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Scenarios have been an important integrating element in the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the understanding of possible climate outcomes, impacts and risks, and mitigation futures. Integration supports a consistent, coherent assessment, new insights and the opportunity to address policy-relevant questions that would not be possible otherwise, for example, which impacts are unavoidable, which are reversible, what is a consistent remaining carbon budget to keep temperatures below a level and what would be a consistent route of action to achieve that goal. The AR6 builds on community frameworks that are developed to support a coherent use of scenarios across the assessment, yet their use in the assessment and the related timelines presented coordination challenges. From lessons within each Working Group (WG) assessment and the cross-WG experience, we present insights into the role of scenarios in future assessments, including the enhanced integration of impacts into scenarios, near-term information and community coordination efforts. Recommendations and opportunities are discussed for how scenarios can support strengthened consistency and policy relevance in the next IPCC assessment cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking stock of global progress towards achieving the Paris Agreement requires consistently measuring aggregate national actions and pledges against modelled mitigation pathways1. However, national greenhouse gas inventories (NGHGIs) and scientific assessments of anthropogenic emissions follow different accounting conventions for land-based carbon fluxes resulting in a large difference in the present emission estimates2,3, a gap that will evolve over time. Using state-of-the-art methodologies4 and a land carbon-cycle emulator5, we align the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)-assessed mitigation pathways with the NGHGIs to make a comparison. We find that the key global mitigation benchmarks become harder to achieve when calculated using the NGHGI conventions, requiring both earlier net-zero CO2 timing and lower cumulative emissions. Furthermore, weakening natural carbon removal processes such as carbon fertilization can mask anthropogenic land-based removal efforts, with the result that land-based carbon fluxes in NGHGIs may ultimately become sources of emissions by 2100. Our results are important for the Global Stocktake6, suggesting that nations will need to increase the collective ambition of their climate targets to remain consistent with the global temperature goals.Aligning the IPCC-assessed mitigation pathways with the national greenhouse gas inventories shows that key global mitigation benchmarks become harder to achieve, requiring achieving earlier net-zero and lower cumulative emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In implementing the European Green Deal to align with the Paris Agreement, the EU has raised its climate ambition and in 2022 is negotiating the distribution of increased mitigation effort among Member States. Such partitioning of targets among subsidiary entities is becoming a major challenge for implementation of climate policies around the globe. We contrast the 2021 European Commission proposal - an allocation based on a singular country attribute - with transparent and reproducible methods based on three ethical principles. We go beyond traditional effort-sharing literature and explore allocations representing an aggregated least regret compromise between different EU country perspectives on a fair allocation. While the 2021 proposal represents a nuanced compromise for many countries, for others a further redistribution could be considered equitable. Whereas we apply our approach within the setting of the EU negotiations, the framework can easily be adapted to inform debates worldwide on sharing mitigation effort among subsidiary entities. An ethically-based method for allocating climate change mitigation effort among subsidiaries, applicable worldwide, is proposed. Applied to the EU Green Deal, this results in a wider range of targets than the Commission's proposal of 2021. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Closing the emissions gap between Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the global emissions levels needed to achieve the Paris Agreement's climate goals will require a comprehensive package of policy measures. National and sectoral policies can help fill the gap, but success stories in one country cannot be automatically replicated in other countries. They need to be adapted to the local context. Here, we develop a new Bridge scenario based on nationally relevant, short-term measures informed by interactions with country experts. These good practice policies are rolled out globally between now and 2030 and combined with carbon pricing thereafter. We implement this scenario with an ensemble of global integrated assessment models. We show that the Bridge scenario closes two-thirds of the emissions gap between NDC and 2 °C scenarios by 2030 and enables a pathway in line with the 2 °C goal when combined with the necessary long-term changes, i.e. more comprehensive pricing measures after 2030. The Bridge scenario leads to a scale-up of renewable energy (reaching 52%–88% of global electricity supply by 2050), electrification of end-uses, efficiency improvements in energy demand sectors, and enhanced afforestation and reforestation. Our analysis suggests that early action via good-practice policies is less costly than a delay in global climate cooperation. Comprehensive policy measures are needed to close the emissions gap between Nationally Determined Contributions and emissions goals of the Paris Agreement. Here the authors present a Bridge scenario that may aid in closing the emissions gap by 2030. