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Much has been written over the years regarding the norms, values, and ideals of modern science—in a word, what is expected of science and scientists. Most frequently, however, attention has focused on the conduct expected of scientists (e.g., Merton’s norms) rather than on the specific content expected of their scientific contributions, and attention has also tended to focus on the current scene rather than on the events that produced it. So. a kind of two-fold gap exists in our understanding of our scientific heritage. Why is this important? Because it turns out that the two general ideals that have shaped the content of modern science right from the start seem to contradict each other. Nonetheless, they both have enjoyed weighty reasons offered in their defense and they both have exerted strong holds through the centuries on scientists and nonscientists alike, and still exert these holds. And the tradition has not offered any satisfying resolution. So, it is high time we deal with this situation. At least, that is what I attempt to do in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jan Patočka's "Galileo Galilei and the End of the Ancient Cosmos" was initially published in the popular science journal Vesmír, 33 (1954), no. 1, pp. 27–29. The year before, there had been published in the same journal, under the general heading "On the Development of the Ideas of Natural Science," a series of Patočka's articles, including "The First Critics of Aristotelianism" [Vesmír 32 (1953), no. 7, pp. 254–256]; "The Breakdown of Aristotle's Dynamics and the Prelude to Modern Mechanicism" (ibid., no. 8, pp. 285–287); "Intermezzo on the Threshold of Modern Science: Cusanus and Comenius" (ibid., no. 9, pp. 322–325). This series had been introduced by yet another text: "Aristotle's Philosophical Natural Science" [Vesmír 32 (1953), no. 3, pp. 102–105]. A last short essay on the theme of the birth of modern natural science—"On the Significance of Francis Bacon of Verulam" [Vesmír 40 (1961), no. 5, pp. 152, 155, and no. 6, pp. 186–188]—followed several years later. These texts were all subsequently revised to a greater or lesser extent and included in the book Aristoteles, jeho předchůdci a dědicové (Aristotle, His Forerunners and Successors), Prague: NČSAV, 1964. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of modern science took place in Western Europe, and one may ask why this was the case. We analyze the roots of modern science by replacing scientific ideas within the framework of Western culture, notably the twin heritage of biblical thought and Greek philosophy. We also investigate Eastern (mostly Chinese) traditions so as to highlight Western beliefs by comparison, and to argue for their relevance to contemporary science. Classical Western conceptions that fostered the rise of science are now largely obsolete, and Eastern thought might be a source of new insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

English philosopher and critic Roger Scruton considers his intellectual odyssey, which has ranged from analytic philosophy at Cambridge to Hegel, Burke, and Plato's Socrates, with topics including music, moral philosophy, and the relation of science to religion. Providing an overview of Scruton's philosophic quest, the book shows how its elements cohere and serves as an unsurpassed introduction to his work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data on the ‘career’ paths of one thousand ‘leading scientists’ from 1450 to 1900, what is conventionally called the ‘rise of modern science’ is mapped as a changing geography of scientific practice in urban networks. Four distinctive networks of scientific practice are identified. A primate network centred on Padua and central and northern Italy in the sixteenth century expands across the Alps to become a polycentric network in the seventeenth century, which in turn dissipates into a weak polycentric network in the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century marks a huge change of scale as a primate network centred on Berlin and dominated by German-speaking universities. These geographies are interpreted as core-producing processes in Wallerstein’s modern world-system; the rise of modern scientific practice is central to the development of structures of knowledge that relate to, but do not mirror, material changes in the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]