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This study draws on institutional theory to examine the role of institutional environments in the formation of entrepreneurial venture creation decision among university students. The aim was to determine how the institutional context influences individual entrepreneurial capability, and mindset for entrepreneurial career. We adopted an exploratory qualitative approach, using a combination of purposive and snowballing sampling techniques. A total of 30 interviews were conducted among university students, and stakeholders across three geopolitical zones in Nigeria. The findings reveal that prevailing societal values and norms have significant influence on entrepreneurial mindset among the youth. The majority of student respondents ascribe high social values and preferences for career opportunities in the formal sectors, rather than an active interest in launching new ventures. In addition, respondents report high uncertainty avoidance, concern for class structure, job security and ascription orientation, all of which impact the cognitive frame and mindset for entrepreneurial career.

The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations purports to show that words and thoughts have no content—that there is no intentionality. This paper refutes the paradox with a dilemma. Intentional states are posited in rational explanations, which use propositional attitudes to explain actions and thoughts. Depending on which of the two plausible views of rational explanation is right, either: the paradox is mistaken about the a priori requirements for content; or, a fatal flaw in content ascription alleged by the paradox is no flaw at all, rather a necessary component of the proper method of propositional-attitude ascription. On either lemma, rational explanation defuses the paradox.

Many accidents happen on roads due to the risky behaviour of drivers including speeding. The rate of fatalities and injuries is high in those accidents where speeding is the reason for the accident. This study aims to identify the significant predictors of drivers’ speeding behaviour considering the theoretical background of the Norm-Activation Model (NAM) theory. The social, cultural, and road environment-related factors were also considered in the design of the questionnaire. This survey was conducted in Lahore city and 556 usable samples were collected. A factor analysis was conducted to confirm the association of observed variables with their latent variables according to NAM theory. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) resulted in factors of personal speeding traits, the effectiveness of traffic enforcements, speeding propensity, situational constraints, drivers’ compliance with speed limits, social and environmental influence. The results of Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) revealed that driver’s Awareness of the Consequences (AC), the Ascription of Responsibility (AR) of behavioural outcomes, and compliance with speed limits are good predictors of Personal Norms (PN) (R2 = 0.62). The factors of personal speeding traits, situational constraints, personal norms, and social and environmental influence have significant correlations with drivers’ speeding propensity (R2 = 0.36). The PN, effectiveness of traffic enforcements, compliance with speed limits, and speeding propensity factors are a direct predictor of drivers’ speeding behaviour (R2 = 0.21). These results implicate that drivers’ ability to comply with speed limits and present traffic enforcements are effective in controlling speedy drivers. However, different situations, specific personality attributes, road driving environment, and culture have a positive influence on speeding propensity.

Not all probability ascriptions that appear in scientific theories describe chances. There is a question about whether probability ascriptions in non-fundamental sciences, such as those found in evolutionary biology and statistical mechanics, describe chances in deterministic worlds and about whether there could be any chances in deterministic worlds. Recent debate over whether chance is compatible with determinism has unearthed two strategies for arguing about whether a probability ascription describes chance—that is, to speak metaphorically, two different strategies for figuring out where the chances are: find the chances by focusing on chance’s explanatory role or find the chances by focusing on chance’s predictive role. These two strategies tend to yield conflicting results about where the chances are, and debate over which strategy is appropriate tends to end in stalemate. After discussing these two strategies, I consider a new view of chance’s explanatory role. I argue that one theoretical advantage of this new view is that allows us to make progress on the question of where the chances are by providing a principled way of determining which probability ascriptions describe chances. From the vantage of this new view, the correct application of both strategies involves figuring out where the chances are by figuring out where the probabilistic scientific explanations are and what those explanations are like.

I investigate: (1) to what extent do folk ascriptions of lying differ between casual and courtroom contexts? (2) to what extent does motive (reason) to lie influence ascriptions of trust, mental states, and lying judgments? (3) to what extent are lying judgments consistent with previous ascriptions of communicated content? Following the Supreme Court’s Bronston judgment, I expect: (1) averaged lying judgments to be similar in casual and courtroom contexts; (2) motive to lie to influence levels of trust, mental states ascriptions, and patterns of lying judgments; (3) retrospective judgments of lying, after being presented with the state of the world, to be inconsistent with previous judgments of communicated content: participants hold the protagonist responsible for content she did not communicate. I performed a survey experiment on the Qualtrics platform. Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 630). I employed standard Likert scales and forced-choice questions. I found that: (1) average lying judgments are similar in casual and courtroom contexts; (2) motive to lie decreases trust ascription and increases lying judgment; (3) judgments of lying are inconsistent with previous judgments of communicated content: participants hold the protagonist responsible for content they did not communicate (effect size of the difference d = .69). Perjury ascriptions are inconsistent. The Supreme Court’s worries expressed in the Bronston judgment are well founded. This article helps reforming jury instructions in perjury cases.

That knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested.

In recent years, the advancements made in the field of neuroscience have been echoed in criminal law, reigniting the discussion on culpability from the viewpoint of if it actually exists, considering the echoes of determinism on the re-found non-existence of free will. This discussion has triggered, once again, the issue of the boundaries and inter-relations between (criminal) law and science, namely on whether normative or legal concepts and categories should acknowledge scientific breakthroughs. Bringing forth the theme of the limits of the law, this discussion is able to provide insight, with reference to a specific problem, as to whether there are plausible legal answers in the context of the ascription of liability if the subject of law ceases to be a responsible—and thus free—person. Taking into consideration evolution both of science and criminal law dogmatic, we aim to argue that in the particular case of culpability, the desired autonomy of law has its limitations, and that without such limitations the ascription of liability would not have a correct answer. For this argument we will firstly approach the meaning of culpability as a milestone of subjective responsibility in criminal law, so that we can then analyse some arguments made regarding the impact of neuroscience on the maintenance of a concept of culpability with the meaning given above, so that lastly we can proceed to the rebuttal of the overarching impact of (neuro) science on the law and advocate the autonomy of culpability within the necessary limits imposed by the needs of a plausible legal answer.