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is part of a Special Issue reporting results from the "Energy Modeling Forum (EMF)-30 Study on Short-Lived Climate Forcers (SLCF) and Air Quality" edited by John Weyant, Steven J Smith, and Zbigniew Klimont Introduction Anthropogenic climate change is driven largely by changes in atmospheric energy balance, termed radiative forcing. For road transport, emission trajectories show similar features with increasing fuel use and steady reduction of emissions (consistent with the CLE development of emission factors - see Fig. This highlights the need to move beyond quantification of the technical potential for methane emission reductions, as assumed in the EMF-30 scenarios, but to understand the barriers to implementing mitigation and to better understand the pace at which deep emission reductions could actually be put into place (van den Berg et al. [24], Höglund et al. [10]). Models that allow a methane price to have an economic impact on methane-emitting technologies show significant non-methane emission reductions, largely CO SB 2 sb , from the increasing methane price in the EMF-30 scenarios. [Extracted from the article]

The relatively short atmospheric lifetimes of methane (CH4) and black carbon (BC) have focused attention on the potential for reducing anthropogenic climate change by reducing Short-Lived Climate Forcer (SLCF) emissions. This paper examines radiative forcing and global mean temperature results from the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF)-30 multi-model suite of scenarios addressing CH4 and BC mitigation, the two major short-lived climate forcers. Central estimates of temperature reductions in 2040 from an idealized scenario focused on reductions in methane and black carbon emissions ranged from 0.18–0.26 °C across the nine participating models. Reductions in methane emissions drive 60% or more of these temperature reductions by 2040, although the methane impact also depends on auxiliary reductions that depend on the economic structure of the model. Climate model parameter uncertainty has a large impact on results, with SLCF reductions resulting in as much as 0.3–0.7 °C by 2040. We find that the substantial overlap between a SLCF-focused policy and a stringent and comprehensive climate policy that reduces greenhouse gas emissions means that additional SLCF emission reductions result in, at most, a small additional benefit of ~ 0.1 °C in the 2030–2040 time frame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several studies have shown that the greenhouse gas reduction resulting from the current nationally determined contributions (NDCs) will not be enough to meet the overall targets of the Paris Climate Agreement. It has been suggested that more ambition mitigations of short-lived climate forcer (SLCF) emissions could potentially be a way to reduce the risk of overshooting the 1.5 or 2 °C target in a cost-effective way. In this study, we employ eight state-of-the-art integrated assessment models (IAMs) to examine the global temperature effects of ambitious reductions of methane, black and organic carbon, and hydrofluorocarbon emissions. The SLCFs measures considered are found to add significantly to the effect of the NDCs on short-term global mean temperature (GMT) (in the year 2040: − 0.03 to − 0.15 °C) and on reducing the short-term rate-of-change (by − 2 to 15%), but only a small effect on reducing the maximum temperature change before 2100. This, because later in the century under assumed ambitious climate policy, SLCF mitigation is maximized, either directly or indirectly due to changes in the energy system. All three SLCF groups can contribute to achieving GMT changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many countries have implemented national climate policies to accomplish pledged Nationally Determined Contributions and to contribute to the temperature objectives of the Paris Agreement on climate change. In 2023, the global stocktake will assess the combined effort of countries. Here, based on a public policy database and a multi-model scenario analysis, we show that implementation of current policies leaves a median emission gap of 22.4 to 28.2 GtCO2eq by 2030 with the optimal pathways to implement the well below 2 °C and 1.5 °C Paris goals. If Nationally Determined Contributions would be fully implemented, this gap would be reduced by a third. Interestingly, the countries evaluated were found to not achieve their pledged contributions with implemented policies (implementation gap), or to have an ambition gap with optimal pathways towards well below 2 °C. This shows that all countries would need to accelerate the implementation of policies for renewable technologies, while efficiency improvements are especially important in emerging countries and fossil-fuel-dependent countries. To evaluate the effectiveness of current national policies in achieving global temperature targets is important but a systematic multi-model evaluation is still lacking. Here the authors identified a reduction of 3.5 GtCO2 eq of current national policies relative to a baseline scenario without climate policies by 2030 due to the increasing low carbon share of final energy and the improving final energy intensity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seasonal