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This paper traces the history of remoteness in contract law, namely the legal formants (in Rodolfo Sacco's terms) constraining the availability of contract damages in various legal systems. Our journey takes us through different times, continents and cultures, from the eighteenth century to the twenty–first century, across the law of France, United States, England and Wales, India and Australia, among other jurisdictions. While it might seem that civilian and common law traditions have very different morphological legal forms, once a closer historical, cultural, and anthropological gaze is turned upon the legal formants involved, it can be seen that remoteness discloses a shared concern which may be common to many human societies and cultures. In other words, as a matter of social experience, humans who enter into transactions generally realise that it is impossible to know the future, or to know what all outcomes of the transaction will be. Consequently, it is recognised that it would be unfair and unjust to hold a defendant liable for all outcomes, and as our journey will show, legal systems seek guidance from other legal systems in their efforts to deal with this problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epicurus holds, in Key Doctrine 31, that what is just according to nature is a súmbolon or sign of the interest there is in neither harming one another nor being harmed. Certain readings of this maxim equivocate this legal sign with other signs found in nature, thereby failing to give sufficient weight to the role of reciprocity in its production. Other readings simply import a legal sense from outside of Epicurean doctrine, thereby failing to explain what makes Epicurean súmbola legal. A final set of readings attempt to find a legal rule as a kind of innate concept or Kantian 'scheme'. This article identifies new sources for understanding súmbolon, drawn principally but not exclusively from Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics. This article offers an original argument that Epicurus adopts Aristotle's' image of the tally stick (symbolon) as a meeting of often divergent interests which constitutes something new and particularly valuable to the Epicurean: friendship. A theoretical argument is also advanced to support this reading which claims that one person's reflection on a 'divine image' of the end (telos) is insufficient to constitute a súmbolon; rather real (as opposed to abstract or ideal) individual interests are filtered via the mechanism of the tally, that is via the meeting of two given individuals who together generate a sign (symbolon) of reciprocal interest in neither harming nor being harmed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contractarians view the corporation as a nexus of contracts, constituted by the express or implied consent of each party to or contracting with it. Strong-form contractarianism takes this claim literally and holds that a corporation can be created and sustained by contract alone, thanks notably to the courts' supportive gap-filling role. We argue that this view is undermined by the way courts actually treat implied terms. While courts do attempt to fill gaps and hold parties to their bargains, they do not typically manufacture counterfactual consent by resorting to the hypothetical bargain logic of contractarianism. Even under the most flexible form of contract law, the common law contract, the capacity of courts to imply third-party obligations in multi-party contracts is highly limited. This makes the contractarian reliance on contract and the courts to construct the complex set of multi-party obligations that make up the corporate form implausible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The introduction of the EU Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive in the legal system of Cyprus was the first instrument specifically dealing with the problems that arise with standard form contracts and the issue of consent. However, the Directive only generated caselaw approximately twenty years after its adoption, whereas the principle-based approach of the test for unfairness (significant imbalance test and good faith requirement) was interpreted in the common law notion of absence of dishonesty. Hence, Cypriot courts interpreted good faith as "honesty in fact". Under this interpretation, it seems that both procedural and substantive unfairness are not captured under the test. It is understood that whereas the statute codifying the contract law of Cyprus has incorporated the [civil law] will theory of contracts, no tools for the invalidation and scrutiny of terms that may be deemed unfair were provided. The statute placed considerable emphasis on procedural fairness, however, Cypriot courts seemed unwilling to adapt their approach and deal with the problems that standard form contracting poses, failing also to follow the developments in the UK. Thus, even after the adoption of EU consumer law directives, Cypriot courts show an unwillingness to scrutinize the parties' initial allocation of risk, even though such allocation was done in a standardized manner by one party. Despite the mixed character of the legal system, consumer law directives and the introduction of content control can be seen as legal irritants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classically a duty to negotiate commercial contracts in good faith has been seen as part of the civil, not the common, law world. Common law commercial lawyers have long resisted the lure of "good faith" as a contractual concept, despite engagement with civil law principles in harmonisation projects, by virtue of membership of the European Union and their use in international conventions such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). This paper will examine whether this situation is changing, focusing on two common law jurisdictions—England and Wales and Canada. In England and Wales and the common law of Canada, case-law in the last 10 years has indicated a movement towards acceptance of express and implied duties of good faith in relation to contractual performance, see e.g. Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) and, most recently, Essex CC v UBB Waste (Essex) Ltd (No. 2) [2020] EWHC 1581 (TCC) in England and Wales; Bhasin v Hrynew 2014 SCC 71 and Callow v Zollinger 2020 SCC 45 in Canada. This paper will examine the extent to which these cases may open the way more generally for a duty to negotiate commercial contracts in good faith. It will examine the reception of these cases and whether they indicate (i) greater acceptance of "good faith" as part of contract law thinking and (ii) a possible extension of good faith into the pre-contractual period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countless contracts have been undermined by the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 as well as government orders to contain it. Flights have been canceled, concerts have been called off, and dorms have been closed, just to name a few. Do these all count as breaches of contract—or are the parties excused due to the extraordinary circumstances? And how should the losses be allocated between the parties? The law provides one set of answers to these questions; ethics offers another. With a focus on American law (developed over the past two centuries) and Jewish ethics (developed over millennia), this paper shows that the two systems are in accord with some respects and differ in others: Both law and Jewish ethics would excuse a party who cannot complete his contract due to a force beyond his control, like the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet Jewish ethics would require that the excused party still be paid, while American law would not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relation between state contract law and the use of accounting information in debt contracts. Contract theory suggests that balance sheet based covenants resolve debtholder-shareholder conflicts ex ante, whereas income statement based covenants serve as trip- wires that trigger the switch of control rights ex post. It is more difficult for lenders to exert their control rights ex post if the contract law is more favorable to debtors (i.e., the law is pro-debtor), suggesting that balance sheet based covenants are more efficient in these jurisdictions. We therefore test and find evidence that lenders using pro-debtor (pro-lender) law are more (less) likely to rely on balance sheet based covenants. We measure reliance using both the weight of balance sheet covenants relative to income statement covenants and the covenant strictness. Our analysis further shows that contracts with performance pricing grids are less likely to include interest increasing grids when the law is more favorable to debtors. The results provide initial evidence that contract law is an important determinant for the design of debt contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows that the law, in subtle ways, may set hitherto unrecognized incentives for the adoption of explainable machine learning applications. In doing so, we make two novel contributions. First, on the legal side, we show that to avoid liability, professional actors, such as doctors and managers, may soon be legally compelled to use explainable ML models. We argue that the importance of explainability reaches far beyond data protection law, and crucially influences questions of contractual and tort liability for the use of ML models. To this effect, we conduct two legal case studies, in medical and corporate merger applications of ML. As a second contribution, we discuss the (legally required) trade-off between accuracy and explainability and demonstrate the effect in a technical case study in the context of spam classification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deconstructs mobile phone contracts as an example of long-term contractual relations in four jurisdictions to reveal that there are three elements which define consumer protection. The elements are contract duration, renewal of the agreement and unilateral modification. Each of these factors are regulated differently in each of the jurisdictions, but, assessed collectively, similar levels of consumer protection are found. The authors show that the reason for the different weighting is determined by regulation (subject-specific or general); by external factors, such as technological development, geography or business considerations; and by wider cultural considerations. The comparison of these features across the jurisdictions shows that, ultimately, regulatory intervention plays little role in contract design, unless an overwhelming policy goal is pursued, which means that, in most cases, regulators would be advised to avoid or reduce regulation of mobile phone and other long-term contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that there are many questions that lawyers might ask, and conversations that they might have, about smart contracts; that some questions that are asked are more important than others; and that there are some questions that are not asked but which should be asked. First, it is argued that the question that preoccupies 'coherentists' (concerning the application of the law of contract to smart contracts, and the fit between smart contracts and the paradigmatic 'fiat contracts' that are recognised by the law of contract) is neither as puzzling nor as important as might be supposed. Secondly, it is argued that, if there are concerns about the acceptability of smart contracts, then the conversation that needs to be had is of a 'regulatory-instrumentalist' nature; in particular, if the question is one of public policy restrictions on the use of smart contracts, then the appropriate balance of interests needs to be made by an institution that has both the necessary mandate and the appropriate mind-set. Thirdly, it is argued that there are conversations that we currently do not have but which urgently need to be had. Blockchain is a potentially transformative technology and it is important to have more fundamental conversations about the kind of community that we want to be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal texts are in the focus of both lawyers and translators. This paper discusses the binary opposition of these two views especially in the light of contract law. There is one crucial epistemic difference between the point of view of the translator and the lawyer when it comes to the interpretation of legal texts. In the translator's view legal text is traditionally conceived as static as to its nature; something that already exists in the form of text. Traditionally, the translator is interested in the text itself as it was written down in a document, i.e. the translator needs to go back to the frozen moment when a legal document was constructed and finalised. The lawyer, in contrast, is very much interested not only in the text of the legal document but also in the contextual surroundings of the text. In fact, for legal interpretation, sometimes the key-elements for the interpretation come from outside of the text itself. This paper concludes that legal translation is in many cases closer to transcreation than it is to traditionally understood translation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Good