In this paper, we motivate, propose and defend the following two conditions as individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary for moral responsibility: (1) PODMA(s) (the principle of doxastic moral asymmetry)—originally proposed by Coren, Acta Analytica, 33, 145–159, (2018), now cast as sufficient rather than necessary—and (2) the TWC* (twin world condition), which amends versions presented by Young (Philosophia, 44(3), 961–969, 2016; Philosophia, 45(3), 1365–1380, 2017). We explain why there is a need for new necessary and sufficient conditions, how these build on and improve existing ideas, particularly in relation to Frankfurt-style counterexamples and the continuing discussion on their effectiveness, and why PODMA(s) and the TWC* are good candidates. Finally, we defend the proposal against anticipated objections in order to clarify why we think these individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary conditions are plausible and able to inform the ongoing debate on the role of alternate possibilities in the ascription of moral responsibility.

According to an idea which is widespread among philosophers, linguistic entities derive their intentionality from the intentionality of mental entities by virtue of some relation between them. Typically, it is some kind of intention on the speaker’s part – e.g., an intention to produce in the hearer a belief with a certain content – that is supposed to endow words with content. This paper argues that the concept of the derivation of content from one entity to another, if understood realistically, is flawed: derived intentionality, I will argue, is merely ascribed intentionality, not a real property of its possessor (one which is independent of any stance or interpretation). Irrealistic-ascriptivist senses are suggested for the ideas of content derivation, of original intentionality, and of the mind as the source of linguistic (and other forms of non-mental) intentionality. Thus, endorsing the idea that mental intentionality is the source of non-mental intentionality need not tempt one to intentional realism. In an intentional irrealistic framework, what forms of intentionality are original and what are derived is a deeply contingent matter, determined by our practice(s) of content ascription. But while intentional irrealism accommodates all those ideas, this paper defends “content-derivation irrealism” but not thoroughgoing intentional irrealism – the idea that there is real original (that is, un-derived) intentionality is not ruled out. Still, assuming that some entities possess real intentionality, what can make them endow intentionality upon other entities is also our practice of content ascription.

The notion of relevance plays a role in many accounts of knowledge and knowledge ascription. Although use of the notion is well-motivated, theorists struggle to codify relevance. A reasonable person standard of relevance addresses this codification problem, and provides an objective and flexible standard of relevance; however, treating relevance as reasonableness seems to allow practical factors to determine whether one has knowledge or not—so-called “pragmatic encroachment.” I argue that a fuller understanding of reasonableness and of the role of practical factors in the acquisition of knowledge lets us avoid pragmatic encroachment.

Leadership emergence theory discusses two pathways to leadership emergence—achievement (i.e. leaders’ behaviors) and ascription (i.e. leaders’ traits). Drawing from multilevel leadership emergence theory (Acton, Foti, Lord, & Gladfelter, 2019) which suggests that context influences the saliency of leadership emergence antecedents, our study simultaneously examined the incremental and relative importance of achievement and ascription antecedents to leadership emergence in contexts of low, medium, and high virtuality. In two independent samples—a laboratory experiment involving 86 teams (n = 340; sample one) and a semester long project involving 134 teams (n = 430; sample two)—we found that in low virtuality contexts, ascription factors accounted for incremental variance over achievement factors in predicting leadership emergence, and had larger relative importance. Conversely, in high virtuality contexts, achievement factors accounted for incremental variance over ascription factors in predicting leadership emergence, and had larger relative importance. Findings in medium virtuality contexts were mixed as achievement and ascription factors played relatively equal roles in the prediction of leadership emergence. Analyses employing other ratings of ascription (i.e. other-rated personality) found that a larger proportion of variance in leadership emergence was explained by other ratings than by self-ratings across all virtuality configurations.

In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of the Organic View of Ethical Status, as outlined by Torrance (2008). A key presupposition of this view is that only moral patients can be moral agents. It is claimed that because artificial agents lack sentience, they cannot be proper subjects of moral concern (i.e. moral patients). This account of moral standing in principle excludes machines from participating in our moral universe. I will argue that the Organic View operationalises anthropocentric intuitions regarding sentience ascription, and by extension how we identify moral patients. The main difference between the argument I provide here and traditional arguments surrounding moral attributability is that I do not necessarily defend the view that internal states ground our ascriptions of moral patiency. This is in contrast to views such as those defended by Singer (1975, 2011) and Torrance (2008), where concepts such as sentience play starring roles. I will raise both conceptual and epistemic issues with regards to this sense of sentience. While this does not preclude the usage of sentience outright, it suggests that we should be more careful in our usage of internal mental states to ground our moral ascriptions. Following from this I suggest other avenues for further exploration into machine moral patiency which may not have the same shortcomings as the Organic View.

Non-source nutrients (e.g., nitrogen, phosphorous) from agriculture have created a massive hypoxic zone in the Gulf of Mexico. This zone contains no oxygen and is devoid of life. US Department of Agriculture programs provide direct payments to farmers to encourage adoption of practices that reduce nutrient pollution. Paying farmers to change behavior, however, is expensive. Personal and social norms may serve to reduce these payment costs by motivating farmers to take action without external reward. This study explored relationships between three normative concepts (awareness of consequences (AC), ascription of responsibility (AR), subjective norms (SN)) and Illinois farmers' intention to continue participation in conservation without financial compensation. Data were obtained from a mailed questionnaire. Only farmers who were currently being paid to participate in a conservation program were included in the analysis (n = 551). Using norm activation theory and the theory of reasoned action, we hypothesized that SN would be positively related to AC, AR, and conservation intentions without compensation. We also predicted that AC would be positively related to AR, and that AC and AR would be positively related to conservation intentions. All hypotheses were supported. Both personal norms (AC, AR) and social norms (subjective norms) were related to intentions to continue conservation without pay. Behavioral interventions that activate norms may help facilitate conservation without payments. As applied in this study, activating personal and social norms may serve to reduce nutrient pollution from agriculture that is flowing into the Gulf of Mexico and resulting in the hypoxic zone.