mismatches between electricity supply and demand is increasing due to expanded use of wind, solar and hydropower resources, which in turn raises the interest on low-cost seasonal energy storage options. Seasonal pumped hydropower storage (SPHS) can provide long-term energy storage at a relatively low-cost and co-benefits in the form of freshwater storage capacity. We present the first estimate of the global assessment of SPHS potential, using a novel plant-siting methodology based on high-resolution topographical and hydrological data. Here we show that SPHS costs vary from 0.007 to 0.2 US$ m−1 of water stored, 1.8 to 50 US$ MWh−1 of energy stored and 370 to 600 US$ kW−1 of installed power generation. This potential is unevenly distributed with mountainous regions demonstrating significantly more potential. The estimated world energy storage capacity below a cost of 50 US$ MWh−1 is 17.3 PWh, approximately 79% of the world electricity consumption in 2017. The potential of seasonal pumped hydropower storage (SPHS) plant to fulfil future energy storage requirements is vast in mountainous regions. Here the authors show that SPHS costs vary from 0.007 to 0.2 US$ m−3 of water stored, 1.8 to 50 US$ MWh−1 of energy stored and 0.37 to 0.6 US$ GW−1 of installed power generation capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To understand how global warming can be kept well below 2 degrees Celsius and even 1.5 degrees Celsius, climate policy uses scenarios that describe how society could reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. However, current scenarios have a key weakness: they typically focus on reaching specific climate goals in 2100. This choice may encourage risky pathways that delay action, reach higher-than-acceptable mid-century warming, and rely on net removal of carbon dioxide thereafter to undo their initial shortfall in reductions of emissions. Here we draw on insights from physical science to propose a scenario framework that focuses on capping global warming at a specific maximum level with either temperature stabilization or reversal thereafter. The ambition of climate action until carbon neutrality determines peak warming, and can be followed by a variety of long-term states with different sustainability implications. The approach proposed here closely mirrors the intentions of the United Nations Paris Agreement, and makes questions of intergenerational equity into explicit design choices. Fundamental value judgments about acceptable maximum levels of climate change and future reliance on controversial technologies can be made explicitly in climate scenarios, thereby addressing the intergenerational bias present in the scenario literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hopes are high that removing fossil fuel subsidies could help to mitigate climate change by discouraging inefficient energy consumption and levelling the playing field for renewable energy. In September 2016, the G20 countries re-affirmed their 2009 commitment (at the G20 Leaders' Summit) to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and many national governments are using today's low oil prices as an opportunity to do so. In practical terms, this means abandoning policies that decrease the price of fossil fuels and electricity generated from fossil fuels to below normal market prices. However, whether the removal of subsidies, even if implemented worldwide, would have a large impact on climate change mitigation has not been systematically explored. Here we show that removing fossil fuel subsidies would have an unexpectedly small impact on global energy demand and carbon dioxide emissions and would not increase renewable energy use by 2030. Subsidy removal would reduce the carbon price necessary to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration at 550 parts per million by only 2-12 per cent under low oil prices. Removing subsidies in most regions would deliver smaller emission reductions than the Paris Agreement (2015) climate pledges and in some regions global subsidy removal may actually lead to an increase in emissions, owing to either coal replacing subsidized oil and natural gas or natural-gas use shifting from subsidizing, energy-exporting regions to non-subsidizing, importing regions. Our results show that subsidy removal would result in the largest CO2 emission reductions in high-income oil- and gas-exporting regions, where the reductions would exceed the climate pledges of these regions and where subsidy removal would affect fewer people living below the poverty line than in lower-income regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of climate policy, it is important to understand emission trends and policies at the national level. The 2015 Paris Agreement includes (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions, so-called (I)NDCs, outlining the contribution of different Parties to the overall target of the agreement to limit global mean temperature increase to well below 2 °C. Here, we assess emission trajectories and the energy system transition of 11 major economies (in the remainder: countries) projected by integrated assessment models (IAMs) for baseline and cost-optimal 450 ppm CO eq mitigation scenarios and compare the results with the (I)NDCs. Limiting global temperature increase to below 2 °C implies a substantial reduction of the estimated available carbon budget for each country. The national carbon budgets between 2010 and 2100 showed reductions between the baseline and the 2 °C consistent mitigation scenario ranging from 52% in South Korea