncover and succinctly state Hayek’s unique definition of knowledge.

In response to Israel Kirzner’s claim that “culture lies outside the scope of economic theory itself,” Storr advances a compelling vision of market processes in which price changes, profit/loss signals, and constitutional rules do their work only when refracted through culturally specific webs of meaning. Yet Storr provides few details about the analytic structure or consequences of his alternative approach and ultimately no answer to the Kirznerian question of how, or how fully, a culture-infused market process would eliminate incoherence of plans. Storr’s focus on the competing spirits that animate particular markets is congenial to Ludwig Lachmann’s emphasis on diverse interpretative frames through which individuals decode market signals. If pursued, the nascent Weber-Schutz-Lachmann trajectory of Storr’s cultural catallactics would showcase the distinctive strengths of the Austrian hermeneutic tradition as a radical alternative to the culturally disembedded Walrasian/Kirznerian market.

Ludwig von Mises’s methodological position is unique because it combines apriorism with qualitative empirical approach. Nonetheless, Mises’s adherents and detractors continue to characterize his apriorism as rejecting forecasting. This paper argues that a prediction market is a traditional market for forward-looking information; it leverages subjective knowledge and aggregates information via the market process to effectively solve the Hayekian knowledge problem. We argue that Austrian economists should embrace prediction markets as a powerful method of forecasting rooted in human action.

How does the permanent war economy interact, and subsume, the private, non-military economy? Can the two remain at a distance while sharing resource pools? This paper argues that they cannot. Once the U.S. embarked upon the path of permanent war, starting with World War II, the result was a permanent war economy. The permanent war economy continuously draws resources into the military sector at the expense of the private economy, even in times of peace. We explore the overlooked costs of this process. The permanent war economy does not just transfer resources from the private economy, but also distorts and undermines the market process which is ultimately responsible for improvements in standards of living.

Israel M. Kirzner is the 2006 winner of The International Award for Entrepreneurship and Small Business Research (the FSF-Nutek Award). In this Prize Lecture he argues that a number of those who have commented on his work have misunderstood certain aspects of his theoretical system, and as a result the common distinction in the literature between “Schumpeterian” and “Kirznerian” entrepreneurs is flawed. He also argues that his understanding of the market process (set in motion by entrepreneurial decisions) provides a theoretical underpinning for public policy vis-a-vis entrepreneurship. Professor Kirzner’s main contributions to the economics of entrepreneurship were also presented and evaluated by Douhan et al. [Small Business Economics 29(1–2):213–223, 2007].

The economic approach to politics revolutionized the way scholars in economics and political science approached the study of political decision-making by introducing the possibility of government failure. However, the persistent and consistent application of neoclassical models of economics also seemed to suggest that once the full costs were accounted for, this failure was an illusion. This paper counters these arguments, typically associated with George Stigler, Gary Becker and Donald Wittman, by focusing on the underlying economic theory. We develop an alternative model of political economy grounded in the Austrian conception of the dynamic market process.

Considerable debate surrounds the concept of entrepreneurial opportunities. This paper approaches the opportunity concept from an evolutionary market process perspective. It argues that new opportunities for entrepreneurial activity frequently emerge as by-products of market competition. Agents may deliberately or unwittingly create opportunities. Organizational development and the evolution of industries are additional sources of new entrepreneurial opportunities. At the same time, they enable agents to acquire the skills required to exploit these opportunities.

Austrian market process theory stands out in assigning particular importance to the role of the customer. This is however not really salient as competition is discussed save for in a few particular instances. This is a pity since the market process discourse thereby deprives itself of a firm progressive footing concerning further elaborations of how market dynamics evolve. By drawing on the reasoning that originates some hundred years ago with the works of Georg Simmel, this paper brings forward an Austrian version of his idea on Tertius Gaudens. In a market context this is the alert buyer who benefits from the disunion that prevails between sellers to the extent that market intimacy, conceived of as supplier specificity, is low. In this manner some of the inner workings of the market process, what promotes competition subject to which institutional constraints, are discussed to the benefit of yet another important Austrian demarcation, that of competition as being geared by the customer.

Many economists, notably Austrian economists, have argued that the market process is essentially an experimental process. We briefly try to clarify this conceptualization, and then argue that we may understand the firm in much the same light. A basic view of the firm as an experimental entity is derived, drawing on property rights insights.

Since its publication in 1985 Paul David's “Economics of QWERTY” has provided a paradigm case for the understanding and application of path-dependent processes in economics, some of which have been identified as yielding sub-optimal outcomes. The accuracy and relevance of this case, and this entire theoretical approach, has been subjected to critical scrutiny by Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis in a series of articles and in a recent book. In this article I provide a wide ranging, and largely appreciative, review of the book and highlight, in some detail, the fundamental disagreements with which it deals.

This paper mathematically treats the following economic problem: A company wants to expand its capacity in investments that are irreversible. The problem is to find the best investment strategy taking the fluctuating market into account. We give some implicit conditions for a solution in the case where the market process is n-dimensional and an explicit solution in the one dimensional case.

Patrick Gunning refuses to acknowledge the most salient arguments against the “Chicago” law and economics case for negligence made by Austrian economists. Because of this, he makes the same errors in his defense of Coase that permeate the Chicago paradigm. In particular, his defense of Coasean type analysis completely ignores Austrian cost theory, i.e., that all economically relevant costs are strictly subjective and therefore conceptually impossible to measure. He also fails to grasp the implications of disequilibrium market process theory for the use of any kind of least-cost-avoider rule in the economic analysis of the law. As a result, Gunning's defense of Coase suffers from the same “pretense of knowledge” as the analysis that he is defending.

Forempirical purposes most studies on the influence of freedom on prosperity across nations use either aggregate measuresof economic freedom combined with a measure of political liberty,or single components of these aggregates to describe the freedom-variable.For a scholar of constitutional economics, both these approachesdo not seem to be satisfactory. From his theoretical viewpointhe would favor an approach that focuses on properties of thepolitico-economic order that can be interpreted as appropriateconstraints for preferred outcomes. Factor analysis is the methodused in this paper to extract from a pool of components thatdescribe freedom two main factors, namely (1) the appropriatenessof the framework in which the market operates, and (2) the degreeof political interventions into the market process. It is shownthat these two factors have great influence on the prosperityof nations.

This paper analyzes the local stability properties of the equilibrium solution of a multi-sectoral model with a linear production technology. The pivotal magnitudes in the adjustment process are the market rates of profit. Three different definitions of the market rates of profit are introduced which correspond to different types of the implicit decision behavior. It is shown that the stability properties of the market process depend essentially on this specification.

The author employs Hayek’s concepts of knowledge and spontaneous order to outline a learning-centered alternative to teacher- and student-centered pedagogies. In a Hayekian classroom, learning (intellectual order) emerges from a polycentric web of instruction, study, conversation, frustration, and discovery that continually elicits and tests the knowledge claims of students and teachers. Yet, unlike Hayek’s impersonal market process, the process of liberal learning is both personal and impersonal. To capture this hybridity, the author supplements Hayek’s insights with those of Parker Palmer, a liberal educator whose analysis of the classroom as a community of truth is attuned to the interpersonal dimensions of knowing and learning.