In recent years, Iran has been increasingly faced with severe water scarcity. In this regard, participation of farmers in water conservation activities is proposed as one of the major solutions to this problem. Despite extensive efforts to encourage water conservation activities among Iranian farmers, there are still no thorough knowledge and understanding of the determinants of their participatory-based water conservation behaviors (PBWCB). Accordingly, the present study makes an attempt to develop an appropriate theoretical framework using the norm activation theory (NAT) to analyze farmers’ PBWCB. For this purpose, a sample of 378 Iranian farmers is selected using stratified random sampling method. The results show that the variable of personal norms (as the main predictor of behavior in NAT) could predict a significant percentage (55.7%) of the variance in PBWCB. In addition, other variables, including ascription of responsibility, subjective norms, perceived ability, and awareness of consequences, explained 47.8% of its variance as the main determinants of personal moral/norms. Analysis of the total effects of three water conservation values (egoistic, altruistic, and biospheric values) also revealed that farmers’ PBWCBs are mostly affected by their underlying values. A number of practical recommendations were finally presented to facilitate the implications of the study results for water resource managers, policy-makers, and executives in relevant organizations.

While machine learning techniques have been used to model categorization/decision making tasks that are beyond the capabilities of traditional AI, these new models are typically uninterpretable, i.e., the reasons for their decisions are not clear. Some have argued that, in developing machines that can report the reasons for their decisions, developers should take, as a guide, human explanations for behavior, which make reference to mental states (e.g., knowledge/belief). This proposal is correct, but unattainable given certain characteristics of current AI. To explain, this article draws on recent discourse-analytic research showing that ascriptions of knowledge/belief presume behavioral performances to instantiate particular sorts of broader dispositions. This is reflected by the possibility of ascribing knowledge/belief to an agent on the basis that there can be no other explanation for their observed behavior. The behavior of AI trained through machine learning is unpredictable in ways that precludes such certainty. Consequently, while it is certainly possible to program machines to report mental states of knowledge/belief to account for their decisions, the failure of current AI to engage in typically human forms of life means that such ascribed mental states are inevitably meaningless.

The question of the moral status of AI and the extent to which that status ought to be recognised by societal institutions is one that has not yet received a satisfactory answer from lawyers. This paper seeks to provide a solution to the problem by defending a moral foundation for the recognition of legal personhood for AI, requiring the status to be granted should a threshold criterion be reached. The threshold proposed will be bare, noumenal agency in the Kantian sense. Agency has been identified by Alan Gewirth as the source of the rights claims of our own species and, at risk of contradiction, is a foundation that must be expanded to all agents or else we contradict the foundation of our own rights. This is something that ought to be recognised through the granting of legal personhood to all noumenal agents by any system that requires such personhood for the enforcement of rights, or else the rule restricting legal personhood cannot be seen as a valid legal norm. Having laid out the case, the paper will move on to defend this natural law conception against the narrower definition of legal personhood proposed by Bryson et al. with regards to AI. It will argue that bare agency is a sufficient, though not necessary, criterion for the ascription of legal personhood in any system that sees the status as necessary for the ascription of legal rights. The paper will conclude by analysing the proposals currently making their way through the legislatures of the UK and European Union. They will be assessed for their compatibility with the claim that a functioning legal system necessarily must recognise the legal personhood of all noumenal agents regardless of their origins, and whether they are future-proofed for the possibility that AI may meet this threshold.

One task of historians is to construct causal ascription of singular historicals between eminent historical events. For instance, the controversy resulting from the confusing butterfly ballot of Florida’s year 2000 presidential election cost Gore his presidency. However, to research into these matters is inevitably to appeal to counterfactual deliberation in an epistemic fashion because the past is fixed. One standard idea is Max Weber’s, Weber causation: “f was a cause of φ” is assertable iff “¬f □→ ¬φ” is assertable. Reiss (2009) gives an exceptionally good analysis of this topic and outlines historians’ reasoning, claiming that backtracking analyses of counterfactual conditionals employed in historical thought experiments is the signature of historical study of causal ascription of singular historicals. Nevertheless, he concludes that it is very difficult to reach an uncontroversial ascription for this sort in most cases. For this reason, he proposes to find difference-making relations that will suffice. The objective of this paper is to provide a more fine-grained, intervention-based, backtracking analysis of counterfactual conditionals upon which a more satisfactory account of causal ascription of singular historicals can be given. Reiss’ account of difference-making relation will be shown to be unsatisfactory. Moreover, a formal ground of the epistemology of historical thought experiments can be given, along with the constraints of this account resultant from the semantic features of non-transitivity and strong centering of counterfactual conditionals. Finally, some epistemological points of causal ascription of singular historicals and historical thought experiments will be given.

This article summarizes Linda Martin Alcoff's Rape and Resistance (Polity, Cambridge, 2018). Alcoff's analysis centers on a political and philosophical defense of the need to recognize the complexity of both the phenomenon of sexual assault and the various political attempts to counter it. Such complexity extends to the process of describing an experience of sexual assault (whether public or private), which Alcoff argues is always shaped by a multitude of political and social discourses. Alcoff's Foucauldian analysis results in an innovative description of the harms of sexual assault, one that focuses on the ways in which experiences of sexual assault prohibit the active involvement of the subject in the development of their sexual subjectivity. Recognizing that gender-based violence is a global phenomenon, Alcoff nevertheless argues that place-specific instances of such violence are contextualized by the larger phenomenon, which is heterogeneous to its core. The article concludes by posing several questions to Alcoff, centered on the themes of the ethics of sexual experimentation, assailants' ascription of hyperagency to targets of sexual assault, and how sexual assault may influence the sexual subjectivity of maleidentified victims, particularly those who were assaulted as children.