to 95% in Brazil. While in the baseline scenario, the share of low-carbon primary energy sources is projected to remain around 15% (with Brazil being a notable exception, reaching 30%); in the mitigation scenarios, the share of low-carbon energy is projected to increase to over 50% in 2050 in nearly all countries, with the EU, Japan and Canada reaching the largest shares. Comparison with the (I)NDCs shows that in Brazil, Canada, the EU, Mexico (conditional target), South Korea and the USA, the emission reduction targets of the NDCs are closer to the mitigation requirement of the 2 °C scenario; in other countries, however, there is still a large gap. The national detail of the indicators adds to the literature on low-carbon emission pathways, assists the assessment of the Paris Agreement and provides support to national policymakers to identify focus areas for climate policy in the coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares projections over the twenty-first century of SO, BC, and OC emissions from three technologically detailed, long-term integrated assessment models. The character of the projections and the response of emissions due to a comprehensive climate policy are discussed focusing on the sectoral level. In a continuation of historical experience, aerosol and precursor emissions are increasingly decoupled from carbon dioxide emissions over the twenty-first century due to a combination of emission controls and technology shifts over time. Implementation of a comprehensive climate policy further reduces emissions, although there is significant variation in this response by sector and by model: the response has many similarities between models for the energy transformation and transportation sectors, with more diversity in the response for the building and industrial sectors. Much of these differences can be traced to specific characteristics of reference case end-use and supply-side technology deployment and emissions control assumptions, which are detailed by sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many impacts projected for a global warming level of 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels may exceed the coping capacities of particularly vulnerable countries. Therefore, many countries advocate limiting warming to below 1.5 °C. Here we analyse integrated energy-economy-environment scenarios that keep warming to below 1.5 °C by 2100. We find that in such scenarios, energy-system transformations are in many aspects similar to 2 °C-consistent scenarios, but show a faster scale-up of mitigation action in most sectors, leading to observable differences in emission reductions in 2030 and 2050. The move from a 2 °C- to a 1.5 °C-consistent world will be achieved mainly through additional reductions of CO2. This implies an earlier transition to net zero carbon emissions worldwide, to be achieved between 2045 and 2060. Energy efficiency and stringent early reductions are key to retain a possibility for limiting warming to below 1.5 °C by 2100. The window for achieving this goal is small and rapidly closing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integrated assessment models can help in quantifying the implications of international climate agreements and regional climate action. This paper reviews scenario results from model intercomparison projects to explore different possible outcomes of post-2020 climate negotiations, recently announced pledges and their relation to the 2 °C target. We provide key information for all the major economies, such as the year of emission peaking, regional carbon budgets and emissions allowances. We highlight the distributional consequences of climate policies, and discuss the role of carbon markets for financing clean energy investments, and achieving efficiency and equity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most important energy development of the past decade has been the wide deployment of hydraulic fracturing technologies that enable the production of previously uneconomic shale gas resources in North America. If these advanced gas production technologies were to be deployed globally, the energy market could see a large influx of economically competitive unconventional gas resources. The climate implications of such abundant natural gas have been hotly debated. Some researchers have observed that abundant natural gas substituting for coal could reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Others have reported that the non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions associated with shale gas production make its lifecycle emissions higher than those of coal. Assessment of the full impact of abundant gas on climate change requires an integrated approach to the global energy-economy-climate systems, but the literature has been limited in either its geographic scope or its coverage of greenhouse gases. Here we show that market-driven increases in global supplies of unconventional natural gas do not discernibly reduce the trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions or climate forcing. Our results, based on simulations from five state-of-the-art integrated assessment models of energy-economy-climate systems independently forced by an abundant gas scenario, project large additional natural gas consumption of up to +170 per cent by 2050. The impact on CO2 emissions, however, is found to be much smaller (from −2 per cent to +11 per cent), and a majority of the models reported a small increase in climate forcing (from −0.3 per cent to +7 per cent) associated with the increased use of