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Despite a developing literature exploring the relationship between regulation, taxation and business startups, few studies have utilized artefactual experimental methods to link the choices made by entrepreneurs to an underlying regulatory framework or tax system. Using information collected from a discrete choice experiment where 182 small business owners and entrepreneurs made eight start-up decisions, we describe the effect of state-level government intervention in terms of an entrepreneur's choice to start a business. The design allows the generation of data on entrepreneurial choice of institutional setting for new business formation, which are difficult or impossible to observe in natural settings from surveys. We find that over 80% of entrepreneurs are likely to respond adversely to regulatory and tax legislation such as mandatory licensing, income taxes, and time to register a business. Results confirm that, at least in the short run, highly regulated business environments are less likely to foster entrepreneurial market entry. Additionally, a non-trivial fraction of entrepreneurs will choose not to start a new business, even in the presence of low taxation and regulatory burden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Principles of dissolution science have been applied to allow waiver of in vivo bioequivalence studies for oral immediate release solid dosage forms, providing certain stipulations are met. This approach reduces regulatory burden without sacrificing product quality and performance requirements that assure continuing equivalence. These principles are broadly applicable to other dosage forms and routes of administration. In this article, we postulate a further opportunity, which relies on a determination of 'optimal performance' for nonsolution orally administered drug products. The determination can be applied to certain highly soluble and rapidly dissolving drug products without further study, paving the way possibly for even further reductions in regulatory burden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who has to decide on whether or not to accept it. Earlier papers considered the case when the evaluation is perfect and showed than higher submission fees increase the expected quality of projects submitted for review by discouraging long-shot submissions. We examine the case of two-sided incomplete information where not only the agent's, but also the evaluator's assessment of the project is imperfect. We show that under this specification, an increase in the submission fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its adverse effects on the evaluator's acceptance policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the UK, regulation of clinical services is being restructured. We consider two clinical procedures, abortion and IVF treatment, which have similar ethical and political sensitivities. We consider factors including the law, licensing, inspection, amount of paperwork and reporting requirements, the reception by practitioners and costs, to establish which field has the greater 'regulatory burden'. We test them based on scientific, ethical, social, political factors that might explain differences. We find that regulatory burden borne by IVF services is greater than in abortion, but none of the explanatory theses can provide a justification of this phenomenon. We offer an alternative explanation based on regulatory 'overspill' from research regulation and policy making, conceptualisation of risk regulation and a high public profile that locks a regulator into self-preservation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]