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We present a comprehensive analysis of the shock absorption role of external positions using the currency exposures dataset by Bénétrix et al. (2020). While the literature has frequently studied how the net international investment position and its currency composition determine the direction and scale of valuation effects, we focus on their amplitude. This is of central importance for global financial stability given the large and increasing scale of external balance sheets. To that end, we propose an indicator showing the extent to which external positions absorb or amplify exchange rate shocks. Analysing a set of 50 countries over the period 1990-2017, we find the external shock absorption role to be present for advanced economies, while this was initially not the case for emerging markets economies (EMEs). In recent years, however, EMEs' external positions increasingly showed a shock absorption capacity. Our regression-based analysis reveals that the level of economic and financial development is associated with a greater capacity to absorb exchange rate shocks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A prominent feature within the sphere of international macroeconomics surrounds the notion of the domestic economy succumbing to a "sudden stop" — i.e. the point at which creditors are no longer willing to enter into fresh exposures vis-à-vis debtors. One avenue which has been increasingly adopted as a means to survey a nation's external sustainability (i.e. its vulnerability to sudden stops) is through the net international investment position (NIIP) — the difference between stocks of cross-border claims and liabilities. On the basis that financial account transactions are larger than current account transactions in terms of both volume and value, this paper by conjoining several strands of the international macroeconomics literature presents three motivations to suggest that the notion of external sustainability can be decoupled from the NIIP, namely that while a nation may in theory be a net creditor vis-à-vis the rest of the world in accordance with its NIIP, in reality, its susceptibility to sudden stops may be larger than an economy which is a net debtor as a consequence of (1) stock or (2) flow effects. Moreover, should the domestic economy succumb to a sudden stop as a result of either stock or flow effects, (3) this may not translate into changes to NIIP, thereby masking the fact that even though the domestic economy has succumbed to balance of payments difficulties, it continues to appear as a net creditor. To achieve its objectives, each motivative factor is presented through systems of financial accounts. Separate annexes also disseminate how delays between payment and settlement result in credit risks, in addition to how exchange rate fluctuations can impose accounting losses/gains on the balance sheets of counterparties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how much of the current account adjustment after the global financial crisis in Spain can be explained by cyclical factors. For this purpose, we extend the IMF's external balance assessment methodology to allow for country-specific slopes and intercepts. The good fit of these cross-country regressions implies negligible residuals for most countries, and, as a result, the positive analysis of current account decompositions provides a more informative assessment of the external balance drivers. According to our findings, around 60% of the 11 pp. adjustment of the Spanish external imbalance over the years 2008–2015 can be explained by transitory factors such as the output gap, the oil balance, and the financial cycle—a share that diminished down to 50% during the more recent recovery period. The remaining adjustment of the Spanish external balance is explained by factors such as the cyclically adjusted fiscal consolidation, population ageing, lower growth expectations, or competitiveness gains, which can all be considered as more permanent phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany's large current account surplus has been widely criticized, especially against the backdrop of the role of macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone crisis. We argue that Germany's resistance to reduce its massive current account surplus through an expansionary policy at home is rooted in distributive struggles about the design of possible adjustment policies. To explore this argument, we leverage original survey data from 135 German economic interest groups, qualitative interviews with interest group representatives and policymakers, and data from public opinion surveys. We show that while there is general support for internal adjustment among German interest groups, they disagree heavily about which specific policies should be implemented to achieve this goal. Together with a broad public and elite-based consensus to avoid a break-up of the Eurozone, this polarization turns financing into a politically attractive strategy. Rather than being rooted only in German ordoliberal ideas or Germany's export-oriented structure, distributive conflicts contribute significantly to Germany's resistance to reduce its large current-account surplus. Because similar dynamics can be observed in other surplus countries, we argue that distributive struggles within surplus countries played an important role in interstate conflicts about the management of the crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sheds light on global GDP spillovers in the context of external imbalances. We adopt a Bayesian time-varying panel vector autoregression framework to analyze the global implications of changes in assets and liabilities of the US and the Euro Area in a global framework which includes 25 industrial and emerging economies. We find significant evidence for assets and liabilities spillovers from positions in the Euro Area and the US which often result in negative effects on GDP growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze current account imbalances through the lens of the two largest surplus countries; China and Germany. We observe two striking patterns visible since the 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis. First, while China has been gradually reducing its current account surplus, Germany's surplus has continued to increase throughout and after the crisis. Second, for these two countries, there is a remarkable reversal in the patterns of exchange rate misalignment: China's currency has turned from being undervalued to overvalued, Germany's currency has erased its level of overvaluation and become undervalued. Our empirical analyses show that the current account balances of these two countries are quite well explained by currency misalignment, common economic factors, and country-specific factors. Furthermore, we highlight the global financial crisis effects and, for Germany, the importance of differentiating balances against euro and non-euro countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the key deep underlying fundamental for the growing international imbalances leading to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system between 1971 and 1973 was rising U.S. inflation since 1965. It was driven in turn by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies ---the elephant in the room. What was kept in the background at the Camp David meeting on August 15, 1971 when President Richard Nixon closed the U.S. gold window, as well as imposing a 10 % surcharge on all imports and a ninety day wage price freeze—was that U.S. inflation, driven by macro policies, was the main problem facing the Bretton Woods System, and that for political and doctrinal reasons was not directly addressed. Instead President Nixon blamed the rest of the world rather than correcting mistaken U.S. policies. In addition, at the urging of Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur F. Burns, Nixon adopted wage and price controls to mask the inflation, hence punting the problem into the