abundant gas. Our results show that although market penetration of globally abundant gas may substantially change the future energy system, it is not necessarily an effective substitute for climate change mitigation policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fifth phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project uses four representative concentration pathways (RCPs) that span the literature range of total anthropogenic radiative forcing but not necessarily of each single forcing agent. We here explore a wide range of air-pollutant emissions over the twenty-first century consistent with the global CO2 paths of the RCPs, by varying assumptions on air-pollution controls and accounting for the possible phase-out of CO2-emitting sources. We show that global air-pollutant emissions in the RCPs (including ozone and aerosol precursors) compare well to and are at times higher than cases that assume an extrapolation of current and planned air-pollution legislation in the absence of new policies to improve energy access for the poor. Stringent pollution controls and clean energy policies can thus further reduce the global atmospheric air-pollution loading below the RCP levels. When assuming pollution control frozen at 2005 levels, the RCP8.5-consistent loading of all species either stabilizes or increases during the twenty-first century, in contrast to RCP4.5 and RCP2.6, which see a consistent decrease in the long term. Our results inform the possible range of global aerosol loading. However, the net aerosol forcing depends strongly on the geographical location of emissions. Therefore, a regional perspective is required to further explore the range of compatible forcing projections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate policies must consider radiative forcing from Kyoto greenhouse gases, as well as other forcing constituents, such as aerosols and tropospheric ozone that result from air pollutants. Non-Kyoto forcing constituents contribute negative, as well as positive forcing, and overall increases in total forcing result in increases in global average temperature. Non-Kyoto forcing modeling is a relatively new component of climate management scenarios. This paper describes and assesses current non-Kyoto radiative forcing modeling within five integrated assessment models. The study finds negative forcing from aerosols masking (offsetting) approximately 25 % of positive forcing in the near-term in reference non-climate policy projections. However, masking is projected to decline rapidly to 5-10 % by 2100 with increasing Kyoto emissions and assumed reductions in air pollution-with the later declining to as much as 50 % and 80 % below today's levels by 2050 and 2100 respectively. Together they imply declining importance of non-Kyoto forcing over time. There are however significant uncertainties and large differences across models in projected non-Kyoto emissions and forcing. A look into the modeling reveals differences in base conditions, relationships between Kyoto and non-Kyoto emissions, pollution control assumptions, and other fundamental modeling. In addition, under climate policy scenarios, we find air pollution and resulting non-Kyoto forcing reduced to levels below those produced by air pollution policies alone-e.g., China sulfur emissions fall an additional 45-85 % by 2050. None of the models actively manage non-Kyoto forcing for climate implications. Nonetheless, non-Kyoto forcing may be influencing mitigation results, including allowable carbon dioxide emissions, and further evaluation is merited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the role of transport electrification in the broader context of energy system transformation and climate stabilization. As part of the EMF27 model inter-comparison exercise, we employ the MESSAGE integrated assessment modeling framework to conduct a systematic variation of availability, cost, and performance of particular energy supply technologies, thereby deriving implications for feasibility of climate stabilization goals and the associated costs of mitigation. In addition, we explore a wide range of assumptions regarding the potential degree of electrification of the transportation sector. These analyses allow us to (i) test the extent to which the feasible attainment of stringent climate policy targets depends on transport electrification, and (ii) assess the far-reaching impacts that transport electrification could have throughout the rest of the energy system. A detailed analysis of the transition to electricity within the transport sector is not conducted. Our results indicate that while a low-carbon transport system built upon conventional liquid-based fuel delivery infrastructures is destined to become increasingly reliant on biofuels and synthetic liquids, electrification opens up a door through which nuclear energy and non-biomass renewables can flow. The latter has important implications for mitigation costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the synthesis of results from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum Study 27, an inter-comparison of 18 energy-economy and integrated assessment models. The study investigated the importance of individual mitigation options such as energy intensity improvements, carbon capture and storage (CCS), nuclear power, solar and wind power and bioenergy for climate mitigation. Limiting the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration to 450 or 550 ppm CO equivalent by 2100 would require a decarbonization of the global energy system in the 21 