Authorship and authorship ordering in the by-line have been gaining interest in the recent past. Unlike authorship in single-author which is an open-book, authorship in multi-author papers have been murky in certain aspects especially, in ordering, among others. Authorship implies responsibility and so, should not order in by-line reflect measures of responsibility on the basis of their contribution? But it hasn’t been that way especially, the authors in middle order and last place, they are addled positions. However, the position of first author is undisputable because of one’s relative contribution or responsibility. On this note, I propose dominance index (DI) and dominance co-efficiency (DC) of a scientist or an author. These measures are on based on the number of times as first author, the total number of multi-authored papers and the total number of times of co-authors. The average number of times as first author is the dominance score and the number of times as first author divided by mean of co-authors gives dominance co-efficiency. These measures are put to test on faculty members of a Department of a University to show how the indexes would look like. The data sets are collected from their biodata and supplemented from SCOPUS database. The results obtained seems quite tenable. But the usage of these indexes is left to the discretion of evaluators. Some pertinent implications and questions such as, the significance of a paper, omission of single-authored papers, the role of corresponding author, the practice of noblesse oblige, the effect of team size, the regulation of authorship and ordering in the by-line are discussed. Further, an alternative measure of dominance is also given on the sine quo non that order of authors in the by-line is strictly according to relative measure of contribution. In this case, the dominance index is a measure of an author’s standing or prominence among his co-authors based on the ranking or position in the ascription of all the co-authored papers. It gives relative rank or position of an author or scientist among one’s co-author(s) of the times of co-authoring based on the ascription of all the paper of significance. Dominance co-efficiency is the product of paper of significance and dominance index. A negative or low DI or DC scores of a scientist or an author do not mean that the scientific or research contribution is low or insignificant. On the other hand, a high DI and DC scores of a scientist or an author do not necessarily mean that his or her scientific contribution is excellent or important.

Theory of Mind is an inferential system central to human–human communication by which people ascribe mental states to self and other, and then use those deductions to make predictions about others’ behaviors. Despite the likelihood that ToM may also be central to interactions with other types of agents exhibiting similar cues, it is not yet fully known whether humans develop ToM for mechanical agents exhibiting properties of intelligence and sociality. A suite of five tests for implicit ToM were performed (white lie test, behavioral intention task, facial affect inference, vocal affect inference, and false-belief test) for three different robots and a human control. Findings suggest that implicit ToM signals are consistent across variably human-like robots and humans, so long as the social cues are similar and interpretable, but there is no association between implicit ToM signals and explicit mind ascription; findings suggest that heuristics and deliberation of mental status of robots may compete with implicit social-cognitive reactions.

Whether perception involves the manipulation of representations is currently heavily debated. The embedded view (EV) advanced by Nico Orlandi seeks a middle passage between representationalism and radical enactivism. In this paper I argue for a non-representational take on EV. I argue that this is the best way to resolve the objections EV has received from both representationalists and non-representationalists. I analyze this debate, and distinguish four sorts of objections: (1) the objection of the wrongfully cut middleman, (2) the argument against explanatory exclusionism, (3) the case for scientific benefits of representations, and (4) the charge of inconsistent ascription of representational status in EV. I argue that (1) the middleman was never cut in EV, and is controversial to boot, (2) otherwise equal, non-representational explanations have primacy over representational explanations, due to the lack of naturalistic grounds for representations and the unnecessarily ascribed cognitive load to the system. Further, I show that (3) puts the cart before the horse, and the arguments on offer are viciously circular. However, the final objection, (4) lays bare a deeper issue for EV. At the cost of giving up the middle position, however, the explanatory tools already available to EV can be shown to cover the work initially thought to require representation. I conclude that EV is best altered to be a non-representational theory of perception.

Although pro-environmental behaviors (PEBs) have been characterized as feminine, some PEBs are masculine suggesting that gender bending (e.g., engaging in pro-environmental behaviors inconsistent with one’s own gender) and gender conformity (e.g., engaging in pro-environmental behaviors consistent with one’s own gender) are possible for both women and men. Social consequences for gender bending versus conformity with PEBs were assessed in three studies. Gender bending created uncertainty about an actor’s heterosexual identity (Studies 1 and 2). Consistent with stigma-by-association, actors’ gender bending influenced judgments about an actor’s friend’s sexual identity (Study 2). However, gender bending had limited effects on ascription of gendered traits: More feminine than masculine traits were ascribed to PEB actors, even actors of masculine PEBs (Studies 1 and 2). Consistent with social ostracism, Study 3 illustrated that men were most likely to socially distance themselves from female gender benders, likely as a result of prejudice against gender-bending women. In contrast, women preferred to socially interact with gender-conforming women, likely resulting from a combination of their greater interest in feminine than masculine PEBs and preferring to interact with women more so than with men. Social repercussions are discussed in terms of stigmatizing engagement in PEBs.

Mindreading capacity has been widely understood as the human ability to gain knowledge about the inner processes and states of others that bring about the behavior of these agents. This paper argues against this epistemic view of mindreading on the basis of different empirical studies in linguistics and social and developmental psychology: we are systematically biased in attributing mental states, and many everyday uses of mental ascription sentences do not reflect an epistemic function in our social interactions. We introduce an alternative view of mental ascriptions, the social cover view, which is consistent with the evidence. The social cover view holds that the main function of mental ascriptions is to cover the social status and reputation of an agent rather than to gain knowledge about her inner processes and states. Finally, we discuss two possible objections to our proposal.