faith is a principle prominent in civil law countries but less so in common law countries, and which allows courts to deviate from black letter law. It provides them with flexibility to change the outcome of a deductive legal decision if they regard it as absurd. The principle of good faith thus empowers the judiciary to deviate. It can be used for an indefinite number of cases and might lead to almost all conceivable legal consequences. For instance, the judge can invalidate the contract, change the price, suspend or change a clause in the contract, or grant injunctive relief, compensation of damages, the disgorgement of profits or a removal claim. We argue that if the principle of good faith is used to develop contract law into an instrument for redistributing wealth in favor of poor parties, this can destroy the concept of contract as a social mechanism for generating mutual gains for parties, which might lead to unwanted economic consequences in terms of efficiency losses. We argue that the principle of good faith must be carefully and reluctantly used to reconstruct the fully specified contract and that well-informed judges, who understand the factual environment of a contract well should ask how fair bur self-interested parties would have allocated the risk in a pre-contractual situation. If the courts restrict the application of the good faith principle to these functions, this provides elasticity that otherwise would not exist if courts would strictly use the rules laid down in black letter law. Moreover, it saves transactions costs and is therefore in line with economic reasoning. We look at the most important Turkish cases and find that the Turkish Supreme Court following Continental European doctrines of good faith actually uses this principle to curb opportunistic behavior of parties and not to achieve redistribution from the rich to the poor by way of interfering into contract law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that the proposed introduction of the doctrine of economic impossibility in Article 137 of the reform draft of the Turkish Code of Obligations is in line with economic considerations and facilitates business transactions. This new rule gives courts the explicit power to terminate a contract and relieve the party, which owes specific performance of its obligation, without imposing any duty to pay expectation damages to the other party. We argue that a court's decision to terminate a contract under economic impossibility should be based on three tests. First, a low-probability-event occurs between contract formation and performance. Second, this event causes an excessive increase in the costs of specific performance. Third, the concept of an excessive increase should take into due consideration the other party's interest in specific performance. The reform draft includes explicitly the first two tests, but not the third test. We also show under which conditions an excessive performance difficulty should not lead to termination of the contract but rather to an adjustment of the agreed price. We argue that the rule of economic impossibility, if diligently adjudicated, saves the parties transactions costs in comparison to a rule under which the law insists on specific performance or damage payments. We also argue that a specific rule of economic impossibility leads to better and more business-oriented solutions to the underlying problems than the alternative, which is to solve such problems under the broad and unspecific cover of the 'good faith' or the 'Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus' doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the process of building a European Private Law, the lawmaking and harmonization dimensions-the modes of harmonization and even more, the scope and reach of the harmonizing effect of the European rules- appear as crucial issues. We show how the harmonization strategy is as important a question as whether we should have European Private Law at all. We present an economic discussion of the different modes of harmonizing Private Law in the abstract, and how they are likely to differently affect outcomes. We also present in informal terms a simple economic model of how to build optimal harmonized rules and standards in a setting of pre-existing separate and diverse national ones, and we systematically explore how the different harmonization regimes (maximum harmonization, minimum harmonization, and pure co-existence of harmonized and national standards) affect the outcomes of the harmonization process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The diversity of contract laws is said by the Commission to discourage cross-border trade and hinder the development by SMEs of a pan-European commercial policy. An optional instrument containing both facilitative general contract rules and mandatory consumer protection rules, one of the solutions proposed by the Commission, is gaining rapid support from key stakeholders. Drawing from firms' own views on the problems of legal diversity, and insights from organisational science, this article sets out the circumstances in which firms will likely consider a European optional code. Results are mixed: some firms may consider it, while others may ignore it. Much depends the firm's aspirations (i.e. SMEs cannot be assumed as-yet to have pan-European aspirations), how the firm perceives the problems of legal diversity, and how it searches for and decides upon solutions. It would appear that a European optional instrument may not be as useful or widely considered as its proponents would like to believe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contract law harmonization in the European Union has met with some significant but limited success. This Essay explores some of the psychological and political forces that can complicate or even hinder law reform efforts. Even when there is a general institutional drive for law reform, as there is in the EU, scarce reform resources force attention to be focused on salient issues, while a status quo bias in individual member states by government officials can provide a braking inertia regarding nonsalient legal reforms. This braking influence can be seized upon and enhanced by interest groups that oppose reforms, especially where there is an alternative to proposed law reforms for private entities. In the case of contract law harmonization, contract doctrine that is not focused on providing consumer protections remain nonsalient, commercial entities can solve the confusion of diverse laws by choosing their own, and interest groups in nations whose laws and dispute resolution forums are commonly chosen will oppose harmonization. Thus, the