century. Robust characteristics of the energy transformation are increased energy intensity improvements and the electrification of energy end use coupled with a fast decarbonization of the electricity sector. Non-electric energy end use is hardest to decarbonize, particularly in the transport sector. Technology is a key element of climate mitigation. Versatile technologies such as CCS and bioenergy are found to be most important, due in part to their combined ability to produce negative emissions. The importance of individual low-carbon electricity technologies is more limited due to the many alternatives in the sector. The scale of the energy transformation is larger for the 450 ppm than for the 550 ppm COe target. As a result, the achievability and the costs of the 450 ppm target are more sensitive to variations in technology availability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fossil resource endowments and the future development of fossil fuel prices are important factors that will critically influence the nature and direction of the global energy system. In this paper we analyze a multi-model ensemble of long-term energy and emissions scenarios that were developed within the framework of the EMF27 integrated assessment model inter-comparison exercise. The diverse nature of these models highlights large uncertainties in the likely development of fossil resource (coal, oil, and natural gas) consumption, trade, and prices over the course of the twenty-first century and under different climate policy frameworks. We explore and explain some of the differences across scenarios and models and compare the scenario results with fossil resource estimates from the literature. A robust finding across the suite of IAMs is that the cumulative fossil fuel consumption foreseen by the models is well within the bounds of estimated recoverable reserves and resources. Hence, fossil resource constraints are, in and of themselves, unlikely to limit future GHG emissions this century. Our analysis also shows that climate mitigation policies could lead to a major reallocation of financial flows between regions, in terms of expenditures on fossil fuels and carbon, and can help to alleviate near-term energy security concerns via the reductions in oil imports and increases in energy system diversity they will help to motivate. Aggressive efforts to promote energy efficiency are, on their own, not likely to lead to markedly greater energy independence, however, contrary to the stated objectives of certain industrialized countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new scenario framework for climate change research envisions combining pathways of future radiative forcing and their associated climate changes with alternative pathways of socioeconomic development in order to carry out research on climate change impacts, adaptation, and mitigation. Here we propose a conceptual framework for how to define and develop a set of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) for use within the scenario framework. We define SSPs as reference pathways describing plausible alternative trends in the evolution of society and ecosystems over a century timescale, in the absence of climate change or climate policies. We introduce the concept of a space of challenges to adaptation and to mitigation that should be spanned by the SSPs, and discuss how particular trends in social, economic, and environmental development could be combined to produce such outcomes. A comparison to the narratives from the scenarios developed in the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) illustrates how a starting point for developing SSPs can be defined. We suggest initial development of a set of basic SSPs that could then be extended to meet more specific purposes, and envision a process of application of basic and extended SSPs that would be iterative and potentially lead to modification of the original SSPs themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scientific community is developing new global, regional, and sectoral scenarios to facilitate interdisciplinary research and assessment to explore the range of possible future climates and related physical changes that could pose risks to human and natural systems; how these changes could interact with social, economic, and environmental development pathways; the degree to which mitigation and adaptation policies can avoid and reduce risks; the costs and benefits of various policy mixes; and the relationship of future climate change adaptation and mitigation policy responses with sustainable development. This paper provides the background to and process of developing the conceptual framework for these scenarios, as described in the three subsequent papers in this Special Issue (Van Vuuren et al., ; O'Neill et al., ; Kriegler et al., ). The paper also discusses research needs to further develop, apply, and revise this framework in an iterative and open-ended process. A key goal of the framework design and its future development is to facilitate the collaboration of climate change researchers from a broad range of perspectives and disciplines to develop policy- and decision-relevant scenarios and explore the challenges and opportunities human and natural systems could face with additional climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new scenario framework facilitates the coupling of multiple socioeconomic reference pathways with climate model products using the representative concentration pathways. This will allow for improved assessment of climate impacts, adaptation and