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A new quantum dialogue protocol is designed by using the continuous-variable two-mode squeezed vacuum states due to its entanglement property. The two communication parties encode their own secret information into the entangled optical modes with the translation operations. Each communication party could deduce the secret information of their counterparts with the help of his or her secret information and the Bell-basis measurement results. The security of the proposed quantum dialogue protocol is guaranteed by the correlation between two-mode squeezed vacuum states and the decoy states performed with translation operations in randomly selected time slots. Compared with the discrete variable quantum dialogue protocols, the proposed continuous-variable quantum dialogue protocol is easy to realize with perfect utilization of quantum bits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the continuous variable GHZ entangled states, an efficient three-party quantum dialogue protocol is devised, where each legitimate communication party could simultaneously deduce the secret information of the other two parties with perfect efficiency. The security is guaranteed by the correlation of the continuous variable GHZ entangled states and the randomly selected decoy states. Furthermore, the three-party quantum dialogue protocol is directly generalized to an N-party quantum dialogue protocol by using the n-tuple continuous variable GHZ entangled states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A novel multiparty controlled bidirectional quantum secure direct communication protocol combining continuous-variable states with qubit block transmission is proposed. Two legitimate communication parties encode their own secret information into entangled optical modes with translation operations, and the secret information of each counterpart can only be recovered under the permission of all controllers. Due to continuous-variable states and block transmission strategy, the proposed protocol is easy to realize with perfect qubit efficiency. Security analyses show that the proposed protocol is free from common attacks, including the man-in-the-middle attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]