Green housing (GH) has been regarded as an effective and sustainable solution for alleviating the energy crisis and reducing environmental pressure in China, but currently, consumers rarely select GH when purchasing houses. This study aims to explore the influencing factors of consumers’ willingness to purchase GH in China. The research model was developed using the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) and norm activation theory (NAM), and it tested hypotheses using data from a questionnaire collected from 355 consumers in Shandong Province, China. Partial least squares structural equation model analysis showed that the testing of hypotheses was significant, in which personal norm and perceived behavioural control as direct influencing variables had a significant influence on consumers’ willingness to purchase GH. Therefore, GH purchase is driven by the comprehensive rational and moral factors of consumers. In addition, part of the mediating effect testing reveals that subjective norm indirectly influences personal norm through perceived behavioural control, and awareness of consequences indirectly influences personal norm through ascription of responsibility. In general, the integration of the structure of TPB and NAM, comprehensive self-interest (rational) and altruism (moral) aspects significantly improve the prediction capability of the theoretical framework. Results show the influence of the consumer to GH purchase willingness with regard to internal psychological factors, design and implementation of related policies and measures for the government to provide a frame of reference.

Ryle, the most prominent proponent of anti-intellectualism, and Stanley and Williamson, the most influential intellectualists, both invoke dispositions to explain the ascription of knowledge-how. It is now well known that conditional analyses of disposition suffer from two types of counterexamples: finkish and masked dispositions. If it is the case that dispositions play a role in the analysis of ascription of knowledge-how, and dispositions can be masked and finkish, then an important question arises: Can knowing-how be masked or finkish too? In response to this question, Hawley claims that (1) unlike dispositions, knowledge-how does not seem liable to finkishness, and (2) knowledge-how can be accounted for in terms of counterfactual success. In this paper both claims will be challenged. I seek to show that Hawley’s account faces two problems: an unjustified asymmetry and a puzzle. I also argue that knowledge-how can, intuitively, be finkish and masked, and therefore the counterfactual analysis of knowing-how suggested by Ryle, Stanley and Hawley fails. What is more, I show that the debate on finkish and masked dispositions can shed a new light on the practical component which is necessary for knowing-how.

Research on fair trade consumption has proliferated in recent years. However, to date, systematic comparisons of the various theoretical models attempting to explain the purchase of fair trade products are rare. The present paper addresses this gap by comparing three theories which explain fair trade consumption by reference to a personal norm: The norm-activation model (NAM), the value-belief-norm (VBN) theory, and the value-identity-personal norm (VIP) model. Using data from a random sample of the general population in Zurich (Switzerland), the paper compares the explanatory power and the causal structures of these theories with structural equation models. The results show that the value-identity-personal norm (VIP) model explains the largest amount of variance in the purchase of fair trade products, followed by the value-belief-norm (VBN) theory. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that values influence the personal norm via specific beliefs (awareness of consequences and ascription of responsibility), as specified in VBN, as well as via the more general concept of an identity as a critical consumer, as hypothesized by VIP. In contrast, the results do not support the moderator-formulation of the NAM. The paper therefore concludes that VIP and VBN both represent valuable theories specifying complementary mechanisms for explaining fair trade consumption, whereas there is no evidence for the NAM as an explanation of fair trade consumption.

Non-Humean accounts of the metaphysics of nature posit either laws or powers in order to account for natural necessity and world-order. We argue that such monistic views face fundamental problems. On the one hand, neo-Aristotelians cannot give unproblematic power-based accounts of the functional laws among quantities offered by physical theories, as well as of the place of conservation laws and symmetries in a lawless ontology; in order to capture these characteristics, commitment to governing laws is indispensable. On the other hand, ontologies that entirely exclude some kind of power ascription to worldly entities (such as primitivism) face what we call the Governing Problem: such ontologies do not have the resources to give an adequate account of how laws play their governing role. We propose a novel dualist model, which, we argue, has the resources to solve the difficulties encountered by its two dominant competitors, without inheriting the problems of either view. According to the dualist model, both laws and powers (suitably conceived) are equally fundamental and irreducible to each other, and both are needed in order to give a satisfactory account of the nomological structure of the world. The dualist model constitutes thus a promising alternative to current monistic views in the metaphysics of science.

This article aims to explore the debate on human enhancement (HE) from the perspective of the evolutions of responsibility paradigms, and in particular from the perspective of the so-called Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) approach. The aim is not to explore the arguments pro or contra the ethical legitimacy and/or technical feasibility of human enhancement, but rather exploring if, and how, the RRI perspective can shape the debate on human enhancement (and vice versa). In particular, the human enhancement debate will be read through the lenses of four main responsibility paradigms that we sketch by examining both, the historical and conceptual evolution of the responsibility idea and the dynamics of its ascription. In order to provide a useful scheme for interpreting human enhancement, RRI will be characterised as a distinctive responsibility model that can subsequently be used to frame the debate on HE with a particular emphasis on its normative implications, as well as on its social and political significance.

This article examines the nonhistoricist higher-order compatibilist theory of moral responsibility devised and defended by Harry G. Frankfurt. Intuitions about certain kinds of cases of moral responsibility cast significant doubt on the wide irrelevancy clause of the nonhistoricist feature of Frankfurt’s theory. It will be argued that, while the questions of the nature and ascription of moral responsibility must be separated in doing moral responsibility theory, the questions of whether or not and the extent to which an agent is morally responsible for performing certain kinds of actions cannot be settled without also answering the question of the history of that agent’s attitudes, preferences, etc. which may have contributed to the agent’s performing such actions. Thus Frankfurt’s repeated claim that the history of an agent’s action is “irrelevant” to the question of that agent’s moral responsibility for it is rendered dubious, thereby rendering problematic the strongly nonhistoricist component of his theory. The methodological difference between my challenge to Frankfurt’s nonhistoricism and those of others is that, while others have challenged Frankfurt’s nonhistoriciams by way of thought experiments involving hyper-manipulation, mine presents a set of counter-examples to his nonhistoricism which emanate from morality and the law. Indeed, if my counter-example is plausible, then Frankfurt’s nonhistoricism cannot make good sense of some standard instances of racism. Furthermore, while many believe that racist hate crimes ought to be punished more heavily than crimes committed absent hate, the argument herein provides reasons for mitigating, rather than increasing, the responsibility and punishments of many such crimes. What matters in such cases is the extent to which the hatred accompanying said crimes has a history in the agent’s life, one which makes it significantly difficult for her to do other than what she did in committing the racist crime.