mitigation. Assumptions about climate policy play a major role in linking socioeconomic futures with forcing and climate outcomes. The paper presents the concept of shared climate policy assumptions as an important element of the new scenario framework. Shared climate policy assumptions capture key policy attributes such as the goals, instruments and obstacles of mitigation and adaptation measures, and introduce an important additional dimension to the scenario matrix architecture. They can be used to improve the comparability of scenarios in the scenario matrix. Shared climate policy assumptions should be designed to be policy relevant, and as a set to be broad enough to allow a comprehensive exploration of the climate change scenario space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the scenario matrix architecture that underlies a framework for developing new scenarios for climate change research. The matrix architecture facilitates addressing key questions related to current climate research and policy-making: identifying the effectiveness of different adaptation and mitigation strategies (in terms of their costs, risks and other consequences) and the possible trade-offs and synergies. The two main axes of the matrix are: 1) the level of radiative forcing of the climate system (as characterised by the representative concentration pathways) and 2) a set of alternative plausible trajectories of future global development (described as shared socio-economic pathways). The matrix can be used to guide scenario development at different scales. It can also be used as a heuristic tool for classifying new and existing scenarios for assessment. Key elements of the architecture, in particular the shared socio-economic pathways and shared policy assumptions (devices for incorporating explicit mitigation and adaptation policies), are elaborated in other papers in this special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses three key energy sustainability objectives: energy security improvement, climate change mitigation, and the reduction of air pollution and its human health impacts. We explain how the common practice of narrowly focusing on singular issues ignores potentially enormous synergies, highlighting the need for a paradigm shift toward more holistic policy approaches. Our analysis of a large ensemble of alternate energy-climate futures, developed using MESSAGE, an integrated assessment model, shows that stringent climate change policy offers a strategic entry point along the path to energy sustainability in several dimensions. Concerted decarbonization efforts can lead to improved air quality, thereby reducing energy-related health impacts worldwide: upwards of 2-32 million fewer disability-adjusted life years in 2030, depending on the aggressiveness of the air pollution policies foreseen in the baseline. At the same time, low-carbon technologies and energy-efficiency improvements can help to further the energy security goals of individual countries and regions by promoting a more dependable, resilient, and diversified energy portfolio. The cost savings of these climate policy synergies are potentially enormous: $100-600 billion annually by 2030 in reduced pollution control and energy security expenditures (0.1-0.7 % of GDP). Novel aspects of this paper include an explicit quantification of the health-related co-benefits of present and future air pollution control policies; an analysis of how future constraints on regional trade could influence energy security; a detailed assessment of energy expenditures showing where financing needs to flow in order to achieve the multiple energy sustainability objectives; and a quantification of the relationships between different fulfillment levels for energy security and air pollution goals and the probability of reaching the 2 °C climate target. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Progress towards climate protection has been modest over the past decades despite the ever-increasing urgency for concerted action against global warming. Partly as a response to this, but more directly as a means to promote sustainable development and poverty eradication, the United Nations has initiated a process to promote three global energy objectives: energy access, renewable energy and energy efficiency. Here we discuss the consistency of the proposed energy-related objectives with the overarching climate goal of limiting global temperature increase to below 2 °C. We find that achieving the three energy objectives could provide an important entry point to climate protection, and that sustainability and poverty eradication can go hand in hand with mitigating climate risks. Using energy indicators as the sole metrics for climate action may, however, ultimately fall short of the mark: eventually, only limits on cumulative greenhouse gas emissions will lead to stringent climate protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a systematic scenario analysis of how different levels of short-term 2020 emissions would impact the technological and economic feasibility of achieving the 2 °C target in the long term. We find that although a relatively wide range of emissions in 2020-from 41 to 55 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (Gt CO2e yr−1)-may preserve the option of meeting a 2 °C target, the size of this 'feasibility window' strongly depends on the prospects of key energy technologies, and in particular on the effectiveness of efficiency measures to limit the growth of energy demand. A shortfall of critical technologies-either for technological or socio-political reasons-would narrow the feasibility window, if not close it entirely. Targeting lower 2020 emissions levels of 41-47 Gt CO2e yr−1 would allow the 2 °C target to be achieved under a wide range of assumptions, and thus help to hedge against the risks of long-term uncertainties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than a decade, the target of keeping global warming below 2?