future. This paper revisits the story of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the origins of the Great Inflation. Based on historical narratives and conversations with the Honorable George P. Shultz, a crucial player in the events of the period 1969 to 1973, I argue the case that the pursuit of sound monetary and fiscal policies could have avoided much of the turmoil in the waning years of Bretton Woods. Moreover, I point out some of the similarities between the imbalances of the 1960s and 1970s—especially fiscal and the use of tariff protection as a strategic tool, as well as some differences—relatively stable monetary policy and floating exchange rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the causality relationship between budget and current account deficits for 14 Asian countries. The major findings based on bootstrap Granger causality tests in heterogenous mixed panels are: First, investments (and foreign capital inflows) have a notable impact on the current account prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Second, we detect direct causality between the budget and the current account imbalances before but not after the crisis. The data suggest that the current account targeting hypothesis, that is, the reverse causality, prevails after the crisis. Third, budget deficits have a significant influence on both investment and foreign capital inflows in the second period. Fourth, Asian countries are less susceptible to the influence of FDI inflows in the aftermath of the crisis. Finally, structural break turns out crucial in assessing the causal patterns of the twin deficits nexus in the Asian countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We model capital flows among Chinese provinces. A version of the present value model of the current account (PVMCA) with non-tradable goods and a savings wedge accounts for around 80% of the variation in inter-provincial capital flows over the 1986-2010 period. The PVMCA also allows us to identify the channels of external adjustment in capital flows at the province-level: variation in intertemporal prices (domestic and international interest rates, the provincial real exchange rate) and intertemporal variation in quantities (output, investment and government spending). We find that cross-province variation in the importance of these channels is correlated with the importance of private and state-owned enterprises and demographic factors. We discuss implications of our results for global imbalances in capital flows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intertemporal equilibrium approach to current accounts analyzed the impacts of respective intra-European Monetary Union (intra-EMU) and Asian-U.S. financial integration between 1999 and 2007 on the intra-EMU current account and global trade imbalances. Moreover, Farmer and Ban (2014) find in a three-country, two-region overlapping generations model that financial integration between both the EMU core and periphery and between Asia and the U.S. induce trade surpluses in the EMU core and Asia, while in the EMU periphery and in the U.S., trade balances become negative when the global economy is dynamically inefficient. In this paper, we first show that in a numerically specified Farmer-Ban model, steady-state trade balance to gross domestic product ratios are too low compared to the empirically observed counterparts. We suggest avenues to ameliorate this problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although currency adjustment is often proposed as a policy tool to reduce current account imbalances, there is no consensus regarding the macroeconomic effects. In this paper we study the macroeconomic aftermath of large exchange rate appreciations. Using a sample of 128 countries over the period 1960-2008, we identify 25 episodes of large nominal and real appreciations shocks. We use narrative identification of exogenous appreciation episodes and study the macroeconomic effects in a dummy-augmented panel autoregressive model. Our results indicate that exchange rate appreciations tend to have strong effects on current account balances. Within 3 years after the appreciation event, the current account balance on average deteriorates by three percentage points of GDP. This effect occurs through a reduction of savings without a meaningful reduction in investment. Real export growth slows down substantially, but the output costs are small and not statistically significant. All these effects appear somewhat more pronounced in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates empirically whether shocks to asset prices transmit into the trade balance through consumption and investment for a group of five of the world's most industrialized countries. We refer to this transmission channel as the international wealth channel and estimate a GVAR model including 29 countries with quarterly data over the period 1981Q1-2006Q4. Generalized impulse response functions show that after a negative stock price shock US and UK consumption decreases, followed by an improving trade balance. This pattern is also visible for France, but not for Germany and Japan. Stock price decreases are only associated with decreasing investment and an improving trade balance in the UK. For housing, we do find that a negative shock to UK housing prices decreases domestic investment and improves the trade balance. However, this pattern is not visible in the other countries. Finally, a domestic negative real exchange rate shock only has a significantly positive impact on the US trade balance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent global imbalances have changed the way international capital flows are shared among developed and developing countries. In the new environment, the U.S., a former lender, has become a borrower. This article discusses how the privileged position of this new borrower might influence developing countries' access to international financial markets. It suggests that for some emerging market countries, the recent increase in current account surpluses might be because of worsening in their borrowing opportunities. Empirical analysis for 39 emerging market economies shows that the increase in the U.S. deficit limited the access of emerging market economies that we analyzed in Commonwealth of Independent States, Developing Asia, Central and Eastern Europe to international financial markets for the 1980-2009 time period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we evaluate the current account patterns of China and Germany. We point out that China's current account surplus as a share of global GDP in recent years resembles that of Germany's. Yet, an important difference is that the Euro block's current account inclusive of Germany has overall been balanced, whereas emerging Asia's current account inclusive of China has mostly been characterized by sizable surpluses. We further find that both China and Germany's current account surpluses seem to be accounted for by common factors. However we have reasons to doubt the long run viability of these current account trends in future decades. Demographic transitions in China and Germany are projected to reduce their surpluses, and this effect is stronger for Germany. We also discuss plausible reasons to doubt the extent to which the Euro block will move towards significant surplus in the coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses QUEST III, a multi-region DSGE model, to study the macroeconomic effects of a gradual equalization of official foreign reserves between dollars and euros. We simulate a scenario of a shift in the composition of foreign reserves holdings from the present ratio of 65% dollars and 25% euros to equal 45% shares over a 10 years period. We assume imperfect substitutability between financial assets to allow this shift to have real effects. Our simulations point towards small real effects due to the reduction in real interest rates resulting from this shift in official holdings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]