This paper defends Lewis’ (Philos Rev 88:513–543, 1979a) influential treatment of de se attitudes from recent criticism to the effect that a key explanatory notion—self-ascription—goes unexplained (Cappelen and Dever in The inessential indexical, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; Holton, in: Loewer, Schaffer (eds) The Blackwell companion to David Lewis, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 399–410, 2015). It is shown that Lewis’ treatment can be reconstructed in a way which provides clear responses. This sheds light on the explanatory ambitions of those engaged in Lewis’ project.

Dispositionalism about modality is the view that metaphysical modality is a matter of the dispositions possessed by actual objects. In a recent paper, David Yates has raised an important worry about the formal adequacy of dispositionalism. This paper responds to Yates’s worry by developing a reply that Yates discusses briefly but dismisses as ad hoc: an appeal to a ’plenitude of powers’ including such powers as the necessarily always manifested power (or disposition) for $$2+2$$ to be 4. I argue that the reply is not ad hoc at all, by defending the metaphysics of dispositions that should underly it. I then argue, first, that a proper understanding of dispositions’ degrees provides us with an argument for such necessarily always manifested dispositions; second, that all the natural attempts to block that argument can be resisted without being ad hoc; and third, that pragmatic considerations explain our intuitive resistance to the ascription of necessarily always manifested dispositions. Dispositionalism can be formally adequate after all.

African immigrants in the U.S. have been headlined as America’s “new model minority.” The purpose of this paper is to examine if evidence exists to support the claim of African immigrant students’ (AIS) educational achievement and excellence (a core indicator of the “model minority” theory) in U.S. k-12 schools. Using a multiple methodological research approach and analysis, the study examines whether aggregated and disaggregated data exist to verify AIS’ superior academic achievement in U.S. k-12 schools. The study reveals a lack of data to substantiate the claim. Instead, the study reveals a paucity of research on AIS’ academic performance and achievement in k-12 schools, as well as academic underperformance and underachievement, and the challenges that exist. The notion of a “model minority” attributed to African immigrants is disingenuous and a disservice to AIS in U.S. k-12 schools. The paper discusses significant implications and recommendations for policy and practice that include overhauling the data collection and reporting system, data disaggregation for AIS, debunking the African immigrant “model minority” ascription, preparing culturally responsive and globally competent teachers, and increasing research on AIS in k-12 schools.

How do animals adapt their behaviors to changing conditions? This question relates to the debate between associative versus representational/computational approaches in cognitive science. An influential line of research that has significantly shaped the conceptual development of animal learning over decades has primarily focused on the role of associative dynamics with little-to-no ascription of representational/combinatorial capacities. The common assumption of these models is that behavioral adjustments are incremental and they result from updating of associations based on actions and their outcomes, without encoding the critical information serving as the determinant(s) of such contingencies (e.g., time in interval schedules, number in ratio schedules). On the other hand, an independent line of research provides evidence for behavioral phenomena that cannot be readily accounted for by the conventional associationist approach. In this paper, we will review different sets of findings particularly in the area of interval timing that suggest the ability of animals to make swift spontaneous computations on subjective quantities and incorporate them into their behavior. Findings of these studies constitute empirical challenges for the associationist approaches to behavioral flexibility. We argue that interval timing is a fertile ground for the formulation of critical tests of different theoretical approaches to animal behavior.

This article explores whether perspective taking has an impact on the ascription of epistemic states. To do so, a new method is introduced which incites participants to imagine themselves in the position of the protagonist of a short vignette and to judge from her perspective. In a series of experiments (total N=1980), perspective proves to have a significant impact on belief ascriptions, but not on knowledge ascriptions. For belief, perspective is further found to moderate the epistemic side-effect effect significantly. It is hypothesized that the surprising findings are driven by the special epistemic authority we enjoy in assessing our own belief states, which does not extend to the assessment of our own knowledge states.

The aim of this paper is to show how Prince Rogers Nelson’s lewd onstage antics and perverse song lyrics were not the only factors that contributed to his sexually charged compositions. By examining the use of anthropomorphism (the ascription of human characteristics to what is not human), in the analysis of several of Prince’s early works between the years 1980 and 1984, the researcher makes the argument that his musical arrangements taken from this earlier musical cannon embody the stages of Masters and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle. Ultimately, the researcher views Prince’s musical arrangements and improvisations to be metaphors for his own genitalia having intercourse with his public.

We are currently witnessing the emergence of a discourse on responsible research and innovation (RRI) in the field of quantum technology. Working on the assumption that the initial stage of discourse is of particular importance with regard to the ascription of meaning to an emerging field, our point of departure is a small corpus of prominent policy-oriented reports on quantum technology recently published in Europe. With a view to these publications, the article analyses various approaches to RRI and discusses lessons learned in nanotechnology discourse as these may impact on emerging discourse on quantum technology and its stance towards RRI. On the basis of our analyses, we outline a strategy for fostering RRI in this promising field of science and technology. We propose implementing a “strong” RRI approach which entails linking parliamentary or other core policy processes to stakeholder dialogues, decision-supporting public engagement and a wide variety of other public communication activities. At the same time, taking our cue from lessons learned in nanotechnology discourse, we argue that a strong RRI approach to quantum technology should be modest and focused in terms of thematic and societal scope.