°C has been a key focus of the international climate debate. In response, the scientific community has published a number of scenario studies that estimate the costs of achieving such a target. Producing these estimates remains a challenge, particularly because of relatively well known, but poorly quantified, uncertainties, and owing to limited integration of scientific knowledge across disciplines. The integrated assessment community, on the one hand, has extensively assessed the influence of technological and socio-economic uncertainties on low-carbon scenarios and associated costs. The climate modelling community, on the other hand, has spent years improving its understanding of the geophysical response of the Earth system to emissions of greenhouse gases. This geophysical response remains a key uncertainty in the cost of mitigation scenarios but has been integrated with assessments of other uncertainties in only a rudimentary manner, that is, for equilibrium conditions. Here we bridge this gap between the two research communities by generating distributions of the costs associated with limiting transient global temperature increase to below specific values, taking into account uncertainties in four factors: geophysical, technological, social and political. We find that political choices that delay mitigation have the largest effect on the cost-risk distribution, followed by geophysical uncertainties, social factors influencing future energy demand and, lastly, technological uncertainties surrounding the availability of greenhouse gas mitigation options. Our information on temperature risk and mitigation costs provides crucial information for policy-making, because it clarifies the relative importance of mitigation costs, energy demand and the timing of global action in reducing the risk of exceeding a global temperature increase of 2?°C, or other limits such as 3?°C or 1.5?°C, across a wide range of scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Air pollution is increasingly recognized as a significant contributor to global health outcomes. A methodological framework for evaluating the global health-related outcomes of outdoor and indoor (household) air pollution is presented and validated for the year 2005. Ambient concentrations of PM2.5 are estimated with a combination of energy and atmospheric models, with detailed representation of urban and rural spatial exposures. Populations dependent on solid fuels are established with household survey data. Health impacts for outdoor and household air pollution are independently calculated using the fractions of disease that can be attributed to ambient air pollution exposure and solid fuel use. Estimated ambient pollution concentrations indicate that more than 80% of the population exceeds the WHO Air Quality Guidelines in 2005. In addition, 3.26 billion people were found to use solid fuel for cooking in three regions of Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia and Pacific Asia in 2005. Outdoor air pollution results in 2.7 million deaths or 23 million disability adjusted life years (DALYs) while household air pollution from solid fuel use and related indoor smoke results in 2.1 million deaths or 41.6 million DALYs. The higher morbidity from household air pollution can be attributed to children below the age of 5 in Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia. The burden of disease from air pollution is found to be significant, thus indicating the importance of policy interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we discuss the results of 2000-2100 simulations following the emissions associated with the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) with a chemistry-climate model, focusing on the changes in 1) atmospheric composition (troposphere and stratosphere) and 2) associated environmental parameters (such as nitrogen deposition). In particular, we find that tropospheric ozone is projected to decrease (RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP6) or increase (RCP8.5) between 2000 and 2100, with variations in methane a strong contributor to this spread. The associated tropospheric ozone global radiative forcing is shown to be in agreement with the estimate used in the RCPs, except for RCP8.5. Surface ozone in 2100 is projected to change little compared from its 2000 distribution, a much-reduced impact from previous projections based on the A2 high-emission scenario. In addition, globally-averaged stratospheric ozone is projected to recover at or beyond pre-1980 levels. Anthropogenic aerosols are projected to strongly decrease in the 21st century, a reflection of their projected decrease in emissions. Consequently, sulfate deposition is projected to strongly decrease. However, nitrogen deposition is projected to increase over certain regions because of the projected increase in NH emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editors discuss various reports within the issue on topics including the features of the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), the emission inventory used for the RCPs, and the harmonization of greenhouse gas emissions, concentrations and radiative forcing.