current state of affairs may prove relatively difficult to alter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals critically with the call for a comprehensive harmonization of legal rules, against the background of the lessons from the recent financial crisis. Before coming to the topic of harmonization of legal rules, it first briefly deals with the question of why rules are necessary at all, and what the functions of rules are. Then it deals with the lessons from the recent financial crisis for the topic mentioned. The article conducts a kind of cost-benefit analysis of legal harmonization by looking at arguments in favor of and against uniform rules. It shows that not only the arguments in favor have increased after the recent financial crisis, but also the arguments against. It also shows that integration of global markets has not only increased the need for new uniform rules but also decreased the chances of their implementation; and that therefore today it is often better to improve the implementation of current rules instead of laying down new uniform rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

nesthesiology residents in the United States (US) not only must develop the clinical skills needed to provide independent patient care, but also are required to become familiar with the business aspects of the modern health care system. Unfortunately, practice management education may be inadequate during anesthesiology residency training. The authors describe the design and implementation of a weekend retreat curriculum in business-of-medicine education for anesthesiology residents. Experts were recruited to discuss interviewing skills, contract law and negotiation, billing and reimbursement, insurance, malpractice, and financial planning. A strict lecture didactic format was avoided, and presentations were designed to encourage speaker-audience interaction. The program was relatively simple to design and implement, satisfied several Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education core competencies for US anesthesiology education, may be altered as practice management evolves, and may be adapted to accommodate the needs of programs in other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contract enforcement is acknowledged as a major issue in Law and in Economics. Contrasting substitution and complementary perspectives with respect to the role of private vs. public enforcement institutions, this article analyses how contract law can support private institutions, and enhance economic efficiency. With multilateral agreements at stake, self-regulation and reputation mechanisms at the core of private ordering have limitations that collective organizations backed by the Law help to overcome. The analysis is substantiated by empirical data from the cattle industry. Our results suggest the need for a broader approach to contract regulation by legal scholars and antitrust-authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The software, music, and movie industries keep suggesting to consumers that if they copy digital contents they may find themselves in jail. Moreover, horrifying damage claims are in the air. The problem with these scenarios is, amongst others, that it is difficult to understand for consumers where their rights end and where illegal use of content begins. This article focuses on the contractual relationship between online content providers and consumers. It explores relevant consumer law issues and lays open the legal uncertainties of the current regimes at the European Community (EC) and national level. The article then looks at current ideas put forward by the Commission on how to regulate internet consumer law. It concludes that a sector-specific i-consumer contract law should be introduced and offers proposals related to its possible content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should the EU introduce an Optional European Contract Law Code and what should it look like? By applying economic theories of federalism and regulatory competition (legal federalism), it is shown why an Optional Code would be a very suitable legal instrument within a two-level European System of Contract Laws. By allowing private parties’ choice of law to a certain extent, it can combine the most important advantages of centralisation and decentralisation of competences for legal rules. Through differentiated analyses of three kinds of contract law rules (mandatory substantive rules, mandatory information rules and facilitative law), important conclusions can be reached: which kinds of contract law rules are most suitable to be applied on an optional basis (e.g. facilitative law) and which might be less so (e.g. a core of information regulations). Furthermore a number of additional general conclusions about the design and scope of an Optional EU Code and some conclusions in regard to sales law are derived. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The paper is an exercise in a neo-Austrian based economic analysis of product liability. After a short historical introduction, we take two of the basic premises of Austrian economic thought and see which system of product liability results. If costs are subjective and entrepreneurship is the essence of an efficient market process, a system of caveat emptor and vendor results. For judges to assess damages, in the way others advocate judges to do, judges would need to measure costs, something that cannot be done according to Austrian economics. The paper also answers some possible criticisms from the mainstream neoclassical perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If during precontractual negotiations a person deliberately keeps quiet about facts which he knew or should have known were of particular importance to the other party that party may avoid the contract on the ground of deceit if, and only if, a duty of disclosure can be found to exist. What are the conditions that must be satisfied to assume the existence of such a duty of disclosure? The European legal systems merely offer vague formulas with little or no operational power. Can economic theory provide more precise criteria? The general principle should be that a negotiating party must proffer information in his possession which is material to the other party's decision. However, economic analysis suggests that a party should be allowed to withhold material information if the information is 'productive' and was costly to obtain unless its acquisition and disclosure were owed under a contract for value. These rules are discussed in the light of a number of cases from various European jurisdictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]