Naturalistic theories of disease appeal to concepts of biological function, and use the notion of dysfunction as the basis of their definitions. Debates in the philosophy of biology demonstrate how attributing functions in organisms and establishing the function-dysfunction distinction is by no means straightforward. This problematization of functional ascription has undermined naturalistic theories and led some authors to abandon the concept of dysfunction, favoring instead definitions based in normative criteria or phenomenological approaches. Although this work has enhanced our understanding of disease and illness, we need not necessarily abandon naturalistic concepts of function and dysfunction in the disease debate. This article attempts to move towards a new naturalistic theory of disease that overcomes the limitations of previous definitions and offers advantages in the clinical setting. Our approach involves a re-evaluation of concepts of biological function employed by naturalistic theories. Drawing on recent insights from the philosophy of biology, we develop a contextual and evaluative account of function that is better suited to clinical medicine and remains consistent with contemporary naturalism. We also show how an updated naturalistic view shares important affinities with normativist and phenomenological positions, suggesting a possibility for consilience in the disease debate.

The minimally conscious state (MCS) is usually ascribed when a patient with brain damage exhibits observable volitional behaviors that predict recovery of cognitive functions. Nevertheless, a patient with brain damage who lacks motor capacity might nonetheless be in MCS. For this reason, some clinicians use neural signals as a communicative means for MCS ascription. For instance, a vegetative state patient is diagnosed with MCS if activity in the motor area is observed when the instruction to imagine wiggling toes is given. The validity of using neural signals in ascribing MCS requires a special sort of inference. That is, no-report paradigmatic assessments must have inductively strong ways of inferring a purported informational content from the observed neural signal that grounds the fact that the patient has top-down cognitive control (or residual volition). Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication and Bayes’ theorem reveals the formal structure of neural communication. On the basis of relevant data from the neuroscience literature, I conclude that the formal structure combined with the data shows that neural signals can be used as a communicative means for operational diagnostic criteria for MCS ascription.

This paper addresses a certain objection to the quantificational theory of definite descriptions. According to this objection, the quantificational account cannot provide correct interpretations of definite descriptions embedded in the non-doxastic attitude ascriptions and therefore ought to be rejected. In brief, the objection says that the quantificational theory is committed to the view that a sentence of the form “The F is G” is equivalent to the claim that there is a unique F and it is G, while the ascription such as, e.g., “S wants the F to be G” is not equivalent to the statement that S wants there to be a (unique) F and for it to be G. I argue that this objection is invalid as it rests on a false assumption concerning the substitutivity of the relative clauses in the non-doxastic attitude ascriptions.

One natural way to argue for the existence of some subjective constraint on agents’ obligations is to maintain that without that particular constraint, agents will sometimes be obligated to do that which they lack the ability to do. In this paper, I maintain that while such a strategy appears promising, it is fraught with pitfalls. Specifically, I argue that because the truth of an ability ascription depends on an (almost always implicit) characterization of the relevant possibility space, different metaethical accounts take obligation to be constrained by different senses of ability. As a result, what initially looks to be a point of consensus—that ability constrains obligation—turns out to be a point of contention, and arguments with this at the foundation are much more likely to obscure, rather than resolve, metaethical disputes. Despite this, appeals to ability in metaethics aren’t doomed to be fruitless. On the contrary, if we can independently establish a particular sense of ability as the normatively relevant one, then we have good grounds for ruling out metaethical accounts that are inconsistent with it. In the final section, I make just such an argument. What seems right about the thought that ability constrains obligation is that an agent cannot be obligated to do that which her circumstances prevent her from doing. I argue that only a sense of ability that is both epistemically and motivationally restricted adequately respects the limits of agential control.

Ethnicity and migrant-related categories in health reporting constitute a discursive practice in knowledge production on infectious diseases such as TB and HIV/AIDS. These categories are bound up with the ascription of identities and are a product of unique socio-historical factors. We use a sociology of knowledge approach to discourse analysis (SKAD), to examine the categories used in TB and HIV/AIDS health reporting in the UK and the discourses on im/migrants, ethnic minorities and infectious disease in which they are embedded. The interpretative analysis shows that the ‘order of knowledge’ instituted by these discourses is historically contingent and that common interpretative patterns in the discourses are of im/migrants and ethnic minority groups as being ‘a risk’ and ‘at risk’ of infectious diseases. However, the dominance of these patterns varies according to the disease. While TB has consistently been constructed since the 1960s as a disease of immigration, with im/migrants and ethnic minorities being more of ‘a risk’ to the nation’s health, HIV/AIDS has been more explicitly linked to the new public health and notions of these groups’ vulnerability. We consider the implications of these discourses in relation to the current TB control strategy and the constitution of knowledge on TB/HIV co-infection.

According to radical versions of embodied cognition, human cognition and agency should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. According to a standard reply, accounts of embodied cognition can explain only instances of cognition and agency that are not “representation-hungry”. Two main types of such representation-hungry phenomena have been discussed: cognition about “the absent” and about “the abstract”. Proponents of representationalism have maintained that a satisfactory account of such phenomena requires the ascription of mental representations. Opponents have denied this. I will argue that there is another important representation-hungry phenomenon that has been overlooked in this debate: temporally extended planning agency. In particular, I will argue that it is very difficult to see how planning agency can be explained without the ascription of mental representations, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that cognition about the absent and abstract can. We will see that this is a serious challenge for the radical as well as the more modest anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition, and we will see that modest anti-representationalism is an unstable position.

Given that an analysis of disposition ascription cannot be made in terms of a simple subjunctive conditional, we present a multiply qualified conditional analysis that places disposition ascription within an implicit fundamental causal conceptual typography within which a disposition ascription is embedded, framed, and understood. By placing the multiply qualified analysis within an implicit causal matrix involving a focal cause, pathway of influence, mechanism of action (via the intrinsic property responsible for the disposition), contributing/partial cause, mediator (i.e., transmitting agent), extrinsic moderator, (protective factor, inhibitory factor), intrinsic moderator, and manifestation (causal consequence), we show how this analysis evades counterexamples and arguments raised against the simple conditional analysis. We then indicate how the causal conceptual landscape provides a roadmap for unpacking and explicating parameters of the ceteris paribus qualifier to acquit the analysis of charges of being vacuous or irredeemably vague.

Presently it is en vogue to search and research business models heedful to concerns of social, moral, and ecological sustainability. On the view here defended, however, we ought not to strive for piecemeal corrections but for a thoroughgoing paradigm change of the predominant economic theories and practices in favor of a genuinely ‘humanistic management.’ This very call for humanistic management serves as an introduction into this paper (section 1). The article then lays out a concept of humanistic management in three methodologically distinct steps, description – ascription – prescription, before addressing potential challenges to the approach of humanistic management and, finally, pointing out some of its practical implications. The article hence proceeds as follows: From a critique of the reductionist description of economic agency given in conventional economics (2), the paper moves on to the ascription of freedom and responsibility by and through human actors (3), which appears essential for any attempt at re-integrating moral prescriptions into economics and, by extension, management theory (4). The resultant, dignity-centered humanistic management conception is then defended against challenges from postmodern authors and defendants of ‘deep ecology’ (5). Afterward, the article presents some normative postulates for management practice (6); last, the main findings of the paper are summarized (7).

Start with an ordinary disposition ascription, like ‘the wire is live’ or ‘the glass is fragile’. Lewis (Philos Quart 47:143–158, 1997) gives a canonical template for what he regards as the analysandum of such an ascription

Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that \(\varphi\) where \(\varphi\) entails \(\psi\), then one is in an evidential position to know that \(\psi\). In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus on two brands of epistemic theory (each the object of sustained recent interest in the literature) that naturally incorporate closure restrictions. The first type holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is relative to a relevant question. The second holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is relative to a relevant topic. For each approach, I offer a formalization of a leading theory from the literature (respectively, that of Jonathan Schaffer and that of Stephen Yablo) and use this formalization to evaluate the theory’s adequacy in terms of a precise set of desiderata. I conclude that neither theory succeeds in meeting these desiderata, casting doubt on the viability of the underlying approaches. Finally, I offer a novel variant of the topic-sensitive approach that fares better.

Genetically modified organisms are a technology now used with increasing frequency in agriculture. Genetically modified seeds have the special characteristic of being living artefacts that can reproduce and spread; thus it is difficult to control where they end up. In addition, genetically modified seeds may also bring about uncertainties for environmental and human health. Where they will go and what effect they will have is therefore very hard to predict: this creates a puzzle for regulators. In this paper, I use the problem of contamination to complicate my ascription of forward-looking moral responsibility to owners of genetically modified organisms. Indeed, how can owners act responsibly if they cannot know that contamination has occurred? Also, because contamination creates new and unintended ownership, it challenges the ascription of forward-looking moral responsibility based on ownership. From a broader perspective, the question this paper aims to answer is as follows: how can we ascribe forward-looking moral responsibility when the effects of the technologies in question are difficult to know or unknown? To solve this problem, I look at the epistemic conditions for moral responsibility and connect them to the normative notion of the social experiment. Indeed, examining conditions for morally responsible experimentation helps to define a range of actions and to establish the related epistemic virtues that owners should develop in order to act responsibly where genetically modified organisms are concerned.

This paper will focus on the establishment of a social event that refers in our case study to a social android robot simulating interaction with human users. Within an open-field study setting, we observed a shifting of interactive behavior, presence setting and agency ascription by the human users toward the robot, operating in parallel with the robots' different modulations of activity. The activity modes of the robot range from a simple idling state, to a reactive facetrack condition and finally an interactive teleoperated condition. By relating the three types of activity modes with three types of (increasing social) presence settings--ranging from co-location, to co-presence and finally to social presence--we observed modulations in the human users' interactive behavior as well as modulations of agency ascription toward the robot. The observations of the behavioral shift in the human users toward the robot lead us to the assumption that a fortification of agency ascription toward the robot goes hand in hand with the increase in its social activity modes as well as its display of social presence features.

The recent development of robotics poses new challenges for the legislature as well as for jurisprudence. Especially, the ascription of responsibility to a specific individual becomes more difficult when confronted with an autonomous, learning and decision-making robot. A discussion about how to solve the problems of the wronged party having to prove the cause of the damage and the person responsible for it has to take place. One possible solution could be to ascribe a specific legal status to autonomous machines, similar to the status of legal persons (corporations). Discussing responsibility in this context should also include the question of the consequences of us intentionally handing over decision-making onto machines. This transfer as well as the development of robotics as such will have repercussions on the normative concepts our society is based upon. The space for these changes has to be created consciously.

I argue that advocates of moderate epistemic idealization need some standards against which they can determine whether a particular individual P has a responsibility to acquire some specific piece of information α. Such a specification is necessary for the purpose of determining whether a reason R, the recognition of which depends on accounting for α, can legitimately be ascribed to P. To this end, I propose an initial sketch of a criterion that may be helpful in illuminating the conditions in which P might be said to have a responsibility to take α into account when searching for reasons to act or believe. I worry that reason ascriptions that are based on information acquisition expectations which are not captured by this criterion (and, hence, not legitimate reason ascriptions) may be open to charges of authoritarianism, especially when such a reason ascription prompts one person to demand that another act in a way that is responsive to the ascribed reason(s).